Slide Osha

Lecture by : Ir Nik M Sapawi Nik Salleh
Processwell Engineering Sdn Bhd
PROCESS SAFETY
MANAGEMENT
AN OVERVIEW
http://store.armstronginternational.com/
Presentation Outlines
1.Process Safety Management
2.Operation & Maintenance of Safety
Critical Devices
Process Safety Management - How does one

define it?
Process safety management is a
management process for identifying,
evaluating and controlling the hazards
associated with a process facility. It is
intended to:
i. Minimize the likelihood of a major hazard
accident occurring
ii. Ensure that the necessary emergency
preparedness mechanisms are in place and
in the event that an accident does happen
Short-form definition of PSM

Keep the stuff
inside the pipes
and equipment
PLANNING
Process Safety Management - What does it mean?
MANAGEMEN
T OF CHANGE
OPERATION &
MAINTENANC
E
FRONT END
ENGINEERING
SAFETY
LIFECYCL
E
ENGINEERING
DESIGN
COMMISSION
ING
Procedure, Training, MI, Work Permit,

PSSR
Contractor Safety, Emergency
Preparedness
Risk Assessment
Audit, Incident Investigation
Management of Change
Process Safety Information

Hazard Identification
CONTROLLI
NG
EVALUATIN
G
IDENTIFYIN
G
Process Safety Management - How does

it work?
Process Safety Management
PSM Major Incidents
PSM Major Incidents
1984 Bhopal,
India Toxic
Material Released
i.
2,500 immediate
fatalities
20,000+ total
ii. Many other
offsite injuries
10
PSM Major Incidents

1984 Mexico City,
Mexico Explosion
i.
300 fatalities
(mostly offsite)
ii. $20M damages
11
PSM Major Incidents
1988 Norco, LA
Explosion
i.
ii.
7 onsite
fatalities, 42
injured
$400M+
damages
12
PSM Major Incidents

1989 Pasadena, TX Explosion and Fire:
23 fatalities
130 injured
damage $800M+
13
PSM Major Incidents
6th July, 1988 Piper Alpha, North Sea

Explosion and Fire:
167 fatalities
damaged USD$3.4 billion
HAZARD
Release of light
hydrocarbon i.e.
condensate
(propane,
butane &
14
PSM Major Incidents

April 20, 2010 BP Horizon, Gulf of
Mexico Explosion,Fire and huge oil spill:
11 fatalities
BP had to pay nearly USD$50 billion
HAZARD
Crude oil &
gas
15
U.S. PSM Incidents

Catastrophic Events in the U.S.
LOCATION
YEAR
DEATH
INJURY
Institute, WV
1985
135
Norco, LA
1988
42
Henderson, NV
1988
350
Richmond, CA
1989
Pasadena, TX
1989
23
232
Channelview,
TX
1990
17
Cincinnati, OH
1990
41
Lake Charles,
LA
1991
10
Sterlington, LA
1991
128
16
The Problem
FLIXBOROUGH
June 1, 1974 at approximately 5:00
p.m.
Release of approximately 20 tons of
cyclohexane, which exploded
28 deaths (all on-site)
36 seriously injured
site totally destroyed
1,821 houses damaged
167 shops damaged
17
Flixborough Incident
The Flixborough plant had been in operation since the year 1967.
It was operated by Nypro (a joint venture between Dutch State
Mines and the British National Coal Board). It produced
caprolactam, which is in turn used to manufacture nylon. The
process used six large pressurized reactors containing
cyclohexane. (Cyclohexane is comparable to gasoline; it is a
liquid at ambient conditions, but vaporizes easily and release
about the same amount of energy as gasoline when ignited.)
Prior to the Event
In March 1974 a vertical crack had appeared in Reactor #5. It was
decided to remove this reactor and to install a bypass between Reactors 4
and 6. This bypass failed due to lateral stresses in the pipe, probably
during a pressure surge. The bypass had been designed by
engineers who were not experienced in high-pressure pipework,
no plans or calculations had been produced, the pipe was not
pressure-tested, and was mounted on temporary scaffolding
poles that allowed the pipe to twist under pressure. Moreover, the
by-pass pipe was a smaller diameter (20") than the reactor flanges (24")
18
so, in order to align the flanges, short sections of steel bellows were
19
20
21
The Event Itself
During the late afternoon on 1st June, 1974 the 20 inch bypass
system ruptured. This may have been caused by a fire at a
nearby 8 inch pipe. The rupture resulted in the release of a
large (about 40 tons) cyclohexane to the atmosphere. The
cyclohexane/air mixture and subsequently found a source of
ignition. It caused a massive explosion.
All eighteen persons in the control room died as a result of the
windows shattering and the collapse of the roof.
22
The Problem
BHOPAL
December 3, 1984
Release of approximately 25 tons of
methyl isocynate
Over 2,500 fatalities
Over 250,000 seek medical treatment
Over 70,000 need to be evacuated
Estimated 2,500 deaths from after
effects
23
The Problem
PASADENA, TEXAS
October 23, 1989 Early Afternoon
Release of approximately 42.5 tons of
hydrocarbon.
Explosion with the force of 2.4 tons of
TNT
23 workers dead
130 injures
Approximately $750 million in damages
24
Total Number of Losses
Marsh & McLennan Protection Consultants

