QUANTITATIVE

QUANTITATIVERISK
RISK
ASSESSMENT
ASSESSMENTMODEL
MODELOF
OF
HAZARDOUS
HAZARDOUSCHEMICALS
CHEMICALS
LEAKAGE
LEAKAGEAND
ANDAPPLICATION
APPLICATION

DIVISION OF SAFETY AND FIRE ENGINEERING

SCHOOL OF ENGINEERING

COCHIN UNIVERSITY OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY

COCHIN 682 022
SEPTEMBER 2015

Submitted by
ADARSH GUPTA
ROLL NO. :- 03
S7, SE

CONTENT
1.

ABSTRACT

2.

INTRODUCTION

3.

RISK ASSESSMENT MODEL

4.

1.

RISK IDENTIFCATION

2.

PROBABILITY CALCULATION

3.

CONSEQUENCE ASSESSMENT

4.

RISK ACCEPTABLE ANALYSIS

RISK ASSESSMENT MODEL APPLICATION

1.

PROBABILITY CALCULATION

2.

INFLUENCE RANGE

3.

LOSS CALCULATIONS

4.

RISK SUMMARY

5.

RISK FORCASTING

6.

ACCEPTABLE RISK ANALYSIS

7.

SUGGESTIONS

5.

CONCLUSION

6.

ANY QUESTION

1. ABSTRACT

The main aim of the seminar:

Is to quantify the risk of hazardous chemicals leakage through the Fire-Explosion-Poisoning

Quantitative Probability Model (FEPQPM).

Is to introduce the probability analysis methods to analyze derivative accidents caused by

hazardous chemicals leakage.

Is to establish quantitative risk assessment models and made acceptable risk level analysis.

Is to present the results of the model when it has been applied to quantitatively assess an
enterprises storage tank of ammonia at Changshou Chemical Industrial Distripark (CID) in
Chongqing, China.

It is shown that the risk level of leakage accident involving poisoning is unacceptable.

2. INTRODUCTION

WHAT IS

HAZARD: An inherent physical or chemical characteristic that has the potential for causing
harm to people, property, or the environment.

RISK: The combination of the expected frequency (events / year) and consequence
(effects/event) of a single accident or a group of accidents.

OR
: Risk is the probability of a hazard turning into disaster.

RISK ASSESSMENT: Risk assessment is scientific assessment method on the basis of data
information, theoretical analysis, subjective experience and objective research.

3. RISK ASSESSMENT MODEL

Risk assessment is scientific assessment method on the basis of data information, theoretical analysis,
subjective experience and objective research, mainly studying three issues as follows.
1. How can a system fail?
2. What is the likelihood or probability of failure?
3. What are the consequences of failure?

3.1 RISK IDENTIFICATION

Risk identification aims to find out :
The

hazardous factors

Hazardous

sources : Chemical materials.

Derivative

accidents :Jet fire , vapor cloud explosion, Poisoning, Radiation, pollution

3.2 PROBABILITY CALCULATION

3.2.1PROBABILITY OF LEAKAGE ACCIDENT

The seminar report calculates the leakage probability on the basis of Information diffusion method.
Risk analysis method based on Information diffusion can compensate for the shortcomings of
insufficient information.
The calculation steps have been listed as follows:
Set indicators domain as:
U = {u1, u2, u3 un}
-(1)
In accordance with the following equation, a single observed sample can spread the information it
carries to all the points in domain U.
-(2)

Where h is diffusion coefficient, determined by the

maximum value b, minimum a, and the number of
-(3)
sample. i = 1, 2 . . . n; j = 1, 2 . . . m
Where b = max (y j, j=1, 2m), a = min (y j, j=1, 2
m), m is the number of sample.

j = 1, 2 . . . m

-(4)

The normalized information distribution of the sample is as follows:

i = 1, 2 . . . n; j = 1, 2 . . . m -(5)
Suppose that

And

-(6)

It is known that Eq. (7) is the probability value of the sample falling in u i (i = 1, 2 . . .
n).
It is regarded as probability estimate.
-(7)

3.2.2 PROBABILITY OF DERIVATIVE ACCIDENT

For leakage source at storage tank exit, the leakage rate can be calculated following the equation:
-(8)
Where m is the mass leakage rate, kg/s; C0 is the leakage coefficient; A is the gap area, m 2; P0 is the tank
internal pressure, Pa; M is the molar mass of gas; Rg is the ideal gas constant; T0 is the leak source
temperature, K; P is the leak pressure, Pa; r is the adiabatic index.

