An Out-of-Step Event in the Peruvian Power System

Presented by
Yofre Jacome COES SINAC Peru Charles Henville Henville Consulting Inc.

Western Protective Relaying Conference October, 2007

Overview

Background on loss of stability

Impact

on system voltages Differential or distance protection

October 2002 Event

Disturbance

records Actions since the disturbance

Relevant factors
Voltage fluctuations Limitations of differential protection systems Benefits of modern multifunction relays Reasons for operating limits Benefits of remedial action schemes

Weak interconnections

System A Y MVA

System B Z MVA (Z>Y)

Weak tie (Rated capability <Y/7 MVA)

Example system
Line A Line B

Equal area criterion (stable)

1.2

Pre-fault
1
Power (PU)

Post-fault

0.8 0.6 0.4 0.2 0 0 50 100 Angle (Degrees) 150

6
Acceleration area Decceleration area

Fault

Damped recovery oscillations

200

150

Angle (Degrees)

100

50 Oscillations leading to stable equilibrium 0 0 1 2 time (s) 3 4 5

Equal area criterion (unstable)

1.2

Pre-fault
1 0.8 0.6 0.4 0.2 0 0 50 100 Angle (Degrees)
Acceleration area Deccel'n. area

Post-fault

Power (PU)

Fault
150
8

Angular separations of sources

200

150

Angle (Degrees)

Loss of synchronism 100

50 Oscillations leading to stable equilibrium 0 0 1 2 time (s) 3 4 5

Voltage Oscillations
P

Electrical Center
10

WECC Planning Standards

11

Figure W-1 From NERC/WECC Planning Standards

Relay response to out of step conditions

Differential relays see no fault!
Distance Relays
P1 P2

P3

d
P1 : Steady state stability limit P2 : Transient stability limit P3 : Loss of synchronism
12

Controlled Separation
Electrical Center
100 MW Grid

70 MW

30 MW

50 MW

40 MW

Controlled separation point

13

Frequency changes

14

An out-of-step event
At 13:09 hours on 22 October, 2002 In the South Eastern Region of Peru

15

System Diagram
South Eastern Area

FAULT

FAUL T

17

Event record from faulted line (L-1008)

18

Moquegua Terminal of L-2030

Trigger 10/09/2002 01:09:06 PM.380 IR R
10 0 -10 -0.2 0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0 1.2 1.4

t/s

IS R
10 0 -10 -0.2 0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0 1.2 1.4

t/s

IT R
10 0 -10 -0.2 0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0 1.2 1.4

t/s

VR R
0 -50 -0.2 0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0 1.2 1.4

t/s

VS R
0 -50 -0.2 0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0 1.2 1.4

t/s

VT R
0 -50 -0.2 0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0 1.2 1.4

19
t/s

Comparison of out-of-step voltages

Tintaya V max 1.07 pu Tintaya V min 0.53 pu

K1:VR R

K2:Va a_1/V

50

50

0 17.8 17.9 18.0 18.1 18.2 18.3 18.4 18.5 18.6

t/s
-50

-50

Moquegua V max 1.00 pu

Moquegua V min 0.85 pu

Voltage in phase Maximum voltage

Voltage out of phase Minimum voltage 20

62 Seconds of asynchronous interconnection

Trigger 10/09/2002 01:09:06 PM.380 IR R
10 0 -10 10 20 30 40 50 60

t/s

IS R
10 0 -10 10 20 30 40 50 60

t/s

IT R
10 0 -10 10 20 30 40 50 60

t/s

VR R
0 -50 10 20 30 40 50 60

t/s

VS R
0 -50 10 20 30 40 50 60

t/s

VT R
0 -50 10 20 30 40 50 60

t/s

21

Frequency Divergence
Machupicchu Generator trip

South-eastern SE Area Frequency load loss

Generation plant trip (by operator)

Underfrequency load shedding in SEIN

SEIN Frequency
22

Actions following the event

Impose operating limits Replaced some protections with new systems including out of step blocking and tripping Replaced some power system stabilizers Implemented generation shedding RAS

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Operating Limit Nomograph

24

Two different system responses

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Conclusions

Weak interconnections are exposed to out of step conditions Out of step conditions should be avoided but, if they happen:

Systems should be separated in a controlled manner Load and generation should be balanced in separated regions

Re-synchronization might happen, but it might not! Real life events validate system models
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Questions?

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