Overview of Strategies

and Tactics to Break the

Stalemate Including Key
Battles: Verdun, the
Somme, Passchendaele

Introduction

 1914-early 1918: inappropriate offensive tactics, slow

commitment of reserve forces & poor use of modern technology
meant that defence prevailed o/attack (hence continuing
stalemate)

 G adopted better defence:

- 1st to adopt three-line trench system
- 1st to adopt defence in depth
- Trenches generally superior in quality (eg. concrete bunkers)

 Main defensive weapons:

- Machine-guns
- Artillery

 Neither side devoted enough time to train soldiers for small

details of trench warfare; instead, generals kept looking for a big
solution (ie. massive offensives)

 Wave assaults usually complete failures, sacrificing many lives;

eventually worked in favour of Allies who had more soldiers (reWF, esp after US entry)

 1914-1917: Artillery used in an unsophisticated fashion; generals

expected brute force to prevail (not until 1918 that its use was
accurate enough to create an advantage for the attack)

Strategies 1915-1917

1914

 By end of November 1914, stalemate fully developed; war of

movement had come to an end

 Most generals (on both sides) believed a breakthrough (via a

frontal offensive) would eventually be possible w/an increase in
firepower, men & resources

 Politicians (esp in GB & F) disagreed w/generals; urged them to

seek alternatives

1915

 Allies alternative strategy: weak point strategy

- Attack enemys weak points (OE & AH): failed

- Stabilise fighting on WF (inc smaller offensive operations w/the

objective of attrition; but they also wore down Allies)

- Rebuild WF forces (eg. weapons; ammunition [esp artillery

shells]; GBs army) in preparation for mass offensives in late 1915
& 1916

 Germanys alternative strategy: Offensives on Eastern Front

- Achieved some success, but R not defeated

- Pioneered use of poisonous gas

- 2 significant WF offensives (eg. 2nd Battle of Ypres a/g GB first

use of gas on WF): both failed

 Sept 1915: First Allied mass offensive (big push)

- Failed (cancelled in Nov 1915)
- John French replaced by Douglas Haig

 Haig & Joffre planned even greater offensives in 1916

1916

 Allies once again prioritise WF (Westerner strategy)

- Main offensive set for mid-year

- Other fronts to be co-ordinated in support of it

- Main offensive to involve more men, weapons & equipment

than ever before

- Objective of main offensive: attrition (ie. not quick victory)

 G also re-prioritised WF

 Feb 21: G launches a mass offensive a/g F at Verdun

- Verdun defended by forts (all surrounded by a salient);

Falkenhayn aimed to capture it all

- Initially v.successful (used small group infiltration tactics)

- Falkenhayn soon realised quick victory was impossible; thus

changed his objective to attrition (bleed the French white)

- But F not defeated (Joffre & Petain performed v.well

u/enormous pressure)

- Defence of Verdun assumed great symbolic importance for F

- July: G abandoned the offensive; G bled even more than F; by

1917, F had recaptured nearly all lost territory

- Aug: Falkenhayn replaced by Hindenburg & Ludendorff

 Aug 1916: After G failure at Verdun, Hindenburg & Ludendorff

moved back to the defensive

 First Allied mass offensive of 1916: Battle of the Somme

- GB attack a/g G in support of F defensive effort at Verdun

- Overall objective: attrition (on a massive scale)

- June 24: 1 week artillery bombardment (mostly ineffective)

- July 1: Soldiers go over the top for the first time (57 000
British casualties)

- July-Nov: repeated attacks involving millions of soldiers,

but no decisive breakthrough

-Tanks used for first time; failed

- Abandoned in Nov: British could not afford further losses

- Most territorial gains=100s of metres only; furthest advance

only 12km

- G suffered heavy losses, but so did GB: but Haig accepted GB

losses as the price of the strategy of attrition

 Allies weak point strategy deteriorated further (eg. Gallipoli

campaign abandoned)

 Despite some G success on EF, the campaign continued to

draw G resources (inc. soldiers) away from WF

 However, despite not being 100% successful, R offensives a/g

G & AH in mid-1916 (u/Brusilov) greatly assisted Allied cause
on WF:

- Forced G to divert large numbers of troops from WF to EF

- Caused virtual destruction of AH army

1917

 G changed strategy on WF:

