MODERNISATION OF THE PLA

RESTRUCTURING OF THE PLA

 The PLA restructuring was an obvious fall out of the

changing doctrinal evolution. The two elements which guided the
restructuring process where new military thinking and investing in
the advanced hardware. The understanding also dawned that it was
not sufficient to invest only in the land forces. The Navy and the
Air Force was an essential asset to take China into the twenty first
century as a military superpower. Thus began the downsizing of
the army and modernization of the PLA in totality. It would be
pertinent, when discussing the modernization of PLA, to include
the three armed forces, the aero space advancement, the
Information warfare and nuclear aspect. The restructuring was
carried out under the following principles :-
 RESTRUCTURING OF THE PLA
 The restructuring should help make the army capable of offensive
attack in depth.
 The restructuring must be guided by the theory of combined
operations.
 It must place due emphasis on electronic warfare at the tactical
level.
 It should prepare the combined units for both a high-tech
conventional war and a tactical nuclear war.8
 THE BEGINNING
 The restructuring process of the PLA began in 1975 when Mao
Zedong entrusted Deng Xiaoping with the every day affairs of the CMC.
The CMC implanted a three year plan to reduce the force from 6.1
million to 4.5 million. The army was reduced by 32 percent, the
strategic missile force by 27.2 percent and the staff itself by 32.2
percent.9 The second stage of reduction was delayed by the Tiananmen
incident, which began in 1992. In this stage nearly 30 percent reduction
took place. In 1998 third major effort was taken to trim the PLA by
nearly 50,000 officers. The purpose of these cutting were saving money
and enhancing social stability.

 Army modernization has the least priority amongst the three

services. The aim being, to reduce numbers and increase the
technological enrichment of the Army. The manpower reduction will
restructure the force into:-
 A small number of hi-tech forces for flexible use in regional
contingencies.
 A large number of forces equipped with low-to-medium
technology weapons for internal security.
 A nuclear force to maintain a viable deterrent against other
nuclear powers.10
 After the Sino Russian Bilateral Force Reduction Agreement in
1998, the deployment of the army has focused on the Southeast area
of the mainland. The force level at present is 24 Group Armies (GA),
divided into six Military Regions (MR),11 viz. Shenyang, Beijing,
Jinan, Nanjing, Chengdu and Lanzhou regions. The focus in the
modernization process had been to modernize and train selected
formations, known as the ‘Fist Units’ or ‘Rapid Reaction
Formations/Units’. The rationale of forming these RRF/RRUs is
drawn from the fact that the emphasis in the new modernization
programme is on ‘Quality Building’. These units are being trained on
the following aspects :-

 Surprise attacks on enemy command and control centres.

 Disrupt enemy supply lines and distribution system.
 Interrupt enemy lines of communication.
 Perturb enemy lines of communication.
 Conduct armed reconnaissance behind enemy lines.
 Cooperate with tactical and operational air assault in the course of
Group Armies’ main engagement.
  Deploy forward observation teams to guide long range artillery
strikes and air support.
 Organise and coordinate guerilla activities with the militia.
 According to an OC 1993 Jane’s Defence Weekly report,
China’s first step towards this was the converting the 15 Airborne
Army’s three brigades into divisions to augment their rapid response
capability. The brigade sized forces were considered too small for
combat missions hence the upsizing to division sized forces. The
Chinese RRF is composed of airborne units and light infantry units. It
is equipped with light weapons and depends entirely upon air
transportation. The RRF is expected to react rapidly to border disputes,
minority rebellions and political violence.
MODERNISATION OF INFANTRY WEAPONS
 China has concentrated on indigenizing weapon manufacture.
The China North Industries Corporation (NORINCO) and China
Precision Machinery Export & Import Corporation (CPMEIC) with 157
factories in China manufacture most of the infantry weapons as also
aspire to be a major exporter of weapons. The focus of modernization
was on improving battlefield survivability, enhanced firepower, targeting
systems, cross wind sensors and third generation night sights, The
earlier Soviet weapons were phased out. The 5.56 automatic rife M16A1
and the Schmel personal fuel-air-explosive (FAE) projectors were built.
The flame throwers gave a very potent rocket grenade against
emplacement.
 MODERNIZATION OF ARMOUR
 China produces various tanks like T-54, T-59, T-69, T-79, T-80,
T-85 and T-90. Since 1997, China has been pursuing improvement in
the fire control systems in the BMP-3. NORINCO has developed the
Type 90 II tanks with reactive armour. The latest tank models also have
greater speed, endurance, improved accuracy and night vision
capabilities. The APC type 90 and WZ 551 have improved armour
plating, higher power to weight ratio and longer ranges. China has also
purchased the Russian BMD-3 airborne infantry fighting vehicle.
 MODERNISATION OF ARTILLERY
 NORINCO developed a “ Super Range Rocket” which can fire
406 rockets with a range of 360 km in addition to howitzers of 122mm,
130 mm, 152 mm, 155 mm, and 203 mm calibers. The CPMEIC has
developed multi-barrel rocket launchers like A 100 (300 mm) which can
fire 10 different rockets at ranges of 50-100 km in 60 seconds. The latest
acquisitions are the Smerch Multiple-Launch Rocket System and
Kitolov laser guided artillery round. It has also purchased the Tor-MI
(SA-15) SAM system to enhance its air defence capability.
