GASOLINE COMPLEX

Work Permit Gap analysis

COMPETENCY
1. Depending on the Shift Supervisor and Permit Issuer assigned, Work permits
implementations has NO consistency of proper WP procedure.
2. At least 2 out of 7 Permit Issuers have the high competency of determining the
hazards and delegate Area operators to validate the Site Inspection, but Area
Operators does not have enough competency on safe work practices to
His and
Safety
contribution
on hazards.(violation
the SUCCESFUL COMPLETION
recommend
determine
on site
of YAS-GI.026.1OF
Section 2.4
COMMISSIONING
START
UP
Work Clearance, 10.5 Area Operator Roles & responsibilities)
OFSafety,
SULFUR
AND
GASOLINE
PROCESS
UNITS
3. Behavioral Based
Heat
Stress
Management,
Chemical
Safety, Hotwork,
Lifting, and Electrical Safety are just a few many safety Procedures not well
known by Issuers and Receivers (precautionary Controls)
4. Lack of knowledge on Emergency Response Procedure (mitigation Controls)
5. Supplementary trainings such as First aid, Fire Fighting, Chemical Handling,
activation of Emergency Protocols are not satisfactory.
6. Lack of knowledge on Incident Investigation procedure and Impact on Plant,
Process, loss Time, Legal implications and incident Reporting

WMK

GASOLINE COMPLEX
Work Permit Gap analysis
ISSUANCE
Preventive Maintenance (routine activity) does not specify specific job steps
thereby common hazards and critical hazards not identified including
precautionary measures not being met.
Based on Competency bullet 1, verification of competency of Permit
receiverHis
not
beingcontribution
checked byon
some
Permit Issuer. COMPLETION
.(violation of YASSafety
the SUCCESFUL
OF
GI.026.1 Section 3.4 Issuer/Receiver
WP Certification)
COMMISSIONING
START UP
At least 2 out OF
of 7SULFUR
Permit Issuers
have the high
competency
of determining
AND GASOLINE
PROCESS
UNITS
the hazards and delegate Area operators to validate the Site Inspection,
but Area Operators does not have enough competency on safe work
practices to recommend and determine on site hazards.(violation of YASGI.026.1 Section 2.4 Work Clearance, 10.5 Area Operator Roles &
responsibilities)
Only predetermined High Risk activity (non Routine) are being addressed to
Safety Advisors to assess and give recommendation for HIRA/JSA. .(violation
of YAS-GI.026.1 Section 2.3 HIRA)
Line break is being treated as Routine Activity (see detailed violations
under LOTO and Attachments)
Support Services (SANKYU)does not have a competent permit receivers
thereby utilizing YASREF Maintenance team to apply multiple work permits
(at least 3-10permits/shift) handled by 1 Maintenance Supervisor. (violation
WMK
of YAS-GI.026.1 Section 10.3 HIRA)

GASOLINE COMPLEX
Work Permit Gap analysis
GAS TESTING
Depending on assigned Issuer, Gas testing most specially on Cold Work
Permit, is not done and verified or filled out inside Shelters only to satisfy
the requirement of Gas Testing not considering the activities on elevated
areas or Gas composition that is lighter than air.
RelyingHis
on Safety
Plant Fixed
Gas Monitors
are mostlyCOMPLETION
situated 400mm
contribution
on thethat
SUCCESFUL
OFoff the
ground
COMMISSIONING START UP
High Hazards,OF
toxic
Gas presence
on certain PROCESS
areas with above
SULFUR
AND GASOLINE
UNITSPermissible
Exposure Limit (PEL) activities are being allowed without specifying
Respiratory Protection.
No Available Gas Test Equipment for other types of Toxic gases such as
Toluene, Xylene, DMDS, Chlorine, MDEA, Sulfolane , HCl.
Competency of Authorized Gas Testers fails due to lack of knowledge on
those particular Gases mentioned.
Maintenance and Calibration of Gas Test equipment often exceeded,
thereby using faulty and unreliable Gas Test.

WMK

GASOLINE COMPLEX
Work Permit Gap analysis
Lock out- Tag out
No Checklist, records, Documentation, LOTO Application Form, Shift
Handover, LOTO Control Box, Lack of proper isolating equipment.
Actual application of Isolation depends on the Area Operator, Maintenance
knowledge and understanding, No Specific Standards being followed.
Most often,
no Blind
List and P&ID
being
given to ensure
all affected
His Safety
contribution
on the
SUCCESFUL
COMPLETION
OF
systems are properly isolated
for RoutineSTART
activities.
COMMISSIONING
UP
No Certified and
LOTO
Officers identified
to verify
Isolation has
OFAuthorized
SULFUR AND
GASOLINE
PROCESS
UNITS
been conducted or not (LOTO organizational chart) (i.e, Electrical,
Mechanical, Instrument, Operations, Engineering, Utilities)
No appropriate Interface Form of LOTO Applications or PROCEDURE to be
followed
No Applicable Flow Chart per system to be followed by LOTO Authorities

WMK

GASOLINE COMPLEX
Work Permit Gap analysis
Attachments
Checklist as stated on the work permit does not have formal YASREF format
Checklist are not being asked by issuer and not being supplemented by
reciever
Due to complacency, most of required attachments on regular equipments
entering
the
Process
areas areon
not
being
checked. COMPLETION OF
His
Safety
contribution
the
SUCCESFUL
Even if attachments areCOMMISSIONING
being provided such
as Lifting
START
UP Checklist,
Maintenance and
or area Operator
are not aware
of the contents
OF SULFUR
AND GASOLINE
PROCESS
UNITS
necessarily to be identified that could create hazards in the workplace
No appropriate Interface Form of LOTO Applications or PROCEDURE to be
followed
No Applicable Flow Chart per system to be followed by LOTO Authorities
Supplementary and Specialized work Permits still not developed (radiation,
Critical Lift, Excavation, Energization Permit, etc.)
MOC forms not being develop, or not shown, and not reviewed by Safety
prior to execution.
Relative Authorities (foreman, RSS, Fire, Utilities, ESO, Security,and Safety)
non-involvement or not aware that some of activities require their
Authorization.
WMK

GASOLINE COMPLEX
Work Permit Gap analysis
Closing of Work Permits
Depending again to Assigned Shift Supervisor and Issuer, some of the
permits are not properly closed, following deviations on closed out;
a. Closing of permits not verified on site by both Issuer and Receiver or
its delegates
b. Receiver
closing
permit on
without
the issuer confirmation
His Safety
contribution
the SUCCESFUL
COMPLETION OF
c. Not confirming onCOMMISSIONING
LOTO application ifSTART
systemUP
is still Isolated or
releasedOF
(noSULFUR
documentation
to prove, and
handover
not noted or
AND GASOLINE
PROCESS
UNITS
transferred to next shift)
d. Housekeeping not done
e. Preventive Maintenance Team often leave worksite without handover
if activity is completed, report are not supplemented to the Area
Supervisor until being requested.

WMK

GASOLINE COMPLEX
Work Permit Gap analysis
Record Keeping
Gasoline Unit have consistent filing of records only required is no filing of
Work permits that are cancelled due to incidents, failure to comply the
requirements, not closed, and permits involved High Critical Activities.

His Safety contribution on the SUCCESFUL COMPLETION OF

COMMISSIONING START UP
OF SULFUR AND GASOLINE PROCESS UNITS

WMK