- Hindenburg & Ludendorff realised G victory on WF would be

very difficult to achieve (as demonstrated at Verdun & Somme)

- Allied defences too strong

- G could not match Allies human & material resources in a

war of attrition

- Thus decided to defend WF & EF only (ie. no mass offensives)

- Early 1917: 30km strategic withdrawal on WF to a prepared

defensive position (Hindenburg Line); held firm all year,
despite significant losses

- At the same time, G used unrestricted submarine warfare a/g

GB, & aimed to destroy I army via mass offensives

 By the end of the year, G believed I army had been destroyed;

thus withdrew from I, leaving AH to mop up

 Allies: Continued attrition strategy via mass offensives

(supported by R & I offensives)

 First massive Allied offensive of 1917 was the Nivelle Offensive:

- Nivelle (who had replaced Joffre) promised decisive victory

within 48 hours (thus BEF placed temporarily u/his control)

- Began April 16; completely failed by May 9

- F army broken by the offensive; wracked by mutinies for 2

weeks in May

- Nivelle replaced by Petain

- Role of F soldiers now significantly reduced (ie. no more

offensives for at least a year; only trusted to defend)

 Third Battle of Ypres (Battle of Passchendaele) was the next

Allied mass offensive of 1917:

- Involved GB forces; led by Haig

- Objective: attrition (Haig believed it would lead to victory by 1918)

- Preliminary attack launched to divert G attention from

disorganised F defences; involved 17 days of artillery
bombardment, followed by co-ordinated explosion of 19
huge mines (a new tactic); failed

- Began in July w/massive 12 day artillery bombardment;

largely ineffective, esp due to G concrete bunkers

- Bombardment, plus heavy rain, made ground v.difficult for

infantry; mud soon became their biggest fear

- Abandoned in Nov; o/300 000 GB casualties for only 8km

advance

 Despite mounting criticism from GBs politicians, Haig

launched another large offensive 2 weeks later - Battle of
Cambrai:

- Objective: attrition

- Marked the first real sign of tactical innovation by GB: coordinated assault featuring infantry, a creeping barrage &
mass use of tanks (476), & no preparatory bombardment

- Had some success, but GB too weakened by Third Battle of

Ypres to hold most of the captured territory; also, tanks not
100% successful

- But tactics in Battle of Cambrai suggested how stalemate

could be broken & victory achieved in 1918

1918

 Strategies used in 1918 in an attempt to break the stalemate

will be covered under later points in the syllabus; in short,
both sides adopted an offensive strategy in 1918 w/the
objective of total victory

New Tactics 1914-1918

 New offensive battle tactics developed during WWI:

- Creeping barrage (both sides, late 1915 onwards)

- Box barrage (both sides, late 1915 onwards)

- Bruchmuller tactics (G 1917-1918; A 1918)

- Predicted artillery fire (A 1918)

- Motorised transport for artillery (A, date?)

- Changes made to infantry wave/frontal assault tactics

(both sides, 1916 onwards)

- Trench raids, inc fire & manoeuvre tactics (both sides, 1915
onwards)

- Infiltration tactics (G 1918 in Spring Offensive)

- Co-ordinated assault tactics (A late 1917 onwards; esp 1918 in

Counter-Offensive)

 New defensive battle tactics developed during WWI:

- Defensive artillery fire (both sides, 1917 onwards)

- Defence in depth (G late 1916 onwards; F 1917 onwards; GB

1918)

- Predicted artillery fire (A 1918)

New Weapons Technology

 Weapons developed prior to WWI:

- Rifles w/bayonets

- Machine-Guns

- Artillery

 New offensive weapons developed during WWI:

- Light machine-guns; ie. portable (both sides, later years of war)

- Grenades; 1st grenades used in WWI were home-made jam

tin explosives (both sides, 1915 onwards)

- Mortars (both sides, 1915 onwards)

- Poisonous gas (G 1914 [but esp 1915] onwards; A 1915

onwards)

- Flamethrowers (both sides, 1915 onwards)

- Tanks (A 1916 onwards; G esp late 1918)

