You are on page 1of 44

Risk Based Inspection (RBI)

- A Transparent Process?

Presented by: Cheryl Frolish
MACAW Engineering Ltd
Co-Authors: Ian Diggory, Richard Elsdon, Krista McGowan
MACAW Engineering Ltd
Richard Jones
Talisman Energy (UK) Limited 1
Introduction
Topsides & Pipelines
RBI & Operators Integrity Management Strategy
RBI Concept & Schemes
Talisman RBI Process MACAW Experience
Conclusions
Questions


2
3
Introduction
Why RBI?
Prioritise Inspection based on the
Assessment of Risk

RBI Applications
Oil and Gas Industry
Topside Processes
Onshore Terminals
Pipeline Networks
Nuclear and Aviation
Applications

Core Criteria
Optimise Inspection
Ensure Safe Operation
Provide an Audit Trail
Introduction
UK Regulations:
Identify Hazards
Prevent
Detect
Control
Mitigate
Reduce risk as low as
reasonably practicable (ALARP)

HSE Guidance:
Best Practice for Risk Based
Inspection as part of Plant
Integrity Management
Focuses on the form and
management of RBI process
rather than specific techniques or
approaches
4
Topsides & Pipelines
Topsides RBI and subsea risk assessments share many areas of
commonality, in particular:
Internal corrosion risks
Topside Processing can be the CAUSE of corrosion issues in
your pipeline:
For Example:
Water Carryover
Microbial Contamination
Condensation from Gas Phase
Process Upsets

5
Topsides & Pipelines
Topsides RBI and subsea risk assessments share many areas of
commonality, in particular:
Internal corrosion risks
Topside Processing can be the SOLUTION to corrosion issues
in your pipeline:
For Example:
Improved Separation Processes
Inhibitor Efficiency
Dew Point Control
Improve Process Reliability

6
Topsides & Pipelines
Knowledge of topside condition can give an early indication of
potential pipeline integrity issues:

Pipework and Vessel Inspections
Condition
Other indications such as sand in the separators

Microbiological Surveys

Corrosion Coupons
7

Topsides and Pipelines - Example
Reservoir
Gas Pipeline
Oil Pipeline
Offshore Processing Onshore Processing
Corrosion
Coupon
Water
Processing
8

Topsides and Pipelines - Example
Corrosion
Coupon
Possible Causes:
Poor separation allowing for water carryover
Inhibitor partitioning time
Process Upsets
MIC
0
45
90
135
180
225
270
315
360
0 10 20 30 40 50 60
Distance - Km
O
r
i
e
n
t
a
t
i
o
n

-

d
e
g
r
e
e
s
9
Topsides and Pipelines - Example
Reservoir
Gas Pipeline
Oil Pipeline
Corrosion
Coupon
RBI will identify HIGH risk areas.
Interaction between topside and
subsea assurance teams to
determine location that best
represents conditions in the
pipeline.
The corrosion coupons have
not been showing any
evidence of corrosion growth.
WHY?
Position
in the
pipe
Location?
Water
Processing
10
RBI & Operators Integrity Management Strategy
Monitoring
and
Mitigation
Topside
Inspection
Pipeline
Inspection
Corrosion
Control
Strategy
RBI
(Topsides)
CRA,
FFP & CGA
(Pipeline)
11
Activities Integrity Schemes
RBI Concept
12
IDENTIFY THREATS/
HAZARDS
to EQUIPMENT
(Pipework, Vessels etc)
SUSCEPTIBILITY to
THREAT
MITIGATION
MEASURES to
REDUCE
SUSCEPTIBILITY
LIKELIHOOD of
FAILURE
FAILURE MODE
CONSEQUENCES of
FAILURE
ASSESS
INSPECTION
HISTORY
REMAINING LIFE or
INSPECTION GRADE
IDENTIFY THREATS/
HAZARDS
to EQUIPMENT
(Pipework, Vessels etc)
SUSCEPTIBILITY to
THREAT
MITIGATION
MEASURES to
REDUCE
SUSCEPTIBILITY
LIKELIHOOD of
FAILURE
FAILURE MODE
CONSEQUENCES of
FAILURE
ASSESS
INSPECTION
HISTORY
REMAINING LIFE or
INSPECTION GRADE
RISK FACTOR
INSPECTION
SCHEME
Internal Threats
Internal Corrosion
Sweet Corrosion
Sour Corrosion /
Cracking Mechanisms
MIC (Microbiologically
Induced Corrosion)
Oxygen Corrosion
Other potential
mechanisms?
E.g. Acetic Acid
weld degradation
Ref: MACAW Defect Atlas, Dr. Colin Argent
13
External Threats
External Corrosion
Atmospheric Corrosion
CUI (Corrosion Under
Insulation)
Chloride pitting of stainless
steels
Galvanic corrosion
Other potential
mechanisms?
Ref: HSE Offshore External Corrosion Guide
14
Mitigation
Internal
Linings
Inhibitors
Biocides
H2S Scavengers
O2 Scavengers
Gas dehydration glycol towers and mol sieves
Dew Point Control
Material type
External
Coatings
Material type
Effective maintenance strategy (paint coatings and insulation
cladding)

