Lecture 6

PROCESS SAFETY

CHEMICALS INVOLVED

1.

Make a list of the chemicals involved in

the ammonia production plant.
2.From the MSDS of each chemical identify
the environmental and health impacts of
the chemical.
3.Perform HAZARD ANALYSIS.

HAZOP ANALYSYS

Introduction to HAZOP
By

E.M. Elkanzi

HAZOP
HAZard and OPerability Study
Premise - the process is safe if operated as
intended.
NOTE: THE HAZOP TEAM MUST
CONFIRM THAT THIS IS INDEED TRUE!
Accidents occur because of deviations from
intended operation.

What is a HAZOP study?

Systematic technique to identify hazard and operating
problems.
Involves a multi-disciplinary methodically brainstorming
the plant design (e.g. using WHAT IF...Technique).
Interaction of the team and their diverse backgrounds
stimulates creativity and generates ideas.

How do we identify hazards?

=> Use
HAZOP!

Hazard and
Study
Formal, systematic
and Operability
critical investigation
components making up a system

of

the

various

Detailed System Description

Brainstorming meetings
HAZOP Team
Causes

Hazards/Operational Problems

Consequences

Outline of HAZOP technique.

HAZOP technique is based on the

assumptions that the plant:
Will perform as designed in the absence
of unintended events that affect the
plant behavior.
Will be managed in a competent manner.
Will be operated and maintained in
accordance with good practice and in
line with the design intent.
Protective systems will be tested
regularly and kept in good working order.
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Principles of HAZOP

A HazOp Guide Word is combined with a Process Paramete

Identify:
Deviations from intended design/operation
Causes of those deviations
Identification
is the focus!

Consequences of those deviations

Safeguards to prevent causes and mitigate
consequences of the deviations
Actions (recommendations) for design or
operation changes to avoid deviation

Principles of HAZOP

Guide words
Parameters
Deviations
Causes
Consequences
Safeguards
Recommendations

HAZOP Guide Words

NO

PART OF

LESS

AS WELL AS

MORE

OTHER THAN

REVERSE

PARAMETERS - Specific
Flow

Level

Temperature

Viscosity

Pressure

Velocity

Composition

Inventory

Phase

Vibration

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General Parameters...

Hot Tap / Work Permit

Standards Compliance

Operability

Insulation

Drawings

Human Factors

11

DEVIATION
Guide Word + Parameter
Examples:
No Flow
Less (Low) Temperature
More (High) Pressure

12

CAUSES
Human

Error

Equipment
External

Failure

Events

13

CONSEQUENCES

Consequences of deviations need to be

developed assuming engineering and
administrative controls have failed.

14

SAFEGUARDS

For each process parameter deviation

which could result in a significant
consequence, there must be at least
two independent safeguards built into
the system:
preferably one hardware and one
software.

15

RECOMMENDATIONS

No Need for Action

Defined Action Item

Request for Information

Need for QRA (Quantitative Risk

Assessment)

16

HAZOP Rules of Thumb

If you want to finish your HAZOP discussions on time, you
must remember these rules, and occasionally remind the
Team Leader also about them !!
1. When thinking about CAUSES of DEVIATIONS in a process
parameter, LIMIT your thinking to the NODE under
consideration.
2. When thinking about the CONSEQUENCES of DEVIATIONS
in a process parameter, think about the WHOLE UNIT/
PLANT/ REFINERY
3. Forget who you are
No us and them
Any one can ask
Any one can answer

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Principles of HAZOP
Guide words cover every parameter relevant to
the system under review.
Flow.
Temperature.
Pressure.
Viscosity.
Components

Consequences must be identified and may range

from trivial to catastrophic.

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HAZOP Procedure
Take a full description of the process and flow sheet.
Line by line HAZOP using guidewords.
Overall flow sheet HAZOP using guidewords.
Systematically question every part to discover how
deviations from design intent can occur.
The results are qualitative.
Consider items relating to plant operability and
safety.
Deviations
are
analyzed
to
determine
the
consequences of an event.
Unrealistic
trivial deviations are rejected; only
significant consequences are reviewed and remedies
recommended.

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HAZOP Procedure
All modes of plant operation must be considered: i)
normal operation, ii) commissioning, iii) routine startup, iv) emergency shutdown, v) routine shutdown
plant.
The prime objective is to identify problems not to
redesign the plant. Recommend obvious solutions but
do not spend excessive time developing solutions.
Recommend follow-up investigations.
The most important factor is to be creative. Lateral
thinking is an important part of HAZOP technique.
Even if your point seems outrageous, still offer the
suggestion. It may stimulate further discussion.
(see Fig.: HAZOP procedure algorithm flow chart).

