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AUTOMATION

SCENARIO
May 10, 2010 National
and Local Elections
STATISTICS
• Estimated 47,000,000 registered voters
• 44,009,069 registered voters - as of April 20, 2009 ERB
Hearing
• 58,327 registration records cancelled by reason of death
• 1,246,272 registration records deactivated
• Last ERB Hearing on November 16, 2009
• 80 Provinces
• 1,631 cities and municipalities
• 320,415 Established Precincts (estimate)
• 80,136 Clustered Precincts (estimate)
• 37,884 Polling Centers (estimate)
• 82,200 PCOS Machines
• 80,136 PCOS Machines for distribution to
clustered precincts
Board of Election Inspectors
• One (1) BEI for every clustered
precinct
• Three regular members
– Chairman
– Delivers ballot to voter
– Poll Clerk
– Third Member
• Support Staff
– Depends on number of precincts clustered
– To assist Poll Clerk and Third Member in
managing
– List of Voters with Voting Records
– Book of Voters
Board of Election Inspectors
No. of No. of Total no. of
Precincts Support personnel
Clustered Staff (BEI + Support
0 none 3
Staff)
2 none 3
3 1 4
4 2 5
5 3 6
Establishing Identity of
Voter
• LIST OF
VOTERS WITH
VOTING
RECORDS
– Photograph
Establishing Identity of
Voter
Establishing Identity of
Voter
• If identity cannot be established
through photograph
– Compare signatures
• Use Book of Voters
– Contains applications for registration
» Includes specimen signature of voter
– Other methods to challenge identity
Official Ballots
• Pre-printed
names of
candidates
• 300
candidates
can be
accommoda
ted
– 150 names
per side of
Official Ballots
• Ovals opposite • Shade oval
names of opposite name of
candidate chosen candidate
PCOS Precinct Count Optical Scan

• One unit per


clustered
precinct
• Voter personally
feeds ballot into
machine
• Ballot can be fed
at any orientation
• Ballot scanned
both sides
simultaneously
TESTING & SEALING
PROCEDURES
At least three days before election day
• Public shall accomplish test ballots
• Ballots shall be manually counted and election returns
accomplished
• Same set of ballots that was manually counted shall be fed
into the counting machine
• Manual count shall be compared with the print-out of the
election returns
• If public is satisfied that the manual count is the same as the
automated count, the print-out and manually prepared
election returns shall be signed-off by the witnesses
• Machines shall be sealed without any connection to
transmission links
• Public shall be allowed to secure the polling places where
the counting machines are installed
• The only time that the counting machines shall be opened is
Voting
• Voting period
– 7:00 a.m. to 6:00 p.m.
• Unless there are voters waiting for their turn
to vote
– Poll Clerk lists down names voters queuing
– Poll Clerk calls voter to cast ballot
– Voter who fails to appear after being called twice
shall not longer be allowed to vote
– Precinct set up
• At least 10 voters can cast ballot at any one
time
Voting
• Before voting starts
– Show that ballot
box is empty
• Transparent plastic
– Turn on and
initialize PCOS
– Print “Zero Report”
• To show that there is
no entry/vote in
machine’s memory
Counting
• At close of polls
– Perform close
function
• To prevent
additional ballots
from being inserted
– After close function,
PCOS automatically
• Starts counting
process
• Prints election
returns after
completion of
Counting
• Insert transmission cable
– After printing first eight (8) copies of
ER
• To eliminate doubts that the PCOS can be
manipulated remotely
• Perform electronic transmission
function
• Print additional twenty-two (22)
copies of ER
– Automatically performed by PCOS
Canvassing/Consolidation
• Electronically transmitted results
– Used as basis for canvassing/consolidation
and proclamation of winning candidates for
• City/municipal officials
• Provincial officials
• Members, House of Representatives
• Senators and Party-list
– Congress will also receive electronically
transmitted results
• Constitution authorized the Congress to
promulgate rules for canvassing of results for
President and Vice-President
Co ng re ss CO MELEC

Na tion al Manual
Boa rd of
Canvasser s
Physical
transport System of
Pro v. CO C Canvassing
Provin ci al SOV M/C

Boa rd of
Ca nvassers Physical
transport

Mu n./Cit y COC

Munici pa l/C ity SOV P

Boa rd of
Canvasser s
Physical
transport

Ele ct ion Re tu rn s
Precin ct
Co ng re ss CO MELEC

Na tion al Electronic
Boa rd of
Canvasser s
Physical
transport Transmission
Pro v. CO C

