NUCLEAR DETERRENCE

IN THE COLD WAR

Topics #19-22

Nuclear Origins: Einsteins letter

to FDR

Nuclear Origins (cont.)

Manhattan Project: $$$ to scientists,
based on the expectation (or fear) that Germany was also
developing A-bomb.
Apparently Germanys nuclear program never got very far.
Germany surrendered before the A-bomb was ready in the summer
of 1945, but Japan had not yet surrendered.
Potsdam Conference and Site Trinity (successful A-bomb test, July 16,
1945)
Potsdam Declaration: We call upon the government of Japan to
proclaim now the unconditional surrender of all Japanese armed
forces, and to provide proper and adequate assurances of their
good faith in such action. The alternative for Japan is prompt and
utter destruction.
The bomb was used to compel early Japanese surrender (prior to
invasion).
Also for atomic diplomacy vs. Soviet Union?
The US, which had been anxious for the SU to act on its pledge to enter
the war against Japan, presumably regarded an early Japanese surrender
as additionally advantageous since the SU then could not claim as large
a role in post-war East Asia.
Was the US also trying to intimidate the SU by actually using the Abombs?

Strategic Implications of Nuclear

Weapons
Bernard Brodie: The Absolute Weapon: Atomic Power
and World Order (1946)
The most basic implication:
destructive power on an unprecedented scale was now
possible, and
it could be inflicted almost instantaneously.

The second implication: combined with strategic

delivery vehicles (long-range bombers and missiles),
destruction could be visited on an adversary at a distance,
and therefore
without first defeating that opponent militarily.

The third implication: if more than two nations

possess nuclear weapons,
mutual destruction is possible.

The fourth implication: nuclear weapons

cannot defend, but
can support deterrent (and possibly compellent) threats.

From Allies to Adversaries

Throughout WWII, US (+UK) and SU viewed each other warily.
There was doubt that the alliance could be maintained after defeat of
Axis powers.
Victorious alliances regularly fall apart after the common enemy is
defeated, and
the Grand Alliance between the West and the SU was hardly based on
common political ideals and institutions.

East-West tensions emerged in last months of WWII and became

profound within a few years.
Eastern Europe was communized behind an Iron Curtain.
There was political instability in Western Europe (with powerful Communist
parties in France and Italy).

While all allied powers substantially demobilized after WWII,

the SU did so less than US and UK.
Many Soviet troops remained in forward positions in Eastern Europe, while
few US troops remained in Western Europe (only on occupation duty in
Germany).
Western powers had fears of potential Soviet aggression or, more likely, of
Soviet compellent threats against Western Europe

Recall Appeasement Theory vs. Spiral Model accounts of the origins of

the Cold War

The US Atomic Monopoly

Western defenses in Western Europe vs. SU were very weak.
But maybe the US had an ace up its sleeve, i.e., its atomic
monopoly,
which seemed to provide the basis for a Western deterrent threat vs. the
SU.

However, it is not clear that this was really true, because at the time
the US had very few nuclear weapons, and
rather few long-range bombers, while
SU had excellent air defenses.

In any event, the SU broke the atomic monopoly in 1949, when it

tested an A-bomb.
It was not a surprise to the US that this happened, but
it was a surprise that it happen so quickly.
This first Soviet bomb was evidently based on atomic espionage, but
later Soviet nuclear advances were based on their own excellent scientific
capabilities.

Another surprise a year later: the outbreak of the Korean war,

to which US responded with WWII-style military forces.
Some official statements suggested nuclear weapons might be used,
but evidently no serious consideration was given to their use.

Eisenhowers New Look at Defense

Policy

Lesson of Korea seemed to be: no more Koreas.

The response to future aggression would be: massive
retaliation by means and at places of our choosing.
The problem was the SU was developing its own nuclear
capabilities and delivery systems

and seemingly doing this at as least as fast a pace as the US.

However, its exact pace was unknown,

as there was almost no way to monitor what was happening in
the SU.