The War at Sea

&
Attempts to Break the
Stalemate

 The battle fleets of GB & G were largely unused in WWI as

they acted as mutual deterrents to each other

 Only 1 major naval battle in WWI Battle of Jutland (May 1916):

- Result was inconclusive
- Both sides claimed victory

 Most effective naval strategy of WWI was GBs blockade of G:

- Imposed as soon as WWI began

- Denied exports from & imports to G

- Involved stopping & searching every ship in North Sea

- A major reason for Allied victory; increased economic

dislocation & shortages w/in G

 G responded to naval blockade w/unrestricted submarine

warfare:

- An attempt to break effects of naval blockade

- Feb 1915: G declared seas around GB to be a war zone in which

all Allied merchant shipping would be destroyed w/out warning

- May 1915: Lusitania (trans-Atlantic US passenger liner) sunk

as G suspected it was carrying ammunition for Allies
(incorrect); 1198 killed, inc 124 US citizens

- Aug 1915: Arabic (also trans-Atlantic passenger liner)

torpedoed; only 44 killed, but incident rekindled US anger
o/unrestricted submarine warfare

- Wilhelm II thus restricted use of U-boats in Atlantic

- Feb 1917: Unrestricted submarine warfare resumed in an

attempt to break GBs naval blockade (a key reason for US entry
into WWI in April 1917)

The War in the Air

&
Attempts to Break the
Stalemate

 Not until 1911 that aeroplanes first appeared in military service

 By end of WWI, both sides (F, GB, G) deployed several

thousand planes, mostly o/WF

 Early in WWI, the major aerial combat tactic was to ram the
opponent; not v. successful

 Thus, the major role of planes became reconnaissance,

liaison & artillery observation

 1914-1916: Planes v. occasionally used to drop darts, light

bombs or grenades (never to great effect)

 1916: Development of fighter aircraft w/interrupter gear

mechanism:

- Enabled pilots to fire machine-guns thru their own propellers

- Led to air-to-air combat (dogfights)

 1916 onwards, planes used:

- in greater numbers to support attacking infantry
- to carry out limited strategic bombing

 1915-1917: G planes technically superior & maintained large

degree of control in skies o/WF

 Mid-1917 onwards: GB produced technologically superior

planes that G could not match due to shortages of material, fuel
& pilots

 1918: Allies co-ordinated assault tactics saw planes come into

effective use as an offensive weapon

 But the most memorable aspect of the air war was in the
propaganda value that both sides generated from victories
in dogfights (fighter pilots seen as heroes)

The Commanders
&
Attempts to Break the
Stalemate

 Its easy to point out mistakes of various Commanders-in-Chief,

esp as many were unwilling to radically alter their tactics despite
the increasing loss of life

 However:

- WWI was fought w/out modern communications

- Most generals had no practical experience of modern warfare

prior to WWI, thus relying on outdated strategies, & also lacking
understanding of new weapons & physical difficulties of soldiers

- Most generals military education was narrow & unscientific;

thus, they lacked understanding of new weapons, clung to the
notion of the offensive spirit of the bayonet, & clung to the notion
that yielding ground was cowardly & defeatist

- It was nearly impossible to launch a surprise offensive due to

its size

- Efficient spy networks had to be overcome (inc interception of

most radio messages)

- Many Allied conscripts were less spirited in battle & more

prone to shell shock than G soldiers

- Command headquarters were located up to 50km behind front

line; thus few generals saw first-hand the fighting on the
battlefield

- Original war plans were v. flawed

- Generals were subject to the whims of the politicians

- Generals could be in constant conflict w/their fellow officers

 Most generals, therefore, spent the war seeking large-scale

solutions to their problems

 Few generals spent sufficient time considering the finer

details of offensive tactics & technology needed to overcome the
superiority of the defence

 G Commanders-in-Chief:
- 1914: von Moltke
- 1914-1916: von Falkenhayn
- 1916-1918: von Hindenburg & von Ludendorff

 F Commanders-in-Chief:
- 1914-1916: Joffre
- 1916-1917: Nivelle
- 1917-1918: Petain

 GB Commanders-in-Chief:
- 1914-1915: French
- 1915-1918: Haig

 US Commander-in-Chief:
- 1917-1918: Pershing

 Foch: Supreme Allied Commander on the Western Front (1918)