 THE PLA NAVY (PLAN)
 In the 1990’s Admiral Liu Huaqing outlined his expansive
maritime vision, including advocacy of access to the Indian Ocean, and
especially propagating his thesis of China building a sea faring blue
water Navy. An aircraft carrier force was described by Liu as extremely
necessary to guard China’s sea lanes as it emerged as a major trading
country and this had to come to symbolize China’s ‘blue water’
ambitions13. This resulted in a protracted and inward-looking land-
warfare-centreed strategy based on mobilization of society to a new
thinking and strategy of forward deployment, employing smaller forces
which were to be trained to operate in areas remote from the Chinese
mainland.
 Under this expansive vision of Admiral Liu, China’s navy was
expected to develop a green-water first-island-chain operational reach
by 2000, blue-water second-island-chain by 2020, and develop a
world-class fleet by 2049, the twenty first century maritime vision
was underlined by Admiral Shi Yunsheng, by highlighting that, in the
new era, China’s naval priorities will be to develop :-
 An offshore defence strategy.
 A strong navy with science and technology.
 More advanced weapons systems.
 Well trained and more qualified personnel.
 The PLAN Naval AF, 7000 marines and 40,000 conscripts.
PLAN has to protect 18000 km of coastline, 32 ports, sea lanes of
communication (SLOC), maritime interest, and project power in
pursuance of National interest of China. PLAN is controlled through
Naval HQ, which is subordinate to the CMC through the General Staff
Department. Many naval elements appear to be under dual
subordination, necessitating inter-services co-ordination. The PLA is
organized into three fleets (North Sea Fleet, East Sea Fleet and South
Sea Fleet), Marines and the PLANAF. The headquarters of the fleets
exercises operational control in their respective areas, overall afloat
forces, naval air units, and the shore elements of coastal defence
including base, shipyard and training facilities.
 UPGRADATION OF EQUIPMENT
 Submarines China has acquired four kilo class conventional
submarines from Russia, including two of the most advanced version of
the kilo class project 636, which have advanced stealth features,
advanced technology in torpedoes, sonar quieting counter measures, and
hull construction.
 Combat Ships
 Acquisition of 2 x Russian Sovremenny class destroyers
fitted with SSN 22 (Sunburn) SSMs, which will be PLAN’s
largest ships. These would enhance China’s long range
offensive and sea denial capability.
 4 x Jiang Wei frigates have replaced Jianghu class
frigates. Two more frigates are under induction.
 New Houjien and Houxian missile patrol crafts and Dayun class re-
supply vessels have joined the fleet.
 Designed to specialize in antisurface warfare in close
cooperation with submarines, Sovermenny/kilo team operating in
conjunction with Air Force fighters and AWACS would
significantly increase PLAN’s ability to blockade any littoral
island state.
 Naval Cruise Missiles. Alongwith the Sovermeny class
destroyers, PLAN has acquired about 30-50 missiles of SSN-22
(Sunburn) SSMs. The 162-mile version has the capability to manoeuvre,
which would make it difficult for the point defence phalanx gun system
to intercept. It is also capable of low level, high speed evasive
maneuvers.
 Marines. The Marines have the capability of amphibious
combat and high mobility. Establishment of the Chinese Marine Corps
signaled the PLA’s quest for a power projection capability. The Corps
was at its peak in 1998 with strength of 56,000 before it was
mysteriously and drastically reduced. The Marine Corps has routinely
participated in combined training on islands in the Western Pacific and
South China Sea. One refueling on reserves the Marine’ strength will
increase to 8 divisions (including 24 infantry, 8 tank and 8 artillery
regiments). Two tank regiments and Army divisions have also been
assigned the amphibious role.
 Naval Doctrine. The PLAN doctrine flows out of the ‘National
Doctrine of Active Defence’. It provides for ‘Defence Close to the
Ocean’ replacing the earlier doctrine of ‘Defence Close to the Coast’. It
necessitates improved firepower in an offshore conflict, maintenance of
effective control over SLOC, and the conduct of warfare in waters
adjacent to Chinese territory.
 PRESENT AND FUTURE PLANS
 The PLA Navy is the third largest in the world and the largest
maritime force in Asia with a total of 2,68,000 personnel, 1350 surface
combatants, more than 100 submarine and about 500 aircraft which
constitute this navy. However, the fleet is unbalanced. Its major vessels
(S/M’s and major combatants) make up only 10% of the total. The
remainder consists of Patrol Craft, Mine-warfare vessels and amphibious
ships.
 China is divided into seven Military Area Commands (MAC).
The geographic extant of each of these zones is such that each covers a
single particular (perceived) threat area. Similarly the PLA-N fleet
disposition is organised such that each is responsible for a particular
geographic threat area.
 MODERNISATION OF SUBMARINE FORCES
 Conventional Submarines. The modernisation of the PLA-N’s
conventional submarine force includes: -
 Series production of the indigenously developed Type
039 Song class submarines, capable of launching C-801/C-802
series of anti-ship missiles (ASMs).
 Acquisition of a further two Russian-built Project 636
Kilo class submarines to complement the current four Kilo class
boats in service.
 Nuclear Attack Submarines. In 1997 the United States
Department of Defence reported that a new SSN, known as the Type
093, was reported under construction. It was reported that the first of
class would be in service by 2005, and a second vessel by 2007. The
Type 093 is expected to be an improved version of the current Han class
and be capable of firing ASMs.
 Surface Combatants. The PLA Navy is following a two-track
approach in order to modernise its operational capabilities. This two-
track approach comprises: -

 Training. The PLA-N has increased emphasis its training

programmes, especially joint warfare programmes, so as to
maximise the effectiveness of its existing equipment. It has also
begun to operate farther away from home waters and has
embarked on goodwill cruises to the United States, the
Philippines, Australia, New Zealand, Malaysia, Thailand and
Pakistan.
