These slides have been edited for release only to those with AKO access.

PLEASE NOTE THE FOLLOWING: --These edited AKO slides are a rough guide to class flow, and are not a full substitute for the classroom session. --They have been redacted for copyright and file-size reasons. Thus they lack most of the pictures and other graphics seen in the classroom slides.

INFANTRY BOLC-B GUERILLA WARFARE HISTORY, AND BATTLE ANALYSIS

MCoE DIRECTORATE OF TRAINING

Dr. Douglas N. Campbell Military History Instructor Ft Benning, GA Bldg 4, Rooms 3308 PHONE: 706-626-2402 E-MAIL: douglas.n.campbell.civ@mail.mil

Enter Infantry School OES into AKO Search; pick the URL that says the same; then select IBOLC folder; then the History folder; & then the Delta Co 7-12 Battle Analysis Guide file (or D
Co 7-12 BA Source or Guerilla War History Lesson)

GUERILLA WARFARE HISTORY AND BATTLE ANALYSIS TLO: Analyze selected guerilla war campaigns and battles. TLO: Write a battle analysis that describes and analyzes a selected battle.

TRADOC Says
Topical History: Guerilla Warfare (Insurgency)

GUERILLA WARFARE TLO: Analyze selected guerilla war campaigns and battles. ELO: Define guerilla warfare

GUERILLA WARFARE
--Military or paramilitary operations conducted in enemy-held or hostile territory by irregular, predominantly indigenous forces (often associated with insurgency)

--Irregular warfare favors the war of the flea: indirect and asymmetric (e.g., unconventional) approaches, though it may employ the full range of military & other capacities

CONVENTIONAL vs. UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE

--Conventional warfare implies direct military confrontation between regular armed forces, in which the enemys armed force or specific war-making power is targeted. --Unconventional warfare includes subversion, raids, robberies, ambushes, assassinations, sabotage, spying, and rescue conducted most often by irregular forces or by specially trained regulars.

GUERILLA WARFARE
TLO: Analyze selected guerilla war campaigns and battles.
ELO: Define guerilla warfare

ELO: Identify the main currents of guerilla warfare history.

GUERILLA WARFARE

TLO: Analyze selected guerilla war campaigns and battles.

ELO: Define guerilla warfare

ELO: Identify the main currents of guerilla warfare history.

GUERILLA WARFARE IS NOT NEW

GUERILLA WARFARE IS NOT NEW

Indeed, in analyzing guerilla success or failure, we see repeated themes from early through modern times . . . .

Guerilla Success --Will & Popular support

Algerian citizens support urban guerilla war against French Army

GUERILLA WARFARE IS NOT NEW

Indeed, in analyzing guerilla success or failure, we see repeated themes from early through modern times . . . .

Guerilla Success
--Over-stressed &/or bad govt/army
The French execute Spanish rioters and help spark the guerilla war in Spain. Americans tar and feather British tax collector.

GUERILLA WARFARE IS NOT NEW

Indeed, in analyzing guerilla success or failure, we see repeated themes from early through modern times . . . .

Guerilla Success
--Charismatic, and/or opportunistic leaders
Carolinas Marion Irelands Collins
Yugoslavias Tito

Cubas Castro

GUERILLA WARFARE IS NOT NEW

Indeed, in analyzing guerilla success or failure, we see repeated themes from early through modern times . . . .

Guerilla Success
--Discipline / organization / prep
Viet Cong cadre

--Intimidation / terror / provocation

Suicide bombers Tamil leader Velupillai Prabhakaran

GUERILLA WARFARE IS NOT NEW

Indeed, in analyzing guerilla success or failure, we see repeated themes from early through modern times . . . .

Guerilla Success
--Favorable environment
The Afghan countryside

--Sanctuary
--OUTSIDE HELP
Allied commando teams help the French Resistance.

GUERILLA WARFARE IS NOT NEW

Indeed, in analyzing guerilla success or failure, we see repeated themes from early through modern times . . . .

Guerilla Success
--Surprise w/light, mobile, flex forces --Asymmetric ops; war of the flea
American Patriot ambush Afghan Mujahedeen ambush

GUERILLA WARFARE IS NOT NEW

Indeed, in analyzing guerilla success or failure, we see repeated themes from early through modern times . . . .

Guerilla Success
--Mixed forces

Viet Cong guerillas

NVA regulars

--Timing

Warsaw Jews must go it alone in 1943, and get crushed.

Germans in 1944 Paris face an uprising and Allied armies.

AND COUNTER-INSURGENCY (COIN) / COUNTER-GUERILLA OPS ARENT NEW EITHER

RECURRING COIN / COUNTER-GUERILLA THEMES IN HISTORY

COIN / C-G Success --AIM / focus / will --Leadership / legitimacy --Popular support
(And if youre using allies, this applies BOTH to you and to the ally.) Philippine Defense Minister Ramon Magsaysay greets supporters as Huk Rebellion subsides, 1953.

