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Session 10

HAZOP
HAZOP - 2
Hazard and Operability Studies Overview
Originated as a hazard identification technique for
process plants developed by ICI in mid 1960s
also commonly applied in petrochemical, nuclear and food
processing industries

Described as a system of imaginative anticipation of
hazards

Differs from Functional Failure Analysis in 4 key ways:
always a team activity
concentrates on deviations in flows between components
uses well-defined guide words to steer analysis
considers both plausible causes and possible consequences of
deviations
HAZOP - 3
HAZOP technical approach
In the process industries, HAZOP is normally applied once the
piping and instrumentation (P&I) diagram has been produced

Scope of study explicitly extends to cover unusual
circumstances such as startup, shutdown and plant
maintenance

Scope of study does not include making detailed design
changes, although recommendations and follow-up questions
should be produced

As with FHA, results are recorded in a tabular format

No reason why HAZOP cannot be applied to any system in
which flows can be identified including information flow in
software
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HAZOP procedure
Select a component
Select a flow
Suggest a deviation
using a guide word
Investigate and
document effects
Investigate and
document causes
Record as non-hazardous
deviation, with a
justification
Record as hazard. Make
recommendations for
action if necessary
Start Finish
All components analysed?
All flows analysed?
All guide words considered?
Does deviation have plausible
causes and hazardous effects?
YES
YES
YES
NO
NO
NO
NO YES
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HAZOP Team Members 1
Leader
planning and preparation
act as chairman for meeting
sign off documentation
ensure follow-up work is
completed
Recorder
participant in study (?)
document the analysis
Designer(s), process / project
engineers
understand and explain the
plant design
answer questions about the
plant and process
User(s)
may be site representative,
operator, maintenance crew
supply information about the
context in which the system
will be used, e.g. site facilities
ask questions, and help decide
which issues affect safety
Expert(s)
key function is to explore
ask questions
suggest deviations / causes /
effects
need good knowledge of
process chemistry, or
experience of similar plant
Team may recruit extra members (technical specialists) if required
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HAZOP Team Members 2
Team may recruit additional members when required

Typically to answer specific questions, e.g.
control engineer
mechanical engineer
occupational health / hygienist
environmental specialists

Different teams often appropriate for different stages of
the lifecycle, but continuity (e.g. same leader) usually
recommended
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HAZOP guide words
Guide Word Deviation Example Interpretation
NO or NONE No part of the intention is achieved No forward flow when there should be.
MORE Quantitative increase in a physical
property (rate or total quantity)
Higher pressure, flow rate, temperature...
Quantity of material is too large.
LESS Quantitative decrease in a physical
property (rate or total quantity)
Lower pressure, flow rate, temperature...
Quantity of material is too small.
MORE THAN
or AS WELL AS
All intentions achieved, but with
additional effects (qualitative
increase)
Impurities in flow (air, water, oil...)
Chemicals present in more than one phase
(vapour, solid)
PART OF Only some of the intention is
achieved (qualitative decrease)
One or more components of mixture
missing, or ratio of components is incorrect
OTHER THAN A result other than the intention is
achieved
Unusual circumstances etc... see next slide
REVERSE The exact opposite of the intention
is achieved
Reverse flow.
Physical properties
Temperature Flow rate Pressure Reaction rate
Viscosity
HAZOP - 8
HAZOP guide words 2
Guide word Other Than has many interpretations
this word particularly is often defined specifically for
particular study
examples include
plant operation phases
startup, shutdown, maintenance, sampling and inspection
instrumentation
control philosophy, location of instruments, alarms and trips
failure of plant services
cooling water, fuels, power supplies
other external factors
weather
spare / non-installed / portable equipment
safety
fire and leak detection, emergency planning
HAZOP - 9
HAZOP example a bit of P&I
PG
PG
LC
Settling tank
Drain
Drain
Drain
Hydrocarbon
from storage
Transfer pumps
(one working, one spare)
To reactor
LC
Valve (normally closed during
operation of the plant)
Valve (normally open during
operation of the plant)
Manually operated valve
Non-return valve
Pump
Automation (level
controller)
HAZOP - 10
HAZOP example output
Guide Word Deviation Possible Causes Consequences Action Required
NONE
No flow No hydrocarbon
available from storage
Loss of feed to reactor.
Polymer formed in
heat exchanger
1) Ensure good communication
with storage area
2) Install low level alarm on
settling tank
Transfer pump fails
(motor fault, loss of
power, impeller
corroded etc.)
As above Covered by 2)
MORE
More flow Level control valve
fails to open, or LCV
bypassed in error
Settling tank overfills 3) Install high level alarm
4) Check size of overflow
5) Establish locking-off procedure
for LCV bypass when not in use
More
pressure
Isolation valve or LCV
closed when pump
running
Line subjected to full
pump pressure
6) Install kickback on pumps
More
temperature
High intermediate
storage temperature
Higher pressure in
transfer line and
settling tank
7) Install warning of high
temperature at intermediate
storage
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Hazard Study Phasing 1
Research and Process
Development
Process and Project
Definition
Project Design
Procurement and
Construction
Commissioning
Operation
1 2 3 4 5 6
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Hazard Study Phasing 2
1 - Concept Study
PHI, checklist, materials and reagents study, first outline HAZOP
2 - Process Flow Study
HAZOP
3 - Detailed Design (P&I) Study
HAZOP
4 - Detailed Design (Physical) Study
HAZOP update, Sneak, Fault Trees, FMEA
5 - Audit of installed plant against design
Checklist, review of HAZOP actions, inspections
6 - Audit / review of process
Final review of evidence, completeness of HAZOP actions
HAZOP - 13
HAZOP Pros and Cons
Advantages
very methodical. Use of guide words can give
confidence in completeness of analysis.
has both inductive and deductive phases
team conclusions may carry more weight than those
reached by individual analysts

Disadvantages
can produce lots of output. Structure is only obtained by
reference back to P&I diagrams
team approach is expensive must be shown to be
cost-effective
HAZOP - 14
ICI Experience
More operability problems than hazards are usually
found
though difference is smaller with existing plants

Number of post-commissioning modifications to plant is
reduced

Time to achieve intended production rates is reduced

For major plant, cost is typically about 1% of design cost
0.1 - 0.2% of total plant cost