In the 1950s, there were many instances of US over-flights

of Soviet borders, and
in the late 1950s, U-2 planes secretly flew over much of the SU.
The Soviets know about the U-2 over-flights
but initially could not shoot them down, and
did not complain publically because they would in effect be
admitting they could not shoot them down.

All this changed when the SU was able to shoot down Francis
Gary Powers U-2 in May 1960.

Implications of Nuclear
Duopoly
One seeming but erroneous implication:
Under the US monopoly, the US could destroy SU
and therefore could deter it from aggression.
Given a US-SU duopoly, each side could destroy
(and therefore deter) the other:
deterrence as an automatic consequence of possessing
nuclear weapons;
mutual deterrence;
balance of terror.

Winston Churchill: It may be that we shall by a

process of sublime irony have reached a stage in
this story where safety will be the sturdy child of
terror, and survival the twin brother of annihilation.

Implications of Nuclear Duopoly

(cont.)
But there was a second less obvious implication,
which was not recognized and acted upon for some time.

In the basic Western scenario, the SU invades Western

Europe, and
the US responds with massive nuclear retaliation on the SU,
the prospect of which should deter the SU in the first place.

But now that the SU is also a nuclear power, the US

now has a choice of targets for its retaliation:
Its nuclear strike can be either
essentially punitive (or countervalue), directed at Soviet cities,
industrial capacity, etc., (as it could only be under the monopoly)
or
directed against Soviet nuclear forces (or counterforce), in an
attempt to destroy them or render them inoperable,
thereby (perhaps) precluding Soviet counter-retaliation.

Clearly the second option seems more sensible,

at least in far as it offers any prospect of success.

Implications of Nuclear Duopoly

(cont.)
But the duopoly relationship is symmetric:
If, in the event of
some US provocation (in Soviet eyes), or
in the expectation of a US nuclear attack, or
in some intense US-SU crisis, or perhaps
out of the blue
the SU were to launch a nuclear attack against the US,
by the same considerations, it would presumably be directed
against the US capacity for retaliation, i.e.,
Strategic Air Command (SAC) bases, and
related communications, command and control, etc., facilities.

However, the dominant scenario discussed in the media, etc., in

the 1950s, was of Soviet bombers appearing (Pearl Harbor style)
not only out of the blue but also over a civilian target like New
York City, etc. ,
even though it clearly would not have made sense for the SU
to initiate a nuclear attack against such unthreatening
civilian targets.

Vulnerability of Strategic Forces

RAND Report (led by Albert Wohlstetter) on The
Selection and Use of Strategic Air Bases, 1953-54
How should SAC bombers be deployed?
In particular, to what extent should SAC rely on foreign
bases relatively close to the SU?
Advantages:
From such bases, SAC bombers could reach targets
more quickly and cheaply.
B-47 (medium range) bombers, which were plentiful,
could be used instead of B-52 (intercontinental
range) bombers (just coming into service),
and prospectively IRBMs rather than ICBMs.
Disadvantages:
Communications, etc.
Many host countries, even if present US allies, were
politically unstable.

Vulnerability of Strategic Forces

(cont.)

The RAND Report noted that putting SAC bombers at

forward bases close to SU has both positive and
negative implications:
it was easier for SAC to attack the SU, but also
it was easier for the SU to attack SAC bases,
quite likely destroying bombers on the ground, or
the airfields they need to get off the ground, etc.

This recognition led to an appreciation of the

significance of the vulnerability of SAC forces in
general.
This RAND report was an example of a systems
analysis, and in particular, of
opposed systems design.
Cf. games against nature vs. games against rational
adversaries.

Vulnerability of Strategic Forces

(cont.)
This conclusion led the RAND researchers to
examine SAC bases within the US:
SAC bombers were concentrated at relatively few bases,
including some foreign bases close SU;
the nuclear weapons themselves were concentrated in
separate and even fewer locations; and
communications, command, and control between
Washington, SAC headquarters, and individual SAC bases
were relatively primitive and most likely would not survive
an attack.

It became clear that (even though the SU was

behind the US in the mid-1950s) the US was
highly vulnerable to a Soviet attack,
especially a surprise counterforce attack with little or no
warning,
which, if the Soviets were to attack, was presumably the
kind of attack they would launch.