25
Total Losses in Billions US$

26
Percentage Loss by Accident Type

27
Why Process Safety Management?
To Prevent
Catastrophic
Releases of
Highly
Hazardous
Chemicals
28

Higher temperature and
pressure in plant systems
More stored energy in processes
Integrated, interconnected
plants
Public demand safer chemical
plant operations
29
Largest 150 Losses Last 30 Years - Hydrocarbon Industry
Cause of accidents
Natural Hazards
Operational Errors
Others
Process Upsets
Mechanical Failure
5% 10%
25%
19%
41%
30
Management system failures are the root

causes of over 90% of incidents.
There should be an integrated approach to
chemical hazard control.
In the U.S., there are now fourteen (14)
integrated elements to process safety.
In NOC, there are eight elements in process
safety
31
PSM Coverage
OSHA 29 CFR
1910.119
1.
Process Hazards
Analysis
2. Process Safety
Information
3. Operating
Procedures
4. Training
5. Contractors
6. Pre-Startup
Safety Review
7. Mechanical
Integrity
8. Hot Work Permits
9. Management of
Change
10. Incident
Investigation
11. Emergency
Planning and
Response
12. Compliance
Safety Audits
API RP 750
1.
AIChE CENTER FOR

CHEMICAL PROCESS
SAFETY
Process Hazards
1. Process Risk
Analysis
Management
2. Process Safety
2. Process Knowledge
Information
and Training
3. Operating
3. Training and
Procedures
Performance
4. Training
4. Capital Project Review
5. Pre-Startup Safety
and Design
Review
Procedures
6. Assuring the Quality
5. Process Equipment
and Mechanical
Integrity
Integrity of Critical
6. Management of
Equipment
Change
7. Safe Work Practices
7. Incident Investigation
8. Management of
8. Audits and Corrective
Change
Action
9. Investigation of
9. Standards, Codes and
Process-Related
Laws
Incidents
10. Accountability:
10. Emergency
Objectives and Goals
Response and
Enhancement of
Control
Process Safety
11. Audit of Process
Knowledge
Processwell
Engineering
Sdn
Bhd
Hazards
11. Human
Factors
Management
NOC STANDARDS
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
Management of
Change (MOC)
Mechanical Integrity
(MI)
Process Safety
Information (PSI)
Process Hazard
Analysis (PHA)
Operating Procedures
(OP)
Design Integrity (DI)
Proprietary and
Licensed Technology
Assessment (PLTA)
Pre-Activity Safety
Review (PASR)
32
Center for Chemical Process Safety

Elements & Components of Process Safety
Management
1 Accountability:
7
Human Factors
Objectives and Goals
2
Process Knowledge and 8

