Theistic Proofs of Gods Existence and Natural Theology

Doctrine of God

Marcos Blanco

Theistic Proofs of Gods Existence

The proofs for the existence of God are within
the discipline known as the philosophy of religion. They offer arguments for the existence of God.

It began in ancient Greek philosophythat is,

some 2,500 years agoand continues to this day. In Book X of Platos Laws (fourth century BC) there is the first recorded version of what we now call the cosmological argument for the existence of God.

Theistic Proofs of Gods Existence

Although many philosophy of religion scholars
for those who hold that God has revealed things to human beings natural theology usually takes on only a secondary and auxiliary importance, they have played a main role in the history of classical theology, together with natural theology and the via negativa.

Theistic Proofs of Gods Existence

It is evident in the fact that most of
philosophers who have offered theistic proofs have also held to the validity, in at least some sense, of revealed theology. That is, most have believed that God could be known in other ways than through theistic proofs.

Aquinas Five Ways

First Way: The first and more manifest way is the argument from motion. It is certain, and evident to our senses, that in the world some things are in motion. Now whatever is in motion is put in motion by another, for nothing can be in motion except it is in potentiality to that towards which it is in motion; whereas a thing moves inasmuch as it is in act. For motion is nothing else than the reduction of something from potentiality to actuality. But nothing can be reduced from potentiality to actuality, except by something in a state of actuality.

Aquinas Five Ways

Thus that which is actually hot, as fire, makes
wood, which is potentially hot, to be actually hot, and thereby moves and changes it. Now it is not possible that the same thing should be at once in actuality and potentiality in the same respect, but only in different respects. For what is actually hot cannot simultaneously be potentially hot; but it is simultaneously potentially cold. It is therefore impossible that in the same respect and in the same way a thing should be both mover and moved, i.e. that it should move itself. Therefore, whatever is in motion must be put in motion by another.

Aquinas Five Ways

If that by which it is put in motion be itself put in
motion, then this also must needs be put in motion by another, and that by another again. But this cannot go on to infinity, because then there would be no first mover, and, consequently, no other mover; seeing that subsequent movers move only inasmuch as they are put in motion by the first mover; as the staff moves only because it is put in motion by the hand. Therefore it is necessary to arrive at a first mover, put in motion by no other; and this everyone understands to be God. (Summa Theologica I.2.2)

Aquinas Five Ways

The Way of Motion: (a) The ultimate cause of motion exists.

(b) The first mover is the ultimate cause of

motion.

(c) Therefore, the first mover exists.

Aquinas Five Ways

Second Way: The second way is from the
nature of the efficient cause. In the world of sense we find there is an order of efficient causes. There is no case known (neither is it, indeed, possible) in which a thing is found to be the efficient cause of itself; for so it would be prior to itself, which is impossible. Now in efficient causes it is not possible to go on to infinity, because in all efficient causes following in order, the first is the cause of the intermediate cause, and the intermediate is the cause of the ultimate cause, whether the intermediate cause be several, or only one.

Aquinas Five Ways

Now to take away the cause is to take away
the effect. Therefore, if there be no first cause among efficient causes, there will be no ultimate, nor any intermediate cause. But if in efficient causes it is possible to go on to infinity, there will be no first efficient cause, neither will there be an ultimate effect, nor any intermediate efficient causes; all of which is plainly false. Therefore it is necessary to admit a first efficient cause, to which everyone gives the name of God. (Summa Theologica I.2.2)

Aquinas Five Ways

The Way of Causation:
(a) All things have an immediate or efficient
cause.

(b) The efficient causes cannot go back

infinitely.

(c) There must be a first, uncaused cause.

Aquinas Five Ways

Third Way: The third way is taken from possibility and necessity, and runs thus. We find in nature things that are possible to be and not to be, since they are found to be generated, and to corrupt, and consequently, they are possible to be and not to be. But it is impossible for these always to exist, for that which is possible not to be at some time is not. Therefore, if everything is possible not to be, then at one time there could have been nothing in existence. Now if this were true, even now there would be nothing in existence, because that which does not exist only begins to exist by something already existing. Therefore, if at one time nothing was in existence, it would have been impossible for anything to have begun to exist; and thus even now nothing would be in existence---which is absurd.