Vulnerability of Strategic Forces

(cont.)
Would the SU ever choose to attack in this way?
If the choice were war vs. no war, probably not.
But what if, especially in some crisis situation,
the Soviets saw their choice as between
a Soviet first strike vs. waiting for a US first
strike?
It seemed likely that,
if US were figuring out that US retaliatory forces
were vulnerable to Soviet attack,
the SU would also be figuring out that SU
retaliatory forces were (at least) equally
vulnerable to US attack, so
the US would be in the same dilemma.

Vulnerability of Strategic Forces

(cont.)
In other words, it appeared as if the US and SU were
entering a situation in which there would be a strong
reinforcing incentive for nuclear pre-emption,
that is, a situation in which both sides might have a
strong incentive to launch a nuclear attack,
because they could not be sure the other side
wasnt thinking along the same lines, and
both sides recognized that the side that struck
first might gain a decisive advantage.
Cf. Reciprocal fear of surprise attack (Schelling)

The Delicate Balance of Terror

Albert Wohlstetter, The Delicate Balance of Terror, Foreign Affairs,
January 1959 [updated and sanitized version of RAND report],
outlined the stringent requirements for nuclear deterrence, that is
the undoubted capability to retaliate after and despite an all-out
surprise attack by the SU directed at the elements of that US
capability.
Such deterrent systems must overcome all six of the following
hurdles:
a stable, safe and not prohibitively expensive "steady-state"
peacetime operation;
and in addition they must have the ability to

survive enemy attacks;

make and communicate the decision to retaliate;
reach enemy territory with fuel enough to complete their mission;
penetrate active enemy defenses (especially fighters and surfaceto-air missiles); and
destroy the target in spite of any passive civil defense in the form of
dispersal or protective construction or evacuation of the target itself.

Nuclear Capabilities
Nation A has a non-preclusive first-strike capability if:
A can inflict (perhaps great) damage on B by striking first, but
only by striking first, and even then
A cannot thereby preclude retaliation by B, and
If B strikes first, A will not be able to retaliate.

Nation A has a preclusive first-strike capability if:

[B has no nuclear capability in the first place, or]
A can destroy Bs retaliatory capability by a counterforce first
strike.

Nation B has a secure second-strike capability if:

A can inflict great (countervalue) damage on B even striking
second, and
A can do this even after absorbing and all-out counterforce
first strike by B.

The Strategic Nuclear Balance

Clearly there are logical interconnections among
these capabilities.
If A has non-preclusive first-strike capability only, it
follows that B has both
a preclusive first-strike capability, and
a secure second strike capability.

While A can inflict (perhaps huge) damage on B by

striking first,
if A makes a nuclear threat against B,
B has a strong incentive to pre-empt.

So if A looks ahead and reasons back, it should be

clear that A
should not be threatening but conciliatory, and
make every effort to persuade B that A has no intention of
launching a nuclear attack.

The Strategic Nuclear Balance

(cont.)
Therefore, As non-preclusive first-strike capability
provides little basis for a deterrent (let alone compellent)
threat,
except perhaps through the rationality of irrationality gambit (or
the reality thereof),
or perhaps through existential deterrence,
But these factors may also induce a pre-emptive strike by B.

On the other hand, Bs nuclear capacity provides it with a

strong basis for deterrent (perhaps even compellent)
threats.
The nuclear balance is stable in that
A has no incentive to pre-empt, and
B has no incentive to pre-empt unless A behaves irrationally, but
this stability is very favorable to B.

The Strategic Nuclear Balance

(cont.)

If both A and B have a preclusive first-strike

capability, the story is both different and much
more scary.
Suppose B believes that A is about to attack B (for
whatever reason):
Then (as before) B has an incentive to pre-empt.
When A looks ahead,
A sees (as before) that B has an incentive to pre-empt.

But now when A reasons back,

A realizes that A also has an incentive to pre-empt,
rather than an incentive to conciliate.

So the nuclear balance is very unstable (or

delicate) [it exhibits fearful symmetry].
We must both live together, or one of us will die the
more trigger-happy one of us lives and the other dies.