Documentation
Training and Performance
Capital Project Review

and Design Procedures
(for new and existing
plants, and
acquisitions)
Incident Investigation
Process Risk
Management
10
Standards, Codes and

Laws
Management of
Change
11
Audits and Corrective

Actions
Engineering Sdn Bhd

Process and Processwell
Equipment
12
Enhancement of Process
33
PSM Elements in USA OSHA 1910.119

1
Applications
Pre-startup safety
review
Definitions
10 Mechanical Integrity
Employee participation
11 Hot work
Process safety
information
12 Management of change
Process hazard analysis
13 Incident investigation
Operating Procedure
14 Emergency planning
Training
15 Compliance audit
Contractors
16 Trade secrets
34
OSHA 1910.119 - Management of Process Hazards

A
Application
Pre Start-up Safety

Review
Definition
Mechanical Integrity
Employee
Participation
Hot Work Permits
Process Safety
Information
Management of
Change
Process Hazards
Analysis (PHA)
Operating Procedures
Emergency Planning
and Response
Training
Compliance Safety
Audits
Contractors
Trade Secrets
Incident Investigation
35
Application (a)
Applies to:
i. Toxic or reactive chemicals
ii. Flammable gases or liquids
iii. Defines threshold quantities
(TQs)
Does not apply to:

i.
ii.
Hydrocarbon fuels used solely for

heating
Liquids stored below boiling point
if not chilled or refrigerated
36
Definitions (b)
Defines terms used throughout
the PSM regulation.
For example:
i. Boiling Point
ii. Catastrophic release
iii. Normally unoccupied remote
facility
iv. Replacement in-kind
v. Trade secrets
37
Employee Participation (c)

Employee Participation ensures
employees are given opportunities to
input into the PSM program.
Drives the development of information
using knowledge and expertise of
employees
ii. Ensures employees have input in
development of plans, process hazard
analyses
iii. Ensures employees have access to
information
iv. Ensures consultation with employees
i.
38
Process Safety Information (d)

Chemical, Equipment, and Technology
Information:
i.
Chemical, physical, reaction hazards of

the materials used
ii. Equipment design basis and codes,
P&IDs, electrical classifications, materials
of construction, safety systems
iii. Process block diagrams and chemistry,
chemical inventories (safe upper and
lower limits)
iv. Material and energy balances
v. Consequences of deviations
39
Process Hazard Analysis (e)

Purpose Systematic approach to
identify, evaluate, and control
process hazards
Scope
i.
All areas identified in the Technical

Analysis
ii. New or modified equipment or
systems
a. Capital projects
b. Maintenance changes
c. Process or procedural changes
40

WHEN TO DO PHAs:
i.
ii.
Project Design Phase

Periodically in the areas defined
in the Technical Analysis
iii. Capital projects
iv. Management of Change
41

PHA Documentation:
i.
ii.
Draft report of recommendations

Include risk rankings of
recommendations
iii. Set dates for evaluating
recommendations
42
Operating Procedures (f)

Procedures required for operations:
i.
ii.
iii.
iv.
Initial start up
Normal operations
Temporary operations
Emergency shutdown with/ without
depressurization
v. Emergency operations
vi. Normal shutdown with/ without
depressurization
vii. Start up after a shutdown
43
Training (g)
Addresses employee training
related to:
i.
ii.
iii.
iv.
Overview training
Initial training for operators
Refresher training
Training documentation
44
Contractors (h)
Coverage is intended to assure a safe
interface of contract employers and
employees with the work
environment.
Employers and the Contractor both
have significant responsibilities to
assure a safe work place
45
Pre-Start Up Safety Review (i)

To ensure that new or modified
facilities are safe to operate:
i.
ii.
iii.
iv.
Equipment has been designed and

installed properly
Procedures are in place
PHAs have been done
Employees have been trained
46
Mechanical Integrity (j)

Mechanical Integrity Program covers:
i.
ii.
iii.
iv.
v.
vi.
Vessels - Pressure, storage tanks, piping