 Acquisition and Construction of New Platforms. No
matter how much training is conducted, the PLA-N will be
limited if it does not update its current force of surface
combatants. The purchase of an additional four Sovremenny
class destroyers from Russia will go someway towards achieving
a balanced fleet, however these purchases must be complemented
by further development of the Luhu and Luhai classes if she is to
achieve a creditable deterrence against the United States, Taiwan
or Japan..
 AMPHIBIOUS WARFARE
 Ships. While scaling down its older classes of amphibious vessels,
China commissioned nine Yuting class tank-landing ships in the 1990s.
These 4,800 ton (full load) ships have the capacity to carry 250 troops,
10 tanks and each carry four Landing Craft Vehicle Personnel. The
rationale behind the continuing modernisation of China’s amphibious
forces is that China must maintain a creditable force with which she
could invade Taiwan, should Taiwan ever declared her independence.
 Manpower. PLA manpower available for amphibious operations
has been enhanced since the mid-1990s. Apart from the 5,000-strong
No.1 Marine Brigade (based in Yulin), the PLA has three divisions
trained in amphibious operations, thus making a total of 30,000 troops
available for amphibious operations. With a lift capacity of under
10,000 troops, it would be expected that China’s merchant fleet would be
available to augment the PLA-N. Such a force would require
considerable escort, a task currently beyond the capability of the PLA-N.
THE PLA AIR FORCE (PLAAF)
MODERNISATION OF EQUIPMENT OF PLAAF
 China’s acquisition of Russian combat aircraft’s and Israeli
combat air technology is pushing China’s Air Force (PLAAF) closer to
the goal of all weather, power projection Air Force. China has emerged
out as third largest aircraft produced in the world producing six types of
aircraft.
 MODERN FIGHTERS AND ATTACK AIR CRAFTS
 In 1996 China purchased 22 additional SU 27s from Russian ie.
in addition to the 24 purchased earlier in 1991.
 Deal contracted with Russia to co-produce SU 27s. This will
enhance PLAFF combat capabilities sharply. Approx 150 SU-27s are to
be produced in Shenyang at the rate of 10-15 ac per year.
 SU 27s have been fitted with two Sarbtisya ECM pods that can
automatically detect and jam hostile radar signals. The electronic sub
systems are being improved.
 China is pursuing a major domestic fighter development
programme, the most ambitions being the J-10 multi role fighter. Flight
tests had begun in Mar 1998. Approx 300 such aircraft’s will be built
eventually. Deal contracted with Russia to co-produce SU 27s. This
will enhance PLAFF combat capabilities sharply. Approx 150 SU-27s
are to be produced in Shenyang at the rate of 10-15 ac per year.
 MODERN FIGHTERS AND ATTACK AIR CRAFTS
 China is discarding J-5, J-6, IL-28 and other older aircraft to
induct J-7, J-8, A-5, H-6, (TU-16) aircraft’s. China is undertaking
indigenous development of super-7, FC-1, FC-1 (CCA), F-8, XJ stealth
fighter, B-7 FGA, and SU-27 aircraft’s.
 China is pursuing a major domestic fighter development
programme, the most ambitions being the J-10 multi role fighter. Flight
tests had begun in Mar 1998. Approx 300 such aircraft’s will be built
eventually. Deal contracted with Russia to co-produce SU 27s. This
will enhance PLAFF combat capabilities sharply. Approx 150 SU-27s
are to be produced in Shenyang at the rate of 10-15 ac per year.
 China is discarding J-5, J-6, IL-28 and other older aircraft to
induct J-7, J-8, A-5, H-6, (TU-16) aircraft’s. China is undertaking
indigenous development of super-7, FC-1, FC-1 (CCA), F-8, XJ stealth
fighter, B-7 FGA, and SU-27 aircraft’s.
 ADVANCED MISSILES AND MUNITIONS
 Along with SU 27s, China has also acquired the Vympel
(AA-11) R-73 air to air missile. This confers a 120 degree field of view,
helmet mounted sight, and a range of 18.6 miles.
 Development of helmet mounted sight to guide PL-9 air to air
missile has been completed. This would be fitted on J-7, and
subsequently on other fighters.
 Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS). China has
procured six to eight Search Water airborne early warning radar systems
for fitting it on its J-8 transport aircraft, which at higher altitudes would
give the radar a range of 200 miles. Two Y-8s (AN-12) have been
modified for Airborne Early Warning. PLAAF is also planning to
modify four IL-76s in Israel, which would be fitted with Phalcon
Radome System.
 Air to Air Refueling. Initially China had modified H-6 bombers
to enable refueling of J-8 II fighters, thereby extending their range from
430 miles to 630 miles. In 1998 China has procured 4 x IL 76 refueling
tankers which can refuel the SU 30s and extend their radius from 932
miles to 1615 miles. At a 600 miles radius IL 76 can carry enough fuel
to refuel at least 6 x SU 27s or SU 30s. This capability will give
additional operating range to her fighter and bomber aricraft’s, which
will be able to threaten land targets upto Ambala and Patna, our island
territory and SLOC, as well as pose nuclear threats to mainland of India
using strategic bombers.
 Transport Fleet. In 1996 China purchased additional 12 x IL
76 to boost up its existing strength of 10 x IL 76 and 10 x TU 154
Transport ac. The fleet is considered insufficient to move a large army
formation and its equipment.
 Helicopters.
 25 x Z-8 (Super Feion) and Z-9 (Daulphin) are being
produced indigenously.
 24 x MI 17 acquired from Russian.