The total ignition probability has been presented as follows:

-(9)

Vapor cloud explosion probability can be written as follows:

-(10)
-(11)

-(12)
Where F1 is vapor cloud explosion probability, F2 is jet fire probability, and F3 is poisoning
probability.

3.3 CONSEQUENCE ASSESSMENT ASSESSMENT

3.3.1INFLUENCE RANGE

Select the appropriate damage model and damage criteria to calculate the corresponding
sphere of influence and the percentage of casualties.
ACCIDENT TYPES

COMMON TYPES

DAMAGE CRITERIA

Fire

Pool fire, jet fire, fireball, Thermal strength criteria

vapor cloud fire, etc.

Explosion

Vapor cloud explosion , Over pressure criteria

physical
explosion,
boiling
liquid
spread
vapor explosion BLEVE,
etc.

Poisoning

Instantaneous leakage, Toxic load criteria

gas leaks, liquid leaks,
etc.

3.3.2 COST CALCULATION

Economic loss concludes personnel and material as well as emergency rescue costs. The Personnel
-(13)
direct economic loss can be attained by the following equation:

Where K1, K2, V are constants depending on the types of accident, respectively.

The economic loss of hazardous chemical leakage can be written as follow:

-(14)
-(15)

NT is the total economic loss of derivative accident. K is constant.

Where Fi is the probability of each accident and N i is economic loss for each derivative accident.
The total death toll can also be obtained by eqn. 15.

10

3.4 RISK ACCEPTABLE ANALYSIS

The risk level of leakage reflects the extent of injury.

Acceptable risk level of leakage accident reflects extent of tolerance to the disaster.
The economic risk level and the life risk level have been the main concern of our study. The curve
function has been presented by following equation:
-(16)
-(17)

In which B, C and n are constants.

PfN presents the probability of life risk level and PfL presents the probability of economic risk level.

In acceptable risk level analysis process, when life risk and economic risk are both acceptable, the
risk level can be regarded as acceptable.
When life risk is acceptable, but the economic risk is unacceptable, the risk level can be regarded
as unacceptable.

11

4. RISK ASSESSMENT MODEL APPLICATION

Specification of case

Based on the risk assessment model, the risk of liquid ammonia storage tank was evaluated at
Changshou CID in Chongqing in China. Assuming the source of leakage is at the top of liquid
ammonia storage tank, and its nominal diameter is 80 mm.

The diameter of tank is 1.5 m.

The height is 7 m, the storage pressure is 8105 Pa.

the storage temperature is 17 C.

Years
1991-1992
1993-1994
1995-1996
1997-1998
1999-2000
2001-2002
2003-2004
2005-2006
2007-2008

The number of accident

00
00
00
00
00
00
01
00
01

12

4.1 PROBABILITY CALCULATIONS

4.1.1The probability of leakage

The calculation takes information diffusion method and normal diffusion function to calculate leakage
probability.

The theory domain is [1991, 2010].

Considering the calculation accuracy, we take 21 (n = 21) control points to constitute a discrete domain of:

The number of samples m = 20.

the maximum value of samples b = 1 and the minimum value a = 0. the diffusion coefficient h = 0.0748,
obtained according to the Eq. (3).

The probability of leakage occurred annually in Chongqing was obtained, that is 0.0981.

There are 2100 tanks of this type in Chongqing then the probability of each tank leak is 4.67 10 -5.

4.1.2 Probability of derivative accidents

Probability

Derivative
accidents
Derivative
accident on
basis of
leakage
probability

Total ignition
probability, F

Jet fire
probability, F1

Vapor cloud
explosion
probability, F2

Poisoning
probability, F3

0.056

0.021

0.035

0.944

2.6 10-6

1.0 10-6

1.6 10-6

4.4 10-5

13

4.2 INFLUENCE RANGE

4.2.1 Jet fire

Fire affects the surrounding environment by way of thermal radiation.

If the object is not in the fire, for a building, the lower limit to make glass broken is 4 kW/m 2, and the
upper limit to make steel deformed and the building being close to damage is 25 kW/m 2

Table shows the damage extent by different thermal radiation intensity. Based on the heat flux
criterion, harm division was made , their losses, and influence ranges were calculated.
Radiation
intensity(KW/m2
)

Harm to equipment

Harm to people

Influence division

Influence scope
partition of jet
fire(m)

All operating equipment are

damage

1 min. 100% people

death, 10 s 1% people
death

21

10 s serious injury

25

Minimum energy of wood

burning with no fire and
long radiation

II

26

12.5

Minimum energy of plastic

melting with flame and
wood burning

1 min. 1% serious
injury, 10 second first
degree burn, feel pain

III

65

IV

>65

37.5

1.6

No unwell feeling with

long time

14

4.2.2 Vapor cloud explosion

Calculation are based upon blast wave pressure criteria

Overpressure(* 105 Pa)

