OLGA TELLIS & ORS.VS. BOMBAY MUNICIPAL CORPORATION
Legal aplitude of the case PARTIES IN THE CASE Appellant Ms. Olga Tellis Vayyapuri Kuppusami Respondent Bombay Municipal Corporation State of Maharashtra LAWS INVOLVED IN THE CASE Constitution of India 1950: Articles 14, 15, 16, 19, 19(1), 21, 22, 25, 29, 32, 37, 39, and Article 41 I.P.C, 1860: Section 441. Bombay Municipal Corporation Act, 1888: Sections 312, 313, 314.
Facts of the case The state of Maharashtra and the Bombay Municipal Corporation somewhere in the June of 1981 decided to evict the pavement dwellers and those who were residing in slums in Bombay. Pursuant to that, the then Chief Minister of Maharashtra Mr. A. R. Antulay ordered on July 13 to evict slum dwellers and pavement dwellers out of Bombay and to deport them to their place of origin. The eviction was to proceed under Section 314 of the Bombay Municipal Corporation Act 1888. On hearing about the Chief Ministers announcement regarding eviction of slum dwellers and pavement dwellers out of Bombay they filed a writ petition in the High Court of Bombay for an order of injunction restraining the officers of the state government and the Bombay Municipal Corporations from implementing the directive of the Chief Minister.
Cont. The High Court of Bombay granted an ad interim injunction to be in force until July 21 1981. Respondents agreed that the huts will not be demolished until October 15, 1981. Contrary to agreement, on July 23 1981, petitioners were huddled in to State Transport buses for being deported out of Bombay. They respondents action was challenged by the petitioner on the ground that it is violation of Articles 19(1)(3), 19(1)(g) and Article 21 of the Constitution. The Respondents also ask for a declaration that Section 312, 313 and 314 of the Bombay Municipal Corporation Act 1888 are violative of Article 14, 19 and 21 of the Constitution.
Issue Involved Question of Estoppels against fundamental rights or Waiver of Fundamental Rights. Constitutionality of provisions of Bombay Municipal Corporation Act, 1888 Scope of right to life under Article 21 of the Constitution Whether pavement dwellers are trespasser under IPC.
Question of Estoppels against fundamental rights or Waiver of Fundamental Rights.
Court Observed, there can neither estoppel against the Constitution nor waiver of fundamental rights. Court observed: No individual can barter away the freedoms conferred upon him by the Constitution. A concession made by him in a proceeding whether under a mistake of law or otherwise that he does not possess or will not enforce any particular fundamental right, cannot create an estoppel against him in that or any subsequent proceedings. Such a concession if enforced would defeat the purpose of the Constitution. Scope of right to life under Article 21 of the Constitution
Court observed, The sweep of the right to life conferred by Article 21 of the constitution of India is wide and far reaching. It does not mean merely that life cannot be reduce or taken away except according to procedure established by law. That is but one of the important aspect of the right to life. An equally important aspect of that right is the right to livelihood because no person can live without the means of livelihood. If the right to livelihood is not treated as a part of the constitutional right to life, the easiest way of depriving a person his right to life would be to remove him of his means of livelihood to the point of abrogation. And such deprivation would not only denude the life of its effective content and meaningfulness but it would make life impossible to live. And yet, the Court further added, such deprivation would not have to be in accordance with the procedure established by law, if the right to livelihood is not regarded as a part of the right to life. Deprive a person of his right to livelihood and you shall have deprived him of his life. It would be a total didacticism, in the light of Article 39(a) and 41, to exclude the right to livelihood from the content of the right to life
Constitutionality of provisions of Bombay Municipal Corporation Act, 1888
the Constitution does not put an absolute embargo on the deprivation of life or personal liberty. By Article 21 such deprivation has to be according to procedure established law. Section 314 is in the nature of an enabling provision and not of a compulsive character. It confers on the commissioner the discretion to cause an encroachment to be removed with or without notice. It is so designed as to exclude the principles of natural justice by way of exception and not as a general rule. The sections 312(1), 313(1)(a), and 314 empowers the Municipal Commissioner to cause to removed encroachment on footpaths over which the public has the right of passage, cannot be regarded as unreasonable, unfair or unjust. Justice Chinnappa Reddy, J. Said: In our view the principles of natural justice know of no exclusionary rule dependent on whether it would have made any difference if natural justice had been observed. The non-observance of natural justice is itself prejudice to any man and proof of prejudice independently of proof of denial of natural justice is unnecessary. It will come from a person who has denied justice that the person who has been denied justice is not prejudiced.
Whether pavement dwellers are trespasser under IPC.
Who does not commit crime in this city? There is no doubt that the petitioners are using pavements and other public properties for an unauthorized purpose, but, their intention or object in doing so is not to "commit an offence or intimidate, insult or annoy any person", which is the gist or the offence of 'Criminal trespass' under Section 441 of the Penal Code. The encroachments committed by these persons are involuntary acts in the sense that those acts are compelled by inevitable circumstances and are not guided by choice. Trespass is a tort. But, even the law of Torts requires that though a trespasser may be evicted forcibly, the force used must be no greater than what is reasonable and appropriate to the occasion and, what is even more important, the trespasser should be asked and given a reasonable opportunity to depart before force is used to expel him.
Court Held Though the Court declined to hold that evicted dwellers had a right to an alternative site but instead made orders that: No person has the right to encroach on footpaths, pavements or any other place reserved or ear marked for public purpose. The provision contained in Section 314 of the Bombay Municipal Corporation Act is not unreasonable in the circumstances of the case. Sites should be provided to residents censused in 1976. Slums in existence for 20 years or more were not to be removed unless land was required for public purposes and in that case, alternative sites must be provided. High priority should be given to resettlement.
Concluding Remarks This judgment reflects very much the Principle of Utility propounded by Jeremy Bentham. Principle of Utility contain that motto of a state action should be the maximum happiness of the maximum number. According to Jeremy Bentham happiness can be maximized only if instance of pain are lighter and fewer. The judgment delivered by the Honble Court can be said to be the replica of the idea embodied in the Principle of Utility. Slum and pavement dwellers constitute almost half of the total population of the Bombay. Involvement of interests of such a large number of peoples compelled the Court to pen down in their favour despite of the existence of the specific law for the eviction of pavement dwellers. According to chief justice Y.V.Chandrachud, although the petitioners are using pavements and public properties unauthorizedly, but they are in no way criminal trespassers under section 441 of the Indian Penal Code since their object or reason behind doing so is not to commit any offence or intimidates, insult or annoy any person, rather they are compelled by inevitable circumstances and are not guided by choice. They just manage to find a habitat in filthy or marshy places. This decision where widened the scope of the term life, has also paved the way for reformation of substantive law.