RECURRING COIN / COUNTER-GUERILLA THEMES IN HISTORY

COIN / C-G Success --Organization (of the whole effort) / discipline
Briggs, Thompson, and Templar get Britains Malayan COIN effort under control -and then get the Malayan Insurgency under control.

RECURRING COIN / COUNTER-GUERILLA THEMES IN HISTORY

COIN / C-G Success --Deny aid & sanctuary -- isolate
Building the Morice Line which cut guerilla traffic in Algerian War Successful coastal blockade, Philippine War

Successful geographic, ethnic, and strategic hamlet isolation, Malayan Insurgency

RECURRING COIN / COUNTER-GUERILLA THEMES IN HISTORY

COIN / C-G Success
U.S. Army Apache scouts

--Divide & conquer; oil stain

Enlisting Filipino scouts for the US Army, Philippine Insurrection

British blockhouse, Boer War

RECURRING COIN / COUNTER-GUERILLA THEMES IN HISTORY

COIN / C-G Success --Intell, Surprise --Light, mobile, flexible forces
Britains Orde Wingate and his Special Night Scouts help suppress the 1930s Palestinian Uprising: Ambush the ambushers and raid the raiders. Seminole guide and Army scouts, Second Seminole War

RECURRING COIN / COUNTER-GUERILLA THEMES IN HISTORY

COIN / C-G Success

--Violent force, but judiciously

--Conciliation

Petraeus

Kilcullen

--Terms
Sons of Iraq with US and Iraqi soldiers

SOME GUERILLA WAR / INSURGENCY READINGS

--Asprey, Robert. War in the Shadows (encyclopedic history of g-war) --Beckett, Ian. The Roots of Counter-Insurgency --CSI Publications has several works that address insurgency/COIN: http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/csi/csipubs.asp --Fall, Bernard. Street without Joy, and The Two Vietnams --Galula, David. Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice --Hammes, The Sling and the Stone --Horne, Alistair. A Savage War of Peace (Algerian War) --Joes, Anthony. Various works (mostly on COIN) --Kilcullen, David. The Accidental Guerilla --Laqueur, Walter. Guerilla Warfare (dated, but still a nice survey) --Marston and Malkasian. Counterinsurgency in Modern Warfare --Moyar, Mark. A Question of Command --Nagl, John. Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife --ONeill, Bard. Insurgency and Terrorism --Poole, H. John. Various works (popular guides) --Record, Beating Goliath --Taber, Robert. War of the Flea --Van Creveld, The Transformation of War

SOME AFGHANISTAN READINGS

--Brooks. Eyewitness to War Volume III: US Army Advisors in Afghanistan (interviews)
http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/cgsc/carl/download/csipubs/EyewitnessToWar_Vol umeIII_Brooks.pdf

--Coll, Steve. Ghost Wars: The Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan, and Bin Laden, from the Soviet Invasion to September 10, 2001 --Courter, Jeff. Afghan Journal: A Soldiers Year in Afghanistan --Crile, George. Charlie Wilson's War --Feifer, Gregory. The Great Gamble: The Soviet War in Afghanistan --Grau, Lester. The Soviet-Afghan War: How a Superpower Fought and Lost; and The Bear Went over the Mountain: Soviet Combat Tactics in Afghanistan --Grau, Lester, and Ali Ahmad Jalali. The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen in the Soviet-Afghan War --Jones, Seth. In the Graveyard of Empires: Americas War in Afghanistan --Junger, Sebastian. War --Koontz, Christopher, ed. Enduring Voices: Oral Histories of the U.S. Army Experience in Afghanistan, 2003-2005 http://www.history.army.mil/html/books/enduring_voices/index.html

SOME AFGHANISTAN READINGS (cont.)

--Loyn, David. In Afghanistan: Two Hundred Years of British, Russian, and American Occupation --MacPherson, Malcolm. Roberts Ridge --Maley, William. The Afghanistan Wars --Matthews, Matt. An Ever Present Danger: A Concise History of British Military Operations on the North-West Frontier, 1849-1947 http://www.cgsc.edu/carl/resources/csi/csi.asp#global (scroll down to it) --Matthews. We Have Not Learned How to Wage War There (Soviet experience)
http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/cgsc/carl/download/csipubs/MatthewsOP36.pdf

--Naylor, Sean. Not a Good Day to Die: The Untold Story of Operation Anaconda --Potter. American Advisors: Security Force Assistance Model in the Long War
http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/cgsc/carl/download/csipubs/AmericanAdvisors.pdf

--Rasheed, Ahmad. (Two books) Taliban, and Descent into Chaos --Roe, Andrew. Waging War in Waziristan: The British Struggle in the Land of bin Laden, 1849-1947 --Rubin, Barnett. The Fragmentation of Afghanistan --Saikal, Amin. Modern Afghanistan: A History of Struggle and Survival --Tanner, Stephen. Afghanistan: A Military History from Alexander the Great to the Fall of the Taliban

SOME AFGHANISTAN READINGS (cont.)