Hurt degree

Influence division

Influence scope
partition of VCE(m)

<0.2

Almost free from harm

IV

>78

0.2-0.5

Minor hurt

III

78

0.5-1.0

Serious hurt, light

structure collapse

II

45

>1.0

Most people died, the

main structural damage

18

4.2.3 Division of poisoning injuries

The consequences of poisoning mainly involves casualties.
Harmful levels of ammonia can be divided into four levels:
C<=30 (mg/m3)

30<C<=200

200<C<=1500

C>1500

No hazard

Mild damage

Moderate harm

Severe hazard

15

4.3 LOSS CALCULATION

Loss calculation refers to:
material direct economic loss
: is based on cost accumulation one by one method
personnel direct economic loss : is by injury grading ratio factor method
direct economic loss
: sum of personnel direct economic loss and material direct economic loss
total economic loss
: is by times ratio coefficient method.
Damage
division

Death
area I

Y value
Death %

4.18
29%

Seriously
injured
area II
3.80
12%

Minus
injures
area III
2.58
0%

Safety
area IV
0
0

4.3.1 Jet fire loss calculation

Personnel direct economic loss

For fire, variable V is based on the duration and intensity of thermal radiation, and K 1 = -12.1, K2 = 2.11.

According to the Eq. (13), corresponding Y value can be calculated.

In terms of Y value, corresponding percentage of deaths of workers in the region can be investigated.

The product of value and value loss rate of hazard-affected bodies is the value loss of hazard-affected bodies,
which can estimate economic losses of personnel in Table.

16

I area/10,000Y

II area/10,000Y

III area/10,000Y

Death toll/person

Seriously injured / per.

Minus injures/person

66.43

22.14

10.38

Economic loss /10,000

Table shows that casualties economic loss in zone I is maximum, and in zone III is mini-mum.
This is mainly due to thermal radiation is inversely proportional to the square the distance, as the distance
increases, the thermal radiation reduced faster, thus reducing the harm to personnel quickly.

Material direct economic loss

The value loss is the product of value and value loss rate of hazard-affected bodies. Through on-site
investigation, the material economic losses have been shown in Table.
I/10,000 Yuan
Total value
Value loss rate
Economic loss/
10,000 Yuan

II/10,000 Yuan

III/10,000 Yuan

28.57

7.38

29.79

0.85

0.50

0.15

3.69

4.39

24.28

17

Total economic loss

the ratio of Chinas direct economic loss and indirect economic loss is about 1:1.
The direct economic loss is the sum of personnel direct economic loss and material direct economic loss,
and the value is 1.3131 million Yuan, and the total economic loss is 2.6262 million Yuan.
Damage
division

Death
area I

Seriously
injured area II

Minor
injuries
area III

Safety
area IV

Y value

4.91

4.03

2.47

Death
percentage

47%

17%

0%

4.3.2 Vapor cloud explosion loss calculation

Personnel direct economic loss
For vapor cloud explosion, the variable V is based on the explosion overpressure, so take K 1 = -30.7, K2 =
3.09. According to the Eq. (13), corresponding Y value can be calculated.
In terms of Y value, corresponding percentage of deaths of workers in the region can be investigated.

18

Death zone/10,000 Yuan

Death toll/person
Seriously injured/
person
Minor injures/person
Economic loss/10,000 Yuan

Seriously injured zone/

10,000 Yuan
0
3

1
1
0
56.74

Minor injuries zone/10,000

Yuan
0
0

0
66.43

4
8.30

Table shows that major losses were distributed in death zone and serious injuries zone, and the economic losses
in these two regional are almost same.
I/10,000 Y

II/10,000 Y

III/10,000 Y

Total value

4.57

31.38

29.79

Value loss rate

0.85

0.50

0.15

Economic loss / 10,000 Y

3.88

15.69

4.47

Material direct economic loss.

The value loss is the product of value and value loss rate of hazard-affected bodies. Through on-site
investigation, the material economic losses have been shown in Table.

19

Total economic loss.

Based on some accident data statistic, the ratio of Chinas direct economic loss and indirect economic loss is
about 1:1.
The direct economic loss is 1.5551 million Yuan, and total economic loss is 3.1102 million Yuan.

