Beruflich Dokumente
Kultur Dokumente
Summary Based on Interim Report of the United States Canada Power Outage Task Force November 19, 2003
investigation
plant performance and security Hundreds of professionals on investigation teams performed extensive analysis
Overview
Overview of power system and reliability Pre-outage conditions on August 14 Trigger events and start of cascade Wide area cascade Root causes Next steps
Reliability Overview
Balance generation and demand Balance reactive power supply and demand Monitor flows and observe thermal limits
Coordinators Identified what had tripped and extent of outage Assessed restoration efforts Maintained open line with DOE/FERC Communicated with DHS, White House, and NRC
First days
Assigned project manager Established Steering Group with
industry executive experts Began organizing investigation teams 90+ volunteers + entire NERC staff
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Sequence of Events
Transmission System Performance, Protection, Control Maintenance & Damage Generator Performance, Protection, Controls Maintenance & Damage
Frequency/ACE
NPCC
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problems Identifies changes, conditions, actions, or inactions at each causal step Starts with final event and drills back through each branch of causal tree. Asks why? at each step. Accurate, reliable, defensible understanding of the root causes.
Successfully used to investigate root causes of PJM voltage stability condition in July 1999 and established history in nuclear and defense industries.
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16:06
Initial Focus
Sammis Star Star South Canton Hanna Juniper Chamberlin - Harding Pre-Existing Conditions E.g. voltages, wide- area transfers, line and generator outages, etc.
15:05
14
16
Exports
MW
0
0:00 2:00 4:00 6:00 8:00 10:00 12:00 14:00 16:00 18:00 20:00 22:00
-2000
Imports
-4000
-6000
-8000
16:00
Hour (EDT)
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Heavy wide-area transfers Low voltages, voltage collapse Lack of IPP voltage/reactive support Frequency anomalies Cinergy outages starting at 12:08 East Lake 5 trip at 13:31
Contributing factor to later events, but not by
DPL Stuart-Atlanta trip at 14:02 Contributing factor to loss of MISO real-time monitoring, but not electrically significant 20
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information on lines out in Cinergy then DPL Human error in not resetting SE automatic trigger
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(59 second refresh) FE system data passed normally to others: MISO and AEP AGC function degraded and strip charts flat-lined
process not tested and still in failed condition No contingency analysis of events during the day including loss of East Lake 5 and subsequent line trips
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indicating problems on the FE system but did not recognize evolving emergency
Canton 15:19 AEP calls again confirming Star-S. Canton trip and reclose 15:35 Calls received about spikes seen on system 15:36 MISO calls FE regarding contingency overload on Star-Juniper for loss of Hanna-Juniper 15:45 FE tree trimming crew calls in regarding Hanna-Juniper flashover to a tree PJM called MISO at 15:48 and FE at 15:56 regarding overloads on FE system
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Chamberlin-Harding (3:05:41)
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Chamberlin-Harding Indication of Ground Fault Due to Tree Contact as Measured by DFR at Juniper
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(3:05:41)
Hanna-Juniper (3:32:03)
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Hanna Juniper Confirmed as Tree Contact at Less than Emergency Ratings of Line
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(3:05:41)
(3:32:03)
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ONTARIO
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Outages
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Dale-W.Canton 138 kV
16:05:55 EDT
15:51:41 EDT
Cloverdale-Torrey 138 kV
15:32:03 EDT
80
60
40
140
120
% of Normal Ratings
100
20
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Sammis-Star (4:05:57.5)
38
39
1600
1200
Flows (MW)
800
400
Harding - Chamberlin Line Trip
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370 Harding - Chamberlin 345 kV Line Trip 350 Hanna - Juniper 345 kV Line Trip
Gaps in Data Records
100% Voltage
Voltage (kV)
Star
290
Star - South Canton 345 kV Line Trip Sammis - Star 345 kV Line Trip
270
250 15:00
Time - EDT
16:00
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Remaining Paths
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Northern Ohio and Eastern Michigan Served Only from Ontario after 4:10:37.5 4:10:38.6 PM
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Eastern Eastern Michigan (Detroit) Unstable Voltage and Frequency Collapse and Pole Slipping
Ontario Michigan Interface Flow and Voltages Beginning 16:10:38
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Conditions at Niagara Indicate Progressively Worsening Stability Conditions with Prior Events
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Frequency in Ontario and New York during Breakup Niagara Generation Stays with Western NY
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contingencies occurred because it did not have an effective contingency analysis capability FE did not have effective procedures to ensure operators were aware of the status of critical monitoring tools FE did not have effective procedures to test monitoring tools after repairs FE did not have additional high level monitoring tools after alarm system failed
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error. MISOs flowgate monitoring tool didnt have real-time line information to detect growing overloads MISO operators couldnt easily link breaker status to line status to understand changing conditions. PJM and MISO ineffective procedures and wide grid visibility to coordinate problems affecting their common boundaries
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Next Steps
U.S./Canada Power Outage TF hearings Public hearings to allow comment on report and input on recommendations
December 4 December 5 December 8 Toronto
NERC next steps NERC executive committees December 11 NERC committees meet January 13-14 Continue investigation
Near term analysis and recommendations in support of U.S. Canada Task Force Long term analysis and recommendations for NERC
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