Aquinas Five Ways

Therefore, not all beings are merely possible, but
there must exist something the existence of which is necessary. But every necessary thing either has its necessity caused by another, or not. Now it is impossible to go on to infinity in necessary things which have their necessity caused by another, as has been already proved in regard to efficient causes. Therefore we cannot but postulate the existence of some being having of itself its own necessity, and not receiving it from another, but rather causing in others their necessity. This all men speak of as God. (Summa Theologica I.2.2)

Aquinas Five Ways

The Way of Contingency:
(a) It is not necessary for any particular thing to exist, they are, rather, contingent things. (b) All possible things at one point did not exist. (c) If all things are merely contingent, then at one time things did not exist. caused all contingent things to be.

(d) There must be a necessary essence that

Aquinas Five Ways

The Way of Contingency:
(a) It is not necessary for any particular thing to exist, they are, rather, contingent things. (b) All possible things at one point did not exist. (c) If all things are merely contingent, then at one time things did not exist. caused all contingent things to be.

(d) There must be a necessary essence that

Aquinas Five Ways

Fourth Way: The fourth way is taken from the gradation to be found in things. Among beings there are some more and some less good, true, noble and the like. But more and less are predicated of different things, according as they resemble in their different ways something which is the maximum, as a thing is said to be hotter according as it more nearly resembles that which is hottest; so that there is something which is truest, something best, something noblest and, consequently, something which is uttermost being; for those things that are greatest in truth are greatest in being, as it is written in Metaph. ii.

Aquinas Five Ways

Now the maximum in any genus is the cause
of all in that genus; as fire, which is the maximum heat, is the cause of all hot things. Therefore there must also be something which is to all beings the cause of their being, goodness, and every other perfection; and this we call God. (Summa Theologica I.2.2)

Aquinas Five Ways

The Way of Goodness:
(a) Things have degrees of perfection
larger or smaller, heavier or lighter, warmer or colder.

(b) Degrees imply the existence of a

maximum of perfection.

(c) This maximum perfection we call God.

Aquinas Five Ways

Five Way: The fifth way is taken from the governance
of the world. We see that things which lack intelligence, such as natural bodies, act for an end, and this is evident from their acting always, or nearly always, in the same way, so as to obtain the best result. Hence it is plain that not fortuitously, but designedly, do they achieve their end. Now whatever lacks intelligence cannot move towards an end, unless it be directed by some being endowed with knowledge and intelligence; as the arrow is shot to its mark by the archer. Therefore some intelligent being exists by whom all natural things are directed to their end; and this being we call God. (Summa Theologica I.2.2)

Aquinas Five Ways

The Way of Design:
(a) Things in this world are ordered to
particular ends.

(b) Even unintelligent things are predisposed

to this and not that.

(c) This order inherent in even inanimate

things necessitates an intelligence to direct it.

The Ontological Argument

The famous ontological argument was first formulated by
Anselm of Canterbury in the eleventh century. This argument for the existence of God has fascinated philosophers ever since Anselm first stated it.

How can we outline this argument? It is best construed as a

reductio ad absurdum argument. In a reductio you prove a given proposition p by showing that its denial, not-p, leads to (or more strictly, entails) a contradiction or some other kind of absurdity. Anselm's argument can be seen as an attempt to deduce an absurdity from the proposition that there is no God. If we use the term God as an abbreviation for Anselm's phrase the being than which nothing greater can be conceived, then the argument seems to go approximately as follows:

The Ontological Argument

Suppose (1) God exists in the understanding but not in reality. (reductio assumption) (2) Existence in reality is greater than existence in the understanding alone. (premise) (3) God's existence in reality is conceivable. (premise)

(4) If God did exist in reality, then He would be greater than He is. [from (1) and (2)]
(5) It is conceivable that there is a being greater than God is. [(3) and (4)] (6) It is conceivable that there be a being greater than the being than which nothing
greater can be conceived. [(5) by the definition of God]

But surely (6) is absurd and self-contradictory; how could we conceive of a being greater than the being than which none greater can be conceived? So we may conclude that

(7) It is false that God exists in the understanding but not in reality.
It follows that if God exists in the understanding, He also exists in reality; but clearly enough He does exist in the understanding, as even the fool will testify; therefore, He exists in reality as well.