--Tupper, Benjamin. Greetings From Afghanistan, Send More Ammo --US Army Combat Studies Institute. Wanat: Combat Action in Afghanistan, 2008 http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/csi/csipubs.asp (and then scroll down), or http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/cgsc/carl/download/csipubs/Wanat.pdf --West, Bing. The Wrong War: Grit, Strategy, and the Way Out of Afghanistan --Woodward, Bob. Obamas Wars --Wright, Donald, et al. A Different Kind of War: The US Army in Operation Enduring Freedom, October 2001-September 2005 http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/csi/docs/DifferentKindofWar.pdf --Wright, Donald, ed. Vanguard of Valor: Small-Unit Actions in Afghanistan
http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/cgsc/carl/download/csipubs/VanguardOfValor.pd

OH BY THE WAY, OTHER SOURCES --Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) website and its on-line library http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/call/archives.asp --US Army Center for Military History (CMH) on-line publications http://www.history.army.mil/bookshelves.html --US Army Combat Studies Institute (CSI) Press on-line publications http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/csi/csipubs.asp --US Army History and Education Center (AHEC; formerly Military History Institute) holdings http://www.ahco.army.mil/site/index.jsp

GUERILLA WARFARE TLO: Analyze selected guerilla war campaigns and battles.
ELO: Define guerilla warfare ELO: Identify the main currents of guerilla warfare history. ELO: Recognize noteworthy guerilla warfare campaigns of the premodern era

ELO: Recognize noteworthy guerilla warfare campaigns and analyze selected guerilla warfare-related battles of the modern era, 1700s up to ~1900

BLACK MINGO SWAMP Swamp near Black River 14 September, 1780 Marions raid against isolated British Loyalist (Tory) outpost Patriot militia leader Francis Marion v. Tory leader John Ball ~1,500 Patriot militia v. ~800 Tory militia

BLACK MINGO SWAMP

Preliminaries
--Aggravated locals support Marions rapid, mounted move --Night, multi-axis attack --Too much noise crossing a bridge --Tories alerted; Marion presses the attack.

BLACK MINGO SWAMP

Battle Summary 14 September 1780

--Dismounted frontal attack fails against intense Tory fire. --Dismounted right-flank attack falters, then rallies. --Left-flank mounted attack delivered with vigor. --Tories panic and run.

BLACK MINGO SWAMP Analysis

Characteristics of the Offense

--Surprise --Concentration --Audacity --Tempo

THE PHILIPPINE WAR, 1899-1902

FOR THE U.S., A CLASSIC COIN SUCCESS

--Political commitment in spite of controversies --Naval blockade: isolate enemy & deny aid --Outposts & small-unit interdiction Environmental awareness --Filipino constabulary: Isolate, Intell --Aid, and conciliation politics Political factors, Legitimacy, Awareness

So with the Philippine War apparently winding down, A small-unit leader counter-insurgency problem arises . . . .

BALANGIGA MASSACRE Isolated village on south coast of Samar Island 28 September 1901 --A local Filipino reaction to US Army companys bad policies as Army tries to subdue rebellion on Samar Island --CPT Thomas Connell v. Valeriano Abador, village chief --US Army, ~75 troops of C Company, 9th Infantry Regiment v. ~500 townspeople and rebels

BALANGIGA MASSACRE Preliminaries

--Cultural unawareness --Villagers and rebels plan well --Clever placement of attackers fools lax Army security

BALANGIGA MASSACRE 28 September 1901 Battle Summary / Result

--Pre-arranged signal strikes Army soldiers at breakfast
--Most guards eliminated by quick overwhelming attack.

--FOB overrun; Connell and half of company killed; the rest escape.

BALANGIGA MASSACRE 28 September 1901 Analysis METT-TC --Mission --Enemy --Terrain/Weather --Troops/Support --Time Awareness --Civil Considerations

GUERILLA WARFARE TLO: Analyze selected guerilla war campaigns and battles.
ELO: Define guerilla warfare ELO: Identify the main currents of guerilla warfare history. ELO: Recognize noteworthy guerilla warfare campaigns of the premodern era ELO: Recognize noteworthy guerilla warfare campaigns and analyze selected guerilla warfare-related battles of the modern era, 1700s up to ~1900

ELO: Recognize noteworthy guerilla warfare campaigns and analyze more recent guerilla warfare-related battles.

GUERILLA WARFARE IN WW2

--Worked best mixed ops / outside help --Timing was very important.

