Is COMELEC System

Transparent?
Manuel A. Alcuaz Jr.
2004 ARMM Dagdag-Bawas
In the 2004 elections the nation experienced
massive election fraud.

Based on a comparison of NAMFREL’s partial

count and the COMELEC count it was
estimated that there was 598, 560 dagdag-
bawas in favor of Gloria Macapagal Arroyo
and against Fernando Poe Jr. in ARMM alone.
 Automated Transmission
and Canvassing Fraud
Automation of transmission and canvassing
will not eliminate wholesale fraud. The
COMELEC’s AES can be manipulated by
insiders to create massive and undetected
election fraud. There could be many
E-garci’s operating undetected!

In three days COMELEC and Congress could

proclaim candidates that the voters did not
elect!
 False Claim

While the proponents of election automation

claim that automation can prevent a
repetition of “Hello Garci” a careful analysis
of the Smartmatic Technical proposal raises
very serious concerns.
 Quick Results

The main objective seems to be getting

quick results. And in order to attain this sole
objective transparency and auditability has
been almost completely eliminated.
 Hacking Smoke Screen

Another objective seems to be security from

any manipulation by outside parties (anyone
not in COMELEC or Smartmatic). And I must
admit that the system has very ample
security against hacking.

But that is just a smoke screen which a lot of

people and institutions have fallen for.
 An Analogy

Consider this analogy. If you live in a

boarding house in an unsafe area with lots of
potential robbers, having grilled windows,
door locks, and padlocks will protect you
from outside robbers. But if the thieves live
in your house you are in trouble.

That is the problem we have in the May 2010

elections can we trust all the people in
COMELEC and Smartmatic?
The nation wants and needs honest and
credible elections.

Unfortunately the COMELEC-Smartmatic AES

does not provide for transparency and
auditability.
 The Old System
In the old manual canvassing system ER’s
where brought to the canvassing center and
the parties, citizens arms would verify that
the ER’s were valid thru a comparison of
signatures.

They could also compare if the vote count

on their copies of the ER were the same as
the vote count on COMELEC’s copy of the
ER. In case of a discrepancy they could
protest.
 The SOV

The ER’s were then transcribed to the

statement of votes (a large paper tabular form
with precincts as columns and candidates as
rows. Each of the parties and citizens arms
could fill up their own forms and with
calculators add up each candidates’ votes to
determine the total votes to be placed in the
COC (certificate of canvass).
 Slow but Transparent

This was a slow process but there was could

be honest errors and there could be
cheating transparency and auditability.
There.

But at least unless you had fallen asleep,

you would know if cheating had taken
place.
In some canvassing centers there were giant
boards where the votes of each candidate by
precinct were posted for all to see.

Even ordinary citizens who had taken pictures of

ER’s posted in precincts as mandated by law
could compare the results posted with the ER’s
they had recorded.

The process at provincial and national canvassing

levels are similar except COC’s are canvassed.
UNFORTUNATELY, WE ARE SPENDING
P7.2 BILLION ON AUTOMATION AND
LOSING THIS TRANSPARENCY AND
AUDITABILITY!
 The COMELEC Smartmatic
System
Transmission

ER’s will be electronically transmitted from

PCOS machines to the municipal canvassing
servers.

The BEI’s will have secure electronic keys to

enable transmission. But will they see what
they are transmitting?
 The Danger
PCOS machines the greatest danger is not that some
hacker will catch the message in the sky and change
it, nor that some outsider will send spurious ER’s to
the municipal canvassing center.

The greatest danger is that someone in COMELEC or

the vendor organization may change the real
election returns in the PCOS and transmit a
manipulated ER.

