Political Law

Discussion of Political Cases

 Political Law
Political laws are laws that govern the administration of the
government and its officials.
Political rights are those which may be exercised in the
formation or administration of the government they are
distinguished from civil, rights, which are the rights which
a man enjoys, as regards other individuals, and not in
relation to the government.
A political corporation is one which has principally for its
object the administration of the government, or to which
the powers of government, or a part of such powers,
have been delegated.
CHAVEZ VERSUS GONZALES
Petitioner Chavez filed a petition under
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court against
respondents Secretary Gonzales and the
NTC, “praying for the issuance of the writs
of certiorari and prohibition, as
extraordinary legal remedies, to annul void
proceedings, and to prevent the unlawful,
unconstitutional and oppressive exercise
of authority by the respondents.”
 Alleging that the acts of respondents are violations of the freedom
on expression and of the press, and the right of the people to
information on matters of public concern, petitioner specifically
asked this Court:  [F] or [the] nullification of acts, issuances, and
orders of respondents committed or made since June 6, 2005 until
the present that curtail the public’s rights to freedom of expression
and of the press, and to information on matters of public concern
specifically in relation to information regarding the controversial
taped conversion of President Arroyo and for prohibition of the
further commission of such acts, and making of such issuances, and
orders by respondents.   As well as due to the facts that from the
events that occurred a year after the 2004 national and local
elections namely, that on June 5, 2005, Press Secretary Ignacio
Bunye told reporters that the opposition was planning to destabilize
the administration by releasing an audiotape of a mobile phone
conversation allegedly between the President of the Philippines,
Gloria Macapagal Arroyo, and a high-ranking official of the
Commission on Elections (COMELEC). 
 The conversation was audiotaped allegedly
through wire-tapping.  Later, in a Malacañang
press briefing, Secretary Bunye produced two
versions of the tape, one supposedly the
version, and the other, a spliced, “doctored” or
altered version, which would suggest that the
President had instructed the COMELEC official to
manipulate the election results in the President’s
favor. It seems that Secretary Bunye admitted
that the voice was that of President Arroyo, but
subsequently made a retraction.
 On June 7, 2005, former counsel of
deposed President Joseph Estrada, Atty.
Alan Paguia, subsequently released an
alleged authentic tape recording of the
wiretap.  Included in the tapes were
purported conversations of the President,
the First Gentleman Jose Miguel Arroyo,
COMELEC Commissioner Garcillano , and
the late Senator Barbers. 
On June 8, 2005, respondent Department of Justice (DOJ) Secretary Raul
Gonzales warned reporters that those who had copies of the compact
disc (CD) and those broadcasting or publishing its contents could be
held liable under the Anti-Wiretapping Act. These persons included
Secretary Bunye and Atty. Paguia.  He also stated that persons
possessing or airing said tapes were committing a continuing offense,
subject to arrest by anybody who had personal knowledge if the
crime was committed or was being committed in their presence.
On June 9, 2005, in another press briefing, Secretary Gonzales
ordered the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) to go after media
organizations “found to have caused the spread, the playing and the
printing of the contents of a tape” of an alleged wiretapped
conversation involving the President about fixing votes in the 2004
national elections.  Gonzales said that he was going to start with
Inq7.net, a joint venture between the Philippine Daily Inquirer
and GMA7 television network, because by the very nature of the
Internet medium, it was able to disseminate the contents of the tape
more widely.  He then expressed his intention of inviting the editors
and managers of Inq7.net and GMA7 to a probe, and supposedly
declared, “I [have] asked the NBI to conduct a tactical interrogation
of all concerned.”
 Now, the question is, is it morally
permissible that Mr. Francisco Chavez
files a petition to Mr. Raul M. Gonzales
for refraining or stopping the
broadcasting or airing companies in
displaying or broadcasting the
wiretapped tape to the public without
any legal basis that the wiretapped
conversation is true or just merely an
edited one?
 VIOLATION
The right being violated is the freedom of expression, particularly the
mass-media display of the news that is written in the section 3,
which states that, “The privacy of communication and
correspondence shall be inviolable except upon lawful order of the
court, or when public safety or order requires otherwise, as
prescribed by law. Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the
preceding section shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any
proceeding.” As well as the section 4 which states that, “No law
shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech, of expression, or
of the press, or the right of the people peaceably to assemble and
petition the government for redress of grievances.”