 24 x S-70 C (Sikorsky) Black Hawak helicopters have
been acquired.
 Air Defence. PLA has procured 144 missiles with launchers of
SA-10 Grumble (S-300P), and raised one AD Brigade
 NEW EQUIPMENT IN THE PIPELINE.
 100 x SU27 fighter aircraft in knocked down condition, and 150
x SU 27 to be manufactured under license.
 Agreement for purchase of 50 x SU-30 fighter aircraft signed in
Apr 97.
 D-4 RPV, B2 Radio controlled target Drones. Z-5 Multipurpose
RPVs and turbojet powered unmanned aircraft Changkong IC (CKIC).
 Phazotron Radars-200. China claims to have developed OTH-B
radar and acquired AN/ UPD-4 Ground mapping radar.
 Argus -2000 radar is to be fitted on IL-76 by UK to convert it as
AWACS.
 Air to air refueling aircraft technology/kits-unspecified quantity.
 3 x IL-76 were modified in 1995. Now 5 x Y -8 ac have been
modified for the same.
 J-10 AND Super-7 (FC-1 being developed indigenously by
Chengdu Aircraft Industry. Production of F-10, a multi role aircraft, is
likely to commence by 2003
 AIR CRAFT CARRIER PLANS
 The exact progress of China’s aircraft carrier progress is
unknown. Reports over the last ten years that China intends to build an
aircraft carrier have proved unfounded. And while some commentators
argue that the construction of the 9,700-ton multi-role ship Shichang is
an indicator of future plans for an aircraft carrier, its limited aviation
facilities belie this rumour. Nevertheless, if China wishes to achieve her
goals of a blue-water navy with global reach, an aircraft carrier must
form part of the equation. Noting China’s small step-by-step progress in
warship production thus far, it would be unlikely that China would jump
straight to the big time and construct a 50,000 to 60,000 ton ship. It is
more likely that a smaller design would be chosen, and the fact that the
president of the Spanish shipbuilder Bazan (builders of Thai Navy’s
carrier) was unsuccessful in his ‘sales pitch’ to PLA-N officials would to
indicate that China does not, in the near term, wish to acquire an aircraft
carrier.
CHINAS NUCLEAR CAPABILITY
 DELIVERY SYSTEMS
 China is the only developing nation to have developed the
complete triad of Nuclear Weapons delivery stems. She has of
late began concentrating her effort on developing a survivable
submarine based strike capability, however she has been troubled
by extremely slow progress in the development of her indigenous
nuclear submarine.17
 STRATEGIC FORCES
 The Chinese strategic forces comprise the following :-
 ICBMs. The Chinese have a maximum of thirty ICBMs
which are silo-based. Under development is a mobile MIRV
vehicle launched ICBM. Besides this they have approximately a
hundred IRBMs and MRBMs.
 Strategic Bombers. The Chinese have 120 H-6s and
some TU-4 bombers. These are old slow-flying and vulnerable
air craft of Soviet origin. However if at least one of these aircraft
will be able to survive the enemy air defence cover, the aim
would have been achieved. The newly procured Su-27 provides
a more potent threat with their 2000 km reach.
 Submarines. The Chinese have one nuclear powered
‘Xia” class submarine which carries 12 SLBMs of 2000 kms
range. A program to develop a better variant is on.
 TACTICAL FORCES
 The Chinese have developed small tactical warheads which can
be fitted to aircraft bombs, to artillery shells or small SSMs. The exact
number of tactical nuclear warheads is not known.
 CLASSIFICATION OF MISSILES
 China classifies her missiles as per a system different from that
followed by the rest of the world. This has enabled her to twist the
provisions of the Missile Technology Control Regime to her
advantage18. The Chinese system is as under:-
 Short range. Range less than 1000 kms.
 Medium range. Range from 1000 to 3000 kms.
 Long Range. From 3000 to 8000 kms.
 Intercontinental. Exceeding 8000 kms.
 STRATEGIC MISSILES
 The Chinese have developed and deployed four classes ob
ballistic missiles and are currently developing the fifth type. These have
been given the generic name of Dong Feng (meaning East Wind) by the
Chinese and CSS (meaning Chinese Surface to Surface) by the West.
 SSMs
 China has also developed a number of tactical ballistic missiles.
While these have the capability of delivering a nuclear warhead and
while China has developed very low yield nuclear warheads, there are no
reports of the two being integrated. This missiles series is referred to in
the West as the “M” series. The operational versions are known as M7,
M9, M11 and M12. Their details are as under :-
 M7. Also called CSS-8, it delivers 190 kg warhead for 150
kms. It has been supplied to Iran.
 M9. This missile is similar to the Soviet SS-23, delivers a
single warhead of approx 500 kg over a range of 600 kms and is
carried on it’s own Transporter-Erector-Launcher (TEL). It has
been supplied to Syria.
 M11. The M11 is an M9 variant having a range of 290 to 300
kms. This missile is analogous to our Prithvi but carries an 800
kg warhead. It has been supplied to Pakistan.
 SSMs
 M12. This missile is a solid propellant missile similar to the M11
but has a range of 120 kms only. This may be an improvement of the
M7 class.
 M18. Nothing is known of this missile except that it is under
development.
 THE CHINESE MISSILE PROGRAMME
 The Chinese began work on delivery systems along with the
development of Nuclear Weapons systems. In the fifties and early
sixties the US and later the USSR could target any point the Chinese
mainland whereas the Chinese did not even have a nuclear Weapon. The
Chinese decided to develop the complete triad of delivery systems-
namely, the ICBM, the SLBM and the aircraft. Accordingly the CMC
established the Fifth Academy to conduct research and development in
rocketry sciences. By 1960 the Chinese had developed a short range
ballistic missile and by 1964 they had the Nuclear Weapon.