ROUGEMONT Small village east-northeast of Paris, rolling terrain 27 August 1944

ROUGEMONT Small village east-northeast of Paris, rolling terrain 27 August 1944 --Attempted French Forces Interior (FFI, Resistance) ambush of retreating German units as Allies advance --Attempted French Forces Interior (FFI, Resistance) ambush of retreating German units as Allies advance --Captains Godfrey Marchant and J. Chaigneau (Jedburgh advisors), Major Dumont-Guillemet (FFI) v. German commanders --Jedburgh 3-man team & ~200-300 FFI v. elements of Panzer Lehr and 9th Panzer Divisions

ROUGEMONT Preliminaries --FFI picks good ambush site --FFI amateurs v. German professionals --FFI poor armaments, & poor intell about targets

ROUGEMONT 27 August 1944 Battle Summary / Result --FFI is discovered and outgunned by German armor.

--Blocking force allows most FFI to escape, and then flees from further German armored attacks.
--Ambush fails

ROUGEMONT Analysis (w/some Prelims & Summary) Warfighting Functions --FFI picks good ambush site --FFI amateurs v. German professionals --FFI poor armaments, & poor intell about targets

--Mission Command
--Fires

--Intell
--Movement & Maneuver --FFI discovered and outgunned by German armor. --Blocking force allows most FFI to escape; then flees

--Protection
--Sustainment

The American Experience in Vietnam (1961-1973)

We would not accept a communist Southeast Asia.

AMBUSH AT PHUOC AN Rice-paddy area near small village complex in Quang Ngai Province, Evening, 18 June 1967 --Part of campaign to disrupt and interdict Viet Cong operations against nearby Chu Lai air base --SGT Lloyd Jones, squad leader) v. Viet Cong (VC) patrol --US Army, 2d Squad, 2d Platoon, C Co, 3d Bn, 21st infantry, U.S. 196th Light Infantry Bde (10-man squad) v. VC patrol (~6+ troops)

AMBUSH AT PHUOC AN 18 June 1967 Preliminaries --Intell on VC activity near villages --Small teams with a mix of weapons (including claymore mines) and night-vision gear --Positioned near trail junction & accounts for flanking threats

CLAYMORE M16 M79 Viet Cong

AMBUSH AT PHUOC AN Battle Summary / Result

--About 6 VC approach; 4 enter the kill zone and stop. --Jones detonates claymore to initiate ambush & prevent premature detection

--VC pt-man mortally wounded

--General firing; VC scatter; firing VC supporting fire suppressed --Per ROE, no IDF support due to nearby village --2 confirmed VC KIA. Success?
CLAYMORE M16 M79 Viet Cong

AMBUSH AT PHUOC AN 18 June 1967 Analysis Warfighting Functions --Command & Control --Fires --Intell --Movement & Maneuver --Protection --Sustainment

--Small teams with a mix of weapons (including claymore mines) and night-vision gear
--Positioned near trail junction & accounts for flanking threats --Jones detonates claymore to initiate ambush & prevent premature detection --General firing; VC scatter; firing VC supporting fire suppressed --Per ROE, no IDF support due to nearby village --2 confirmed VC KIA. Success?

BEFORE WE GET TO THE SOVIET AND US EXPERIENCE IN AFGHANISTAN, LETS LOOK AT ITS MODERN HISTORY

INSURGENCIES in AFGHANISTAN
--Afghanistan ---It appeared as a political entity in the 1700s. ---It even briefly flourished as a small empire. ---But it struggled to remain whole. WHY?

A TOUGH PLACE
--We know the land is rugged. --What justified an attempt to control the entire area? --We have men and we have rocks in plenty, but we have nothing else. -- Dost Muhammad First Afghan War leader

A TOUGH PLACE
--Breeds isolated, tough, and independent-minded people --Pashtunwali (the Pashtuns ethical guide: hospitality, justice/vengeance; bravery; group loyalty; religion; personal dignity; womans dignity) --Intense group loyalty for all Afghans; & zan zar zamin: land, money, women: what any Afghan will allegedly fight for if provoked re same =A different concept of honor from what many in the West call honor, but a strong sense of it nonetheless --Religion: conservative, & revivals

But for all of that, outsiders still like to meddle . . . .

--The Great Game with Russia drove British influence in Afghanistan in the 1800s-early 1900s.

INSURGENCIES in AFGHANISTAN: First Anglo-Afghan War, 1839-42

--The underlying cause of the First Anglo-Afghan War was Britain and Russias Great Game struggle for control/influence in Central Asia. Britain incorrectly perceived that Afghan ruler Dost Muhammad had allied himself with Russia; and thus in 1839 the British Army entered Afghanistan via the Bolan Pass through Kandahar, up through Ghazni (after an excellent reduction of Ghaznis fort), and then on to Kabul. Muhammad fled (later surrendered) and the British emplaced an apparently more favorable leader, Shah Shujah, on the throne. But there was no local enthusiasm for Shujah, and the British Armys Sepoy troops were uneasy about fighting outside of India proper.

INSURGENCIES in AFGHANISTAN: First Anglo-Afghan War, 1839-42 (cont.)

