Beruflich Dokumente
Kultur Dokumente
financial crisis
10 July 2014
Southwestern University of Finance and Economics
Overview
What is the European Union?
What is the Eurozone? Whos in the Eurozone?
The institutional design of the Eurozone: guaranteed to
avoid inflation and printing money?
The performance of Eurozone 1999-2014
The global financial crisis
Moral hazard, bail-outs and monetisation of debt
The outlook for the Eurozone
Article 2:
The objectives of European Union are a high level of employment
and sustainable and non-inflationary growth.
So:
fighting inflation is the absolute priority
supporting growth and employment comes next
Objectives (2)
Making the inflation objective operational: does the ECB have
a target?
It has a definition of price stability:
The ECB has defined price stability as a year-on-year increase in
the Harmonised Index of Consumer Prices (HICP) for the euro area
of below 2%.
Independence
Politically independent
Article 7: Independence
neither the ECB, nor a national central bank, nor any member of
their decision-making bodies shall seek or take instructions from
Community institutions or bodies, from any government of a
Member State or from any other body
Article 21: Operations with public entities
overdrafts or any other type of credit facility with the ECB or with
the national central banks in favour of Community institutions or
bodies, central governments, regional, local or other public
authorities, other bodies governed by public law, or public
undertakings of Member States shall be prohibited, as shall the
purchase directly from them by the ECB or national central banks of
debt instruments
Financially independent
9
Automatic stabilisers:
tax receipts decline when the economy slows down
welfare spending rises when the economy slows down
rule of thumb: deficit worsens by 0.5% of GDP when GDP
growth declines by 1%
10
Alert:moral
hazard!
The no monetisation / no-bailout clauses in Maastricht
Treaty
11
Maastricht Treaty
1.2. Monitoring of budgetary discipline
The Treaty prohibits the direct financing of public entities
deficits by national central banks (Art. 101), be it overdraft
facilities, other types of credit facility or the purchase of debt
instruments, except for the purpose of monetary policy. The
Treaty also prohibits public entities' privileged access to
financial institutions (Art. 102).
Moreover, the no bail-out clause in Article 103 stipulates
explicitly that neither the Community nor any Member State
is liable for or can assume the commitments of any other
Member State.
12
13
14
15
Source: http://sdw.ecb.europa.eu/home.do?chart=t1.6
Inflation
target
16
17
18
19
20
doubledip
21
22
23
24
SGP
Limit
25
Never achieved
SPG ceiling
26
27
28
Source: Eurostat
29
30
The bailouts
In April 2010, bailout mechanism used - 30bn lent to Greece
In May 2010, EU established a larger fund of 750bn
440bn from eurozone states
60 billion from European Commission
250 billion from the IMF
31
32
33
34
35
36
Conclusions
The ECB set up with primary objective of price stability and
independent of national and EU governments it may not directly
monetise debt
In EMU, national fiscal policy is the only macroeconomic policy
tool to adjust to negative shocks
But there are important external effects of budget deficits - EU
has failed to effectively enforce controls on national fiscal policy
Between 2010-12, EMU was at risk of being destabilised by
sovereign default but countries in crisis small and the EU has
acted decisively
Some argue Maastricht Treaty has been breached and ECB has
increased future risk of moral hazard but deficit countries are
paying a high price for past overspending
37