"The Nazi regime depended more on its broad popularity than on terror in the years 1933-9" How far

do you agree with this opinion? Explain your answer using the evidence of Sources 4, 5 and 6 and your own knowledge of the issues related to the controversy. All three sources make reference the use of terror within the Nazi regime, and whilst Evans seems to argue that the sole existence of the regime was based on terror, in reality the opinions of Johnson and Gellately are undeniable more holistic when examining the regime, and support the fact that the Nazi regime did depend more on broad popularity than terror, but that both played an integrated role. There is definite evidence to suggest that broad popularity was indeed more important than terror throughout the years 1933-9. As stated by Gellately - "most people.. had no direct confrontation with the Gestapo.. or the concentration camps", which is further asserted by Johnson who states that terror was used in a "selective nature" - shown by the fact that within Hanover there were a mere 42 Gestapo officers, and so there was not the physical man power available to survey all individuals . Gellately furthers states that even though they had knowledge of the existence of these agencies "there was much popular support" due to the belief it was solely a means of controlling political prisoners, and was a result of the "two way treatment of different sections of the German population" mentioned by Johnson- with any directly opposed to the regime targetted by terror and the vast majority who were not were left relatively alone. This highlights the important of propaganda within the regime to achieve broad popularity, and this idea is further corroborated by Johnson who argues that terror was seen "as something that served their interests" instead of being a means of oppression of the regular German people. This can clearly be seen in the fact that 1.25 million Communists leaflets were confiscated in 1934 alone, and by July 1922 around 26,000 were held as political prisoners, showing that for many people these apparatus of terror were a means of helping the Nazi regime survive, not as a means of controlling the people. However, both Johnson and Gellately fail to attribute the broad popularity to reasons other than the use of terror to oppress political opponents, and neglect factors such as the popular policies that were present that benefitted the people. One example of this is the KdF sponsored holidays - which were enjoyed by around 10 million (one third of the workforce), and programmes such as the 'People's Car' - both of which can be viewed as giving individuals within Germany a better style of living, further increasing popularity. Gellately does however make implicit reference to some of these programmes by mentioning that much of what was heard was heard 'on the radio' -and the selling of radios was further used by Hitler to increase popularity - by 1939 it was estimated to reach around 56 million Germans. Evans makes no reference to the importance of popularity which is highly simplistic, ignoring the highly complex and integrated factors used within the Nazi state, and seems to imply that the Nazi's were only able to survive through the use of terror. However he fails to account for the fact that terror was only directly used on individuals against the regime, and that terror was "never implemented in a blanket or indiscriminate fashion" (as argued by Johnson), and so ignoring the fact that it is probable that for most Germans, popularity was more of a reason to support the regime than terror. However the role of terror cannot be underestimated, it still played a vital role within the German system. Evans makes reference the Nazi's "much wider net of surveillance, terror and persecution" which even included "politically neutral organizations like tax offices", the idea that the Nazi's relied on a vast apparatus of terror is supported by Gellately who mentions "Gestapo, Kripo, concentration

camps... 'People's Court'", outlining the various methods relied upon by the Nazi state. Furthermore although Evans fails to account for the role of popularity he does accurately depict the terror state within Nazi Germany (albeit with some exaggeration about the extent of its reaching), and unlike Johnson who states that the Nazis "ignored or dismissed expressions of non-conformity and the mild disobedience", Evans highlights that all agencies were used to inform "about deviants or dissidents", and so even minor cases of non-conformity could lead to punishment. This is evident in the fact that between 1933-45 around 800,000 individuals were detained for resistance, with such a large number it is clear to see these could not all be active political opposition to the regime, it is likely that many were simply grumbling about the regime and were caught. Furthermore although Evans highlights the "pervasive atmosphere of fear and terror which never slackened" this is contradicted by Johnson who states that "many Germans perceived the terror not as a personal threat". The best explanation for this is given by Gellately who states that "the coercive or terroristic side of Hitler's dictatorship was created by what was passed along", and so implicitly references the atmosphere of fear within the state created by knowledge of the terror being used on individuals even mildly against the regime. This was exacerbated after the Night of the Long Knives in 1934 - the violence used against individuals such as Rohm previously thought to be indispensible to the Nazi regime highlighted to the people that nobody was safe and limited the extent of any form of opposition and resistance, supporting the idea of the worker in Evans who stated that "the Third Reich was fear". In conclusion it is clear to see that Gellately's view of the Nazi regime - although not perfect - most accurately depicts the relationship between terror and popularity, with both playing an important role. Evans exaggerates the need for terror and dismisses the role of popularity, and although Johnson shares similar views to Gellately on the relationship between popularity and terror he fails to attribute some of the terror for use as a means of oppression even mild forms of disobedience, and whilst Gellately makes an implicit reference to the idea that by knowing of the terror the German people conformed out of fear, Johnson seems to believe that the physical punishment was the only real role played by terror in the Nazi state. It is evident that within the Nazi state neither popularity of terror played a sole sovereign role, but it does appear that popularity was the means used to control the masses, and that terror was used to firstly control any dissidence and secondly to cement the idea within the masses that the Nazi party should be supported indefinitely. It therefore shows that popularity was more important than terror in general, but the two factors integrated to give the Nazi regime an absolute control over the people.