TRAINING PROGRAM QUANTITATIVE RISK

ASSESSMENT

9th April 2013

CONTENTS
Overview
Risk Assessment Process
Hazards Identification
Consequence Analysis
Event Probability
Risk Presentation
Risk Tolerability
Risk Reduction

OVERVIEW
Risk Assessment is the process of evaluating identified
hazards by determining the likelihood of the hazard and its
consequences.

The assessment can be ,

Qualitative - where hazard frequency and consequences
are assigned to generic categories.
Semi-quantitative - where the hazard frequency and
consequence categories have an explicit quantitative
definition
Quantitative - where a numeric "best estimate" of risk is
Calculated

QUANTITATIVE RISK ASSESSMENT

RISK ASSESSMENT PROCESS

The risk assessment process can be broken down into six broad
stages:

HAZARDS IDENTIFICATION
The aim of hazard identification is to identify all relevant potential
causes of harm to people, damage to the environment and damage
property.
The Hazardous identification techniques,
Hazard and Operability Study :
Techniques to identify the potential operability deficiencies as
well as hazards.
It uses a series of guidewords to prompt study participants to
identify possible hazards and their causes and consequences
by using their imaginations.
It is carried out by a multi-disciplinary team to ensure
maximum input of experience.

to

HAZARDS IDENTIFICATION
Hazard Identification Study:
HAZID typically focuses on plant layout drawings, as it aims to
identify intrinsic hazards.
HAZID can be very useful at an early stage of a new design so
that all potential hazards can be taken into account.

Task Risk Management :

A check-list based analysis which will verify the list of hazards
that may be associated with particular plant or operations.
It will specify those aspects of plant or operations that require
attention from the point of view of safe design.

HAZARDS IDENTIFICATION
Failure mode and Effect Analysis :
Failure mode and effects analysis (FMEA) considers each item of
equipment or operation in turn and evaluates the consequences
of each failure mode in turn.
It provides a thorough investigation of the causes and
consequences of single failures and is useful where the main
danger comes from equipment failure
But it is not so effective in dealing with complex interactions
where more than one failure can occur at a time, nor
where the main danger comes from the properties of hazardous
materials

CONSEQUENCE ANALYSIS
Consequence analysis is the study of the possible extent of
effects of potential incidents.

harmful

It is carried out by making calculations for an idealized description

of one or more potential incidents (or scenarios).
The calculations required are defined by mathematical models
that describe the physical or chemical process of the potential
incident.
Main Elements of Consequences

Gas Dispersion

Fire Hazards

Explosion Hazards

Toxic gas dispersion

Escalation

CONSEQUENCE ANALYSIS
Gas Dispersion
Gas/aerosol dispersion models are used to determine outputs such as
the distance from the release point to a concentration of interest and the mass of
flammable material within a cloud.
Fire Hazard
There are five distinct types of situations considered by basic fire models:
Flash fires or cloud fires : It arises from the delayed ignition of a flammable gas
or vapour cloud, which in the absence of significant confinement or obstruction,
results in a low velocity flame front, with minimal overpressure effects and
primarily local impacts.
Jet fires : It arises from the ignition of a high velocity gas, aerosol or liquid,
usually from a pressurized source. They are characterized by high momentum
and good combustion conditions. A jet fire variant is a diffusive fire, which is
characterized by a lower exit velocity and is dominated by thermal buoyancy
effects rather than momentum.

CONSEQUENCE ANALYSIS
Fire Hazard
Pool fires : It arises where flammable or combustible liquids burn on a
flat horizontal surface, which can be solid or liquid. Pool fires often have
poor combustion and can generate large quantities of smoke.
Fireballs or BLEVEs : It arises from the surface-burning of a cloud of
unmixed flammable gas, typically following rapid release of volatile
material from pressurized equipment. Some overpressure may arise
from BLEVEs due to the rapid expansion on loss of containment.
Ventilation-controlled fires : It arises when the intensity of the fire is
determined by the rate of ventilation and hence access to oxygen,
rather than the availability of fuel. Many fires within buildings and
enclosed compartments are ventilation controlled.

CONSEQUENCE ANALYSIS
Explosion Hazard
Main three elements of explosion hazards
1.Determination of the size, shape and composition of the gas or
aerosol cloud.
2.Modeling of the explosion to determine likely overpressure values
and other relevant factors such as the period for which overpressure
exists (the positive phase duration).
3.Prediction of structural damage as a result of the blast wave.
Determination of cloud, size, shape and composition is part of the
dispersion modeling process.

CONSEQUENCE ANALYSIS
Explosion Hazard
The blast effect (overpressure) produced by a burning vapour cloud is
determined by the speed of flame propagation.
In the absence of turbulence, the flame speed is low and the cloud
burns as a flash fire. Turbulence within the cloud will accelerate the
flame and can result in damaging overpressures.
Turbulence in a vapour cloud explosion can arise either from the
release of pressurized flammable material or by the presence of
multiple obstacles, such as pipe work.
Both these mechanisms can result in very high overpressures.