Rotating equipment
Process controls, emergency shutdown
systems
Pressure relief systems
Emergency response systems
Fixed Fire Protection
47
Hot Work Permit (k)

All hot work requires a permit
Hot work includes cutting, grinding,
welding, heating
48
Management of Change (l)

Purpose is to ensure that any changes
to:
i.
ii.
iii.
iv.
Process chemicals
Process technology
Procedures
Equipment
are adequately reviewed and

approved prior to being made
49
Management of Change (l)

Following considerations must
be addressed:
i. Technical basis for change
ii. Impact on safety and health
iii. Modifications to operating
procedures done
iv. Time period for the change
v. Training affected employees
vi. Authorization for change
50
Incident Investigation (m)

Definitions:
A PSM incident or near miss is one
which did result, or could have
resulted, in a catastrophic release of
any highly hazardous chemical
A non-PSM incident is any other
incident that does not involve a highly
hazardous chemical
51
Emergency Planning and Response (n)

Emergency action plan for releases of
HHCs, fire, explosion
Program to include who is to do what
action in event of emergency
52
Compliance Audit (o)

Purpose:
To comply with self-audit
requirement of PSM rule
How an Audit is Conducted:

Team familiar with process, specific
elements, assessment techniques
Audit Frequency:
Must be done at least every 3 years
53
Trade Secrets (p)

Trade secret information needed to
comply with all sections of the PSM
rule will be available to all employees
and their designated representatives,
and contractors
The company reserves the right to
require confidentiality agreements
54
Process Safety Aspects/Elements in

NOC
PTS exist for these aspects:
i.
Management of Change
(MOC)
ii. Mechanical Integrity (MI)
iii. Process Safety Information
(PSI)
iv. Process Hazard Analysis
(PHA)
v. Operating Procedures (OP)
vi. Design Integrity (DI)
vii. Proprietary and Licensed
Technology Assessment
(PLTA)
viii. Pre-Activity Safety Review
(PASR)
Other aspects:
i.
ii.
iii.
iv.
Leadership
Training & Competency
Measurement & Review
Contractor
Management &
Procurement
v. Incident Investigation
vi. Emergency Preparation
vii. Non-routine Work
Authorization
55
PROCESS SAFETY MANAGEMENT SYSTEM
OPERATION &
MAINTENANCE OF
SAFETY CRITICAL
DEVICES
56
PLANNING
Process Safety Management Safety Life Cycle
MANAGEMEN
T OF CHANGE
OPERATION &
MAINTENANC
E
FRONT END
ENGINEERING
SAFETY
LIFECYCL
E
ENGINEERING
DESIGN
COMMISSION
ING
57
What is a Safety Instrumented System

(SIS)?
An SIS is designed to:
Respond to conditions in the plant which may be hazardous
in themselves or,
If no action was taken, could eventually give rise to a
hazard, and
Respond to these conditions by taking defined actions that
either prevent the hazard or mitigate the hazard
consequences.
Input ---- Logic Solver ---- Output

No matter how sophisticated or how advance the
technology used in the SIS, if it is not properly operated
and maintained, it will not be able to protect any facility.
Sample P&ID
Sens
or
Final
Element
Final
Element
59
Fault Detection Designed In

Testing
Simulated process demand conditions are imposed on
the system to verify functionality & find any hidden
faults.
Provisions are made in the design to facilitate on-line
testing as much as possible.
If a fault is detected, repairs are made ASAP to restore
full protective functionality.
In cases where repairs cannot be readily accomplished,
alternate protection is placed in service or operations are
taken to a stable, safe state until the repairs can be made.
60/52
Relation between Shutdown and Revenue
Loss of
revenue
SIS
Testing
Plant
Shutdo
wn
61
Testing Frequency
API RP 14C, Analysis, Design, Installation,
and Testing of Basic Surface Safety
Systems for Offshore Production
Platforms recommends a minimum testing
frequency of once per year.
The testing frequency varies from one
company to another from quarterly to annually.
The testing frequency used to be based on
time but now the testing frequency is based on
SIL (Safety Integrity Level)
62
Next Level of Improvements

