Beruflich Dokumente
Kultur Dokumente
Studies
Concepts and models
Realistic
Compositional
Transtextual
Artistic
Diegetic
Categories of meaning
Diegetic
Explicit
Implicit
Symptomatic
Jakobsons communication
model
addresser
addressee
context
text
channel
code
Context
Codes
Channel
Media specificity: how does a given
media condition and modify messages?
Comparison of the purely audiovisual
qualities of film and television with verbal
expression
Comparison of film and television as
means of communication and artistic
expression
Film and television in the historical
continuum of moving image technologies
Implied author
The implied author is an agent internal to
narrative fiction, who guides the reading or
viewing. It is a construction which the reader or
spectator imagines as the source of the meaning
of the work (Chatman)
Jerrold Levinson: The implied author is the agent
who appears to have invented, arranged, and
integrated the various narrative agents and
aspects of narration involved in the film, as well
as everything else required to constitute the film
as a complete object of appreciation. The implied
filmmaker, in short, is the picture we construct of
the films maker - beliefs, aims, attitudes, values,
and personality - on the basis of the film
construed in its full context of creation
Reception
aesthetics
Artists cannot completely control how people
receive their works
The dominant culture and ideology do not
always determine reception
Meanings actually emerge in contextualized
readings
Time and ever new contexts function as ghost
writers
Communication is by nature dialogical and
polyphonic (Bahtin)
Reception is always a process in which several
cultural and social factors intermingle
Conventionalism and
realism
Conventionalism: Our knowledge of the world
and ourselves is based on certain conventional,
historically and socially conditioned, arbitrary
symbolic systems Culture and language
determine the limits of understanding (codes)
Realism: Certain universal perceptual and
cognitive abilities broadly determine our ability
to make sense of perceptual data, come to
terms and understand our environment as well
as formulate symbolic systems (schemas)
Schemata
unconscious conceptual structures which
process perceptual data and guide our
understanding
basis of our perceptual and cognitive abilities
to process information about our environment
emerge and develop in our interaction with
our natural and social environment
classify perceived phenomena on a mainly
unconscious level
both enable and restrict our perception and
understanding
Cognitivism / formalism
Screen theory
conventionalism
psychological constructivism
social constructivism
external story
physical
recordable
public
addressee
orientation
permanent
internal story
virtual
reportable
private
no addressee
orientation
fleeting
Three interfaces
Fiction emerges from the interaction between
notions about the real world and our fantasies;
fiction in turn influences both notions about the
real world and our fantasies about it
Notions about the real world are processed both
in private fantasies and public fiction; those two
in turn influence notions about the real world
Fantasies feed on fiction but gain their relevance
from being related to our needs and desires in
respect of real people; fantasies in turn inspire
fiction and to some extent even our relationship
with the real world
Merleau-Ponty:
The girl who is loved does not project her emotions like an
Isolde or a Juliet, but feels the feelings of these poetic
phantoms and infuses them into her own life. It is at a later
date, perhaps, that a personal and authentic feeling breaks
the web of her sentimental phantasies. But until this feeling
makes its appearance, the girl has no means of discovering
the illusory and literary element in her love. It is the truth of
her future feelings which is destined to reveal the mis
guidedness of her present ones, which are genuinely
experienced. The girl loses her reality in them as does the
actor in the part he plays, so that we are faced, not with
representations or ideas which give rise to real emotions,
but artificial emotions and imaginary sentiments. Thus we
are not perpetually in possession of ourselves in our whole
reality, and we are justified in speaking of an inner
perception of an inward sense, an analyser working from
us to ourselves which ceaselessly, goes some, but not all,
the way in providing knowledge of our life and our being
(Phenomenology of Perception, p. 380)