POWERS OF CONGRESS

STATUTORY-MAKING POWER
FORMAL LIMITATIONS
1. All legislative enactments start as a bill which is defined as a
proposed law which is submitted for consideration by Congress. A bill
is required to embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in
the title thereof. However, the one-subject-one-bill rule does not
require Congress to employ in the title of an enactment, language of
such precision as to mirror, fully index or catalogue all the contents
and the minute details therein. There is a sufficient compliance with
such rule if the title expresses the general subject and all the
provisions are germane to that general subject.
2. A bill may be presented by any member of either House. However,
all appropriation, revenue or tariff bills, bills authorizing increase of
the public debt, bills of local application, and private bills shall
originate exclusively in the House of Representatives, but the Senate
may propose or concur with amendments

STATUTORY-MAKING POWER
FORMAL LIMITATIONS
3. In order to transform the bill into a statute, it
shall undergo the following legislative process:
a.
b.
c.
d.
e.
f.
g.

First reading
Referral to appropriate committee
Second reading
Printing and Distribution
Third Reading
Referral to Other House
Submission to the President

STATUTORY-MAKING POWER
SUBSTANTIAL LIMITATIONS
1. It cannot pass laws granting a title of royalty or
nobility.
2. It cannot pass laws that will impair the obligations
of contracts.
3. It cannot pass ex-post facto law and bill of attainder
4. An inherent and practical limitation on the statutory
power of Congress is that it cannot pass
irrepealable laws.
5. In general, it cannot pass laws, which are contrary
to the provisions of the Constitution.

POWER OF
APPROPRIATION
Constitutional basis: Section 29(1), Article VI of
the Constitution which states that No money
shall be paid out of the Treasury except in
pursuant of an appropriation made by law.
Kinds of appropriation law: General and special
Major phases of government budgeting

1.
2.
3.
4.

Budget preparation
Legislative authorization
Budget execution
Budget accountability

POWER OF
APPROPRIATION

Effect of failure to general appropriations

law for the succeeding fiscal year before
the end of the current year: Application of
the
DOCTRINE
OF
AUTOMATIC
APPROPRIATION which means that the
general appropriation law for the preceding
fiscal year shall be deemed reenacted and
shall remain in full force and effect until the
general appropriation bill for the succeeding
fiscal year is passed by Congress

POWER OF
APPROPRIATION
CONSTITUTIONAL RESTRICTIONS ON THE EXERCISE OF THE
POWER OF THE PURSE
1.

2.

No public money or property shall be appropriated, applied, paid,

or employed, directly or indirectly, for the use, benefit, or support
of any sect, church, denomination, sectarian institution, or system
of religion, or of any priest, preacher, minister, or other religious
teacher, or dignitary as such, except when such priest, preacher,
minister, or dignitary is assigned to the armed forces, or to any
penal institution, or government orphanage or leprosarium.
However, if a public expenditure would benefit the government
directly, such an expenditure would be constitutional even if it
would result to incidental benefit to religion.
An appropriation bill must originate from the House of
Representatives

POWER OF
APPROPRIATION
3.

4.

The President prepares the budget for the

operation of the Government which shall serve
as the basis of Congress in enacting the general
appropriations law. In the passage of a general
appropriation law, Congress cannot increase
the budget recommended by the President.
Congress is not allowed to insert riders (nonappropriation items inserted in an appropriation
measure) unless it relates specifically to some
particular appropriation in the appropriation
general appropriation bill.

POWER OF
APPROPRIATION
3.

4.

The President prepares the budget for the

operation of the Government which shall serve
as the basis of Congress in enacting the general
appropriations law. In the passage of a general
appropriation law, Congress cannot increase
the budget recommended by the President.
Congress is not allowed to insert riders (nonappropriation items inserted in an appropriation
measure) unless it relates specifically to some
particular appropriation in the appropriation
general appropriation bill.

POWER OF
APPROPRIATION
5.

6.

The procedure in approving appropriations

for the Congress shall strictly follow the
procedure for approving appropriations for
other departments and agencies.
A special appropriation bill shall specify the
purpose for which it is intended, and shall
be supported by funds actually available as
certified by the National Treasurer, or to be
raised by a corresponding revenue proposal
therein.

