Dynamical Systems Approach (Teoria Sistemelor Dinamice)

Netwon (Galilei), Poincare, Landau (44) Ecological approach (Gibson 66, 79) Ecological psychologists (Turvey et al. 81) Turvey Kluger Kelso (80s)-Motor coordinatio Thelen & Smith (90s) for cognition Embodied cognition (Gibson, Agre and Chapman, Hutchins) Situated action (Gibson Barwise and Perry 81, 83 Pfeifer and Scheier, Glenberg, Brooks) Extended mind (Clark 01, 08)

van Gelder & Port (95) Dynamical and computational approaches to cognition are fundamentally different Dynamical approach = Kuhnian revolution Brain (inner, encapsulated) vs. Nervous system + body + environment Discrete static Rs vs. Mutually + simultaneously influencing changes

 Geometrical Rs To conceptualize how system change! A plot of states traversed by a system through time = Systems trajectory through state space Trajectory Continuous (real time) or discrete (sequence of points) a dimension = a variable of a system a point = a state

Ex: Height-weight; 2 neurons; 4 or 60 neurons = High dimensional state space

 Dynamic systems theory (DST) - Physics Dynamical system: Set of state variables + dynamical law (governs how values of state variables change with time) The set of all possible values of state variables = phase space of system (state space) All possible trajectories = phase portrait Parameters Dimensions of space The sequence of states represents trajectory of system

Dynamical Systems Terminology 1. The state space of a system = space defined by set of all possible states system could ever be in. 2. A trajectory or path = set of positions in state space through which system might pass successively. Behavior is described by trajectories through state space. 3. An attractor = point of state space - system will tend when in surrounding region 4. A repeller = point of state space away from which system will tend when in surrounding region 5. The topology of a state space = layout of attractors and repellors in state space 6. A control parameter = parameter whose continuous quantitative change leads to a noncontinuous, qualitative change in topology of a state space 7. Systems - modeled with linear differential equations = linear systems Systems - modeled with nonlinear differential equatio-s = nonlinear systems 8. Only linear systems are decomposable = modeled as collections of separable components. Nonlinear systems = nondecomposable 9. Nondecomposable, nonlinear systems - characterized - collective variables and/or order parameters, variables/parameters of system that summarize behavior of systems components (Chemero 09, p. 36)

 Goal: Changes over time (and change in rate of change over time) of a system (Clark 2001) DST- Understanding cognition Cognitive systems = Dynamical systems Cognitive agents are dynamical systems and can be scientifically understood as such. (van Gelder 99)

Change vs. state Geometry vs. structure (van Gelder 98)

 Behavior of system (changes over time): Sequence of points = Phase space (Numerical space described by differential equations) Geometric images Trajectory of evolution Collective variables (relations bet. variables) Control parameters = Factors affect evolut. Ex: Solar system - Position + Momentum of planets - Mathematical laws relate changes over time A math-ical dynamical model Rates of change: Differential equations (van Gelder 1995, + Port 1995)

 DST: Cognition - in motion No distinction between mind-body

Mind-body-environment: Dynamical-coupled systems Interact continuously, exchanging information + influencing each other Processes - in real continuous time

 Quantities (scientific explanation) vs. qualities (Newell & Simon law of qualitative structure, van Gelder 98)
What makes a system dynamical, in relevant sense? dynamical systems are quantitative. they are systems in which distance matters. Distances between states of system/times that are relevant to behavior of system Rate of change (t) (Van Gelder 1998)

 DST: Time involved Geometric view of how structures in state space generate/ constrain behavior + emergence of spatiotemporal patterns Kinds of temporal behavior - translated in geometric objects of varying topologies

Dynamics = Geometry of behavior (Abraham & Shaw 1983; Smale 1980 in Crutchfield, 95)

The computational governor vs. the Watt centrifugal governor Computational governor - Algorithm: (1)Operating internal Rs and symbols, (2)Computational operations over Rs (3)Discrete, sequential and cyclic operations (4) Homuncular in construction, Homuncularity = Decomposition of system in components, each - a subtask + communicating with others (Gelder 95)

Centrifugal governor (G):

Norepresentational + noncomputational Relationship betw. 2 quantities (arm angle and engine speed) = Coupled Continuously reciprocal causation through mathematical dynamics

Clark (p. 126)

