Beruflich Dokumente
Kultur Dokumente
„big
five“: China
85% India
Brazil
Mexico Republic of Korea
Mexico
Chile
Argentina
Republic of Korea Nigeria
Indonesia
Malaysia
South Africa
Brazil
China Qatar
Colombia
Peru
Israel
Egypt
Thailand
18. Philippines
India Pakistan
Uzbekistan
rest of the world
Number of CER/yr
Current Status of the CDM II
„big
five“:
rest of the world 74% China
India
China Brazil
Mexico
Malaysia
6. Philippines
6. Philippines Chile
Indonesia
Mexico Thailand
Brazil
India
Number of projects/country
Current Status of the CDM III
Two
scopes
77% (01) Energy industries
(renewable - / non-renewable
sources)
(15) Agriculture
Projects in scopes
Current Status of the CDM IV
energy industries renewable - non
Three renewable (1)
agriculture (15)
Transport (7)
CER in scopes
Categories of Industrial CDM Projects
Hydroelectricity
Methane recovery
and usage
Biomass to energy
Wind from electricity
CDM Projects
❚ This development has reasons: economics
and chemistry
❚ Economics: the bigger the project, the
more efficient
❚ Chemistry: the bigger the GWP, the bigger
the amount of CER
Climate Change, Basics
❚ Various GHG have different “Green House
Power”
GHG GWP
❙ CO2 1
❙ CH4 (methane) 21
❙ N2O 300
❙ (H)CFC/PFC ∼ 1’000 – 10’000
❙ SF6 23’900
❚ Thus reduction of 1 ton of certain GHG has
different effect on climate
GWP of the Most Important GHG
CFC, HFC, and PFC
Gas GWP ODP lifetime
CFC
R 11 4000 1 50 ± relevant
R 12 8500 1 100 ± relevant
HFC
R 22 1700 0.05 13 relevant
R 123 93 0.02 1.4
Special case
PFC
R 23 11700 0
R 134 a 1300 0 15.6 relevant
R 152 a 140 0 1.8
R 407C 1300 0
the classic
CO2 (= R 744) 1 0 100
often underestimated
N20 296 114
CH4 21 0 relevant
and then there is ...
SF6 23'900 0 > 1'000
by the way
R 290 (Propan) 3 0
R 717 (Ammoniak) 0 0 -
The Fight Against Climate Change
❚ Most industrialised countries have a
quantified emissions limitation
❚ EU is one of the very big spaces with a
limitation (cap)
❚ Kyoto Protocol gives opportunity to reduce
either in the country or jointly with other
countries: flexible mechanisms
How Does Limitation Work? I
❚ Top down attribution of allowed emissions
❙ (per bubble)
❙ per country
❙ (per sector)
❙ per company
❚ Company gets the right, to emit a maximum
of GHG: allowances
❚ Issued by government to company’s account
How Does Limitation Work? II
❚ At the end of a year, the company must
surrender allowances equal to the total
emissions of the company
❚ If emissions < allowances: selling possible
❚ If emissions > allowances: buying necessary
Allowances
for 2008
Allowances
for 2009
Allowances
for 2010
Allowances
for 2011
Allowances
for 2012
How Does Limitation Work? III
2012
Avg 2008 -
How Does Limitation Work? III
disposable
allowances
excess of
allowance
s
How Does Limitation Work? III
Buy
lack of EUA
allowance Buy
s ERU
Buy
CER
disposable
allowances
Buying Allowances/Certificates: How
Much?
❚ Buying EUA
❙ unlimited
❚ Buying ERU
❙ limited
❚ Buying CER
❙ limited
Emissions Reductions: How - and Where?