15
Consequences of Failure
Consequence
of Failure
Safety Environment
Production
Fluid Type
Failure
Mode
Manning
Levels
Temperature
and Pressure
Flammability
Toxicity
Size of
Release
Fluid Type
Location
Temperature
Flammability
Toxicity
Commercial
Criticality
Back up
systems?
Loss of
Production
16
RBI Concept
17
IDENTIFY THREATS/
HAZARDS
to EQUIPMENT
(Pipework, Vessels etc)
SUSCEPTIBILITY to
THREAT
MITIGATION
MEASURES to
REDUCE
SUSCEPTIBILITY
LIKELIHOOD of
FAILURE
FAILURE MODE
CONSEQUENCES of
FAILURE
ASSESS
INSPECTION
HISTORY
REMAINING LIFE or
INSPECTION GRADE
IDENTIFY THREATS/
HAZARDS
to EQUIPMENT
(Pipework, Vessels etc)
SUSCEPTIBILITY to
THREAT
MITIGATION
MEASURES to
REDUCE
SUSCEPTIBILITY
LIKELIHOOD of
FAILURE
FAILURE MODE
CONSEQUENCES of
FAILURE
ASSESS
INSPECTION
HISTORY
REMAINING LIFE or
INSPECTION GRADE
RISK FACTOR
INSPECTION
SCHEME
Inspection History
Inspection
History
Remaining
Life
Inspection
Grading
API RP
570 & 510
IP 12 &13
Model Code of
Safe Practice
Calculate time to failure based on
wall thickness measurements.

Maximum inspection interval =
remaining service life
Effectiveness and results of
inspections are graded. IP
guidelines set out
recommended maximum
intervals based on
inspection grade
Quantitativ
e
Qualitative
18
Outcome of an RBI?
What? How?
When?
Result of an RBI
Where?
Types of
damage
expected
Inspection
Frequency
Appropriat
e
Inspection
Technique
Hotspot
locations
19
RBI Schemes
In 2002 HSE funded a study to compare several RBI schemes
Quantitative vs Qualitative
Black box approach
Varying levels of detail
HSE study identified the need for:
A TRANSPARENT process
A balance between quantitative and qualitative methods
A balance between theory, inspection and engineering judgement

Ref: Risk Based Inspection A Case Study Evaluation of Onshore Process Plant, W Geary, 2002.
20
Talisman Assets
North Sea Operator
11 Platforms
1 FPSO
2 Onshore Terminals
Network of over 3000 km of subsea pipelines
Ageing assets, near or past design life
Previous owners and inspection companies
Incomplete data set
Historical data often stored in hard copy only
Some existing RBI schemes but varied in type and
complexity
A unified approach was required
21
Talisman RBI Scheme
Initial Approach

Talisman had adopted an RBI program
Based on API half-remaining life approach
MACAWs initial role to populate and run this program

Problem

- Information was limited or just not available
- Program required complete data set to operate successfully
A common feature of quantitative models
- Gaps in inspection history and lack of confidence in results meant that
API approach was not appropriate
22
Talisman RBI Scheme

MACAW and Talisman collaborated in development
of a more robust scheme
MACAW applied the concept of transparency to Talisman
RBI scheme
Moved away from API approach to IP grading method
Top down approach, prioritised safety critical systems

23
Talisman Assets
Scale of the project:
11 platforms, 1 FPSO and 2 onshore terminals
Typical platform:
350 vessels (inc. heat exchangers, filters and air accumulators)
3000 items of pipework (grouped into ~120 streams)
For all of Talismans assets, this equates to approximately:
2500 Vessel RBIs
1700 Stream RBIs
The project was split into three phases
Phase 1 - Safety Critical Systems
Phases 2 & 3 Less Critical Systems
24
RBI The Key Steps
MACAW Team
Stakeholders
Define Systems and Streams
Data Collection
Assess Corrosion Threats and Consequences
Assess Inspection History
Review Process
Documentation and Handover
Training and Technical Support
Implementing RBI
Updating RBIs
Reviewing RBIs