The Strategic Nuclear Balance

(cont.)

Finally, if A and B each has a secure second-strike

capability, the story is distinctly less scary.
Neither A nor B has an incentive to pre-empt.

The nuclear balance is stable [it is still symmetric

but in a much less fearful way].
We must both live together, or both of us will die.
This may be cold comfort, but it is comforting none the less,
as the common interest of A and B in avoiding nuclear war is
easier to realize.

The following chart summarizes these different

relationships, and
links (approximate) historical periods of the Cold War nuclear
balance to particular combinations of nuclear capabilities for
the US and SU.

The Strategic Nuclear Balance During the

Cold War

The Incentive to Pre-empt

Clearly the preceding either/or distinctions among different nuclear capabilities
are never so clear in practice.

Securing a Second-Strike
Capability
Most obvious quick fixes for the delicate balance
problem in the 1950s were expensive and
ineffective, and/or
dangerous.

Ineffective -- buying more bombers/missiles, etc.

(closing the bomber gap/missile gap, etc.):
Such a merely quantitative increase enhances first-strike
capability, but
does little or nothing to increase second-strike capability,
if the additional vehicles are equally vulnerable.

Dangerous high-alert status: e.g.,

keeping a large fraction of the SAC force on airborne alert at all
times; or
launching bombers on warning (even with a failsafe system).

Tradeoffs: greater dispersion of weapons and vehicles:

This reduces vulnerability, but
increases communications, command, and control problems,

Side Point: Nuclear War by

Accident

The possibility of accidental nuclear war was a focus

of much attention (in the popular media as well
strategic planning) in the late 1950s and early 1960s.
Dr. Strangelove (farce) and Failsafe (serious) movies
based best-seller novels (Red Alert and Failsafe respectively).

This probability of accidental nuclear war is

essentially the product of two probabilities:
the probability of an accidental missile firing, etc.,
times
the probability that such an event would trigger general war.

Both probabilities are

relatively large in a delicate balance situation in which both
side have an incentive to pre-empt, and
much lower in a mutual deterrence situations in which both
sides have a secure second-strike capability.

Securing a Second-Strike
Capability (cont.)

Moreover, the immediate next generation of technology

involved
liquid-fuel ballistic missiles that would supplement (and perhaps
replace) bombers.

This looked to worsen the situation.

First generation liquid-fuel ballistic missiles:
would sit in fixed above-ground positions;
could not be moved around like bombers;
would take a long to fuel and prepare for launch (and had a
tendency to blow up on the launch pad);
in the meantime, would be highly vulnerable to any kind of
attack,
especially IRBMs in forward bases (e.g., US missiles in Italy
and Turkey, Soviet missile in Cuba); and
once launched, could not be recalled (like bombers),
though they could in principle be destroyed in flight.

Securing a Second-Strike
Capability (cont.)

JFK campaigned on the missile gap theme,

that had been made politically salient by Sputnik and Mr.

Ks boasts and threats.

President Eisenhower knew from U-2 photography

that these were indeed boasts,
but he could not refer to U-2 evidence to support this view.

JFK and his Defense Secretary Robert McNamara

soon recognized that the missile gap, if it ever
existed, was not the main problem.
The immediate problem was to secure a second-strike
capability.

Fortunately, second-generation solid-fuel missiles

had much more benevolent implications for
escaping the delicate balance problem.

Securing a Second-Strike
Capability (cont.)
First priority: obtaining a secure second-strike capability:
Redundancy: the triad (or unholy trinity) with three
legs:
long-range bombers (B-52s) based in US but dispersed;
long-range solid-fueled land-based (Minuteman)
missiles placed in blast-resistant and dispersed silos;
medium-range solid-fueled missiles in nuclear
submarines (Polaris, Poseidon, Trident).
Emphasis on Communications, Command, and Control
(CCC)
Permissive Action Links (PALs)

Securing a Second-Strike
Capability
(cont.)
Evidently, the Kennedy Administration attempted (with
considerable success) to instruct the SU in nuclear
strategy (and perhaps even shared some technology
with it), particularly concerning
the importance of having a secure second-strike capability,
and especially
the importance of effective and secure CCC systems, PALs etc.