POWER OF
APPROPRIATION
7.

The State shall assign the highest budgetary priority to

education and ensure that teaching will attract and retain
its rightful share of the best available talents through
adequate remuneration and other means of job
satisfaction and fulfilment

As aptly observed by respondents, since 1985, the budget for education has tripled to upgrade
and improve the facility of the public school system. The compensation of teachers has been
doubled. The amount of 29,740,611,000.00 set aside for the Department of Education, Culture
and Sports under the General Appropriations Act (R.A. No. 6831), is the highest budgetary
allocation among all department budgets. This is a clear compliance with the aforesaid
constitutional mandate according highest priority to education.
.Having

faithfully complied therewith, Congress is certainly not without any power, guided
only by its good judgment, to provide an appropriation, that can reasonably service our
enormous debt, the greater portion of which was inherited from the previous administration. It
is not only a matter of honor and to protect the credit standing of the country. More especially,
the very survival of our economy is at stake. Thus, if in the process Congress appropriated an
amount for debt service bigger than the share allocated to education, the Court finds and so
holds that said appropriation cannot be thereby assailed as unconstitutional. (GUINGONA v.
CARAGUE, G.R. No. 94571, 22 April 1991, 196 SCRA 221)

POWER OF
APPROPRIATION
8.

Congress is prohibited from passing a law that

will authorize the transfer of appropriation from
one department to another.
However, the
President, the Senate President, the Speaker of
the House of Representatives, the Chief Justice
of the Supreme Court and the heads of
Constitutional Commissions maybe authorized
by law to augment any item in the general
appropriation law for their respective offices
from savings in other items of their respective
appropriations. (Doctrine of Augmentation)

POWER OF
APPROPRIATION
PORK BARREL

An appropriation of government spending meant for localized projects and

secured solely or primarily to bring money to a representatives district
May be categorized into congressional pork barrel and presidential pork
barrel
Congressional pork barrel is basically a lump-sum budgetary allocation
for each member of Congress which is inserted in the General
Appropriations Law. While the allocation may be used for projects which
were pre-determined by the Executive Department (in the form of project
list, program menu, priority list), the power to determine to which project
the fund may be used, including the authority to realign the same, is
lodged with the legislator/congressional committee. It is noteworthy to
mention that the identification of the project, the determination of its
beneficiaries and the realignment of the budgetary allocation take place
after the enactment of the appropriations law.

POWER OF
APPROPRIATION
PORK BARREL

The validity of the pork barrel system was upheld in PHILCONSA v.

Enriquez, G.R. No. 113105, 19 August 1994 (235 SCRA 506) where the
Supreme Court ruled
The procedure of proposing and identifying by members of Congress of particular projects or activities
under Article XLI of the GAA of 1994 is imaginative as it is innovative.
The Constitution is a framework of a workable government and its interpretation must take into
account the complexities, realities and politics attendant to the operation of the political branches of
government. Prior to the GAA of 1991, there was an uneven allocation of appropriations for the
constituents of the members of Congress, with the members close to the Congressional leadership or
who hold cards for horse-trading, getting more than their less favored colleagues. The members of
Congress also had to reckon with an unsympathetic President, who could exercise his veto power to
cancel from the appropriation bill a pet project of a Representative or Senator.
The Countrywide Development Fund attempts to make equal the unequal. It is also a recognition that
individual members of Congress, far more than the President and their congressional colleagues are
likely to be knowledgeable about the needs of their respective constituents and the priority to be given
each project.

POWER OF
APPROPRIATION
PORK BARREL

In the recent case of Belgica v. Executive Secretary,

G.R. No. 208566, 19 November 2013, the Supreme
Court declared the congressional pork barrel system
for violating the following constitutional principles
1.
2.
3.

4.

