Beruflich Dokumente
Kultur Dokumente
Game Theory
Basic Concepts
Players
Strategies
Payoffs
Players
Strategies
Payoffs
Equilibrium Concepts
Nash Equilibrium
Nash Equilibrium
10
11
Confess
Silent
12
Confess
Silent
-3, -3
-1, -10
-10, -1
-2, -2
13
Confess
.
Confess
-3, -3
14
Silent
B
Silent
-10, -1
Confess
Silent
-1, -10
-2, -2
B
Confess
Silent
15
Confess
Silent
-3, -3
-1, -10
-10, -1
-2, -2
B
Confess
Silent
16
Confess
Silent
-3, -3
-1, -10
-10, -1
-2, -2
B
Confess
Silent
17
Confess
Silent
-3, -3
-1, -10
-10, -1
-2, -2
B
Confess
Silent
18
Confess
Silent
-3, -3
-1, -10
-10, -1
-2, -2
B
Confess
Silent
19
Confess
Silent
-3, -3
-1, -10
-10, -1
-2, -2
Dominant Strategies
20
Mixed Strategies
21
Heads
Tails
22
Heads
Tails
1, -1
-1, 1
-1, 1
1, -1
Heads
23
Tails
Heads
Tails
Heads
1, -1
-1, 1
-1, 1
B
Tails
1, -1
Heads
Tails
24
Heads
Tails
1 , -1
-1, 1
-1, 1
1 , -1
25
Ballet
Boxing
Ballet
2, 1
0, 0
Boxing
0, 0
1, 2
A (Wife)
Ballet
.
Ballet
2, 1
26
Boxing
B (Husband)
B (Husband)
Boxing
0, 0
Ballet
Boxing
0, 0
1, 2
27
Ballet
Boxing
Ballet
2, 1
0, 0
Boxing
0, 0
1, 2
Best-Response Function
28
The function which gives the payoffmaximizing choice for one player in each
of a continuum of actions of the other
player is referred to as the best-response
function.
A (Wife)
29
Boxing
Ballet h
Box 1
2, 1
Box 3
0, 0
Boxing 1-h
Box2
0, 0
Box 4
1, 2
(h)(2) + (1 h)(0)
= 2h
(h)(0) + (1 h)(1)
=1-h
h
1
Husbands bestresponse
function
Wifes bestresponse
function
1/3
.
30
Pure-strategy
Nash equilibrium
(both play Boxing)
2/3
Pure-strategy
Nash equilibrium
(both play Ballet)
Mixed-strategy
Nash equilibrium
31
32
Always go to Ballet
Do the opposite
Always go to Boxing
B (Husband)
A (Wife)
33
Ballet
Boxing
Ballet / Ballet
Ballet / Boxing
2, 1
0, 0
Ballet / Ballet
Boxing / Boxing
2, 1
1, 2
Boxing / Ballet
Ballet / Boxing
0, 0
0, 0
Boxing / Ballet
Boxing / Boxing
0, 0
1, 2
A (Wife)
Ballet
.
Ballet
2, 1
34
Boxing
B (Husband)
Boxing
0, 0
B (Husband)
Ballet
Boxing
0, 0
1, 2
A (Wife)
Ballet / Ballet
Ballet / Boxing
Nash
equilibrium 1
2, 1
Boxing / Ballet
Ballet / Boxing
0, 0
Boxing
0, 0
35
Ballet / Ballet
Boxing / Boxing
Nash
equilibrium 2
2, 1
1, 2
0, 0
Boxing / Ballet
Boxing / Boxing
0, 0
Nash
equilibrium 3
1, 2
Subgame-Perfect Equilibrium
36
Simultaneous
Version
A (Wife)
Ballet
.
Ballet
2, 1
37
Boxing
B (Husband)
Boxing
0, 0
Ballet
B (Husband)
Boxing
0, 0
1, 2
Sequential
Version
A (Wife)
Ballet
.
Ballet
2, 1
38
Boxing
B (Husband)
Boxing
0, 0
B (Husband)
Ballet
Boxing
0, 0
1, 2
Backward Induction
39
A (Wife)
Ballet
.
Ballet
2, 1
40
Boxing
B (Husband)
Boxing
0, 0
(Next Slide)
B (Husband)
Ballet
Boxing
0, 0
1, 2
A (Wife)
Ballet
Boxing
B (Husband)
plays Ballet
2, 1
41
B (Husband)
plays Boxing
1, 2
42
43
44
cooperation to be a subgame-perfect
equilibrium, (6.1) must exceed (6.2).
Adding 2 to both expressions, and then
adding 3(r + r2 + r3 + . . .) to both
expressions, (6.1) exceeds (6.2) if
r + r2 + r3 + . . . > 1
6.3
45
Continuous Actions
46
6.4
6.5
6.6
6.7
6.8
As best-response
function
60
40
Nash equilibrium
Bs best-response
function
40
47
60
120
SA
Continuous Actions
48
6.9
sB
s A 66
2
6.10
As best-response
function shifts out
Nash equilibrium
shifts
40
36
Bs best-response
function
SA
40 48
49