Process Hazards Analysis

Process Safety Information Process Hazard Analysis

By : MSd
Oct. 2004

Philosophy

ECPL believes that Process hazards analysis (PHAs) shall be conducted on regular basis to Identify, Evaluate and Develop methods to control significant hazards associated with Highly Hazardous Processes (HHP) and Lower Hazard Operations (LHO).

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Process Hazard Analysis Concept

PHA is a Methodical Study Approach used to Examine :

Each new or Existing facility

To assure that hazards of "catastrophic and major" Safety or Environmental Consequences are:

Identified and Adequately controlled to an acceptable risk level.

Seek a multi-disciplined consensus on hazard control Results are used for:

Follow-up Emergency Planning and

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Training

Concept

Process hazards analysis (PHAs) are used to:

Identify Evaluate and Develop methods

to control significant hazards associated with HHP and LHO.

These hazards generally represent the potential for:

Fires Explosions Release of toxic materials

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What is Risk?

Risk =

Possibility of loss or injury

or

Probability an event may impact & Consequence of an event when it impacts

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Risk Lowering thru Multiple Protection Layers

Frequency
High Med Low
V Lo

Inherently Safer Design

Consequence

Consequence Inspections & Tests

Hazard

Procedures and Training

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Risk Lowering thru Inherently Safer Design

Frequency
Low Med High

Consequence

Consequence

Hazard

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Consequence Probability Matrix

4 Frequency 3 2 1 0 Low 0
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High

Medium

2 3 Consequence
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PHA Planning and Frequencies

ECPL has a process which includes:

Annual PHA planning. Conduct PHA (including consequence analysis), Documentation and Follow up.

PHAs are mandatory and must be conducted for:

New Project Facilities Existing Facilities (cyclical PHAs),

Mothballing or Dismantling of Process Facilities or

Any Significant change requiring a Management of Change Authorization e.g., Sub SOC etc.
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Team

Conducted by Trained Team Leaders & a Cross Functional Team

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Consequence Analysis

Consequence Analysis - Based on scientific and empirical information. Estimate a range of potential release quantities including worst case. Estimate down wind effects, concentration for toxic, heat effects for ignition and overpressure for explosives. Estimate impact on on-site and off-site people and their environment. Documentation of Consequence Analysis includes reasons for Worst Case Scenario Selection, Methods used and Assumptions made.
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Process Hazard Reviews

Process Hazard Review (PHR) shall be conducted using one of following 04 methodologies.

What If / Checklist Hazard and Operability Study (HAZOP) Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) Failure Mode and Effect Analysis (FMEA)

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PHR method logic diagram

Cause

Deviation

Cosequence
Legends

FMEA What / If checklist

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HAZOP Fault Tree Analysis

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What / If Checklist

Strengths

Covers a broad range of hazards Requires little prior training Is effective as a learning tool Challenge design

Recognizes effects of adjacent processes

Compares process with previous experience.

Limitations

Short cut leads to weak reiew

Depth of analysis depends upon team diligence Works only if right questions are asked.
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What /If checklist method

Select the process segment to be studied. List the worst case consequence and other hazardous events. Generate a list of "what if" questions

Do not discuss answers There are no dumb questions. Cover all parts of process segment.

Use checklist to prompt additional questions. Review human factor and inherently safer processes checklists. Assign questions to individuals to develop responses. Develop responses to all questions Ensure that team reaches a consensus on all questions Summarize the recommendations, highlighting the high priority items.
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HAZOP

Strengths

Methodical assessment of all deviations from design intention

Good for novel situations Easy to document Designed for chemical processes but can be used elsewhere.

Limitations

Assumes design is correct

Requires accurate model or diagram Easy to get side tracked
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HAZOP Deviation matrix

Guided words Parameters

More Of
high flow

Less Of
low flow Low temp

None Reverse Part Of Of

no flow back flow wrong concent

As well AS
contaminants

Other Than
wrong material

Flow Temprature Pressure Time

high temp

high pressure Too long too late

low pressure too short too soon misses a step steps backward action missed wrong time

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HAZOP Method

Define design intent of NODE

List important parameters and develop deviations using guide words.

List the consequence of deviation on entire system List existing protection against deviations, causes and consequences.

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FMEA

Strengths

Methodical approach to failure mode and consequence

Breaks unusual processes into segments for critical analysis. Easy to use and document with proper training

Limitations

Focus on "go-no-go" situations

Does not question design basis

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FMEA Method

Recommended for analysis of small segments Select process segment to be studied List the worst case consequence

Identify component and human failure

Describe the system in drawing Describe each component and number it.

List the failure mode and error mode of each component.