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HAZOP ALGORITHM

SELECT LINE

SELECT DEVIATION
Eg MORE FLOW

IS MORE FLOW
POSSIBLE ?

NO

IS MORE FLOW
POSSIBLE ?

IS IT HAZARDOUS?

NO

CONSIDER OTHER
CAUSES OF
MORE FLOW

NO

ACTION FOR
OUTSIDE MEETING

DOSE IT PREVENT
EFFICIENT OPERATION?

IS THERE A
SIMPLE SOLUTION?

RECOMMEND
ACTION

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HAZOP Team
Independent experienced leader.
Project Engineer.
Operations Representative.
Discipline Engineers i.e. Process,
Instrument, Electrical, Mechanical,
Maintenance.
HAZOP Minutes Recorder.
Any others suggested by the leader.

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Few Points of Guidance for

HAZOP Leaders
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

6.

7.

Always prepare a study program in advance.

Design and agree a recording format before the study
commences together with a circulation list.
Prepare a follow up procedure for dealing with actions
generated.
Define the basic philosophy of HAZOP, its objectives and the
limits of the study at the first meeting.
Stop the team trying to redesign the process. Team activities
should be confined to considerations of deviations and
generation of actions for review outside the meeting.
Always remember that a HAZOP study is a team exercise,
never allow the quiet members of the team to be dominated
by others.
In the event of conflict between team members consider:

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leaving the controversial area until later in the study,

b)
changing the composition of the team,
c)
changing the team leader (as the last resort).
8. Prevent long discussions by recording the area of particular
concern as an action to be resolved outside the meeting.
9. In many cases team members will be senior to the team leader.
This situation must nor deter a team leader from carrying out the
full procedure or force him to adopt a modified procedure with
which he does not agree.The leader must be strong, yet diplomatic.
10. Speak clearly and never be afraid to sayI do not understand the
technical point you are making, or that point does not relate to
the area under discussion etc. This is sometimes difficult if you are
junior to the team members.
11. Before leading the team for the first time, it is advisable to sit in as
a team member on some other project(s). This will give confidence.
12. You will frequently be under pressure not to study certain minor
drawings on the basis that they are safe systems. Remember, a
minor system although safe in itself, could cause hazards in others.
a)

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What Information is required?

Information must be accurate and complete.

All necessary information must be available in the
HAZOP meeting.
Information requirements vary depending on:
The stage of the report.
The aims of the study.
The nature of the plant; e.g. P & Ids,
Layouts, Process Flow Diagrams, Material
Hazard Sheets, e.t.c.
For modification of existing plant, a visit by
the whole team prior to the HAZOP
meetings is worthwhile.
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When to HAZOP?
Safety Review early in design-apply
inherent safety principles.
Full HAZOP as soon as P & IDs available.
Pre-commissioning review.
Every future change to process or
procedures.
Procedural HAZOP may be used for
construction.

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HAZOP Reporting & Follow-up

Review meeting records-use guide word review

sheets.

Summary of recommendations.

HAZOP report consists of: study basis and

method, recommendations, discussion of major
points.

HAZOP Action Follow-up: an addendum to the

HAZOP report. Deviations should be noted. Major
changes may require follow-up HAZOP.

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Small Group HAZOP Exercise

Consider the reactor system shown in Fig.(II-2)
The reaction is exothermic. A cooling system is
provided to remove the excess heat of reaction.
In the event the cooling function is lost, the
temperature of the reactor would increase. This
would lead to increase in rate of reaction leading
to additional heat release.
The result could be a run away reaction with
pressures exceeding the bursting pressure of the
reactor.
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Small Group HAZOP Exercise

The temperature within the reactor is
measured and used to control the cooling
water flow rate by a valve. Perform a HAZOP
on this unit to improve the safety of the
process.
Solution
The guide words are applied to the cooling coil
system. The design intention is cooling. The
results are shown in the HAZOP study sheet.