The Ontological Argument

For the critique of Kant to this argument, and

the restate of it by Alvin Plantinga, see

http://mind.ucsd.edu/syllabi/0203/01w/readings/plantinga.html

The Cosmological Argument

The cosmological argument begins with a fact about experience, namely, that something contingent exists. We might sketch out the argument as follows: (1) A contingent being (a being such that if it exists it could have not-existed or could cease to) exists.

(2) This contingent being has a cause of or explanation for its existence.
(3) The cause of or explanation for its existence is something other than the contingent being itself. (4) What causes or explains the existence of this contingent being must either be solely other contingent beings or include a non-contingent (necessary) being. (5) Contingent beings alone cannot provide an adequate causal account or explanation for the existence of a contingent being. (6) Therefore, what causes or explains the existence of this contingent being must include a non-contingent (necessary) being.

(7) Therefore, a necessary being (a being such that if it exists cannot not-exist) exists.

The Argument from Religion

The argument from religious experience goes
something like this:

(a) If an entity is experienced, then it must

exist.

(b) God is the sort of being that it is possible to experience or encounter directly. (c) People claim to have experienced God directly. (d) Therefore, God exists.

The Teleological Argument or Argument from Design

Design arguments are routinely classed as analogical arguments various parallels between human artifacts and certain natural entities being taken as supporting parallel conclusions concerning operative causation in each case. The standardly ascribed schema is roughly thus: (a) Entity e within nature (or the cosmos, or nature itself) is like specified human artifact a (e.g., a machine) in relevant respects R. (b) a has R precisely because it is a product of deliberate design by intelligent human agency. (c) Like effects typically have like causes (or like explanations, like existence requirements, etc.) (d) Therefore, it is (highly) probable that e has R precisely because it too is a product of deliberate design by intelligent, relevantly humanlike agency.

Humes critique of the Design Argument

In his Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion, Hume first presented a powerful version of the Design Argument through his character Cleanthes: Look round the world: contemplate the whole and every part of it: You will find it to be nothing but one great machine, subdivided into an infinite number of lesser machines, which again admit of subdivisions, to a degree beyond what human senses and faculties can trace and explain. All these various machines, and even their most minute parts, are adjusted to each other with an accuracy, which ravishes into admiration all men, who have ever contemplated them. The curious adapting of means to ends, throughout all nature, resembles exactly, though it much exceeds, the productions of human contrivance; of human designs, thought, wisdom, and intelligence. Since therefore the effects resemble each other, we are led to infer, by all the rules of analogy, that the causes also resemble; and that the Author of Nature is somewhat similar to the mind of man; though possessed of much larger faculties, proportioned to the grandeur of the work, which he has executed. By this argument a posteriori, and by this argument alone, do we prove at once the existence of a Deity, and his similarity to human mind and intelligence.

Humes critique of the Design Argument

These are the facts, Cleanthes says. Next comes his argument from analogy: Since therefore the effects resemble each other, we are led to infer, by all the rules of analogy, that the causes also resemble, and that the Author of nature is somewhat similar to the mind of man, though possessed of much larger faculties, proportioned to the grandeur of the work which he has executed.

Hume presents five counterarguments against the design argument through his character Philo. Here the three more relevant:

 1. What caused the designer of the

Humes critique of the Design Argument

universe? If the cause of the universe is the mind of some sort of intelligent designer, Hume said, then why cant we ask who or what caused that mind? What licenses design arguers to stop the regress once they get to the designer? Doesnt the order exhibited in minds require explanation as much as the order that we see in the universe? For all we can tell from the Design Argument alone, the designer of the universe might well have had a maker.

Humes critique of the Design Argument

2. The Design Argument, even if sound, is not a proof of God: Humes point here was that even if the Design Argument is an entirely successful theistic proof, the designer whose existence will have been proved is far from the God of theism. For if your view of the designer is formed simply by the argument itself, there is no reason to hold that the designer is unique, that is, that there is but one designer. There is no reason to hold that the designer is infinite or perfect. There is no reason to hold that the designer is everlasting or even still exists today.

Humes critique of the Design Argument 3. The existence of evil in the world makes the
Design Argument unable to prove a morally perfect designer: Similarly, Hume argued that if one practices pure natural theology and reaches conclusions about the designer only on the basis of the Design Argument, the existence of evil and suffering in the world ruins the Design Argument as an argument for the existence of a morally good designer. The evidence for design plus the evil that we see do not together suggest the existence of an all-powerful and morally good designer. For if the designer were omnipotent, it would have the power to create a world devoid of useless and undeserved suffering; and if it were morally perfect, it would surely want to create such a world. Why then is there so much suffering?