--The British hoped to secure peace through bribes and manipulation of the disparate tribes, but their leaders made judgment errors. They withdrew most of their best troops to India. The remaining British general in Kabul, Wm. Elphinstone, was a weak leader and deferred too much to the arrogant civil governor, Sir Wm. MacNaghten. MacNaghten decided that, with Afghanistan apparently tranquil, the British Kabul garrison could be moved from the imposing Bala Hissar fortress to a low cantonment area a few miles away.
--Also, the British brought families, spurring culture clashes over things like womens status. British troops fraternization with Kabuli women infuriated Kabuli men. A British attempt to build an Afghan Army at the tribes expense engendered more ill will; and MacNaghtens manipulative tactics failed to quell it.

First Anglo-Afghan War, 1839-42 (cont.) --Rebellions against the British started outside Kabul. A British column returning to India had to fight its way through the Khyber Pass in autumn 1840. Rebellion then erupted in Kabul in late 1841. The British response was weak and disorganized. The supposedly reliable Shah Shujah increasingly favored the rebels.

--Rebellion escalated. By early 1842, Britains Kabuli force was in dire straits and Elphinstone accepted a rebel offer of an amnesty retreat east to Jalalabad. Undisciplined rebel groups attacked the procession anyway; and except for Dr. Wm. Brydon, all British were either killed or captured.

First Anglo-Afghan War, 1839-42 (cont.) --Britains response was brutal. In summer 1842, GENs Wm. Nott and George Pollock advanced through the Bolan and Khyber Passes, and crushed all direct opposition. They also rescued the remaining available captives. --But the British did not stay because: (a) they did not want the extra commitment; and (b) they achieved an understanding with the previous ruler, Dost Muhammad, that he would regain the throne and ally with them and not the Russians.

Second Anglo-Afghan War, 1879-80

--The Second Anglo-Afghan War repeated the first one somewhat. Upset over Afghan ruler Sher Ali Khans apparent friendliness with the Russians, the British occupied much of the country in 1879 and forced Alis successor, Muhammad Yaqub Khan, to sign a treaty granting Britain various privileges. One of these was an expanded British mission in Kabul, which was massacred later that year in a Kabuli uprising after the British Army returned to India.
--The returning British Armys punitive expeditions occasionally struggled with Afghan forces (e.g., Maiwand), but they mostly drubbed their opponents in conventional battles and regained general control of key areas. Suspecting Yaqub of complicity in the massacre of the mission, the British allowed Abdur Rahman to take power.

Second Anglo-Afghan War, 1879-80

--As with the first war, the British did not want to spend money and resources occupying Afghanistan permanently. Indeed, a newly elected British government under Wm. Gladstone wanted no overt imperial expansion in that area. Instead they wanted and got a more compliant Afghan leader who, in return for ample British subsidies, would maintain some order and not let the Russians gain an advantage.

--Subsequent treaties set Afghan boundaries close to what exist today. The most notorious is the Durand Line, which mostly follows the southern mountain range crest but also splits many Pashtun mountain tribes between two national jurisdictions.
--Neither the Afghan leaders nor the British colonial authorities ever completely controlled the people in the Durand Line area. The British bought some order via bribes and the occasional punitive raid (e.g., see Churchills The Story of the Malakand Field Force http://www.gutenberg.org/etext/9404).

INSURGENCIES in/near AFGHANISTAN

Post-Durand Agreement --Afghan struggles for full independence & with modernity
Amanullah Khan, 1919-1929, secures greater Afghan sovereignty, but is overthrown for pushing reforms which upset tribal and religious order. Habibullah Kalakani, 1929, the ex-soldier and exbandit who briefly ran Afghanistan after Amanullahs overthrow Nadir Shah, 19291933, the officer who stabilized the country somewhat by nullifying most of Amanullahs reforms

Accelerating Modernization and Upheaval

Zahir Shah 1933-1973 Daoud Khan 1973-1978 Nur M.Taraki 1978-1979 Hafi. Amin 1979-1979
B. Karmal

1979-1986

--Zahir Shah continued his father Nadirs moderate approach, but Daoud Khan and especially the communist leaders who succeeded him wanted to compel accelerated change. Afghan politics became unstable and bloody as communist factions vied for control.

Zahir Shah and the new Great Game

--Moderate reform --US & USSR rentier state: superpower aid is a major source of Afghan GDP as Zahir plays the rivals. The Soviets give more aid, and with it comes unfortunate influence within Afghanistan --Pakistan (arguments over the Durand Line border and the fate of the Pashtun tribes split by same. Beset with border problems with its larger neighbor and bitter rival India, Pakistan rejects Afghan proposals to give Pahstun territory to Afghanistan or to create a Pashtunistan) --Cousin Daouds big ideas to accelerate Afghan modernization sparks his overthrow of Zahir.