Provin ci al SOV M/C


Come le c Cen tra l
Boa rd of
Ba ck-up Serve r
Ca nvassers Physical Adv ance Resu lts/
transport
Mo nito ring
Secur ed
Mu n./Cit y COC Pub li c
Munici pa l/C ity SOV P Website

Boa rd of
Canvasser s Ser ve r for
Physical
transport Domi nant
Majori ty/ Min orit y
Part ie s, Cit iz ens
Ele ct ion Re tu rn s Arm, KBP
Precin ct Adv ance Resu lts
SECURITY
• Security measures under a manual
election system still applicable
• Strengthen security through
automation
– Password
– PIN
– Digital signatures
– Encryption
SECURITY
• 128-bit
encryption
128

2
 2 • 29 = 512• 216 =
1024 65,536
3
• 2 = 4 • 210 = 17

2048 • 218 =
4
• 2 = 8 • 211 =
4096 131,072
5
• 2 = 16 • 212 = 19

• 20
8192 2 =
6 13
• 2 = 32 • 2 =
7 14 262,144
21
• 2 = 64 • 2 = 16,384
8 • 222 =
• 2 = 128 • 215 = 32,768 524,288
• 2 = 256 • 2 =
1,048,576
SECURITY
• 128-bit encryption

• 223 = • 230 =
8,388,608
24 1,073,741,824
31

• 225 = • 232 =
16,777,216
26 2,147,483,648
33

• 227 = • 234 =
33,554,432
28 4,294,967,296
35
• 229 = • 236 =
67,108,864 8,569,934,592
•2 = • 2 =
134,217,728 17,179,869,184
SECURITY
• 128-bit encryption

• 237 = 137,438,953,472
• 238 = 274,877,906,944
• 239 = 549,755,813,888
• 240 = over One Trillion combinations
SECURITY
• 128-bit encryption
– Same security system used by banks
• Random Encryption
– Temperature of machine
– Voltage
– Unique machine identity
– User identity
• No single/master decryption code
SECURITY
• Time needed to decrypt one precinct
result will be same amount of time
needed to decrypt next precinct result
• Transmission takes at most 2 minutes
• Copies for distribution
– 30 copies of election returns at the precinct
level
– 30 copies of certificate of canvass at
municipal level
– 14 copies of certificate of canvass at
provincial level
SECURITY
• Audit Log
– Activities
– Time
– Date
SECURITY
• Paper Ballot
• Ballot digital image
• Data storage device
• Transmitted results
• Hard copies of election results
FIELD TEST/S
• 8 areas
– 2 for NCR
– 2 each (1 urban/1 rural)
• Luzon
• Visayas
• Mindanao
• To test system and transmission in
the same environment/conditions as
on election day
CONTINUITY PLAN
• Types of Systems Breakdown
– Fails to scan
– Able to scan but fails to print ER
– Able to print ER but fails to transmit
– Able to transmit but fails to consolidate
CONTINUITY PLAN
• Fails to scan
– Use spare PCOS
– Use PCOS of another precinct
• Wait for other PCOS to complete process in
its precinct
• Get PCOS and reconfigure for next precinct
• Scan ballots
– If all PCOS fails
• Manual counting
CONTINUITY PLAN
• Able to scan but fails to print ER
– Use spare PCOS
– Use PCOS of another precinct
• Wait for other PCOS to complete process in
its precinct
• Get PCOS and reconfigure for next precinct
• Use removable storage device of defective
PCOS and let replacement PCOS print ER
– If all PCOS fails
• Manual counting
CONTINUITY PLAN
• Able to print ER but fails to transmit
– Go to nearest precinct or polling center
which has a functioning transmission
facility
– Use removable storage device of defective
PCOS and let the functioning facility
transmit precinct results
– If all transmission facilities bog down
• Physically transport removable storage
device to canvassing site
– In the presence of watchers and security escorts
CONTINUITY PLAN
• Able to transmit but fails to consolidate
• Use consolidation/canvassing system (CCS) of
another municipality/province
• Use the removable storage device and let
functioning CCS consolidate the results
• Provide back-up canvassing through the
Central Server
– Print results and send the same to affected board of
canvassers
– Print results and constitute special board of
canvassers to take the place of the affected board
Basic Elements of Elections
• People • Systems &
– Vote-buying Procedures
– Coercion – Misreading of
– Intimidation ballots
– Terrorism – Unreadable
handwriting
– Error
• Honest
• Deliberate
– Fraud
– Manufactured
election returns
– Tampering of
election results
Successful Implementation
• Vigilance of citizenry
• Cooperation
• Coordination
• Support
THANK YOU!