 VERDICT
    The court’s decision is that Mr. Francisco Chavez won
with the said petition. In this jurisdiction, it is established
that freedom of the press is crucial and so inextricably
woven into the right to free speech and free expression,
that any attempt to restrict it must be met with an
examination so critical that only a danger that is clear
and present would be allowed to curtail it. 
Indeed, we have not wavered in the duty to uphold this
cherished freedom. We have struck down laws and
issuances meant to curtail this right. When on its face, it
is clear that a governmental act is nothing more than a
naked means to prevent the free exercise of speech, it
must be nullified.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,
GENERAL ROMEO ZULUETA,
COMMODORE EDGARDO
GALEOS, ANTONIO CABALUNA,
DOROTEO MANTOS &
FLORENCIO BELOTINDOS,
petitioners, vs. VICENTE G. LIM,
respondent.
In the present case, fifty-seven (57) years have
lapsed from the time the Decision in the
subject expropriation proceedings became
final, but still the Republic of the Philippines,
herein petitioner, has not compensated the
owner of the property.  To tolerate such
prolonged inaction on its part is to
encourage distrust and resentment among
our people – the very vices that corrode the
ties of civility and tempt men to act in ways
they would otherwise shun.
On September 5, 1938, the Republic of the Philippines
(Republic) instituted a special civil action for expropriation
with the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Cebu, docketed as
Civil Case No. 781, involving Lots 932 and 939 of the Banilad
Friar Land Estate, Lahug, Cebu City, for the purpose of
establishing a military reservation for the Philippine Army. Lot
932 was registered in the name of Gervasia Denzon under
Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 14921 with an area of
25,137 square meters, while Lot 939 was in the name of
Eulalia Denzon and covered by TCT No. 12560 consisting of
13,164 square meters.
After depositing P9,500.00 with the Philippine National Bank,
pursuant to the Order of the CFI dated October 19, 1938, the
Republic took possession of the lots. Thereafter, or on May
14, 1940, the CFI rendered its Decision ordering the Republic
to pay the Denzons the sum of P4,062.10 as just
compensation.
 The Denzons interposed an appeal to the Court of
Appeals but it was dismissed on March 11, 1948. An
entry of judgment was made on April 5, 1948.
In 1950, Jose Galeos, one of the heirs of the
Denzons, filed with the National Airports Corporation a
claim for rentals for the two lots, but it “denied knowledge
of the matter.” Another heir, Nestor Belocura, brought
the claim to the Office of then President Carlos Garcia
who wrote the Civil Aeronautics Administration and the
Secretary of National Defense to expedite action on said
claim. On September 6, 1961, Lt. Manuel Cabal rejected
the claim but expressed willingness to pay the appraised
value of the lots within a reasonable time.
 For failure of the Republic to pay for the lots, on
September 20, 1961, the Denzons’ successors-in-
interest, Francisca Galeos-Valdehueza and Josefina
Galeos-Panerio,filed with the same CFI an action for
recovery of possession with damages against the
Republic and officers of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines in possession of the property. The case was
docketed as Civil Case No. R-7208.
In the interim or on November 9, 1961, TCT Nos.
23934 and 23935 covering Lots 932 and 939 were
issued in the names of Francisca Valdehueza and
Josefina Panerio, respectively. Annotated thereon was
the phrase “subject to the priority of the National Airports
Corporation to acquire said parcels of land, Lots 932 and
939 upon previous payment of a reasonable market
value.”
 On July 31, 1962, the CFI promulgated its Decision in favor of
Valdehueza and Panerio, holding that they are the owners and have
retained their right as such over Lots 932 and 939 because of the
Republic’s failure to pay the amount of P4,062.10, adjudged in the
expropriation proceedings. However, in view of the annotation on
their land titles, they were ordered to execute a deed of sale in favor
of the Republic. In view of “the differences in money value from
1940 up to the present,” the court adjusted the market value at
P16,248.40, to be paid with 6% interest per annum from April 5,
1948, date of entry in the expropriation proceedings, until full
payment.
After their motion for reconsideration was denied, Valdehueza
and Panerio appealed from the CFI Decision, in view of the amount
in controversy, directly to this Court. The case was docketed as No.
L-21032. On May 19, 1966, this Court rendered its Decision
affirming the CFI Decision. It held that Valdehueza and Panerio are
still the registered owners of Lots 932 and 939, there having been
no payment of just compensation by the Republic. Apparently, this
Court found nothing in the records to show that the Republic paid
the owners or their successors-in-interest according to the CFI
decision. While it deposited the amount of P9,500,00, and said
deposit was allegedly disbursed, however, the payees could not be
ascertained.
Notwithstanding the above finding, this Court still ruled that
Valdehueza and Panerio are not entitled to recover possession of
the lots but may only demand the payment of their fair market
value, ratiocinating as follows:

 “Appellants would contend that: (1)

possession of Lots 932 and 939 should
be restored to them as owners of the
same; (2) the Republic should be
ordered to pay rentals for the use of said
lots, plus attorney’s fees; and (3) the
court a quo in the present suit had no
power to fix the value of the lots and
order the execution of the deed of sale
after payment.
 It is true that plaintiffs are still the registered owners
of the land, there not having been a transfer of said lots
in favor of the Government. The records do not show
that the Government paid the owners or their
successors-in-interest according to the 1940 CFI
decision although, as stated, P9,500.00 was deposited
by it, and said deposit had been disbursed. With the
records lost, however, it cannot be known who received
the money (Exh. 14 says: ‘It is further certified that the
corresponding Vouchers and pertinent Journal and Cash
Book were destroyed during the last World War, and
therefore the names of the payees concerned cannot be
ascertained.’) And the Government now admits that
there is no available record showing that payment
for the value of the lots in question has been made
(Stipulation of Facts, par. 9, Rec. on Appeal, p. 28).
The points in dispute are whether such payment can still
be made and, if so, in what amount.  Said lots have been
the subject of expropriation proceedings.  By final and
executory judgment in said proceedings, they were
condemned for public use, as part of an airport, and
ordered sold to the Government. In fact, the
abovementioned title certificates secured by plaintiffs
over said lots contained annotations of the right of the
National Airports Corporation (now CAA) to pay for and
acquire them.  It follows that both by virtue of the
judgment, long final, in the expropriation suit, as well as
the annotations upon their title certificates, plaintiffs are
not entitled to recover possession of their expropriated
lots – which are still devoted to the public use for which
they were expropriated – but only to demand the fair
market value of the same.”
VIOLATION
Art. III, Sec. 9, Private property shall not be taken for
public use without just compensation.
Justice is the first virtue of social institutions. When
the state wields its power of eminent domain, there
arises a correlative obligation on its part to pay the
owner of the expropriated property a just
compensation.  If it fails, there is a clear case of
injustice that must be redressed. 
VERDICT
On May 4, 2001, the RTC rendered a decision in
favor of respondent, thus:

“WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in

favor of plaintiff Vicente Lim and against all
defendants, public and private, declaring
plaintiff Vicente Lim the absolute and
exclusive owner of Lot No. 932 with all the
rights of an absolute owner including the
right to possession. The monetary claims in
the complaint and in the counter claims
contained in the answer of defendants are
ordered Dismissed.
 LUNG CENTER OF THE PHILIPPINES,
petitioner,
vs.
QUEZON CITY and CONSTANTINO P.
ROSAS, in his capacity as City
Assessor of Quezon City, respondents.
 Summary of the case:
 The petitioner Lung Center of the Philippines is a non-stock and non-
profit entity established on January 16, 1981 by virtue of Presidential
Decree No. 1823.2 It is the registered owner of a parcel of land,
particularly described as Lot No. RP-3-B-3A-1-B-1, SWO-04-000495,
located at Quezon Avenue corner Elliptical Road, Central District,
Quezon City. The lot has an area of 121,463 square meters and is
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 261320 of the
Registry of Deeds of Quezon City. Erected in the middle of the
aforesaid lot is a hospital known as the Lung Center of the Philippines.
A big space at the ground floor is being leased to private parties, for
canteen and small store spaces, and to medical or professional
practitioners who use the same as their private clinics for their
patients whom they charge for their professional services. Almost one-
half of the entire area on the left side of the building along Quezon
Avenue is vacant and idle, while a big portion on the right side, at the
corner of Quezon Avenue and Elliptical Road, is being leased for
commercial purposes to a private enterprise known as the Elliptical
Orchids and Garden Center.
 On June 7, 1993, both the land and the hospital building of the petitioner were
assessed for real property taxes in the amount of P4,554,860 by the City Assessor of
Quezon City.3 Accordingly, Tax Declaration Nos. C-021-01226 (16-2518) and C-021-
01231 (15-2518-A) were issued for the land and the hospital building, respectively.4
On August 25, 1993, the petitioner filed a Claim for Exemption5 from real property
taxes with the City Assessor, predicated on its claim that it is a charitable institution.
The petitioner’s request was denied, and a petition was, thereafter, filed before the
Local Board of Assessment Appeals of Quezon City (QC-LBAA, for brevity) for the
reversal of the resolution of the City Assessor. The petitioner alleged that under
Section 28, paragraph 3 of the 1987 Constitution, the property is exempt from real
property taxes. It averred that a minimum of 60% of its hospital beds are exclusively
used for charity patients and that the major thrust of its hospital operation is to
serve charity patients. The petitioner contends that it is a charitable institution and,
as such, is exempt from real property taxes. The QC-LBAA rendered judgment
dismissing the petition and holding the petitioner liable for real property taxes.6
 The QC-LBAA’s decision was, likewise, affirmed on appeal by the Central Board of
Assessment Appeals of Quezon City (CBAA, for brevity)7 which ruled that the
petitioner was not a charitable institution and that its real properties were not
actually, directly and exclusively used for charitable purposes; hence, it was not
entitled to real property tax exemption under the constitution and the law. The
petitioner sought relief from the Court of Appeals, which rendered judgment
affirming the decision of the CBAA.8
 Undaunted, the petitioner filed its petition in this Court
contending that:

 A. THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN DECLARING

PETITIONER AS NOT ENTITLED TO REALTY
TAX EXEMPTIONS ON THE GROUND THAT
ITS LAND, BUILDING AND IMPROVEMENTS,
SUBJECT OF ASSESSMENT, ARE NOT
ACTUALLY, DIRECTLY AND EXCLUSIVELY
DEVOTED FOR CHARITABLE PURPOSES.
 B. WHILE PETITIONER IS NOT DECLARED AS
REAL PROPERTY TAX EXEMPT UNDER ITS
CHARTER, PD 1823, SAID EXEMPTION MAY
NEVERTHELESS BE EXTENDED UPON
PROPER APPLICATION.
 VERDICT
 CALLEJO, SR., J.:
 This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule
45 of the Rules of Court, as amended, of the
Decision1 dated July 17, 2000 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 57014 which affirmed
the decision of the Central Board of Assessment
Appeals holding that the lot owned by the
petitioner and its hospital building constructed
thereon are subject to assessment for purposes of
real property tax.
 VIOLATION
 Section2 of Presidential Decree No.
1823, relied upon by the petitioner,
specifically provides that the
petitioner shall enjoy the tax
exemptions and privileges.
 Section 28(3), Article VI of the 1987
Philippine Constitution provides, thus:
 (3) Charitable institutions, churches and
parsonages or convents appurtenant
thereto, mosques, non-profit cemeteries,
and all lands, buildings, and
improvements, actually, directly and
exclusively used for religious, charitable or
educational purposes shall be exempt
from taxation.32
 SECTION 234. Exemptions from Real Property
Tax. – The following are exempted from
payment of the real property tax:
 ...
 (b) Charitable institutions, churches,
parsonages or convents appurtenant thereto,
mosques, non-profit or religious cemeteries
and all lands, buildings, and improvements
actually, directly, and exclusively used for
religious, charitable or educational
purposes.35
 CHURCHILL vs.
RAFFERTY CASE
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 10572. December 21, 1915.]
 FRANCIS A. CHURCHILL and STEWART TAIT,
plaintiffs-appellees,
vs.
JAMES J. RAFFERTY,
Collector of Internal Revenue, defendant-appellant.

 Attorney-General Avancena for appellant.