Shortly after the Cuban Missile Crisis (when US-SU

relations were exceptionally friendly),
Sec. of Defense McNamara gave an extraordinarily detailed
and candid talk to a select US audience on these issues, and
The US government notified Soviet Ambassador Anatoly
Dobrynin (died 4/6/10) and Soviet Embassy staff in advance
and
urged them to read and digest what McNamara said, and
to report the information to their government.

Mutual Assured Destruction

(MAD)
When the SU acquired a secure second-strike capability
(in the mid- to late-1960s), a stable balance of Mutual
Assured Destruction between the US and SU was
achieved.
The was achieved largely by several technological
accomplishments:
the development of small reliable solid-fuel ballistic missiles;
The development of small nuclear warheads that could be
fitted onto such missiles;
the development of nuclear submarines (in addition to landbased silos) that could carry such missiles; and
the development of guidance systems that could direct such
missiles to targets
even from mobile under-water launch platforms.

Type II (or Extended) Nuclear

Deterrence
To this point, we have been discussing what was once
called (by Herman Kahn) Type I Deterrence, i.e.,
the ability to deter an all-out nuclear attack.

A necessary, though perhaps not sufficient, condition

for Type I Deterrence was a secure second-strike
capability.
But this capability did not necessarily deter any less extreme
act of aggression, e.g.,
a Soviet invasion of Western Europe, or
a Soviet nuclear attack on Western Europe, or
a limited Soviet nuclear attack on the U.S.

As we have noted, in the 1950s the US was officially

committed to a policy of (all-out nuclear) massive
retaliation to deter such aggressive acts,
a policy that became increasingly unrealistic as Soviet (and
US) nuclear capabilities increased.

When he became Defense

Secretary, Robert McNamara was
briefed by General Thomas Power,
the head of SAC, on the official
U.S. nuclear war plan, called SIOP
(Strategic Integrated Operational
Plan).
Under this plan,
if the Soviets invaded any part of
the free world even without firing a
single nuclear weapon,
SAC would retaliate by launching its
entire arsenal of nuclear weapons
(3,423 bombs and warheads,
totaling 7,847 megatons),
which was expected to kill 250-300
million Russians and Chinese and
injure 40 million more,
along with uncalculated casualties
caused by radioactive fallout all
over the world (including the US).

Bill is William Kaufman; the text is from his

recent obituary in PS: Politics and Political
Science

Type II
Deterrence
(cont.)

Type II Deterrence
In addition to being horrified by SIOP, McNamara
believed it was an unwise [insane?] policy, because
it had never been publicly announced in such
stark terms (for understandable reasons),
so the Soviets probably were not fully aware of it.

In so far as it might be carried out automatically,

it was, in effect, an unannounced Doomsday
Machine,
like the Soviet Doomsday Machine in the Dr.
Strangelove movie.

Herman Kahn characterized SIOP as spasm

war,
which was not intended to be a compliment.

Type II Deterrence
Even if the Soviets were (or became) aware of the
US policy embodied in SIOP,
they might not be deterred,
because they would not believe that the US would
carry out such a horrendous and disproportionate
threat,
as it reserved for the US the last clear chance to
avoid what would be pretty much be the end of
the world.
In any case, if the Soviets had aggressive
intentions, they would use salami tactics, i.e.,
their aggression would come in small incremental steps,
no one of which would justify massive retaliation,
as explained by the Scientific Advisor in Yes, Prime
Minister.

Flexible Response
The Kennedy-McNamara alternative to Massive
Retaliation against less than massive aggressive by SU
was Flexible Response, with two components:
Rebuild conventional (non-nuclear) military capabilities
to defend against , and thereby perhaps also deter, conventional aggression,
especially a Soviet/Warsaw Pact attack on Western Europe; and

Prepare for limited or controlled (less than all-out or

spasm) nuclear war.
This was the idea that William Kaufman had tried to explain in his interview
with General Power.