CONSEQUENCE ANALYSIS
Toxic Hazard
The effects of toxic materials range from mild irritation through to fatality
However the dose needed to give any particular effect is subject to
considerable uncertainty.
Individual people can show varying levels of response to the same dose
of toxic material due to differing fitness levels, susceptibility to panic,
genetic and other factors.
Toxic dose for any particular effect or probability of effect is most usually
defined as:
Cnt
in which: C - is the toxic gas concentration (usually given in ppm or mg
m-3)
n - is the toxic index
t - is the time of exposure (usually given in minutes)

CONSEQUENCE ANALYSIS
Escalation
Escalation occurs when one event, such as fire or explosion, leads to
failure of adjacent facilities, loss of containment of hazardous material
and consequent additional potential for hazardous effects.
The principal mechanisms of escalation are:
Explosion overpressure causes failure of equipment or structures.
Thermal radiation from a fire heats equipment containing hazardous
material, causing eventual failure of the equipment through a
combination of increasing the pressure of the contents and decreasing
the inherent strength of the materials of construction.
Thermal radiation from a fire weakens the structure supporting
equipment sufficiently to cause collapse.
Missiles generated during an explosion or BLEVE penetrate
equipment.

QUANTIFICATION OF EVENT PROBABILITIES AND RISK

The technique of Event Tree Analysis should be used in complex
situation to determine the potential outcomes of a scenario and their
frequency.
The basic process of event tree analysis is to take the initial state of the
scenario and work through to the possible outcomes.

QUANTIFICATION OF EVENT PROBABILITIES AND RISK

Basic Data
Probability and frequency data for the fault trees and event trees should
be derived or determined data source from the public domain such us

OGP Database

Offshore Reliability Database (OREDA)

AEA Technology database

FACTS

Worldwide Offshore Accident Database (WOAD)

MHIDAS is an incident database compiled on behalf of the UK

Health and Safety Executive.

RISK PRESENTATION
The presentation of risk should be selected to fulfill the goal of the
assessment.
Individual risk - a single number representing the risk of a
particular level of harm to a person or location.
Risk contours - individual risk plotted over an area so as to show
the relative risk between locations.
Potential loss of life - a summation of individual risks over an
exposed population. Similar parameters can be derived for
outcome types other than fatality.
Societal Risk (Cumulative Frequency Curves or F-N Curves) - a
graph of the
frequency of events with a particular consequence
or greater versus the consequence magnitude.

JUDGMENT OF TOLERABILITY AND ACCEPTABILITY OF RISK

Individual Risk

JUDGMENT OF TOLERABILITY AND ACCEPTABILITY OF RISK

Societal Risk
Societal risk is usually represented by F-N (fatality - frequency) curve
This F-N Curve represents societal risk for a single fixed installation
only, like a refinery, a process plant or a platform.

TYPICAL INPUT REQUIREMENTS

Scenario Selection

Process Flow Diagrams

Piping and Instrumentation Diagrams
Heat and material balance
Isolation Philosophy
Blow down Philosophy
Project Description
Plot Plan
Plant layouts

Consequence Analysis

Project Weather Conditions

Project Wind Conditions

TYPICAL INPUT REQUIREMENTS

Event

Probabilities

Failure frequency data

Ignition Probability data
Risk Calculation
Onsite Manning distribution data
Societal Population details
Wind Probability

ASAB 3 PROJECT
107 Isolatable sections

Process Streams
Weather Parameters & Wind Stability (2 F & 5 D)
Hole sizes 5mm, 25 mm, 100 mm, FB
Release duration 3600, 1800,900 seconds
Parts Count
Ignition probability ( Immediate & Delayed- Database)
Consequence End Points
Fire (Pool/ Jet/ BLEVE fire ball) 37.5, 12.5 & 3.5
kW/sq.m.
Flash Fire LFL distances
Explosion 0.3,0.1, 0.03 bar
Toxic (H2S) Concentrations 300, 100, 10 ppm

EFFECT OF THERMAL RADIATION

Radiation kW/m2

Effect

1.6

Will cause no discomfort even for long exposure

3.15

Sufficient to cause pain to personnel if unable to reach cover within 30 seconds;

blistering of the skin (second degree burns) is likely; 0% fatality

4.5

Intensity sufficient to cause pain to personnel unable to reach cover in 20 seconds;

first degree burns are unlikely

Intensity tolerable to escaping personnel and for emergency actions lasting up to 1

minute without shielding but with protective clothing

9.5

Pain threshold reached after 8 seconds; second degree burns after 20 seconds

12.5

Minimum energy required for piloted ignition of wood, melting of plastic tubing

25.0

Intensity at which non-piloted ignition of wood occurs

37.5

Sufficient to cause damage to process equipment. Non-piloted ignition of wood

occurs within one minute; piloted ignition within 30 seconds.