 Aitken & DeSelms for appellees.
 SYLLABUS
 1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; SCOPE OF INQUIRY IN TESTING
VALIDITY OF A LAW. — Unless a law be so repugnant to the
supreme law that it appears clearly that constitutional
limitations have been overstepped by the legislature, courts
should not declare a legislative enactment invalid. Merely to
doubt its validity is to resolve the doubt in favor of its validity.
 2. INTERNAL REVENUE; INJUNCTION TO RESTRAIN
COLLECTION OF A TAX. — A provision in an internal revenue
law prohibiting the courts from enjoining the collection of an
internal revenue tax is not invalid as opposed to the "due
process" and "equal protection of the law" clauses of the bill of
rights of the Organic Act. Such legislation, both Federal and
State, has been upheld by the United States Supreme Court.
 3. JURISDICTION OF COURTS. — Nor is such a provision of law
invalid as curtailing the jurisdiction of the courts of the Philippine
Islands as fixed by section 9 of the Organic Act: (a) because
jurisdiction was never conferred upon Philippine courts to enjoin the
collection of taxes imposed by the Philippine Commission; and (b)
because, in the present case, another adequate remedy has been
provided by payment and protest.
 4. POLICE POWER; NATURE AND SCOPE IN GENERAL. — If a law
relates to the public health, safety, morals, comfort, or general
welfare of the community, it is within the scope of the police power
of the State. Within such bounds the wisdom, expediency, or
necessity of the law does not concern the courts.
 5. NOT LIMITED TO ANY PARTICULAR SUBJECT. — From whatever
direction the social, economic, or general welfare of the people is
menaced, there is legal justification for the exercise of the police
power; and the use of private property may be regulated or
restricted to whatever extent may be necessary to preserve
inviolate these declared essentials to the well being of the public.
 6. THINGS OFFENSIVE TO THE SENSES OF SMELL OR HEARING. —
It has long been recognized that uses of private property which are
offensive to the senses of smell of hearing may be so regulated or
segregated as to disturb as little as possible the pursuits of other
persons.
 7. SIGHT. — It is not the adoption of a new principle but
simply the extension of a well established principle to hold
that the police power may also regulate and restrict uses
of private property when devoted to advertising which is
offensive to the sight.
 8. BILLBOARDS.— The indiscriminate use of outdoor
advertising tends to mar not only natural outdoor
landscapes but whatever of civic beauty has been attained
by the expenditure of public moneys for parks, boulevards,
and buildings. The widespread agitation in many European
countries, as well as in the United States, against the so-
called billboards — the most common form of this kind of
advertising — shows that they are a source of annoyance
and irritation to the public and interfere with the proper
enjoyment of outdoor life by the general public. This
justifies their suppression or regulation to the extent that
they interfere with the right of the public.
 Discussion
 This case divides itself into two parts and gives
rise to two main questions:
(1) that relating to the power of the court to
restrain by injunction the collection of the tax
complained of, and
(2) that relating to the validity of those provisions
of subsection (b) of section 100 of Act No. 2339,
conferring power upon the Collector of Internal
Revenue to remove any sign, signboard, or
billboard upon the ground that the same is
offensive to the sight or is otherwise nuisance.
 The first question is one of jurisdiction and is of vital importance to the
Government. The sections of Act No. 2339, which bear directly upon
the subject, are 139 and 140. The first expressly forbids the use of an
injunction to stay the collection of any internal revenue tax;
 the second provides a remedy for any wrong in connection with such
taxes, and this remedy was intended to be exclusive, thereby
precluding the remedy by injunction, which remedy is claimed to be
constitutional. The two sections, then, involve the right of a dissatisfied
taxpayer to use an exceptional remedy to test the validity of any tax
or to determine any other question connected therewith, and the
question whether the remedy by injunction is exceptional.
 VERDICT
 The judgment appealed from in this case perpetually restrains and
prohibits the defendant (JAMES J. RAFFERTY) and his deputies from
collecting and enforcing against the plaintiffs (FRANCIS A.
CHURCHILL and STEWART TAIT) and their property the annual tax
mentioned and described in subsection (b) of section 100 of Act
No. 2339, effective July 1, 19]4, and from destroying or removing
any sign, signboard, or billboard, the property of the plaintiffs, for
the sole reason that such sign, signboard, or billboard is, or may be
offensive to the sight; and decrees the cancellation of the bond
given by the plaintiffs to secure the issuance of the preliminary
injunction granted soon after the commencement of this action.
 DECISION ON THE MOTION FOR A
REHEARING, JANUARY 24, 1916.
 If a billboard is so constructed as to offer no room
for objections on sanitary or moral grounds, it
would seem that the ordinance above quoted
would have to be sustained upon the very
grounds which we have advanced in sustaining
our own statute.
 It might be well to note that billboard legislation in

the United States is attempting to eradicate a

business which has already been firmly
established. This business was allowed to expand
unchecked until its very extent called attention to
its objectionable features.
 In the Philippine Islands such legislation has almost
anticipated the business, which is not yet of such
proportions that it can be said to be fairly
established. It may be that the courts in the United
States have committed themselves to a course of
decisions with respect to billboard advertising, the
full consequences of which were not perceived for
the reason that the development of the business has
been so recent that the objectionable features of it
did not present themselves clearly to the courts nor
to the people.
 We, in this country, have the benefit of the
experience of the people of the United States
and may make our legislation preventive rather
than corrective. There are in this country,
moreover, on every hand in those districts
where Spanish civilization has held sway for so
many centuries, examples of architecture now
belonging to a past age, and which are
attractive not only to the residents of the
country but to visitors. If the billboard industry
is permitted without constraint or control to hide
these historic sites from the passerby, the
country will be less attractive to the tourist and
the people will suffer a distinct economic loss.
The motion for a rehearing is
therefore denied.
 Submitted by:

Abejo, Mike IC D.
Misa, Pilar Francesca Z.
Cimafranca, Francis
Milana, Janelle B.
(in the order of the cases)
BSN-2A
Submitted to:
Dr. Alexander Suan
HISTORY 2