Where are faults occurring in protective
systems?
Final Element
55%
Sensor
40%
Logic Solver
5%
63/52
Online Testing of Sensors

Having sensors designed as follows
will facilitate online testing:
i.
Redundancy The ability to tolerate

faults is enhanced by the use of multiple
components. This includes such things as
redundant sensors/logic solvers/output
devices.
ii. Multiple Sensors Multiple input devices
which can be used for voting/validity
checking/median value selection.
iii. Independent Technologies Use of
different sensor/ output types to avoid
common cause failure modes.
64/52
Maintenance of SIS to ensure the Integrity
Two common problems with

the sensor (instrument) are as
follows:
1. Drift (means a gradual change, in some
property of an instrument, which affects the
measurements made with that instrument)
the instrument will need to be re-calibrated
since the reading or measurement is no
longer accurate.
2. Damaged due to exposure to harsh
Processwell
Engineering
Sdn Bhd will need to be
environment
the
instrument
65
Online Testing of Final Element

The final elements could be a motor that
drives a pump or compressor or a
shutdown valve.
The most common problem for a valve
that it fails to close (shutdown valve
SDV) or open (blowdown valve BDV)
upon demand. In order to test the valve
without plant interruption, test can be
done either by:
Partial Stroke Test the valve will be partially
stroke by a computer for every certain period of
time, or
ii. Full Stroke Test can be done during plant
planned or unplanned shutdown
i.
66/52
Back-up Notes
PROCESS HAZARD
ANALYSIS
67
Process Hazard Analysis

Simply, PHA allows the employer to:
Determine locations of potential safety
problems
Identify corrective measures to improve
safety
Preplan emergency actions to be taken if
safety controls fail
68/49
PHA Requirements
Use one or more established
methodologies appropriate to the
complexity of the process
Performed by a team with expertise in
engineering and process operations
Includes personnel with experience
and knowledge specific to the process
being evaluated and the hazard
analysis methodology being used
69/49
PHA Must Address

The hazards of the process
Identification of previous incidents
with likely potential for catastrophic
consequences
Engineering and administrative
controls applicable to the hazards and
their interrelationships
70/49
PHA Must Address (contd)

Consequences of failure of
engineering and administrative
controls, especially those affecting
employees
Facility siting; human factors
The need to promptly resolve PHA
findings and recommendations
71/49
Hazard Analysis Methodologies

What-If
Checklist
What-If/Checklist
Hazard and Operability Study (HAZOP)
Failure Mode and Effects Analysis
(FMEA)
vi. Fault Tree Analysis
vii. Layer of Protection Analysis (LOPA)
viii. An appropriate equivalent
methodology
i.
ii.
iii.
iv.
v.
72/49
What-If
Experienced personnel
brainstorming a series of
questions that begin, "What if?
Each question represents a
potential failure in the facility or
misoperation of the facility
73/49
What-If
The response of the process and/or
operators is evaluated to
determine if a potential hazard can
occur
If so, the adequacy of existing
safeguards is weighed against the
probability and severity of the
scenario to determine whether
modifications to the system should
be recommended
74/49
What-If Steps
1. Divide the system up into
smaller, logical subsystems
2. Identify a list of questions for a
subsystem
3. Select a question
4. Identify hazards, consequences,
severity, likelihood, and
recommendations
5. Repeat Step 2 through 4 until
complete
75/49
What-If Question Areas

Equipment failures
What if a valve leaks?
Human error
What if operator fails to restart pump?
External events
What if a very hard freeze persists?
76/49
What-If Summary
Perhaps the most commonly used
method
One of the least structured methods
Can be used in a wide range of
circumstances
Success highly dependent on
experience of the analysts
Useful at any stage in the facility
life cycle
Useful when focusing on change
77/49
Checklist
Consists of using a detailed list of
prepared questions about the design
and operation of the facility
Questions are usually answered Yes
or No
Used to identify common hazards
through compliance with established
practices and standards
78/49
Checklist Question Categories

Causes of accidents
Process equipment
Human error
External events
Facility Functions
Alarms, construction materials, control
systems, documentation and training,
instrumentation, piping, pumps,
vessels, etc.
79/49
Checklist Questions
Causes of accidents
i.
ii.
iii.
iv.
Is process equipment properly supported?