Effective
Communications
Implementation
Live System
25
Define Scope
Transparent
Decisions
Audit & Handover

Project Manager (1)


Senior Corrosion Engineers (2)


Project Supervisors (3)


Technical Assistants (6)
MACAW Team
26
Team is set up to work on 6
RBI projects at a time

Data intensive process

Engineering assessment
required on missing data

Stakeholders

Talisman
Assurance Engineer
Focal Point Engineer
Process Engineer
Chemist
Offshore Inspection Engineer

Inspection Company
Inspection Engineer
Corrosion Engineer
27
Systems and Streams
Systems are defined by their fluid and function, e.g.
Produced Oil & Oil Export
Gas Compression and Export
Fuel Gas
Systems determine equipment to be assessed, such as:
Separation vessels
Heat exchangers
Streams
Streams are used to define sections of pipework operating
under similar parameters, such as:
Pressure
Temperature
Material
Fluid composition
Added chemicals (e.g. Corrosion Inhibitor injection)


28
Systems and Streams
Process Flow Diagram
extract
Before stream mark up



A
B
C D
E
F
G
H
I
J
K
29
Systems and Streams
Process Flow Diagram
extract
After stream mark up



12
30
Data Collection
Fluid data




Design and operating details





Inspection history
CO
2
H
2
S
pH
Water
Cut
Material
Wall
Thickness
Design and
Operating
Temperature
Design and
Operating
Pressure
Corrosion
Allowance
Internal
Lining
Bug Count
and Type
O
2

Sand
Content
Inspection
Type
Results and
Conclusions
31
Assess Corrosion Threats and Consequences
Internal
Corrosion
Mechanisms
Susceptibility
Mitigation
Likelihood of
Failure
External
Corrosion
Mechanisms
Susceptibility
Mitigation
Likelihood of
Failure
High Medium High High
Medium Low Medium High
Low Low Low Medium
Low Medium High
I
n
t
e
r
n
a
l

L
i
k
e
l
i
h
o
o
d

o
f

F
a
i
l
u
r
e
INTERNAL RISK
Consequence of Failure
High Medium High High
Medium Low Medium High
Low Low Low Medium
Low Medium High
Consequence of Failure
E
x
t
e
r
n
a
l

L
i
k
e
l
i
h
o
o
d

o
f

F
a
i
l
u
r
e
EXTERNAL RISK
32
Assess Inspection History
Inspection history and
grading
IP 12 and 13 Inspection
Grading method
Modified to incorporate risk
Example Pressure vessel
inspections next slide

33
Assess Inspection History
Equipment Grade 0 Grade 1 Grade 2 Grade 3
Process Pressure vessels and
heat exchangers
36 48 84 144
Internal Inspection Intervals for Vessels and Heat Exchangers (Months)
Internal
Risk
Grade 0 Grade 1 Grade 2 Grade 3
High 24 36 72 84
Medium 36 48 84 144
Low 48 72 144 144
IP recommended maximum interval
RBI recommended maximum interval
NB: Hydrocarbon Systems will always fall into High and Medium Risk Categories due
to the consequence of failure associated with these systems
34
Review Process
Staged Review Process

Level 1: Peer Review of each system

Level 2: Integrity Review covering all systems within each phase

Representatives required from the following areas:
Assurance
Inspection
Process Engineering
Production Chemist
Operations
Site personnel
Safety and Environment
35
Documentation and Handover
Documentation of
Assumptions
Issues
Key decisions
Marked up PFDs and P&IDs
PFDs hyperlinked to RBIs
References for Data Sources
RBIs in spreadsheet format
Change logging
Live summary sheet


36
Linked PFD and RBI Front Sheet
37
Risk Assessment and Data Sources
Change Log and Prompts
39
A
C
D
B
Live Summary Sheet
40
Training and Technical Support
Helpdesk set up for ongoing technical support
41
Date:
Request
from:
Contact details: Asset: RBI File name:
Q.A.P 4.26.1
08/10/2007
Request
MACAW RBI Help Request form
Operating the Scheme
Once handed over the RBI becomes the responsibility of the
client
Quality Controls
Allocated users
Permissions should be set up so that only persons who have
attended training sessions may edit the RBIs
Procedures for Updating and Reviewing Internally
Procedures for sharing RBI information with other interested parties
Subsea Integrity
Contractors


42
Conclusions
Involve all stakeholders from the beginning of the process

Develop a system that can cope with variability of data

Decisions and criteria should be transparent

RBI is an ongoing process

The output from the RBI should carry through into pipeline
integrity assessments
43

Thank you for your time,
any questions?
44