 MODERNISATION PROGRAMME FOR MISSILES
 Second Artillery Corps. A sustained modernization programme for the PLA
strategic forces continues, with a view to improve their accuracy and survivability.
New Cruise, ballistic and anti missile systems are being developed.
 Ballistic Missile. China is presently modernizing its ICBM force
estimated to consist of 4 to 18,8000 km range DF-5 liquid fuel ICBMs. DF-41
with a range of 12000 km and 800 kg payload is likely to replace DF-5. DF-31
with an 8000 km range and 700 kg payload is also expected to be operational
soon. Both of these missiles are likely to incorporate multiple independently
targeted re-entry vehicle (MIRV) technology. Amongst the tactical ballistic
missiles systems DF 25 with a range of 1700 km is being improved to 2000
km with a payload of 2000kgs. Other tactical missiles include DF-15/M-9
with 600km range and DF-11/M-11.
 Cruise Missiles. The second Artillery Corps and PLA are not yet
armed with strategic cruise missiles. However land attack cruise missile for
theatre and strategic missions have high priority for development.
 China is know to be trying out combined GPS/Inertial, and Tercom
guidance system for cruise missiles.
 Anti Missile, Anti Satellite & Space Warfare. China has
produced HQ-9 surface-to air missile. This missile would be useful
against cruise missiles and may at least have a potential for limited anti-
tactical ballistic missile (ATBM) capability. China has shown interest in
the improved S-300 PMU2 Favosit, which features a longer-range
missile. Longer range phased array radar, improved ECCM, and the
ability to hit both cruise and ballistic missiles is being developed. China
has also invested heavily in anti satellite and space warfare programmes.
 The Ballistic Missile –Theater Ballistic Missile Defence
Imbroglio. There is a far cruder, but very specific, way in which China
is attempting to ensure its relevance in regional security. The PLA
excels in very few warfare areas, but one of them is its arsenal of short-
and medium-range ballistic missiles-primarily (but not necessarily)
tipped with conventional warheads.
 China has offered almost every conceivable argument against the
development and deployment of theater ballistic missile defence
(TBMD).
KOREA: SEEING DOUBLE AND ENJOYING THE VIEW
 Chinese leaders are cautious about the process of change on the
Korean Peninsula and the implications of that impending change for
China. Despite outward composure, Beijing is increasingly concerned
by the developments in North Korea, a concern undoubtedly intensified
by the history of disruptions to China’s security and stability that have
originated in Korea. Chinese leaders are troubled that Pyongyang
remains deaf to its suggestions for reform and more rational conduct-
advice given with Asian gentility in the hope that it can be accepted
more readily than if delivered with Western bluntness.
 Delicately Balanced Dual Relations. Beijing has been
particularly attentive to, and ingenious in, its relationships with its two
near neighbors, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) and
the Republic of Korea (ROK).
 Nuclear Weapons in Korea – and the Japan Link.
Chinese officials say that China wants a stable, nonnuclear Korean
Peninsula. Beijing has expressed a preference for a Korean Peninsula
nuclear-free zone. It wants a peninsula void of weapons of mass
destruction (WMD) and the means to deliver them.
KOREA: SEEING DOUBLE AND ENJOYING THE VIEW
 Learning to Like Multilateralism. In April 1996, Seoul and
Washington proposed talks to include North Korea, South Korea, China,
and the United States. Beijing was initially quite reticent about these
Four-Party Talks, as they came to be known. Eventually, Chinese
leaders urged a reluctant Pyongyang to accept the proposal and agreed to
participate themselves.
 Prognosis. China expects to enter the next century with a divided
Korea composed of a crippled North and an economically recovering
South. It expects that the Chinese economy will continue to benefit
from trade and investment from South Korea.
 Taiwan Complications Intrude Again. As in so many other
aspects of China’s regional security situation in the coming years, the
issue of Taiwan is inescapable. If the Taiwan issue remains unresolved,
and especially if it remains volatile.
 PLA CAPABILITIES IN THE 21ST CENTURY :
HOW DOES CHINA ASSESS ITS FUTURE SECURITY NEEDS ?
 With the Asian financial crisis and the floods in China. It hardly seems urgent
to address the future war fighting capabilities of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA).
But China’s military planners are patient, long-term strategic thinkers, so despite the
current problems, I will still provide some comments on the topic. This chapter is
divided into six sections. Its purpose is to present a “net assessment” of how China
may see its future military capabilities.
 Section One continues a discussion, begun in the introductions, about errors to
be avoided in estimating future Chinese military capabilities. Section Two describes
the way that the open sources of information available in China assess the future
security environment, including the likelihood of war and the future trends in military
capabilities of the major powers. Section Three narrows the focus of this chapter to
China’s quantitative estimates of Comprehensive National Power (CNP) for 2010 and
2020, based on books by the Academy of Military Science and the Academy of Social
Science, including a discussion of why some Chinese analysts claim these national
power “scores” can predict the outcome of future warfare. Section Four identifies
debates among the Chinese military about long-term modernization goals. Section Five
lists China’s military investment allocation priorities and attempts to link some of these
investment decisions to the defence debate, suggesting that the shape of the PLA by
2020 can be affected a great deal by the debate among the three schools. Section Six
describes how Chinese military authors assess future American military capabilities to
defend South Korea and Taiwan and to pursue a potential Revolution in Military
Affairs (RMA). Easily offended or highly nationalistic American readers should skip
this section.