Principle of separation of powers

Non-delegation of Legislative Power
System of Checks and Balances, particularly in (a) depriving the
President of his power to veto an item in the appropriation law, and (b)
diluting the exercise of oversight function by Congress.
State Policy on Local Autonomy

POWER OF
APPROPRIATION
PORK BARREL

Presidential pork barrel consists of the Malampaya Fund and Presidential

Social Fund.
The so-called Malampaya Fund (which was named after the Malampaya
Deep Water Gas-to-Power Project in Palawan) was created as a special
fund under Presidential Decree No. 910. Under Section 8 of P.D. 910, the
special fund was authorized to be used to finance energy resource
development and exploitation program and projects of the government,
and for such other purposes as may be directed by the President.
Meanwhile, the Presidential Social Fund was created under Presidential
Decree No. 1869 (Charter of PAGCOR), as amended. The Fund, which is
derived from the aggregate gross earning of PAGCOR, was authorized to
be used to finance the priority infrastructure development projects and to
finance the restoration of damaged or destroyed facilities due to
calamities, as may be directed and authorized by the Office of the
President.

POWER OF
APPROPRIATION
PORK BARREL

MALAMPAYA FUND. Insofar as the law authorized the President to use the Malampaya
Fund for financing energy resource development and exploitation programs and projects
of the government, the Supreme Court upheld its constitutionality since it provides an
adequate limitation on the authority of the President in the use of the funds. However,
as regards the Presidents authority to make use of the funds for such other purposes as
may be directed by (him), the phrase gives the President unbridled discretion to use the
funds for any purpose. It also allows him to unilaterally appropriate public funds beyond
the purview of the law.

PRESIDENTIAL SOCIAL FUND. Section 12 of Presidential Decree No. 1869, as amended,

was declared constitutional insofar as it allowed the President to make use of the
Presidential Social Fund to finance the restoration of damaged or destroyed facilities
due to calamities. However, the Supreme Court struck down the power of the President
to make use of the same fund to finance priority infrastructure development projects
since it gives him carte blanche authority to make use the same fund for any
infrastructure project he may so determine as priority. Verily, the law does not supply a
definition of priority infrastructure development projects and hence, leaves the
President without any guideline to construe the same.

The Disbursement Acceleration Program, as embodied in the

National Budget Circular No. 541 and related documents issued
by the DBM Secretary, was designed by the administration of
President Aquino in 2011 to ramp up public spending and to
accelerate economic growth by investing on high-impact
budgetary program, activity, or project (PAP).

To finance the Program, the Aquino Administration declared

savings out of the following: (1) withdrawn unobligated
allotments of the various departments and agencies of
government,
(2)
unreleased
appropriations,
and
(3)
unprogrammed funds. These savings were then realigned in
order to augment the funds for existing PAPs or to support
other priority PAPs.

DISBURSEMENT ACCELERATION
PROGRAM (DAP)

The constitutional basis of DAP as cited by DBM us Section 25

(5), Article VI of the Constitution which states: No law shall be
passed authorizing any transfer of appropriations; however, the
President, the President of the Senate, the Speaker of the House
of Representatives, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, and
the heads of Constitutional Commissions may, by law, be
authorized to augment any item in the general appropriations law
for their respective offices from savings in other items of their
respective appropriations.

DISBURSEMENT ACCELERATION
PROGRAM (DAP)

Requisites for the application of Section 25 (5), Article VI of the

Constitution as cited in Araullo, et al. v. Aquino, G.R. No. 209287,
1 July 2014
1. There is a law authorizing the President, the President of the
Senate, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, the
Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, and the heads of the
Constitutional Commissions to transfer funds within their
respective offices;
2. The funds to be transferred are savings generated from the
appropriations for their respective offices; and
3. The purpose of the transfer is to augment an item in the
general appropriations law for their respective offices.

DISBURSEMENT ACCELERATION
PROGRAM (DAP)

The statutory definition of savings in the 2011, 2012 and 2013

GAA
Savings refer to portions or balances of any programmed
appropriation in this Act free from any obligation or encumbrance which
are: (i) still available after the completion or final discontinuance or
abandonment of the work, activity or purpose for which the
appropriation is authorized; (ii) from appropriations balances arising
from unpaid compensation and related costs pertaining to vacant
positions and leaves of absence without pay; and (iii) from
appropriations balances realized from the implementation of measures
resulting in improved systems and efficiencies and thus enabled
agencies to meet and deliver the required or planned targets, programs
and services approved in this Act at a lesser cost.