For each failure list the potential worst case consequence on whole system
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FMEA Method

Develop approximate ranking of events Evaluate adequacy of existing process safe guards Identifies hazards that may require Fault tree analysis Document review findings Assign a "Hazard rating" to each failure Assign a "Probability of failure rating" to each failure. Calculate "criticality" for each failure List the curent protection against failure Determine whether additional protection is needed for high criticality items Review human factor Make recommendations where needed

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Fault Tree Analysis

Strengths

Defines various routes to top event Quantifies probability of reaching top event Analyze combination of events Analyzes human error

Allows for comparison of the loss rates (dollars per year)

Limitations

Not readily understandable to readers

Focus is on event vs. process

Requires specialist expertise Considerable efforts and expense may be required
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FTA Method

The Undesired event is placed at the top of the tree The possible causes of top event are portrayed in the form of tree in reverse order

Each sub-event should be evaluated independently

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Evaluations and Risk Scoring

The team evaluates:

The possible harmful effects of each event versus The current protection and Decides on whether additional protection is needed.

For each hazardous event identified, the PHA team shall document:

Consequence (C1 C4) Frequency rating (F1 F4) and A risk level (1 IV) Inherently Safer Process Human factors if the process in a HHP Facility Siting"
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In a PHR following shall also be looked into:

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What If / Checklist Example

Process What If .... ? Consequence Protection Step or Now Equipment Piece P-2509s at Seal Leaks Ammonia will Routine D-2528 release into surveillance atmosphere by operations. P-200A/B/C Operator pumps operates Startup / wrong valve Shutdown Pump can rotate in reverse direction. Seals damage and ammonia release.
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Recommend ation

Get the seal replaced with double mechanical seal design None

Oct. 2004

Recycle valve on standby pumps kept open. NH3 cannot go back thru pump

Qualitative Risk Assessment Protocol

Type of Event / impact C-1 C-2 C-3 Public safety and health No injury or Minor injury of Injury or moderate health effects reversible health health effects. Liability effects for injury + damages $500 M - $ 1 MM Employee safety and No injury or Minor injury or Multiple MTC injuries; health health effects reversible health 1-2 RW C / LWCs or effects moderate health effects.
Category Typical Descripti on

C-4 Death or irreversible health effects. Liability for injury + damages more than $ 1 MM. One or more fatalities or irreversib le health effects.

F-1 Extremely unlikely (or remote) F-2 Very unlikely

Not realistically expected to occur Not expected to occur, but not incredible

Approximate corresponding quantitati ve frequency (per year) < 10 -4 10 -3 to 10 -4

F-3 Unlikely

F-4 Likely

Unlikely to occur in the plants lifetime, but 10-2 to 10 -3 could occur in one of number of similar plants May occur at least once in the life time of the > 10-2 installation

Frequency category

Increasing likelihood

F-4 F-3 F-2 F-1

IV IV IV IV C-1

I I II I III II IV III C-3 C-4 Increasing severity Consequence Category

II III IV IV C-2

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PHA Recommendations Approval and Tracking

Recommendations are made based on Risk Score for each and every identified risk. PHA recommendations shall be reviewed and approved by Sub SOC Case of Substantial Cost and / or Risk of noncompliance is very high are also reviewed in Sub SOC(P/M) & SOC. PHA report completion and circulation responsibilities lie with the sponsor (Operations Unit Managers / Relevant Section Head) Follow up on recommendations is done by Unit Manager.
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Record, Training and Follow-up

PHA Follow up Coordinator is Safety Advisor. PHA follow up lists are issued monthly by Site Safety Advisor. Completed PHA Recommendations are filed for the life of facility. Training of employees on the PHA methods would be conducted periodically - record kept. The Emergency Response Coordinator is responsible for follow up of risk analysis reviews related to Emergency 28

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PHA Activity Flow

When to conduct a PHA Planning and Preparing to Conduct a PHA Define PHA Charter and Scope Team Preparation Team Responsibilities Start PHA Activities Hazards Identification Process Hazard Review
Human Factors, Facility Siting and Inherently Safer Processes

Develop PHA Recommendations PHA Report and Presentation to Management

Recommendations Follow-up, Tracking, Monthly Stewardship

Closing Recommendations
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A Typical PHA Out Come

Frequency

18

13

1
324

Sample Data High Risk (5) Low Risk (349)

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Medium Risk (57) Not Specified (0) 0 1

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Consequence

Tips for PHA Team

When the team considers risk and concludes that a recommendation is appropriate, the recommendation should be specific and accomplishable. Do Not make make recommendations to study, consider or investigate a situation. The team should do any investigation needed, except in cases where a long range investigation by an expert is needed.
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Questions.

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