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Introduction
Game theory
Price setting
monopoly
oligopoly
Quantity setting
monopoly
oligopoly
Homogeneous
goods
Process innovation
1
Bertrand (1883)
x1
x2
p1
p2
2
3
p1
1
2
Homogeneous duopoly
(linear case)
Two firms (i=1,2) produce a homogenous
good.
Outputs: x1 and x2, X= x1+x2
p X a bX a b x1 x2
Cournot-Nash equilibrium
Profit functions: 1 ( x1 , x2 ), 2 ( x1 , x2 )
Reaction functions:
x ( x2 ) arg max x1 1 ( x1 , x2 )
R
1
C
1
C
2
Nash equilibrium: ( x , x )
x1R ( x2C ) x1C
x2R ( x1C ) x2C
7
1 ( x1 , x2 ) p ( X ) x1 c1 x1 (a b( x1 x2 ) c1 ) x1
2b
2
R
1
Nash equilibrium
a c2 x1
analogous : x ( x1 )
2b
2
R
2
a 2c1 c2 C
a 2c2 c1
, x2
3b
3b
(a c1 c2 )
C
p
3
( a 2c1 c2 ) 2
( a 2c2 c1 ) 2
C
C
1
analogous : 2
9b
9b
C
x1
M
2
C
2
Cournot-Nash
equilibrium
x2R ( x1 )
x1C
x1M
x1
9
Exercise (Cournot)
Find the equilibrium in a Cournot competition.
Suppose that the demand function is given by
p(X) = 24 - X and the costs per unit by c 1 = 3
and c2 = 2.
20
S. : x
and
3
C
1
23
x
3
C
2
10
Common interests
c 1, c 2
Obtaining government subsidies and
negotiating with labor unions.
a , b
Advertising by the agricultural industry
(e.g. CMA).
11
dt 3
12
1C 1 1 x1C 1 x2C
0
c1
c1
x1 c1 x 2 c1
direct
effect
0 0
0
strategic
effect
14
t
1
s
o
m
c
r
l
i
f
a of
n
i
rg ion
a
m uct
red
equilibria: increase in
production of firm 1
x1R ( x2 )
x2R ( x1 )
x1
15
16
c1 , c2 1 c1 , c2 , x c1 , c2 , x c1 , c2
C
1
C
1
C
2
0
dc2
c2
x2 dc2
x1 dc2
=0
<0
<0
direct
effect
strategic
effect
=0
17
inc
co r ea s
sts e o
of f m
fir
m argi
na
2
l
x2
x2R ( x1 )
x1
18
x2R ( x1 ) 2b
2
0
x2M
a c2
if x1
b
otherwise
x2R ( x1 )
x1L
a c2
Note: x
alone leads to a price of c2 .
b
L
1
x1
19
firm 1
as a monopolist
C
x2M
x2 0
x2R ( x1 )
M
L
1
x x
M
1
x1
20
Blockaded entry
c1 a and c2 a
c1 a and
x x
L
1
M
1
i.e.
a c2 a c1
b
2b
1
c2 p (c1 ) (a c1 )
2
M
21
no
supply
firm 1 as a
monopolist
1
a
2
duopoly
1
a
2
firm 2 as a
monopolist
a
c1
22
23
Stackelberg equilibrium
Profit functions 1 ( x1 , x2 ), 2 ( x1 , x2 )
x2R ( x1 )
x1
Blockade or
deterrence
R
2
a c2
x
b
L
1
x1
25
2b
2
R
2
a c2 x1
1 ( x1 , x ( x1 )) a b x1
c1 x1
2b
2
Nash equilibrium
R
2
a 2c1 c2 R
, x2
x
2b
with
and
a
2c1 3c2
S
x2
4b
S
1
a 2c1 c2
p
4
S
26
x2
x1R ( x2 )
x2M
x
x
C
2
S
2
quantities in a
Stackelberg equilibrium
C
S
x1C
S
1
x2R ( x1 )
x1
27
Exercise (equilibria)
x
x
x
S
1
S
1
C
1
,
?
, x2R x1S ,
,x
R
2
,x
C
2
First order
condition
1
1
2 for firm 1
( x , x ) p( X ) x1 C1 ( x1 )
dR1
dp dX
dp
p( X ) x1
p ( X ) x1
dx1
dX dx1
dX
dx1 dx 2R
dx1 dx1
R !
dx
dp
dp 2
p ( X ) x1
x1
MC1 ( x1 )
dX
dX dx1
direct effect
Exercise (Stackelberg)
Possible or not: ?