❚ All these measures are different in different
industries – and countries
❚ The more efficient an industry, the more
expensive further efficiency improvements
❚ The cheaper energy, the less profitable energy
efficiency measures, the less the incentive
❚ Short: the profitability (and therefore the
effectiveness) of measures varies
❚ Thus it makes sense, to co-operate
The CDM: Joint Mitigation of GHG
❚ Goal: registration with the UNFCCC = basis
for issuing of CER
❚ Necessary: CDM project cycle
❚ Prerequisites with project developers
❙ Competence
❙ Knowledge of the CDM project cycle
❙ Systematic work
❙ … and practice
❚ Therefore: maybe contract a specialist for the
CDM part
The CDM Project Cycle
executive board
project participants
variation
profit margin trader
transaction costs
project costs
The Price of CER I
❚ Price is made at stock exchanges
❚ E.g. EEX, CCX
❚ Price influenced by demand and supply
❚ Caps for companies are fix
❙ when economy booms, they need certificates
❙ when economy is in recession, they need less
or no certificates
❚ Therefore the price depends among other
things on the course of the economy
The Price of CER II
Euros/tonne CO2e
Price CER
Source: www.eex.de
Market Size
❚ Demand of CER depends mainly on
economy and development of industries
in OECD countries
❚ In Europe, number of CER that may be
bought by companies is limited by decree
❚ Therefore the market is not unlimited
and the price for CER is lower than the
price for EUA
Price Comparison I
Euros/tonne CO2e
Price EUA
for 2010
20
15
10
Price Comparison II
Euros/tonne CO2e
Price CER
for 2010
15
10
Price Expectations, EUA I
35
[Euro/tonne]
30
25
20
15
10
0
EUA 2009 EUA 2010 EUA 2011 EUA 2012
Price Expectations, EUA II
35
[Euro/tonne]
30
25
20
17.26
16.25
15.62
15.24
15
10
01.07.2008 04.09.2009
0
EUA 2009 EUA 2010 EUA 2011 EUA 2012
Price Expectations, CER I
35
[Euro/tonne]
30
25
20
15
10
0
CER 2009 CER 2010 CER 2011 CER 2012
Price Expectations, CER II
35
[Euro/tonne]
30
25
20
13.60
13.48
13.28
13.28
15
10
01.07.2008 04.09.2009
0
CER 2009 CER 2010 CER 2011 CER 2012
The CER Market I
❚ Market illusions
❙ Great volume – great earnings
❙ Easy money making - large profits
❙ Etc.
❚ Reality
❙ Hard work
❙ Difficult (impossible?) to find investors
❙ Sell CER in a highly competitive market
❙ Prices (→ profits) currently low
The CER Market II
❚ Who needs CER?
❚ Who buys CER in the market?
❚ Role of intermediaries
❚ Role of stock exchange
Who Needs/Buys CER?
❚ Mainly companies (industries) with a cap
❚ Only in case emissions > cap
❚ How do industries buy CER?
❙ Core business is production
❙ Commitment (emissions ≤ cap) is “only” legal
problem
❙ Realise measures pays → looked at in industries
❙ Buying CER → broker
❙ Investing in projects abroad: no way
Investors in the CER Market? I
❚ Investors
❙ Industries
❘ Unknown business
❘ No qualified personnel
❘ No intention to employ specialised staff
❘ Risks!
❙ ⇒ They don’t invest in projects
❙ Who else?
❚ Funds
❙ They mostly have their focus
❙ Want to have a choice of projects, no singularities
Investors in the CER Market? II
❚ Rare exemption
❙ companies, who bring a technology
❙ e.g. biomass gasification
Intermediaries in the CER Market
❚ CER are a tradable good
❚ CER market thus classical field of brokers
❚ They specialise in buying/selling tradable
goods
❚ They know markets and developments (?)
❚ They buy big lots of CER from various
projects and thus allocate risks
❚ They do not work free of charge …
What is the Problem? I
❚ What risks exist?
❚ Project risks
❙ The project will not be registered
❙ The project is registered, but not implemented
❙ The project generates less CER than expected
❙ The monitoring fails
❙ Company goes bankrupt or similar
❙ Quality of CER
❙ …..
What is the Problem? II
❚ Market risks
❙ Demand declines
❙ Supply rises (‘overproduction’ of CER)
❙ Prices fall
❙ General framework changes (post Kyoto treaty)
❙ …
❚ Country risks
❙ Risk premium (= price reduction)
❙ Hesitation to make contracts at all (stability of
the country)
New Developments
❚ What happens after “Kyoto”?
❙ New treaty is under negotiation
Dec 2009: Copenhagen
❙ Possible goal: 2020 = 1990 – 20%
❙ (Kyoto: 2010 = 1990 – approx. 5%)
❙ 2011: airlines included in EU-ETS, as far as
they start or land in a country of the EU
❙ Allowances to companies (EU-ETS) will be
partially auctioned → prices of CER may rise
Uncertainties I
❚ What happens after “Kyoto”?
❙ How are goals formulated?
❘ Absolute?
❘ Relative? (to what?)
❘ How will growth be considered?
❙ Who is included in quantified limitation
scheme?
❘ Which countries?
❙ How is trade organised, i.e.
❘ does the CDM exist further?
❘ Is usage of CER still limited?
❘ Significance of technology transfer?
Uncertainties II
❚ What happens after “Kyoto”?
❙ How do countries react
❘ Cap and trade?
❘ Inclusion of (big) industries only?
❘ Inclusion of traffic?
❘ Inclusion of private households?
❙ How do capped industries react?
❘ Do they realise more measures?
❘ Do they displace production?
Attempt to Outlook
❚ The problem of climate change is far away
from being solved
❚ The GHG mitigation process will go on
❚ The number of included countries will rise
❚ Trade will continue, the potential market
might grow
❚ Thus realising GHG mitigation projects has
always three advantages for project owners
❙ Improvement of efficiency and productivity
❙ Reduce future risks (cost reduction)
❙ Evtl. participate in trading of GHG reductions