Constant speed for flywheel of steam engine: Vertical spindle to flywheel - Rotate at a speed proportionate to speed of flywheel 2 arms metal balls - free to rise + fall Centrifugal force-in proportion to speed of G Mechanical linkage: Angle of arms - change opening of valve Controlling amount of steam driving flywheel If flywheel - turning too fast, arms - rise Valve partly close: Reduce amount of steam available to turn flywheel = Slowing it down If flywheel - too slowly, arms - drop Valve open: More steam = Increase speed of flywheel

 Such mechanisms = Control systems noncomputational, non-R-l No Rs or discrete operations Explanation = Only dynamic analysis Relationship arm angle-engine speed: no computational explanation These 2 quantities - continuously influence each other = Coupling Relation brain-body-environ. = = Continuous reciprocal causation

DST- 2 directions for R: (1) Radical embodied cognition = No Rs/computation Maturana and Varela 80; Skarda and Freeman 87; Brooks 1991; Beer and Gallagher 92; Varela, Thompson, + Rosch 91; Thelen + Smith 94; Beer 95; van Gelder 95; van Gelder + Port 95; Kelso 95; Wheeler 96; Keijzer 98 We might also add Kugler, Kelso, + Turvey 1980; Turvey et al. 81; Kugler + Turvey 1987; Harvey, Husbands, + Cliff 94; Husbands, Harvey, + Cliff 95; Reed 96; Chemero 00, 08; Lloyd 00; Keijzer 01; Thompson + Varela 01; Beer 03; Noe and Thompson 04; Gallagher 05; Rockwell 05; Hutto 05, 07; Thompson 07; Chemero + Silberstein 08; Gallagher + Zahavi 08 (Chemero 09)

(2) Moderate = Replace vehicle of Rs or R in a weaker sense (Bechtel 98, 02; Clark 97a,b; Wheeler & Clark 97; Wheeler 05) Clark has argued several times (97, 01, 08; Clark and Toribio 94 (Miner & Goodale 95, ventral vs. dorsal); Clark and Grush 1999) that anti-R-ism of radical embodied cognitive science is misplaced. (Chemero, 09, p. 32)

 Radicals: R, computation, symbols, and structures - Useless in explanation cognition (van Gelder, Thelen & Smith, Skarda, etc.) Explanation in terms of structure in the headbeliefs, rules, concepts, and schemata - not acceptable. Our theory - new concepts coupling attractors, momentum, state spaces, intrinsic dynamics, forces. These concepts - not reductible to old We are not building Rs at all! Mind is activity in time the real time of real physical causes. (Thelen and Smith 94)

 Notions: Pattern + self-organization + coupling + circular causation (Clark 97b; Kelso 95; Varela et al. 91) Patterns - emerge from interactions between organism and environment Organism-Environment = Single coupled system (composed of two subsystems) Its evolution through differential equations (Clark)

 DST rejects Rs, introduces time Bodily actions (T&S 98, childs walking) Movement of fingers (HKB 87, Kelso 95) Extrapolate from sensoriomotor processes to cognition processes! No decision making/contrafactual reason Replace static, discrete Rs with attractors = Continuous movement At conceptual level attractors seem static and discrete

 Globus 92, 95; Kelso 95: Reject Rs + computations Globus: Replaces computation with constraints between elements-levels [R]ather than computes, our brain dwells (at least for short times) in metastable states. (Kelso 95) (See Freeman 87) Radical embodied cognition: Explores minimally cognitive behavior = Categorical perception, locomotion, etc. (Chemero 09, p. 39)

 Against REC - Clark and Toribio (94): certain tasks cannot be accomplished without Rs Hungry Rs problems (decision making, counterfactual reasoning) - Decoupling between R-l system and environment = Off-line cognition (not on-line) Cognitive system has to create a certain kind of item, pattern or inner process that stands for a certain state of affairs, in short, a R. (Clark 97a) Compromise: Milner and Goodale (95), Norman (02)

 TDS - Change: a) Interactions betw. (ensembles) neurons b) Constitutive relations betw. Rs

No prediction but explanation Dynamics among Rs (Fisher and Bidell 98; van Geert 94)

 Radical dynamicists: Cognition = Result of evolution of perception + sensoriomotor control systems

Dynamical models - having R-s: Attractors, trajectories, bifurcations, and parameter settings
DS store knowledge + Rules defined over numerical states (van Gelder & Port 95)

 DST manages discrete state transitions (a)Using discrete states (catastrophe model Bifurcation) (b) Discreteness: How a continuous system can undergo changes that look discrete from a distance
If cognition = particular structure in space and time, mission - discover how a stable state of brain in context of body + environ. (van Gelder and Port 95)

Distinction on-line/off-line processes Off-line cognition = Decision making + contrafactual reasoning Subject thinks about Rs in their absence Not rejecting computation of brain that presuposses Rs (Clark)

Van Gelders in BBS (98) Open Peer Commentary: Many commentaries - DST can explain only perception + sensoriomotor control systems, not cognitive processes Van Gelder & Port: Everything in motion No static discrete Rs Everything is simultaneously affecting everything else.