Arguments Against the Theistic Proofs

For several reasons, theistic proofs are widely
criticized and even denigrated by believers and unbelievers in God alike. Here are the reasons:

1. Not a proof: Most of the participants in

the debate concede that none of the theistic proofs succeeds in demonstrating the existence of God.

Arguments Against the Theistic Proofs 2. Unpersuasive: Perhaps for the previous reason, it is
often pointed out that the theistic proofs are unpersuasive: few people are converted to belief in God because of one of the theistic proofs. Bertrand Russell, for example, tells the following story about his days as a Cambridge undergraduate: I remember the precise moment, one day in 1894, as I was walking along Trinity Lane, when I saw in a flash (or thought I saw) that the ontological argument in valid. I had gone out to buy a tin of tobacco; on my way back, I suddenly threw it up in the air, and exclaimed as I caught it: Great Scott, the ontological argument is sound. Of course, Russells impression of the soundness of the ontological argument did not stick, and for the rest of his life was a confirmed atheist or at least agnostic.

Arguments Against the Theistic Proofs

3. Irrelevant to religious faith and practice: Theologians, religious people, and some philosophers play down or even scoff at the proofs as totally irrelevant to religious faith and practice. Believers do not need the proofswhy try to demonstrate something you already know? And the proofs, it is said, are cold, formal, and philosophical; they do no call for faith or commitment, nor do they meet the spiritual needs. 4. Just a philosophical God: The God of the theistic proofs, it is said, is a mere philosophical abstraction (a necessary being, the Greatest Conceivable Being, the Prime Mover, etc.) rather than the living God of the Bible.

Arguments Against the Theistic Proofs

5. The Methodological Objection: Perhaps
the main objection to the theistic proofs is that they place the understanding of God in the multiple sources of theological knowledge matrix, which greatly distort the self-revelation of God testified to in Scripture. The teachings of Natural Theology dominate in the interpretation of biblical information about God's being and acts. In the process, biblical thought is either completely neglected or distorted.

Relative Value of the Theistic Proofs

Instead of attempts to convince people that God exists, it is
better to think of these arguments as indications that it is reasonable to believe in God. Their effect is to show that religious faith is a genuine option for thinking people, not to persuade those who are convinced otherwise.

For decades, theologians, most famously, Karl Barth, have been contending that Anselms argument was prepared for those that already have faith in God and simply need to discover the intelligibility of their belief. Although arguments along these lines have helped to dispel the longstanding myth that Anselms proof is pretheological, they do not seem to fully elaborate what exactly is involved in making faith intelligible and how Anselms argument facilitates efforts to do this.

NATURAL THEOLOGY

Theistic proofs are used in the context of that is called natural theology. What is natural theology? John Macquarries definition accurately captures the consensus: there is a knowledge of God accessible to all rational beings without recourse to any special or supposedly supernatural revelation.

Natural theology is the attempt to reach sound conclusions about the existence and nature of God (among other things) based on human reasoning alone. Natural theology uses such human cognitive faculties as experience, memory, introspection, deductive reasoning, inductive reasoning (such as probabilistic and analogical reasoning), and inference to best explanation.

NATURAL THEOLOGY
Natural theology is traditionally associated
with Catholic tradition, and was given official endorsement by the First Vatican Council, which affirmed that God, the beginning and end of all things, can be known with certainty by the natural light of human reason from the works of creation. Concilium Vaticanum I, Constitutio dogmatica Dei Filius, chap. 2, De revelatione, available in Enchiridion Symholorum (Freiburg: Herder. 1965) 588, no. 3004.

Revealed Theology and Natural Theology

St. Augustine, in describing how he was taught as a catechumen in the Church, writes:

From this time on, however, I gave my preference to the Catholic faith. I thought it more modest and not in the least misleading to be told by the Church to believe what could not be demonstratedwhether that was because a demonstration existed but could not be understood by all or whether the matter was not one open to rational proofYou [God] persuaded me that the defect lay not with those who believed your books, which you have established with such great authority amongst almost all nations, but with those who did not believe them. Confessions VI.7.