Insiders in the vendor organization could do this for

thousands of machines when they create the
programs that the PCOS machines will use for
counting and transmission.
 The CCS
The Smartmatic CCS System has impressive
security features. Unfortunately it
eliminates the transparency and auditability
of the traditional canvassing process.
According to Smartmatic’s Technical
Proposal CCS consists of four modules:
Reception Module
Canvassing Module
Administrative Module
Control Module
 The Reception Module
The Reception Module receives ER’s from
the PCOS machines either thru electronic
transmission or thru a back up storage
device.

The module has extensive security features

to assure that spurious data are not
accepted. The verified data is stored in a
database that is used by the canvassing
system.
 Not Transparent

That may be secure but definitely not

transparent; people at the canvassing
center do not see what is received. Neither
are there means for them to compare their
ER’s with what was received.
 Canvassing Module

The canvassing module has the following

functions:
Generate canvass reports
View COC and Reports

Generate Certificate of Canvass and

Proclamation
Generate Statement of Votes
The Canvass Report is generated
periodically (every 15 minutes). For hours
what the watchers will see is canvass
reports.

It seems that the canvass report will just

contain information on what ER’s or COC’s
have been received.

Unlike in the old manual system where the

ER or COC would be posted on a blackboard
or tally sheet.
If the COMELEC was interested in
transparency it could have
specified projectors to be used!
When all the expected ER’s or COC’s have
come in a certificate of canvass is generated
and printed.

Once the certificate of canvass is signed a

proclamation for relevant officials is printed.

These is very interesting, people will be

proclaimed with no audit having taken place.
Interestingly, what Smartmatic refers to as a
statement of votes is a list of Election
Returns taken into account in the COC. This
does not conform with the definition of
statement of votes in RA 9369.

This is very suspicious it seems that

COMELEC intends to complete proclamation
of winners with no transparency and no
audits.
This is worse than Hello Garci in 2004!
 Electronic Transmission
Compliance?
Section 19 of RA 9369 states “within one hour after
the printing of election returns, the Chairman of
the Board of Election, inspectors, or any official
authorized by the Commission shall in the presence
of watchers and representatives of the accredited
citizens’ arm, political parties/candidates, if any,
electronically transmit the precinct results to the
respective levels of board of canvassers, to the
dominant majority party and minority party, to the
accredited citizens’ arm and to the Kapisanan ng
mga Broadcasters ng Pilipinas (KBP).
Unfortunately as defined in Smartmatic’s
financial bid there is a single shared server
where all the electronic transmission will
be sent to.

There is a strong possibility that there may

be a communication bottleneck with 82,200
PCOS There also is a strong possibility that
the server may somehow fail.

How will the four concerned parties audit

the election in such a case.
 What Should be Done?
Ideally, the four concerned groups should
have PC’s that can receive the EER’s
(electronic election returns) at each
canvassing center.

Since these PC’s will cost a very small

percentage of COMELEC’s P11.3 billion
automation budget, legislation should be
passed to allow rental or purchase of PC’s
with communication capabilities for the
above in every canvassing location.
 Add Visibility
The Oversight Committee and the two
houses of Congress should mandate that
COMELEC and Smartmatic should institute
ways to enhance the transparency and
auditability of the election process.

Instead of just issuing a canvass (progress)

report the ER’s or COC’s that are received
at a canvassing center ER”s and COC’s
received should be made visible for the
concerned parties and citizens that may be
watching.
 Audit Question
There should be a process for questioning
discrepancies between COMELEC’s electronic copy
of the ER or COC and that of other concerned
parties. This should be done as results arrive not
after the generation of the COC.

Furthermore, the requirement of RA 9369 that

national canvassing should be completed before
local canvassing and proclamation should be
strictly mandated.
 What Should Congress Do?
If the Senate and the House are sincere in their
desire to have clean, honest, and credible elections
they should pass legislation to make it possible.

The required legislation is two pronged:

1.Require that before transmitting of COC’s from

each level, COMELEC cross check with the majority
party, minority party, citizens arm, and KBP if there
are discrepancies.
2.Provide the funding for 1,530 PC’s with
communication facilities for each of the four
organizations and funding for communications.