C
1
S
1
30
50
3
31
Blockaded entry
p
a
blockaded entry
for firm 2
p ( x1 )
c2
p1M
c1
x1L
x1M
x1
x1
32
x1R ( x2 )
x2R ( x1 )
L
1
M
1
x1
33
1 x1 ,0
1 x1 , x 2R x1
x1L
x1M
x1
34
p1M
c2
c1
p ( x1 )
1L
x1M
x1L
x1
35
Deterrence pays,
d1 x1 , x2R x1
0
dx1
x1L
1
1M
1 x1 ,0
1 x1 , x 2R x1
x1M x1L
x1
36
d 1 x1 , x2R x1
0
dx1
x1L
1
1M
1 x1 ,0
1 x1 , x2R x1
x1M
x1S
x1L
x1
37
p M ( c1 ) or
a c1
c2
2
and
c1 a
c1 a
38
Deterrence pays if
a c1
c2
p1M
2
d 1 x1 , x2R x1
1
1
1
3
L
0
bx1 a c2 c1 a c2 c1
dx1
2
2
2
2
x1L
1
2
c2 a c1
3
3
Deterrence if
1
2
a c1
a c1 c2
3
3
2
39
1
a
2
1
a
3
no supply
blockade
firm 1 as a
monopolist
d et
nc
e
r
r
duopoly
1
a
2
firm 2 as a
monopolist
a
c1
40
41
C1 x1
x1 0
0,
Follower' s cost function
3 x2 , x2 0
C2 x2
x2 0
0,
42
b) Entry blockaded ?
Comparison
is not sufficient
4 3
M
1 4,0 1 0 1 0,0 x1 4
x 4,
M
1
4 3
p x c2
1
R
R
M
x2 x1 6 x1 x2 x1 4
2
2 4,4 4 0,25 4 4 4 3 1 4 1 0
M
1
Lq
1
3
4
6 x
3
2
Lq
1
Lq
1
5
4
1
16
1
16
Lq 2
1
3 6 12 x1Lq
Lq 2
1
x1Lq1 12 4 3,
x1Lq : x1Lq 2 12 4 3
12 x
L
1
44
45
6
x 2R x1
x1S
x1M x1Lq
12
x1
46
x1M 4
x1S 2
0,5 1,44
Accommodation
3
Deterrence
4
Accommodation
CF
Blockade
47
xd
xf
1
2
W s Cd c s, c sxdC c s, c
49
xf
x
Strategic effect: d f 0
x
x
R
d
R ,s
d
x f
<0
<0
Cournot-Nashequilibria
xdC c s, c xdS c, c !!
xM
(firm d Stackelberg
leader)
x Rf
x
xd
50
51
52
Optimization conditions
!
( 1 2 )
dp
p( X ) ( x1 x2 )
MC1 ( x1 ) 0
x1
dX
!
( 1 2 )
dp
p( X ) ( x1 x2 )
MC2 ( x2 ) 0
x2
Compare
monopoly withdX
two factories.
54
55
Cartel quantities
x2
quantities in a
symmetric cartel
x1R ( x2 )
x2M
x2C
1 M
x2 x2S
2
S
K
1
2
M
1
C
1
x x x x
S
1
M
1
x2R ( x1 )
x1
56
57
58
pM
pC
pS
p PC = c
X M X C X S X PC
quantity
59
laws
enforcement
Bundeskartellamt
60
Ck concentration ratio
xi
Setup: n firms, si
X
and
s1 s2 sk sn
k
C
s
,
for
n
identical
firms
:
C
,k n
Definition: k i
k
n
i 1
n k 1 kn 1
monopoly:
GWB, 19 (3)
Definition:
xi
H
i 1 X
n
monopoly : H 1
2
s
i 1
2
i
n identical firms : H
1
n
perfect competition
(n ) : H 0
63
i ( x1 ,..., x n ) p( x1 ... xn ) xi Ci xi
xi X dp
si
p 1
p 1
X p dX
X ,p
64
p MCi !
p p
si
1
X , p
p
si
X ,p
p
X ,p X ,p
i 1
i 1
n
65
Exercise (Replication)
In a homogenous good market there are m identical costumers and n
identical firms. Every costumer demands the quantity 1-p at price p.
The cost function of firm j is given by
C j x j 0,5 x 2j .
a) Calculate the inverse market demand function!
b) Calculate the reaction function of firm j and the total market output
and pC in the symmetric CournotC
C
C
C
X x1 x 2 x n
equilibrium! Hint:
Use
X j x1 ... x j 1 x j 1 .. xn
c) Now the number of firms and costumers is multiplied by Calculate
.
again pC and MCj! Prove that for
the gap between
price and marginal costs converges to zero!
S. : a) p X 1 mX
m
n
b) X C n
, pC 1
m 1 n
m 1 n
66