 PLA CAPABILITIES IN THE 21ST CENTURY :
HOW DOES CHINA ASSESS ITS FUTURE SECURITY NEEDS ?
 What are some of the key issues in understanding what China’s military
capabilities may be in the first 2 decades of the 21st century? In spite of the hazards of
straight-line projections of China’s current forces to 2010 or 2020, many still use this
estimative methods to arrive at a picture of future capabilities. This chapter argues that
it is also important to know in detail the objectives that China’s leaders seek to pursue
through military modernization. Happily, Western analysts of the Chinese military may
have a better chance to get right the issue of China’s modernization goals than whether
China’s military technology programs will succeed. After all, China leaders continue
to proclaim the validity of Sun Tzu and to repeat Deng Xiaoping’s guidance tao guang
yang hui (conceal our capabilities and bide our time). China is unlikely to raise its
level of transparency by inviting the U.S. defence attaché to visit the research and
development (R&D) programs in fields such as counter-stealth radar, laser weapons,
electro dynamic railguns, anti-satellite interceptors, precision guided missiles, and
many other weapons designed to focus on U.S. vulnerabilities. I believe that its is
relatively easy to determine that China lacks items on the Military Critical
Technologies List, but by paying attention to Chinese open sources, especially books
and professional journals that deal with long-term future modernization goals, we can
make some sound judgments about China’s Military future.
CHOOSING AMONG ESTIMATIVE METHODS
FOR CHINA’S FUTURE CAPABILITY
 This chapter concludes that China’s future military capabilities will be based
on factors that are impossible to estimate beyond 2010. Some of these factors cannot
even be estimated accurately today. They include quantitative estimates of the
fundamentals of military power such as the future size of China’s defence budget, its
future industrial base, its access to advanced military technology, and “non-equipment”
factors such as the quality of its future officer corps. Of course, it is possible to
estimate that a certain specific Chinese force structure may come into existence by
2010 by using straight-line projection. Even though this is and error-prone estimative
method, it is quick and simple and perhaps can fool the gullible who have no idea how
their own nation makes defence modernization decisions. For example, an intelligence
analyst could simply use the current numbers of Chinese ships, tanks, aircraft, and
other key indicators, then multiply these units by China’s growth rate (say, 8 percent a
year), perhaps adding a few new weapons systems known to be in development and
retiring a few judged to be obsolete by 2010. Indeed, some in the U.S. intelligence
community used such an approach on the Soviet Union for many years, even when it
produced incorrect results. The erroneous assumption is that China is on “autopilot” in
pursuing its military modernization. A more likely assumption is that China’s leaders
will debate and adjust their military programs (perhaps many times) between now and
2020. If so, then we must try to understand these debates and these adjustments rather
than straight –lining, or making up long lists of obstacles that the Chinese can “never”
overcome.
 CHOOSING AMONG ESTIMATIVE METHODS
FOR CHINA’S FUTURE CAPABILITY
 In a book published in 1998, a much better and more realistic
approach than straight-lining has been suggested by John Culver who
wisely points out that “most prudent analysts of the Chinese military rule
out very few scenarios.”2 Culver’s recommended approach proceeds
from two important facts. First, he states that,
. . . a survey of analytical documents prepared by the U.S. intelligence
community over the past decade reveals a tendency towards “optimistic”
assessments of developmental weapons programs or changes in the force
structure of the Chinese military.
 CHOOSING AMONG ESTIMATIVE METHODS
FOR CHINA’S FUTURE CAPABILITY
 In other words, American analysts have tended to overestimate
China’s capability to improve its forces and should be cautious not to
repeat this mistake. This chapter argues that one factor in China’s slow
modernization has been a debate among the military leaders about their
goals, a debate that includes at least three “schools” of thought, three sets
of scenarios for future warfare China may face, and three corresponding
preferences for defence allocations. Unfortunately, in spite of the
evidence of these Chinese “schools,” some specialists continue to impute
“ unified rational actor” decision-making to China as if Graham Allison,
the Kennedy School of Government, and the seminal book, Essence of
Decision, never existed.
I also agree completely with John Culver’s second point, namely
that,
. . . in the course of examining the spectrum of development possibilities
of the Chinese military in the next 10 to 20 years, two possibilities at the
extreme end of the spectrum stand out: China could continue to make
halting progress. . . or, China could break completely with the past and
exhibit unprecedented abilities to integrate a new level of technology
into its military. Either of these development trends is possible ( as are
any number of alternatives failing between these points on the
development spectrum. . .
 CHOOSING AMONG ESTIMATIVE METHODS
FOR CHINA’S FUTURE CAPABILITY
 Culver’s prudent view of the range of choice that China faces
suggests a potential policy challenge. The United States and other major
powers (especially Japan and Russia) will have influence ( if they wish
to apply it ) to shape China’s future military capability. Along with
Henry Kissinger, Culver and I and many others are impressed by the
wide range of future Chinese military capabilities that may
hypothetically develop in the next 10 to 20 years. Kissinger recently
pointed that American options will not be lost by failing to confront
China soon:
Undoubtedly, if China continues to grow at the rate of the past 20 years,
it will become perhaps the most powerful country in Asia. Its impact on
its neighbors would magnify. But do we really want a showdown now . .
.? (W)ere Beijing, at whatever juncture, to pursue hegemonistic policies
it would have to contend around its borders with many states of
considerable strength. A wise America could forge a determined
resistance among them.
 TWO COMMON ERRORS IN ESTIMATIVE
METHODS
 Unfortunately, Culver’s views are not universally held, inside or outside the U.S. Government.