DISBURSEMENT ACCELERATION
PROGRAM (DAP)

Unobligated allotments. The GAAs provide for a two-year

period of availability of the appropriations for the capital
outlay and MOOE. Thus, when the DBM declared them as
savings before the end of the fiscal year, in effect, it
shortened the availability of the appropriations for MOOE
and capital outlay. This is tantamount to forcing the
generation of savings in order for the President to have
larger fund available for discretionary spending under the
DAP, which effectively defeats the Congress power of the
purse.

DISBURSEMENT ACCELERATION
PROGRAM (DAP)

Unreleased appropriations. Based on its statutory definition, there

could only be savings when the purpose for which the funds have
been allotted were already satisfied, or the need for such funds had
ceased to exist.
This can only be determined when the
appropriation has reached the agency level. It is only when the
appropriation has reached the agency level may it be determined
whether (a) the PAP for which the appropriation had been
authorized was completed, finally discontinued, or abandoned; or
(b) there were vacant positions and leaves of absence without pay;
or (c) the required or planned targets, programs and services were
realized at a lesser cost because of the implementation of measures
resulting in improved systems and efficiencies. For the President to
declare as savings unreleased appropriations would seriously
undercut the congressional power of the purse, because such
appropriations had not even reached and been used by the agency
concerned vis--vis the PAPs for which Congress had allocated them

DISBURSEMENT ACCELERATION
PROGRAM (DAP)

Unprogrammed funds. Under the GAA, the President has the

standby authority to incur additional obligations for priority PAPs
when revenue collections exceeded the original revenue targets.
The original revenue targets pertain to the totality of all the
revenue targets as specified by the President in the BESF. Under
the Disbursement Acceleration Program, however, the President
dealt not with the whole revenue targets but individual revenue
targets. Hence, when the Executive exceeds its collection in one
source of revenue (say dividends from the shares of stocks of
GOCCs) but fails to meet its revenue target in other source (E.g.
tax revenues), it could not be said that the Executive exceeded its
original revenue targets. To allow the separate treatment of each
revenue to determine if the original revenue target is exceed
would result to the creation of artificial revenue surpluses.

DISBURSEMENT ACCELERATION
PROGRAM (DAP)

PRINCIPLE OF IMPOUNDMENT

Impoundment refers to a refusal by the President, usually for political or

ideological reason, to spend funds made available by Congress. It is the
failure to spend or obligate budget authority of any type. This finds basis
in Section 38, Chapter 5, Book VI of the Administrative Code, by which
the President was granted the authority to suspend or otherwise stop
further expenditure of funds allotted to any agency whenever in his
judgment the public interest so required.

Lessons from Arraullo:

1.

The President can veto a specific item in the GAA. But once the President approves the
GAA or allows it to lapse into law, the President can no longer veto or cancel any item in the
GAA or impound the disbursement of funds authorized to be spent in the GAA.

DISBURSEMENT ACCELERATION
PROGRAM (DAP)

LESSONS FROM ARAULLO:

2.

3.

Section 38, Chapter V, Book VI of the Administrative Code of 1987 which allows the
President "to suspend or otherwise stop further expenditure" of appropriated funds
can be invoked for a legitimate purpose. It does not authorize the President to
permanently stop so as to cancel the implementation of a project in the GAA
because the President has no power to amend the law.
The President has no power to impound unobligated funds in the GAA for two
reasons: first, the GAA once it becomes law cannot be amended by the President
and an impoundment of unobligated funds is an amendment of the GAA since it
reverses the will of Congress; second, the Constitution gives the President the power
to prevent unsound appropriations by Congress only through his line item veto
power, which he can exercise only when the GAA is submitted to him by Congress for
approval.

DISBURSEMENT ACCELERATION
PROGRAM (DAP)

LESSONS FROM ARAULLO:

4.

Once the President approves the GAA or allows it to lapse into law, he himself is bound by it. There
is no presidential power of impoundment in the Constitution and this Court cannot create
one. Any ordinary legislation giving the President the power to impound unobligated appropriations
is unconstitutional. The power to impound unobligated appropriations in the GAA, coupled with the
power to realign such funds to any project, whether existing or not in the GAA, is not only a
usurpation of the power of the purse of Congress and a violation of the constitutional separation of
powers,
but
also
a
substantial
re-writing
of
the
1987
Constitution.