EFFECT OF EXPLOSION OVERPRESSURE

Overpressure

Asset Damage

Impact on Humans

0.3 bar

Heavy structure damage

Fatality

0.1 bar

Repairable structure damage

Damage to organs

0.03 bar

Major glass damage

Damage to hearing

0.01 bar

10% glass damage

EFFECT OF H2S CONCENTRATION IN

AIR
Concentration
Effect
in Air
1 ppm

Odour of rotten eggs can be clearly detected. ACGIH recommended Threshold Limit
Value TLV TWA. *

5 ppm

ACGIH TLV STEL averaged over 15 minutes. *

10 ppm

Unpleasant odour. Possible eye irritation.

20 ppm

Burning sensation in eyes and irritation of the respiratory tract after one hour or
more exposure.

50 ppm

Loss of sense of smell after about 15 or more minutes exposure. Exposure over
one hour may lead to headache, dizziness, and/or staggering. Pulmonary oedema
reported following extended exposure to greater than 50 ppm. Exposure at 50 ppm
or greater can cause serious eye irritation or damage.

100 ppm

Coughing, eye irritation, loss of sense of smell after 3 to 15 minutes. Altered

respiration, pain in eyes and drowsiness after 15 to 20 minutes, followed by throat
irritation after one hour. Prolonged exposure results in a gradual increase in the
severity of these symptoms

200 ppm

The sense of smell will be lost rapidly, and it will irritate the eyes and throat.
Prolonged exposure (>20 to 30 minutes) may cause irreversible pulmonary
oedema, i.e. accumulation of fluid in the lungs.

300 ppm

Marked conjunctivitis and respiratory tract irritation. Concentration considered

immediately dangerous to life or health (IDLH).

500 ppm

Unconsciousness after short exposure, breathing will stop if not treated quickly.
Dizziness, loss of sense of reasoning and balance. Victims need prompt artificial
ventilation and / or Cardiopulmonary Resuscitation (CPR) techniques.

700 ppm

Unconscious quickly. Breathing will stop and death will result if not rescued
promptly. Artificial ventilation and/ or CPR is needed immediately.

>1000 ppm

Unconsciousness at once. Permanent brain damage or death may result. Rescue

promptly and apply artificial ventilation and/or CPR.

RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN RISK INDICATORS

LSR = Failure frequency * Event probability
Failure frequency: is the failure frequency of the
considered system.
Event Probability: Probability of Jet fire, Pool fire,
Flash fire, BLEVE, Explosion and Toxic impacts from
the release source
Individual Risk = LSR * Exposure

LSR - NEW LP BOOSTER COMPRESSOR

STATION

LSR ASAB 0 (NEW & EXISTING FACILITIES)

LSR ASAB 0 (EXISTING FACILITIES ONLY)

LSR ASAB 0 (NEW FACILITIES ONLY)

RISK TRANSECTS PROPOSED PIPELINES

LSR ASAB I/II PROPOSED FACILITIES

IRPA RESULTS
(NEW LP BOOSTER & ASAB 0 AFTER INTRODUCTION OF NEW FACILITY)
Category

Maintenance

Sr. No
1
2
3
4
5
6
7

Occupancy of
Individual in New LP
Booster Compressor
Station (/Yr)

Location Specific
Individual Risk (LSR)
(/Yr)

1.09E-02

2.0E-07

Category
Operator - Average
Operator MCR
Operator - Process Area
Maintenance & Inspection
Administration
Safety and Fire-fighting
Catering Contractors

Individual
Risk (IR)
(/Yr)

IRPA
1.40E-04
9.28E-05
2.07E-04
1.15E-04
2.83E-05
1.17E-04
1.02E-05

2.18 E-09

PLL
3.04E-03
1.01E-03
2.24E-03
2.50E-03
2.45E-04
1.01E-03
5.50E-04

IRPA RESULTS
(ADJOINING FACILITIES)

Asab Police Station

Total
3.07E-07

CNIA

1.83E-05

0.287 (8 hrs per

day, 45 weeks
per year)

5.26 E-6

Mosque

3.64E-06

0.107 (3 hrs per

day, 45 weeks
per year)

3.93 E-7

Warehouse / Maintenance Workshop

4.98E-05

0.204 (8 hrs per

day, 32 weeks
per year)

1.02 E-5

ADCO Camp

1 E-7

0.86 (24 hrs per

day, 45 weeks
per year)

8.63 E-8

Sr. No.

Facility Area

Exposure
0.287 (8 hrs per
day, 45 weeks
per year)

Individual Risk
8.83 E-8

MANAGE THE RISK

PREVENT
MITIGATE
RECOVER
ELIMINATE
REDUCE

HIERARCHY OF RISK REDUCTION

RECOMMENDATIONS
REDUCTION
SUBSTITUTION
ATTENUATION
SIMPLIFICATION

Thank you ..
Questions?....