Daoud Khans Fatal Waltz with Modernity, 1973-1978

--Factional resistance, as usualsome of it in the university that Daoud promotes as part of modernization. Also, some Afghans dont like his ruthless approach to reform --Pakistan: occasional arguments over the border; and to make things hot for the pesky Afghans, Pakistan supports the rebel activities of one of the university radicals, Gulbuddin Hekmatyar --Misunderstandings with the Afghan communist allies who helped him seize power. They dont like his distancing himself from them and their even bigger plans for Afghanistan. =They kill him in the overthrow

The Communist Regime to the mid 1980s

--Communism/modernity forced hard on Afghans ---Sweeping socio-political reforms ---Max coercion --Communist factions roughly match Afghan tribal divisions --Top-level rift within a faction = another bloody overthrow
Nur M.Taraki 1978-1979 Hafi. Amin 1979-1979
B. Karmal

1979-1986

--Enter the Soviets & their idea about leadership

SO WHY DID THE SOVIETS GO THERE in LATE 1979?

--To reinforce an unstable client & pre-empt any U.S. involvement

--Aging Soviet leaders goofed the assessment of the place

---Assumed more support: decades of Soviet aid

---Brought a military designed for conventional European warfare, not a mountain insurgency.

Soviets, 1979-1985:
--Afghan Army defections --Hearts & minds? Nahhh, Drain the sea. --Questionable will, focus; ---Low #s (<120,000) ---Bad support ---Morale & disease (!?) --Some special/small-unit air-mobile ops, but still too conventional

--Resource advantage to wear down insurgents BUT not enough to win outright

Mujahideen, 1979-1985:
--Wouldnt give up --Sanctuary & increasing aid --Tactics good & bad (they use terrain and stealth well, but often attack
Soviet mech infantry columns instead of more vulnerable targets)

--Cannot eject Soviets --Divided force: There were factions within the factions. =Stalemate

Soviets VS. VS. Hekmatyar VS. Massoud

DOBANDI AMBUSH, Paktia Prov., evening in May 1987 Trail exiting mountains unto high desert plain

--Soviet attempt to interdict Mujahideen rat line from Gardez toward Kabul --Commander Haji Sahak v. Soviet ambush team leader
--31 Mujahideen v. ambush team from 108th Motorized Rifle Division or 103rd Airborne Division

From Lester Grau and Ali Ahmad Jalali, The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War

DOBANDI AMBUSH May 1987 Preliminaries --Mujahideen check before committing supplies --Dispersed march formation

--Soviet ill-defined, open-ended kill zone

From Lester Grau and Ali Ahmad Jalali, The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War

DOBANDI AMBUSH May 1987 Battle Summary --Soviet premature ambush --Mujahideen good fire control --Mujahideen fire support against relief column --Mujahideen escape from trap

DOBANDI AMBUSH May 1987 Analysis

Warfighting Functions --Mission Command --Fires --Intell --Movement & Maneuver --Protection --Sustainment

Prelims & Battle --Mujahideen check before committing supplies --Dispersed march formation --Soviet ill-defined, open-ended kill zone --Soviet premature ambush --Mujahideen good fire control

--Mujahideen fire support against relief column

WARS PROGRESS
1986-1989 --Gorbachev & a reassessment of the war --Better outside aid, to include Stinger SAMs --Over-stressed Soviet government =Soviet withdrawal in 1988-89

Post-Soviet Occupation, Pre Taliban

--Continued rebellion, but fractious rebels cannot unite against regime --Soviet aid helps Najibullahs communist regime --Najibullah coopts some opposition leaders and potential troublemakers in the regime; he can still be ruthless as needed --Outside players shift, as US and UK reduce rebel aid dramatically --USSRs fall = Najibullahs fall in 1992 --Chaos as factions vie for power over the next four years.

PAKISTANS SITUATION
--India is divided when it gains independence from Britain in 1947. --Pakistans multiple wars with India over, among other things, Indias possession of mostly Muslim Kashmir and its key terrain --Pakistans ISI & radicals: Pakistani intelligence use Islamic radicals for guerilla-war baiting of the Indians in Kashmir. This can be a two-edged sword for the Pakistani government

--The Afghanistan Front & the Taliban. Pakistan wants Afghan leaders who are sympathetic with Pakistans border concerns and who wont ally with India against Pakistan. The newly formed Taliban fits that bill, and gets critical Pakistani support in Afghanistans post-Soviet civil war.
--The Taliban takes most of Afghanistan (Ahmed Shah Massouds Northern Alliance continues resistance) --The Talibans brutal regime, friendship with bin Laden, and 9/11

OEF
--October 2001, first US air raids against Taliban --US air power and special forces work with Northern Alliance --November 01, Mazari-Sharif & Kabul fall to N. Alliance & US --December 01, Kandahar & Tora Bora fall to N. Alliance & US

THE AFTERMATH IN AFGHANISTAN, 2002 ~2006 --After Soviet occupation, destructive civil war, and Taliban repression, Afghanistan needed assistance if it was to move forward with a stable, non terrorist-influenced regime. So, what kind of assistance?