Rebuilding conventional capabilities:

Maybe more Koreas after all (instead of No More Koreas),
i.e.,
fight WWIII much like WWII.

European nations were unenthusiastic about Flexible

Response and tended to advocate (Nuclear) Deterrence Only.
Flexible response gave the US the flexibility not to respond, and
WWII all over again meant something different to Europeans and Americans.

Limited Nuclear War (No Cities

Doctrine)

Robert McNamaras No Cities Doctrine speech,

June 1962.
Given a secure and plentiful second-strike
capability, in the event of
an all-out Soviet conventional attack on Western Europe
or
a less than all-out Soviet nuclear attack on Western
Europe, or other allies, or the US itself,

respond with controlled and limited (rather than

all-out or massive) nuclear retaliation,
directed at some Soviet military targets,
probably including Soviet nuclear forces (counterforce),

while deliberately avoiding Soviet cities and other

civilian or value (as in countervalue) targets.

No Cities Doctrine (cont.)

This controlled response nuclear strike would
somewhat degrade the ability of the Soviets to retaliate,
but would not entirely destroy it,
because the US expected (perhaps wanted) the SU to
also have a secure second-strike capability.
Most US nuclear forces would be held in reserve,
and most of Soviet society (most value targets) would remain
unharmed.

Thus deterrence would continue to operate even after

(limited) nuclear war begins.
Contrary to General Power,
the point isnt to kill the bastards as quickly as possible, but
to enhance US bargaining power by being able to credibly
threaten to kill some of them.

No Cities Doctrine (cont.)

That US threat and bargaining power is lost once
the US has expended all its firepower, and/or
the US has killed all its hostages.

Note that an all-out (SIOP-style) US nuclear attack on

the SU
may or may not disarm the SU (depending how secure its
second-strike capability was),
but it certainly disarms the US.

Recall the Hostage-Holding Game:

It is certainly not expedient for the hostage holders to kill all
their hostages at the first sign of trouble from the authorities.

The US and SU in effect held [and, incidentally, still

hold] a large fraction of each others population
hostage,
somewhat in the manner of the ancient practice of exchanging
hostages for security.

The Arms Race as an On-Going

Prisoners Dilemma
Remember that in the 1950s the US could not
reliably monitor Soviet technological and military
developments.
Being uncertain as to what the SU was doing,
the US (unsurprisingly) tended to fear the worst.

More generally, the US-SU arms race was like an ongoing Prisoners Dilemma, in which
cooperating meant exercising restraint in the technological
arms race, while
defecting meant going ahead full blast.

In a single-shot PD, we know that defect is each

sides dominant strategy,
even though this produces a worse outcome for both sides
than if both cooperate.

On-Going Prisoners Dilemma

(cont.)
But in a repeated PD with perfect information from
one iteration of the PD to the next,
if A defects while B cooperates,
B can retaliate by defecting on the next round,
and the prospect of this retaliation should deter A
from defecting in the first place.
By like argument, B is also deterred from defecting.
Thus ongoing cooperation should be possible in a
repeated PD with perfect information,
even though it is not in a single-shot PD.

On-Going Prisoners Dilemma

(cont.)
But (more or less) perfect information is essential
for this cooperation.
If A repeatedly defects but B does not find out about
As defections until many rounds later (i.e., if
successive rounds of the PD are played with
imperfect information),
it may be too late for B to catch up,
so A is actually encouraged to defect rather than
being deterred from defecting.
And of course B has a similar incentive to defect.
So cooperation is as difficult in the repeated PD with
imperfect information as in the single-shot PD.

Strategic Intelligence and the

Arms Race

At the first post-Potsdam East-West Summit

Conference in Geneva in 1955,

Eisenhower proposed an open skies agreement to the SU,

which the SU (very unsurprisingly) rejected.

The SU could find out a great deal about US

technological and military developments just by
subscribing to the NY Times, Aviation Week, etc.
As noted previously, the US attempted a unilateral
open-skies gambit with the U-2.
In the late 1950s, US initiated the CORONA
reconnaissance satellite project.
One political/legal problem:
Would the SU strenuously object to US satellite orbiting
over Soviet territory (at an altitude of 100-200 miles)?