Is equipment identified properly?
Are the procedures complete?
Is the system designed to withstand
hurricane winds?
Facility Functions
i.
Is it possible to distinguish between

different alarms?
ii. Is pressure relief provided?
iii. Is the vessel free from external corrosion?
iv. Are sources of ignition controlled?
80/49
Checklist Summary
The simplest of hazard analyses
Easy-to-use; level of detail is
adjustable
Provides quick results;
communicates information well
Effective way to account for
lessons learned
NOT helpful in identifying new or
unrecognized hazards
Limited to the expertise of its
author(s)
81/49
Checklist Summary (contd)

Should be prepared by experienced
engineers
Its application requires knowledge
of the system/facility and its
standard operating procedures
Should be audited and updated
regularly
82/49
What-If/Checklist
A hybrid of the What-If and Checklist
methodologies
Combines the brainstorming of What-If
method with the structured features of
Checklist method
83/49
What-If/Checklist Steps
Begin by answering a series of
previously-prepared What-if
questions
During the exercise, brainstorming
produces additional questions to
complete the analysis of the process
under study
84/49
What-If/Checklist Summary
Encourages creative thinking (What-If) while
providing structure (Checklist)
In theory, weaknesses of stand-alone methods
are eliminated and strengths preserved not
easy to do in practice
E.g.: when presented with a checklist, it is
typical human behavior to suspend creative
thinking
85/49
HAZOP
Hazard and Operability Analysis:
Identify hazards (safety, health,
environmental), and
Problems which prevent efficient
operation
86/49
HAZOP
1. Choose a vessel and describe
intention
2. Choose and describe a flow path
3. Apply guideword to deviation
Guidewords include NONE, MORE OF,

LESS OF, PART OF, MORE THAN,
OTHER THAN, REVERSE
Deviations are expansions, such as
NO FLOW, MORE PRESSURE, LESS
TEMPERATURE, MORE PHASES THAN
(there should be),
87/49
HAZOP
1. Vessel
2. FLOW PATH
Feed Tank
Pump
Check
Valve
To Distillation Column
3. REVERSAL OF FLOW
HAZOP
4. Can deviation initiate a hazard of
consequence?
5. Can failures causing deviation be identified?
6. Investigate detection and mitigation
systems
7. Identify recommendations
8. Document
9. Repeat 3-to-8, 2-to-8, and 1-to-8 until
complete
89/49
HAZOP
1. Vessel
(Illustrative
Feed Tank
2. FLOW PATH
example of HAZOP)
Pump
Check
Valve
To Distillation Column
3. REVERSE FLOW
4. Distillation materials returning via min recycle flow
5. Pump failure could lead to REVERSAL OF FLOW
6. Check valve located properly prevents deviation
7. Move check valve downstream of min recycle
flow
90/49
90/49
Loss of Containment Deviations
Pressure too high

Pressure too low (vacuum)
Temperature too high
Temperature too low
Deterioration of equipment
91/49
HAZOPs Inherent Assumptions

Hazards are detectable by careful review
Plants designed, built and run to appropriate
standards will not suffer catastrophic loss of
containment if ops stay within design
parameters
Hazards are controllable by a combination of
equipment, procedures which are Safety Critical
HAZOP conducted with openness and good faith
by competent parties
92/49
HAZOP Pros and Cons