Revealed Theology and Natural Theology

Here Augustine describes being asked to believe certain
things, that is, take them on authority, even though they could not be demonstrated. The distinction between what one takes on authority (particularly the authority of Scripture) and what one accepts on the basis of demonstration runs throughout the corpus of Augustines writings. These two ways of holding claims about God correspond roughly with things one accepts by faith and things that proceed from understanding or reason. Each of the two ways will produce a type of theology. The program for inquiring into God on the basis of faith/text-commitments will be called revealed theology many centuries later. Also, the program for inquiring about God strictly on the basis of understanding or reason will be called natural theology many centuries later.

Revealed Theology and Natural Theology

The distinction between holding something by faith and holding it by reason, as well as the distinction between the two types of theology that each way produces, can be traced through some major figures of the Middle Ages. Two examples follow. First, Anicius Manlius Severinus Boethius (480524) presented an elaborate account of Gods existence, attributes, and providence. Although a Christian, Boethius brings together in his Consolation of Philosophy the best of various ancient philosophical currents about God. Without any appeal to the authority of Christian Scripture, Boethius elaborated his account of God as eternal, provident, good, and so forth.

Second, Pseudo-Dionysius (late 5th century) also raised the distinction between knowing things from the authority of Scripture and knowing them from rational arguments: Theological tradition has a dual aspect, the ineffable and mysterious on the one hand, the open and more evident on the other. The one resorts to symbolism and involves initiation. The other is philosophic and employs the method of demonstration. Epistola IX (Luibheid, 1987) Here we have the distinction between the two ways of approaching God explicitly identified as two aspects of theology. Augustine, Boethius, and Pseudo-Dionysius (to name but a few) thus make possible a more refined distinction between two types of aspects to theology. On the one hand, there is a program of inquiry that aims to understand what one accepts in faith as divine revelation from above. On the other hand, there is a program of inquiry that proceeds without appeal to revelation and aims to obtain some knowledge of God from below.

Revealed Theology and Natural Theology

 For Aquinas, there are two sorts of truths about

God:

Revealed Theology and Natural Theology

There is a twofold mode of truth in what we

profess about God. Some truths about God exceed all the ability of human reason. Such is the truth that God is triune. But there are some truths which the natural reason also is able to reach. Such are the truth that God exists, that he is one, and the like. In fact, such truths about God have been proved demonstratively by the philosophers, guided by the light of natural reason. (Summa Contra Gentiles I.3.2)

Revealed Theology and Natural Theology

The truths of natural reason are discovered or
obtained by using the natural light of reason. The natural light of reason is the capacity for intelligent thought that all human beings have just by virtue of being human.

Revealed Theology and Natural Theology

Theology (in the Thomistic sense), as it later came to be called, is the program for inquiring by the light of faith into what one believes by faith to be truths beyond reason that are revealed by God. Natural theology, as it later came to be called, is the program for inquiring by the light of natural reason alone into whatever truths of natural reason human beings might be able to find about God. Theology and natural theology differ in what they inquire into, and in what manner they inquire. What theology inquires into is what God has revealed himself to be. What natural theology inquires into is what human intelligence can figure out about God without using any of the truths beyond reasonthat is, the truths divinely revealed.

 Theology proceeds by taking Gods revelation

as a given and using one divinely revealed truth to account for another divinely revealed truth (or to give a higher account of truths of natural reason). Natural theology proceeds by bracketing and setting aside Gods revelation and seeking to discover, verify, and organize truths of natural reason about God. Aquinass distinctions remain the historical source of how many contemporary theologians and philosophers characterize the differences of their respective disciplines.

Revealed Theology and Natural Theology

General Revelation vs. Natural Theology

General revelation is a revelatory activity performed by
God.

Natural theology is an interpretative activity performed

by human beings.

In general revelation, God uses nature and history to

reveal His will to each person with the goal of their salvation.

In natural theology, however, human beings address

these same objects, but with the purpose of interpreting them from their own perspectives to gain an understanding of God.

General Revelation vs. Natural Theology

One should not confuse the revelatory act of
God with the hermeneutical act of human beings. These two activities are different in agent and nature.

In general revelation, God is the agent and His

will the content; His purpose is to lead each individual to Himself.

In natural theology, human beings are the

agents and the contents are theoretical ideas about God produced by their imagination.