--American assumptions / aims: a big foreign presence will spark an insurgency, and big nation-building projects usually fail anyway, so keep the US presence (footprint) small and temporary ---Misimpressions of the Soviet experience. We assumed that the fierce Afghan resistance to the Soviets 1980s occupation was due mainly to their large forces, but there were never more than 120,000 Soviet troops in country. Soviet brutality inspired Afghan anger. ---Aversion to nation building. The Vietnam War and stability operations in places like Somalia led many Americans, including the Bush administration, to prefer not to build nations in troubled places that we dont understand or where we dont want to remain for long. Indeed, President Bush and staff regarded most such deployments, even the one to Bosnia, as wasteful diversions if not outright failures.

THE AFTERMATH IN AFGHANISTAN, 2002 ~2006 --Stability and security issues: If we wanted a small foreign footprint, then Afghan national peace at least required a rebuilt Afghan Army / police force and stable central government. US leaders worked with non-Taliban local leaders to promote an Afghan approach to these tasks; but it meant working with the fractious warlords and factional leaders who helped sustain the chaos that followed the Soviets 1989 withdrawal. Other problems with building effective national government and security institutions included: illiteracy, corruption, low army status among Afghans, poor soldier pay, factionalism, and related disputes among Afghans over who served and how.

--But given a relative calm after the Taliban governments overthrow; encouraging signs like the 2004 Afghan national elections; and a big US distraction in Iraq, the US commitment to Afghanistan remained small and policy formation remained uncertain for several years.

THE AFTERMATH IN AFGHANISTAN, 2002 ~2006 Small footprint & uncertain policy formation --US force size remained at about, or below, 20,000 for years --At first, commanders were told to avoid heavy commitments to stability-force or COIN ops because we were not supposed to be there long. --At the time, US Army familiarity with COIN & local area needed work --The situation improved some as commanders like LTGEN David Barno strove to implement COIN pros and to coordinate efforts better; but still the US commitment remained small. --Obviously, there was also a big distraction with OIF.

40

30

20

10

9 04 9 04

12 04 12 04

4 05 4 05

6 05 6 05

9 05 9 05

12 05 12 05

4 06 4 06

6 06 6 06

9 06 9 06

12 06 12 06

04

2005

2006

U.S. Troops In-Country in Afghanistan, Thousands of Troops

80

60

40

20

9 04 9 04

12 04 12 04

4 05 4 05

6 05 6 05

9 05 9 05

12 05 12 05

4 06 4 06

6 06 6 06

9 06 9 06

12 06 12 06

04

2005

2006

Average Number of Daily Insurgent Attacks in Afghanistan Relatively low

Afghanistan, Mid-2000s
--Security & services breakdown as local Afghan forces struggle --Local corruption: old warlords still run some places

--Willpower issues: Ours declines as OIF continues. Allied forces often operate under serious restrictions imposed by their governments. Over time, the Taliban starts to resurge. --The rebels outside help, and this involves Pakistan, with its internal troubles.

Control, and the lack thereof: as the situation deteriorates, can we control the countryside per classic COIN? 80
60

40

20

9 04 9 04

12 04 12 04

4 05 4 05

6 05 6 05

9 05 9 05

12 05 12 05

4 06 4 06

6 06 6 06

9 06 9 06

12 06 12 06

4 07 4 07

6 07 6 07

9 07 9 07

12 07 12 07

4 08 4 08

6 08 6 08

9 08 9 08

04

2005

2006

2007

2008

Average Number of Daily Insurgent Attacks in Afghanistan Steady Increase

Control, and the lack thereof: as the situation deteriorates, can we control the countryside per classic COIN? 40
30

20

10

9 04 9 04

12 04 12 04

4 05 4 05

6 05 6 05

9 05 9 05

12 05 12 05

4 06 4 06

6 06 6 06

9 06 9 06

12 06 12 06

4 07 4 07

6 07 6 07

9 07 9 07

12 07 12 07

4 08 4 08

6 08 6 08

9 08 9 08

04

2005

2006

2007

2008

U.S. Troops In-Country in Afghanistan, Thousands of Troops

Afghanistan, Mid-2000s
--Security & services breakdown --Local corruption

--Willpower issues
--The rebels outside help, and this involves Pakistan. --Control, the lack thereof, and the Battle of Wanat. US forces were already having trouble maintaining full control of eastern Afghanistans Waygal Valley, and had pulled one of their outposts back down the valley to Wanat village. Just after the Wanat outposts establishment, rebels attacked it with much firepower but its small garrison repelled the assault. Controversy arose over preparation and whether the Wanat outpost was still too isolated. Later the US would withdraw further down the valley.