Creative, open-ended
Completeness identifies all process
hazards
Rigorous, structured, yet versatile
Identifies safety and operability issues
Can be time-consuming (e.g., includes
operability)
Relies on having right people in the
room
Does not distinguish between low
probability, high consequence events
(and vice versa)
93/49
FMEA Failure Modes, Effects Analysis
Manual analysis to determine the

consequences of component, module or
subsystem failures
Bottom-up analysis
Consists of a spreadsheet where each

failure mode, possible causes, probability
of occurrence, consequences, and
proposed safeguards are noted.
94/49
FMEA Failure Mode Keywords
Rupture
Crack
Leak
Plugged
Failure to open
Failure to close
Failure to stop
Failure to start
Failure to continue
Spurious stop
Spurious start
Loss of function
High pressure
Low pressure
High temperature
Low temperature
Overfilling
Hose bypass
Instrument bypassed
95/49
FMEA on a Heat Exchanger

Failure
Mode
Causes of
Failure
Symptoms
Tube rupture
Corrosion
from fluids
(shell side)
H/C at higher Frequent has

pressure than happened 2x in
cooling water
10 yrs
Predicted
Frequency
Impact
Critical
could
cause a
major fire
Rank items by risk (frequency x impact)

Identify safeguards for high risk items
96/49
FMEA Failure Modes, Effects Analysis

FMEA is a very structured and reliable method
for evaluating hardware and systems.
Easy to learn and apply and approach makes
evaluating even complex systems easy to do.
Can be very time-consuming (and expensive)
and does not readily identify areas of multiple
fault that could occur.
Not easily lent to procedural review as it may
not identify areas of human error in the process.
97/49
Accident Scenarios May Be Missed by PHA
No PHA method can identify all

accidents that could occur in a
process
A scenario may be excluded from the
scope of the analysis
The team may be unaware of a
scenario
The team consider the scenario but
judge it not credible or significant
The team may overlook the scenario
98/49
Summary
Despite the aforementioned issues with PHA:
Companies that rigorously exercise PHA are
seeing a continuing reduction is frequency
and severity of industrial accidents
Process Hazard Analysis will continue to
play an integral role in the design and
continued examination of industrial processes
99/49

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Lecture by : Ir Nik M Sapawi Nik Salleh

Processwell Engineering Sdn Bhd

Processwell Engineering Sdn Bhd

Processwell Engineering Sdn Bhd

Processwell Engineering Sdn Bhd

Process Safety Management - How does one

Short-form definition of PSM

Processwell Engineering Sdn Bhd

Process Safety Management - What does it mean?

Processwell Engineering Sdn Bhd

Processwell Engineering Sdn Bhd

Procedure, Training, MI, Work Permit,

Process Safety Information

Process Safety Management - How does

Process Safety Management

Processwell Engineering Sdn Bhd

PSM Major Incidents

Processwell Engineering Sdn Bhd

PSM Major Incidents

Processwell Engineering Sdn Bhd

PSM Major Incidents

Processwell Engineering Sdn Bhd

PSM Major Incidents

Processwell Engineering Sdn Bhd

PSM Major Incidents

Processwell Engineering Sdn Bhd

PSM Major Incidents

6th July, 1988 Piper Alpha, North Sea

Processwell Engineering Sdn Bhd

PSM Major Incidents

U.S. PSM Incidents

Processwell Engineering Sdn Bhd

Processwell Engineering Sdn Bhd

Total Number of Losses

Marsh & McLennan Protection Consultants

Total Losses in Billions US$

Marsh & McLennan Protection Consultants

Percentage Loss by Accident Type

Marsh & McLennan Protection Consultants

Why Process Safety Management?

Why Process Safety Management?

Processwell Engineering Sdn Bhd

Largest 150 Losses Last 30 Years - Hydrocarbon Industry

Processwell Engineering Sdn Bhd

Why Process Safety Management?

Management system failures are the root

Processwell Engineering Sdn Bhd

AIChE CENTER FOR

Center for Chemical Process Safety

Process Knowledge and 8

Training and Performance

Capital Project Review

Standards, Codes and

Audits and Corrective

Engineering Sdn Bhd

PSM Elements in USA OSHA 1910.119

Process hazard analysis

Processwell Engineering Sdn Bhd

OSHA 1910.119 - Management of Process Hazards

Pre Start-up Safety

Hot Work Permits

Processwell Engineering Sdn Bhd

Does not apply to:

Hydrocarbon fuels used solely for