DISBURSEMENT ACCELERATION
PROGRAM (DAP)

POWER OF
APPROPRIATION
Does the Constitution proscribe lump-sum
appropriation
(vis--vis
itemized
appropriation)?
Discretionary funds appropriated for particular
officials shall be disbursed only for public
purposes to be supported by appropriate
vouchers and subject to such guidelines as
may be prescribed by law. (Section 25 [6],
Article VI)

TAXATION POWER

The power of taxation is one of the inherent powers

of the State and it is vested in the legislature.

The power enables Congress to pass a law that will
raise revenue to defray public expenses and enable
the government to perform vital governmental
functions

TAXATION POWER
CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITS
The rule of taxation shall be uniform and equitable. The
Congress shall evolve a progressive system of taxation.
2. Charitable institutions, churches and parsonages or convent
appurtenant thereto, mosques, non-profit cemeteries, and all
lands, buildings and improvements actually, directly and
exclusively used for charitable, educational or religious
purposes shall be exempt from taxation.
3. No law granting any tax exemption shall be passed without
the concurrence of a majority of all the members of the
Congress.
1.

TAXATION POWER
CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITS
4. All revenues and assets of non-stock, non-profit

educational institutions used actually, directly and

exclusively for educational purposes shall be
exempt from taxes and duties.
5. Subject to conditions prescribed by law, all grants,
endowments, donations or contributions used
actually, directly and exclusively for educational
purposes shall be exempt from tax.

POWER OF LEGISLATIVE INQUIRIES

Basis: Section 21, Article VI which states: The
Senate or the House of Representatives or any of its
respective committees may conduct inquiries in aid
of legislation in accordance with its duly published
rules of procedure. The rights of persons appearing
in or affected by such inquiries shall be respected.
The SC characterized it as essential and appropriate
auxiliary to the legislative function. It pointed out,
however, that the power of legislative inquiry is coextensive with the range of the legislative power,
which means that the matters which may be a
proper subject of legislation and those which may be
a proper subject of investigation are one.

POWER OF LEGISLATIVE INQUIRIES

BENGZON v. SENATE BLUE RIBBON COMMITTEE,
G.R. No. 89914, 20 November 1991, 203 SCRA 767:
xxx the issue sought to be investigated by the respondent Committee is one over
which jurisdiction had been acquired by the Sandiganbayan. In short, the issue had
been pre-empted by that court. To allow the respondent Committee to conduct its
own investigation of an issue already before the Sandiganbayan would not only
pose the possibility of conflicting judgments between a legislative committee and a
judicial tribunal, but if the Committee's judgment were to be reached before that of
the Sandiganbayan, the possibility of its influence being made to bear on the
ultimate judgment of the Sandiganbayan cannot be discounted.
In fine, for the respondent Committee to probe and inquire into the same justiciable
controversy already before the Sandiganbayan, would be an encroachment into the
exclusive domain of judicial jurisdiction that had much earlier set in.
COMPARE: SENATE BLUE RIBBON COMMITTEE v. MAJADUCON,
G.R. No. Nos. 136760 & 138378, 29 July 2003, 407 SCRA 356

POWER OF LEGISLATIVE INQUIRIES

REQUIREMENT RE DULY PUBLISHED RULES OF PROCEDURE

NERI V. SENATE COMMITTEE ON ACCOUNTABILITY OF PUBLIC OFFICERS AND

INVESTIGATIONS/GARCILLANO v. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES COMMITTEE ON
PUBLIC INFORMATION: The phrase duly published rules of procedure requires the
Senate of every Congress to publish its rules of procedure governing inquiries in aid of
legislation because every Senate is distinct from the one before it or after it. Since
Senatorial elections are held every three (3) years for one-half of the Senates
membership, the composition of the Senate also changes by the end of each term. Each
Senate may thus enact a different set of rules as it may deem fit. Not having published
its Rules of Procedure, the subject hearings in aid of legislation conducted by
the 14th Senate, are therefore, procedurally infirm.