Many analysts of Chinese capabilities are overly ( perhaps obsessively) concerned with identifying the
obstacles that China faces in developing its future military capabilities to the exclusion of finding factors that
will help China’s military modernization. It sometimes seems to me that some analysts of the Chinese
military try to outdo each other to see who can imagine the most potent obstacles that China cannot possibly
overcome for “decades.” Strangely, perhaps for half-conscious ideological reasons, these same analysts shy
away from considering even the most obvious benefits and advantages that China may enjoy as a
technological latecomer. They seem to ignore that Japan, in the economic field in the 1950s and 1960s,
benefited from catching up from behind. Excessively dwelling on the obstacles that China faces and
ignoring China’s advantages as a technological later comer is a serious error. Analysts who doubt that
obstacles can be overcome should read General Mi Zhenyu’s book, National Defence Development Strategy,
which lists the latecomers’ advantages and urges China to exploit them. It seems to me rather strange for
some analysts to display an almost cocky certainty that they can identify so well the obstacles to China’s
modernization and can identify so few advantages, especially in light of China’s well-known secrecy about
military affairs. As Ambassador James Lilley told the Senate Intelligence Committee on September 18, 1997:
The other thing that clouds the issue is the Chinese superb practice of deception-when capable, feign
incapacity. This is the way they operate. They’ll throw up smoke screens. They’ll take your to backward
factories. They’ll lead you down the garden path, and you’ll always get some gullible person coming back
saying their military is backward. For example they’ll use obsolete tanks. That’s because that’s what the
Chinese wanted them to see.
 TWO COMMON ERRORS IN ESTIMATIVE
METHODS
 Analysts of the Chinese military who make long lists of obstacles
are bad enough, but I fear more those analysts who neglect or even
completely ignore the intentions and policy preferences of the Chinese
military leadership. To estimate China’s future military capabilities, it
seems to me that a basis starting point should be to understand what
China’s leaders think they ought to try to develop. There is an especially
perverse version of this error. It is committed by analysts who
apparently assume the Chinese leadership to be robots in lockstep,
incapable of disagreeing with each other about what goals for military
modernization should be pursued. In one of the most useful analytical
findings in many years, Dennis Blasko pointed out in 1996 that there
seemed to be no Chinese Doctrine of Local War, in spite of the fact that
quite a few Western analysts had been proclaiming a “new” doctrine of
Local War for a decade. A similar major contribution was made by Ellis
Joffe in The Chinese Army After Mao, when he shrewdly warned
analysts of the Chinese military that there had been no formal
termination or epitaph for Chairman Mao’s doctrine of People’s War, but
that it had evolved in a very Chinese manner into something quite
different.
 TWO COMMON ERRORS IN ESTIMATIVE
METHODS
 What is the solution to the shortcomings of estimative methods?
Are straight-line projections the only solution? Should we keep piling up
examples of obstacles? Can we ever learn what doctrine and goals are
guiding China’s military modernization? Despite China’s veil of secrecy,
two modest steps may be worth consideration: greater example of open
sources and greater comparison of China with other cases, including
historical cases.
SECTION ONE: U.S. DEFENCE DEPARTMENT
NET ASSESSMENT
 What is strategic or net assessment? Does China do it differently
than the United States? Net assessment is sometimes confused with
intelligence analysis of foreign forces and international trends. The
difference is that net or strategic assessment is an analysis of the
interaction of two or more national security establishments both in
peacetime and in war, usually ourselves and a potential enemy. It is the
interaction of the two belligerents that is the central concept, not an
assessment of one side alone.
 A number of lessons form U.S. experience may help understand
how China performs strategic assessment. They practice of strategic
assessment in the U.S. Department of Defence in the past 25 years has
been dived into the following six categories of studies and analyses:
 efforts to measure and forecast trends in various military
balance such as the maritime balance, the Northeast Asian
balance, the power-projection balance, etc.;
SECTION ONE: U.S. DEFENCE DEPARTMENT
NET ASSESSMENT
 Assessments focused on weapons and force comparisons with
efforts to produce judgments about military effectiveness ;
 Historical evaluations of lessons of the past;
 Analyses of the role of perceptions of foreign decision-makers and
even the process by which foreign institutions make strategic
assessments;
 The search for quantitative analytical tools; and
 Identifying competitive advantages and distinctive competencies
of each side’s military force posture, highlighting important trends that
may change a long-term balance, identifying future opportunities and
risks in the military competition, and appraising the strengths and
weaknesses of U.S. Forces in light of long-term shifts in the security
environment. This sixth form of study is the ‘net assessment’ approach.
 SOURCES OF ERRORS IN STRATEGIC
ASSESSMENT
 In historical analysis, it is possible to examine what the senior
leaders on each side did to “assess” the outcome and nature of the
coming wars in the time prior to their outbreak. In fact, a widely praised
explanation for the causes of war is precisely that the strategic
assessments of opposing sides where in conflict prior to the initiation of
combat- one side seldom starts a war believing in advance it will lose.
Thus, we may presume there are almost always miscalculations in
strategic assessments according to the nature of the national leadership
that made the assessment . China may make its own miscalculations, and
we should be alert to this possibility.
 An insightful set of seven historical examples of strategic
assessment in 1938-1940, which was produced for the Office of Net
Assessment of the Office of the Secretary of Defence, has identified a
number of serious assessment errors in Britain, Nazi Germany, Italy,
France, the Soviet Union, the United States, and Japan. A number of
lessons drawn from these examples are relevant to any effort to
understand how the Chinese leadership conducts strategic assessment of
its future security environment.