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[HAZOP] Example Problem

30

[HAZOP] Example Problem

Intent: Cooling Flow in Coils
Deviation

No Cooling

Causes

Guide: No Process Parameter: Cooling F

Consequences

Plug in Line Temperature Increases

Safeguards

None

Actions

Temperature
Alarm

Blocked Line Possible Runaway

Relief Valve
Pipe Breaks

Broken Coils due to

Block in

CW Low Flow

CV Fails

Alarm

Controller Fails

Study of Water
Reactant
Interaction
Emergency
Shutdown

CW System
Fails
Air System Fail
Sewer Backs Up

Back up CW
System
AFO Valve
Filter on CW
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[HAZOP] Studies
Deviation

Causes

Consequences

Safeguards

Actions

Hazard & Operability Studies will help us identify the

principal hazards in our plant. We can use this
identification to invoke the Inherent Safety
Strategies reduce the hazards.
Remember, while HazOps identify hazards, they do
not give insight into the probability that they will
escape and cause harm.

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Outcome of the HAZOP Study

The potential modifications resulting from this study
are as follows:
Installation

of a high temperature alarm to alert

the operator in the event of cooling ware loss.
Installation of a high temperature shut down
system.
Installation of a check valve in the cooling line to
prevent reverse flow.
Periodical inspection of cooling coil.
Study cooling water source for contamination and
interruption.
Installation of a cooling water flow meter and low
level alarm.
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Outcome of the HAZOP Study

The review committee performing the HAZOP

decided that the installation of a back up controller
and control valve was not essential. The
temperature alarm and shut down system prevents
a runaway in this event. Similarly, a loss of coolant
water source or plugged cooling line would be
detected by either the alarm or shut down system.
The committee suggested that all coolant water
failures be properly reported.

This example demonstrates that the number of

process changes suggested is quite numerous
although only a single process intention is
considered.
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Outcome of the HAZOP Study

The advantage to this approach is that it provides

a more complete identification of hazards,
including information of how hazards can develop
as a result of operating procedures and
operational
upsets
in
the
process.
The
disadvantages are that HAZOP approach is
tedious to apply and requires considerable
manpower and time.

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HAZOP Study Sheet

Small Group HAZOP Exercise on Deviation from Cooling Flow

Date:

SYSTEM: Reaction Vessel with Cooling Coil

FLOWSHEET: Cooling Water Coil
The reaction in the vessel is at 230 C: normal situation is
continuous cooling water flow through valve.

PROJECT: Training Exercise

PRESENT:
CHAIRED:
SECRETARY:

PAGE: 1
TOTAL PAGES:

No
.

Guide
Word

Deviation

Possible Causes

Consequences

Action required

Who

When

NO

No cooling

1. Control valve fails closed.

2. Plugged cooling line.
3. Cooling water service
failure.
4. Controller fails & closes
valve.
5. Air pressure to drive valve
fails,closing valve.

1. Temperature increases in
reactor.
2. Possible thermal
runaway.

M. Ali
Shift
Supervis
or

Next
meeting.
All
times

MORE

More
cooling flow

1. Control valve fails to 0pen.

2. Controller fails and opens

1. Reactor cools, reactant

builds-up, possible runaway
on heating.

1. Install back-up control

valves, or manual bypass
valve.
2. Install filters to prevent
plugging material.
3. Install high temperature
alarm to alert operator.
4. Install high temperature
emergency shutdown.
etc.
1. Instruct operators on
procedures.

LESS

Less cooling
flow

1. Control valve fails to

respond.
2. Partially plugged cooling
line.
3.Partial water source failure.

1. See 1 above.

1. See 1 above

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No.

Guide
Word

Deviation

Possible Causes

Consequences

Action required

Who

When

AS
WELL
AS

Cooling water
in reactor.

Leak in cooling coils,

pressure in reactor less than
in cooling coils.

1. Dilution of contents.
2. Product ruined.
3.Overfilling of reactor.

1. Install high level and/ or

pressure alarm.
2. Install proper relief.
3. Check maintenance
procedure and schedule.

A.
Hussain
ALL

Next
meeting
Next
meeting

PART
OF

See 3 above

1. Improper cooling,
possible runaway.

1. Failure of water source

resulting in backward flow.
2. Back flow due to back
pressure.

REVE
RSE

Reverse
cooling flow

1. Install check valve in

cooling water line.
2. Install high temperature
alarm to alert operator.
1. Isolation of cooling water
source.
2. Install check valve to
prevent back flow.
3. Install high temperature
alarm.
4. Review actions 1 ,4, 6

OTHE
R
THAN

Another
material
besides
cooling water

1. Water source
contaminated.
2. Back flow from sewer.

1. Possible loss of
cooling with possible
runaway.

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