 Evidently, the Eisenhower

Administration was
content to allow the SU to
be first in space with
Sputnik.
Werner von Brauns US
Army Jupiter-C rocket
could have put a US
satellite in orbit a year
or more before Sputnik.
Officially, the US
wanted the civilian
Project Vanguard to put
the first US satellite in
orbit.
After Sputnik, von
Braun was given the
go-ahead.

Strategic
Intelligence
(cont.)

Strategic Intelligence (cont.)

This following is evidently is the back story [from
NOVA, PBS science show].
The Eisenhower Administration wanted the SU to put the
first satellite in orbit.
The US then would conspicuously not object to the
Sputniks orbit carrying it over the US.
With this precedent set, the SU couldnt later object to the
US launching its satellites in orbits carrying them over the
SU.
These would initially be
Explorer and Vanguard
but later CORONA and then
much more powerful reconnaissance satellites.

The SU in due course would develop its own

reconnaissance satellites.

Spy Satellites, SALT, and ABM

Treaty

Reconnaissance satellite technology had a

benevolent effect the US-SU strategic balance.
First, it dramatically slowed down the US-SU
strategic arms race,

since each side could (pretty much) see what the

other was doing and then respond on the basis of
this information,
rather than fearing the worst and then responding
on the basis of these worst fears.

Second, allowed arms control agreements to be

verified by national means of inspection.
Devising international inspection systems that would be
acceptable to the SU had always been a hang-up.

The SALT and ABM Treaties

The SALT and ABM treaties of the early 1970s essentially
ratified the existing strategic balance based on
a secure second-strike capability on both sides, and
limited anti-ballistic missile capabilities on both sides.
Essentially each side agreed not to try to free its
hostages,
by depriving the other side of its second-strike
capability, or
by being able to defend its population against attack.
This implicit agreement was dubbed Mutual Assured
Destruction or MAD.
Some people (on both the left and right) thought the
acronym was all too appropriate.

Challenges to MAD
In the later Cold War period, MAD was challenged
by both technology and by strategic thought.
The principal technological challenges were two:
the (extraordinarily) enhanced capability of
guidance systems, and
the development of MIRVs (Multiple
Independently Targetable Re-entry Vehicles).

Challenges to MAD: MIRVs

In the classic (1960s) MAD strategic balance, missiles
had single warheads and were not especially accurate.
If A targeted a single missile against a specific missile
silo of B, As missile would probably not come close
enough to Bs silo to destroy the missile (or prevent its
launch), i.e.,
the kill ratio was distinctly less than 1,
so A would be disarming itself faster than A would be disarming
B.

But with greater accuracy, the kill ratio could

approach 1.
And with MIRVs, the kill ratio could greatly exceed 1.
Thus MAD might be undermined as each side potentially regain
a preclusive first-strike capability.
Note: submarine-based (Trident) missiles continued to be regarded as
more or less invulnerable.

Challenges to MAD: Strategic

Defense
Mutual Assured Vulnerability
Some strategists noted that, in the early nuclear age, the
basic strategic lesson was:
Since we cant defend, we must deter.
But, in the later nuclear age, this lesson was illogically
transformed into:
Since we must deter, we cannot (and should not)
defend.
Strategic defense (ABM systems, etc.) was regarded as
potentially undermining MAD and therefore destabilizing.
In terms of MAD, strategic defense of nuclear forces could
be stabilizing (and perhaps necessary to counteract
MIRVs).
But strategic defense of cities and other value targets was
contrary to MAD.

Challenges to MAD: Strategic

Defense

However, if strategic defense is technologically possible

(at reasonable cost, relative to strategic offense),
Mutual Assured Defense would seems to be
preferable to MAD.
Each side would have strong strategic defenses,
combined with small (or even zero) strategic
(offensive) forces.
The defenses (coupled with reconnaissance satellites)
could defend against any (including illicit hidden)
strategic forces on the other side,
and also against third-parties (e.g., Iran, North
Korea).
The problem is that the effectiveness ABM and other
strategic defense technology is very much open to
doubt.