 SOURCES OF ERRORS IN STRATEGIC
ASSESSMENT
 First, it is a mistake to examine static, side-by-side, force-on-
force comparisons of numbers of weapons and military units without
trying to analyze the way these weapons and units would actually
interact in future combat. The static use of counting numbers and units
was at fault in the French military assessment of potential German
attack in 1939. The military balance, measured in quantitative terms
between the German forces opposite France and the French forces
involved in that theater, was almost equal, even slightly favoring France.
The armored fire power of France and its allies exceeded that of the
Germans by one-third. Force-on-force comparisons used by the French
before the war did not reveal that (1) that Germans would achieve a four-
to-one advantage by massing forces in the sector in which they achieved
a break through, (2) the Germans could
make rapid, deep penetrations to destroy rear areas in France, and (3) the
German air force would completed neutralize French air power and
achieve absolute air superiority. Only a strategic assessment focusing on
the qualities of the interaction of the two belligerents would give any
indication of the outcome of the war.
 SOURCES OF ERRORS IN STRATEGIC
ASSESSMENT
 Second, the failure to define correctly who will be a friend and
who a foe in wartime is critical to the outcome. Therefore, the question
of international alignments or alliances cannot be ignored. Professor
Paul Kennedy points out that Britain’s pre-war planning completely
failed to identify the role the Soviet Union could play as a second front
in the war against Hitler. The French error was similar : French security
thinkers failed to consider the scenario that Germany might first conquer
France’s East European allies, eliminating France’s alliance, before
attacking France directly.
 SOURCES OF ERRORS IN STRATEGIC
ASSESSMENT
 Third, it is a mistake to deduce from an opponent’s peacetime
training exercises, published military doctrines, and peacetime military
deployments what may be the way forces actually conduct themselves
in a protracted war that goes beyond the original plan of war because
the longer a war, the more time for factors involving the entire national
society and economy to be brought into play and the less important the
initial deployments, doctrines, and plans. Professor Stephen Rosen of
Harvard University had found that, between August 1939 and June 1940,
the U.U. Navy senior leadership’s strategic assessments of the adequacy
of U.S. Military capabilities paid little attention to how a future war
might unfold. It mainly satisfied U.S. Navy peacetime criteria, using
simple comparisons of the number of U.S. Navy and Imperial Japanese
Navy ships”. . . (with) no sense of the possible wartime interaction
between the two fleets let alone between the two nations.”
 SOURCES OF ERRORS IN STRATEGIC
ASSESSMENT
 Fourth, it is mistake to mirror image the assumptions of
other nations. As Andrew Marshall wrote in 1982 about
assessing the former Soviet Union.
A major component of any assessment of the adequacy of the
strategic balance should be our best approximation of a soviet-
style assessment of the strategic balance. But this must not be
the standard U.S. calculations done with slightly different
assumptions . . . rather it should be, to the extent possible, an
assessment structured as the Soviets would structure it, using
those scenarios they see as most likely and their criteria and ways
of measuring outcomes. . . the Soviet calculations are likely to
make different assumptions about scenarios and objectives, focus
attention upon different variables, include both long-range and
theater forces (conventional as well as nuclear), and may at the
technical assessment level, perform different calculations, use
different measures of effectiveness, and perhaps use different
assessments may substantially differ from American
assessments.
 SOURCES OF ERRORS IN STRATEGIC
ASSESSMENT
 A fifth mistake is geographic scope or “big picture” problems.
U.S. errors in the period between the two world wars were “big picture”
problems. Although the United States eventually developed fire
alternative scenarios (RAINBOW I to V ), it initially mistakenly
believed it had only one potential enemy in the Pacific (Japan) and
therefore assumed that, because of the Anglo-Japanese alliance of 1904,
the United States might be forced to fight England in the Atlantic. Then
with the rise of Hitler, 15 years of American assessments had to be
discarded when the strategic focus shifted to winning first in Europe,
while staying on the defensive in the Pacific.
 A sixth mistake may be to neglect open sources. The most
relevant comparison for better understanding China from among these
pre-World War II case studies may be the study of the secretive Soviet
Union of 1940. As Professor Earl Ziemke describes Soviet secrecy in
1940:
The Soviet net assessment process cannot be directly observed. Like a
dark object in outer space, its probable nature can be discerned only
from interactions with visible surrounding. Fortunately, its rigidly
secret environment has been somewhat subject to countervailing
conditions . . . . Tukhachevsky and his associates conducted relatively
open discussion in print.
 SOURCES OF ERRORS IN STRATEGIC
ASSESSMENT
 Ziemke’s description of the Soviet assessment process resembles
in a few ways the Chinese process, including the “ open discussion in
print” of some assessment issues. It is apparent from Ziemke’s account
of the way in which Soviet strategic assessment was performed in the
1930s that a number of similarities, at least in institutional roles and the
vocabulary of Marxism-Leninism, can also be seen in contemporary
China. The leader of the Soviet Communist Party publicly presented a
global strategic assessment to periodic Communist Party Congresses.
The authors of the military portions of the assessment came from two
institutions which have counterparts in Beijing today and were
prominent in Moscow in the 1930sl the General Staff Academy and the
National War College. Another similarity was that the Soviet
Communist Party leader chaired a defence council or main military
committee and, in these capacities, attended peacetime military exercises
and was involved in deciding the details of military strategy, weapons
acquisition, and war planning. As the leader of a party based on
“scientific socialism,” the leader was expected to pronounce openly the
Party’s official assessment of the future. Sensitive details obviously had
to remain secret, but open sources could provide at least an outline of the
assessment.