REASON: The present Senate under the 1987 Constitution is no longer a continuing
legislative body. The present Senate has twenty-four members, twelve of whom are
elected every three years for a term of six years each. Thus, the term of twelve Senators
expires every three years, leaving less than a majority of Senators to continue into
the next Congress. The 1987 Constitution, like the 1935 Constitution, requires a
majority of Senators to constitute a quorum to do business. Applying the same
reasoning in Arnault v. Nazareno, the Senate under the 1987 Constitution is not a
continuing body because less than majority of the Senators continue into the next
Congress. The consequence is that the Rules of Procedure must be republished by the
Senate after every expiry of the term of twelve Senators.

POWER OF LEGISLATIVE INQUIRIES

In the exercise of its power of legislative inquiry, both Houses of

Congress are conferred with contempt powers.

For how long may a person cited in contempt be detained?

Had said resolution of commitment been adopted by the House of Representatives,

we think it could be enforced until the final adjournment of the last session of the
Second Congress in 1953. We find no sound reason to limit the power of the
legislative body to punish for contempt to the end of every session and not to the
end of the last session terminating the existence of that body. The very reason for
the exercise of the power to punish for contempt is to enable the legislative body to
perform its constitutional function without impediment or obstruction. Legislative
functions may be and in practice are performed during recess by duly constituted
committees charged with the duty of performing investigations or conducting
hearing relative to any proposed legislation. To deny to such committees the power
of inquiry with process to enforce it would be to defeat the very purpose for which
that the power is recognized in the legislative body as an essential and appropriate
auxiliary to is legislative function. It is but logical to say that the power of selfpreservation is coexistent with the life to be preserved. (ARNAULT V.
NAZARENO, G.R. No. L-3820, 18 July 1950, 87 Phil 29

POWER OF LEGISLATIVE INQUIRIES

Section 21, Article VI must be distinguished from

Section 22 which states

The heads of departments may upon their own initiative, with

the consent of the President, or upon the request of either House,
as the rules of each House shall provide, appear before and be
heard by such House on any matter pertaining to their
departments. Written questions shall be submitted to the
President of the Senate or the Speaker of the House of
Representatives at least three days before their scheduled
appearance. Interpellations shall not be limited to written
questions, but may cover matters related thereto. When the
security of the State or the public interest so requires and the
President so states in writing, the appearance shall be conducted
in executive session.

POWER OF LEGISLATIVE INQUIRIES

Section 22 pertains to the exercise of legislative

oversight function. It is synonymous to the question
hour in a parliamentary system thereby making the
constitutional provision a deliberate introduction of
a practice in a parliamentary system into the
presidential system as part of the system of checks
and balances.

While the contempt power is ordinarily not available,

the exercise of legislative oversight function can still be
facilitated by compulsory process but only to the extent
that it is performed in pursuit of legislation.

NON-LEGISLATIVE POWERS
OF CONGRESS

The Congress, by vote of two-thirds of both Houses in

joint session assembled, voting separately, shall have
the sole power to declare the existence of a state of
war

Certain presidential actions require the concurrence of

Congress.
Particularly, the declaration of amnesty
must bear the approval of
a majority of all the
members of Congress. Also, no treaty or international
agreement shall be valid and effective unless concurred
in by at least two-thirds of all the members of Senate

NON-LEGISLATIVE POWERS
OF CONGRESS

Congress has the sole authority to canvass the

votes for the President and the Vice President
and to proclaim the winning candidate

The power to call for a special election for

President and Vice-President in case of
simultaneous vacancy in those two offices, and
the power to determine the Presidents physical
fitness if he is unable to discharge the functions
of his office

NON-LEGISLATIVE POWERS
OF CONGRESS

The power of impeachment. In impeachment cases, the House

of Representatives shall have the exclusive power to initiate a
complaint for impeachment, while the Senate shall act as the
impeachment tribunal

The power to confirm presidential appointments

The power to revoke or extend the suspension of the privilege

of the writ of habeas corpus or the declaration of martial law

Congress may propose amendments or revision to the

Constitution as a constituent assembly on the basis of Sections
1 and 2, Article XVII of the Constitution.