Cognitive processes Conceptualize in geometric terms Unfolds over time = How total states system passes through spatial location Unfold in real time their behaviors - by continuities and discretenesses Structures - not present from first moment, but emerge over time - operate over many times scales and events at different times scales (van Gelder & Port 95)

Skarda & Freemans model of olfactory bulb Freemans network (85) (Bechtel, p. 259) Rabbit - Pattern neurons - Smelling A, then B then again A Pattern of activity A1 A2 (even similar) No Rs (88, 90) Nothing intrinsically R-l about dynamic process until observer intrudes. It is experimenter who infers what observed activity patterns represents to in a subject, in order to explain his results to himself. (Werner 88, in Freeman & Skarda 90)

 Neural system does not exhibit behavior that can be modeled with point attractors, except (anesthesia or death) Instead, nervous system = Dynamical system, constantly in motion Chaos - System continuously changes state; trajectory appears random but determined by equations Chaotic systems: Sensitivity to initial conditions = Small differences in initial values Dissimilar trajectories

Excitatory + inhibitory neurons (different cell types) = Separate components: Second-order nonlinear diff-tial equations Coupled via excitatory/inhibitory connec-s Interactive network Conditioned rabbits respons to odors EEG recordings: - Exhalation = Pattern of disorderly - Inhalation = More orderly

 Late exhalation: no input + behaves chaotically Inhalation: Chaos Basin of one limit cycle attractors (Each attractor is a previously learned response to a particular odor) System - recognized an odor when lands in appropriate attractor Recognition response is not static! Odor recognition = Olfactory system alternates between relatively free-ranging chaotic behavior (exhalation) and odorspecific cyclic behavior (inhalation)

 Freemans model - Logistic equation (figure 8.2, p. 242) = Chaotic dynamics in a region with values of A beyond 3.6. Within this region there existed values of A for which dynamics again became periodic Moving from chaotic to temporarily stable (and back to chaotic ones) through small changes in parameter values Ability could be extremely useful for a nervous system (Bechtel 02)

Haken-Kelso-Bunz model (fingers movements) 2 basic patterns (in phase-antiphase) Increase oscillation frequency in time: 1) People: in antiphase motion in-phase (at a certain frequency of movement critical region) 2) Subjects: in-phase = NO in phase motion 2 stable patterns of low frequencies, 1 pattern = Stable, frequen. beyond critical point 2 stable attractors at low frequencies bifurcation at a critical point 1 stable attractor at high frequencies (Kelso in Walmsley 2008)

coordination - not as masterminded by a digital computer but as an emergent property of a nonlinear dynamical system self-organizing around instabilities (van Gelder 98) Fischer & Bidell (98), van Geert (93) Continuity + discreteness Dynamical combinations of R-s Dynamical structuralism: Variations within stability + Structure in motion [Ecological, dynamic, interactive, situated, embodied approaches]

Melanie Mitchell (98) Theory of cognition: both computational and dynamical notions How functional information-processing structures emerge in complex dynamical system DST - Do not explain information-processing content of states over which change is occurring because either tasks with no complex information processing or high-level information-related primitives pp. a priori

Objections Computers are Dynamical Systems Dynamical Systems are Computers Dynamical Systems are Computable Description Not Explanation (Dynamical models = Descriptions of data, not explain why data takes form it does. Wrong Level (DST operates at micro, lower levels) Not focus on specifically cognitive aspects Complexity + Structure (van Gelder 98)

 Both alternatives (computationalism & DST) = Necessary for explaining cognition Clark 97, 01 Markman & Dietrich 00, 02 Wheeler 96, 05 Fisher & Bidell 98 van Geert 94 no decomposition into distinct functional modules + no aspect of agents state need be interpretable as a R. (Beer 95, p. 144)