OP KAHLER, WANAT, Kunar Province, 13 July 2008 Small village in mountain valley

WANAT, Kunar Province, 13 July 2008, small village in mountain valley

--Mujahideen attempt to disrupt US outpost move --CPT Matthew Myer v. Mawlawi Sadiq Manibullah --ANA Platoon & 2nd PLTN, C Co, 2nd BN, 503rd IR (~73 troops) v. Lashkar al Zil (~150-300 rebels)

WANAT, Preliminaries
--Move to this COP is quite recent; valley bottom --Chilly locals, but US assumes delay before big attack --COP abuts village; detached OP --US does early AM stand-to anyway

WANAT, 13 July 2006 Battle Summary --All-aspect rebel attack, maximum firepower

WANAT, 13 July 2006 Battle Summary / Results

--All-aspect rebel attack, maximum firepower --Key US weapons disabled; detached OP high losses --US directs remaining fires well --Commander calls in fire support & QRF; COP saved

WANAT, 13 July 2006 Analysis: METT-TC

--Mission --Terrain --Time --Enemy --Troops/Support --Civil Issues

Afghanistan, Mid-2000s
--Security & services breakdown --Local corruption --Willpower issues (ours/the rebels/allies) --The rebels outside help (Pakistan) --Control, and the lack thereof With Aghan problems increasing, surge completion in Iraq, and a new U.S. president in 2009, there is a refocus upon Afghanistan. Early in 2009 there is a review, and it produces . . . .

MARCH 2009, U.S. STRATEGY FOR AFGHANISTAN AND PAKISTAN President Obama CENTCOM commander Petraeus

The goal is . . . to defeat, disrupt, and dismantle Al-Qaeda in Afghanistan and Pakistan, and to prevent their return to either country. For Afghanistan, the strategy commits to increasing U.S. troop levels to fight extremists along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border, train Afghan security forces, and provide civilian experts to help the Afghan government.

Military strategies involve hurting al Qaeda by using special forces, and also by preventing a Taliban takeover of Afghanistan: --Use both conventional and special forces to secure key areas and to degrade Taliban to levels manageable by Afghan Army and security forces --Build up Afghan Army and security forces Not quite full-scale COIN; not quite limited counter-terror; time/resource-constrained effort

--The goal and strategy reflect the presidents resolution of conflicting opinions among his top deputies.

---Some leaders (both mil & civ) wanted a COIN full-court press with ample troops and dedication to rebuilding Afghanistan.
---Others (both mil & civ) were concerned about American domestic problems (economy, war weariness, etc.), the daunting prospects for a timely resolution of Afghanistan and Pakistans many internal problems; and so wanted a reduced commitment by relying more upon high-tech weapons and small special forces.

Afghanistan, Mid-2000s
--Security & services breakdown --Local corruption --Willpower issues (ours/the rebels/allies) --The rebels outside help (Pakistan) --Control, and the lack thereof --The new surge

--

80

60

40

20

9 04 9 06

12 04 12 06

4 05 4 07

6 05 6 07

9 05 9 07

12 05 12 07

4 06 4 08

6 06 6 08

9 06 9 08

12 06 12 08

4 07 4 09

6 07 6 09

9 07 9 09

12 07 12 09

4 08 4 10

6 08 6 10

9 08 9 10

12 08 12 10

1 09 4 11

4 09 6 11

6 09 9 11

12 09 12 11

1 10 4 12

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

U.S. Troops In-Country in Afghanistan, Thousands of Troops

80

60

40

20

9 04 9 04

12 04 12 04

4 05 4 05

6 05 6 05

9 05 9 05

12 05 12 05

4 06 4 06

6 06 6 06

9 06 9 06

12 06 12 06

4 07 4 07

6 07 6 07

9 07 9 07

12 07 12 07

4 08 4 08

6 08 6 08

9 08 9 08

12 08 12 08

1 09 4 09

4 09 6 09

6 09 9 09

12 09 12 09

1 10 4 10

04

2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

10

Average Number of Daily Insurgent Attacks in Afghanistan

THE DEFINITION OF WAR

A conflict between organized groups with unknown resolve, each seeking to impose its will on the other

Afghanistan, Recently (President Obama Speech, 22 June 2011)

--Reduce forces used for surge ---10,000 out by end of 2011 ---33,000 total reduction --Meeting our goals

---Al Qaeda is under more pressure than at any time since 9/11. (Bin Laden death, 2 May 2011)
---We've inflicted serious losses on the Taliban and taken a number of its strongholds ---Afghan Security Forces have grown . . . . [and] we have already begun to transition . . . security to the Afghan people.

Afghanistan, Recently (President Obama Speech, 22 June 2011)

This is the beginning -- but not the end -- of our effort to wind down this war . . . . But we must be as pragmatic as we are passionate; as strategic as we are resolute. At a time of rising debt and hard economic times . . . we must invest in America's greatest resource -- our people. Living within our means . . . . we must recapture the common purpose that we shared at the beginning of this time of war. We will not try to make Afghanistan a perfect place . . . . America, it is time to focus on nation building here at home.

So please . . . preach for more study of books and history, a greater seriousness in military art. With 2,000 years of examples behind us we have no excuse . . . for not fighting well.

T.E. Lawrence, alias, Lawrence of Arabia, 1933