4.3.3 Poisoning loss calculation

Personnel direct economic loss.
Time
(min)

Death area I
(%)

Seriously injured
area II

Minus injures
area III

Minus
Seriously injured/pers
person
on

Economic
loss/injures/
10,000 Yuan

30

Time

Death toll/
(min)

60

12

2%

30

12

280.26

90

23

4%

60

16

26

477.48

90

18

31

566.75

For ammonia poisoning, variable V is toxic load (Cn.t), K1 = -9.82, K2 = 0.71.

In terms of Y value, corresponding percentage of deaths of workers in the region can be investigated. The
results have been shown in Tables.

20

Time(min)

30

60

90

Direct economic
loss/10,000 Y

283.84

481.06

570.33

Total economic
loss/ 10000 Y

567.68

962.12

1140.66

MATERIAL DIRECT ECONOMIC LOSS

The value loss is the product of value and value loss rate of hazard affected bodies. Through on-site
investigation, material direct economic loss is nearly about 35,800 Yuan.

TOTAL ECONOMIC LOSS

The ratio of Chinas direct economic loss and indirect economic loss is about 1:1.
The direct economic loss and total economic loss has been present in Table.
Table shows that, with the leakage time increases, the economic losses have increased. It can be seen that
economic losses is relatively small at early stage of leakage, but its growth rate is fast.

21

4.4 RISK SUMMARY

Accident
type

Jet
fire

Probabili 0.021
ty
Death
0
toll
Total
262.6
loss
2

Vapor
cloud

Poisoning(30 Poisoning(60
min)
min)

Poisoning(90
min)

0.035

0.944

0.944

0.944

3.11.02

567.68

962.12

1140.66

The probability of each tank leak is 4.67*10-5 times/year.

Table has shown that, the economic losses of fire and explosion are more or less the same.
Economic losses of poisoning are more than twice fire or explosion.
By the foregoing calculation, it is shown that economic loss of personnel casualties is far much
larger than that of materials in the accident.

22

4.5 RISK FORECASTING

Death toll of leakage accident increases over time, resulting in greater economic losses.
Economic loss is in direct proportion with death toll.
Rescue and dealing with accidents within 30 min timely can reduce the economic losses about
5.3597 million Yuan.
Rescue and dealing with accidents within 60 min timely can reduce the economic losses about
1.6854 million Yuan.

23

4.6 ACCEPTABLE RISK LEVEL ANALYSIS

Acceptable risk level of leakage accident reflects extent of tolerance to the disaster.

Figure represents the economic loss of three derivative accidents respectively.

Point 1 presents (2.6 *106, 1 *10-6); Point 2 presents (3.1 *106, 1.6*10-6); Point 3 presents (5.7 *106, 4.4*
10-5); Point 4 presents (9.6* 106, 4.4 *10-5); Point 5 presents (1.1*107, 4.4* 10-5).

It is shown that the economic risk level of jet fire and vapor cloud explosion is acceptable.

24

Figure 2 and 3 represent that the economic risk level of leakage within 60 min is unacceptable,
but the life risk level of leakage within 60 min is acceptable, therefore the total risk level of
leakage is unacceptable.

From the analysis of acceptable risk level, it is seen that:

The risk level of jet fire and vapor cloud explosion is acceptable.

The poisoning accident, the risk level of leakage is unacceptable.

25

4.7 SUGGESTION

Water curtain or spray gun should be set around the tank.

Measures should be taken to prevent leakage into the water, sewer, basement, or confined inner
space.
Spill collection system should be added, centrally treating and then discharging, to reduce
hazards to body of water and land.
The best way to avoid poisoning is to ignite it before poison gas spreads. Meanwhile, the ignition
sources should be avoided in a hazardous area.

The main measures are taking use of explosion-proof lighting, prohibiting the use of mechanical
equipment and tools easy to produce sparks.
Toxic gas detectors should be set in the workplace.
The related person in workplace should master self-help and mutual aid emergency response
measures.
In the event of leakage, the manager should evacuate people in the shortest period to prevent
poisoning accidents.

26

5. CONCLUSIONS

The seminar report analyzed main derivative accidents caused by hazardous leakage; established
corresponding quantitative risk assessment models, and applied this model to quantitatively
assess an enterprises storage tank in Changshou Chemical Industrial Distripark (CID) of
Chongqing.

The seminar report made a risk summary and acceptable risk level analysis. The results have
shown that the probability of poisoning is very large, resulting in greater economic losses.

It is seen that the risk level of jet fire and vapor cloud explosion is acceptable; however, when
involving the poisoning accident, the risk level of leakage is unacceptable.

The report introduced the probability analysis methods and acceptable risk level, establishing a
completed leakage model.

27

6. ANY QUESTIONS

28

THANK YOU

29