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Chapter Sixteen
Capital Structure Policy

Copyright 2011 John Wiley &


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Learning Objectives
1. Describe the two Modigliani and Miller
propositions, the key assumptions underlying
them and their relevance to capital structure
decisions.
2. Discuss the benefits and costs of using debt
financing.
3. Describe the trade-off and pecking order
theories of capital structure choice and
explain what the empirical evidence tells us
about these theories.

4. Discuss some of the practical considerations


that managers are concerned with when they
choose a firms capital structure.
Copyright 2011 John Wiley &
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Quick Links
Capital Structure
The Optimal Capital Structure
The Modigliani and Miller Propositions
The Benefits and Costs of Using Debt
Other Benefits
The Costs of Debt
Two Theories of Capital Structure
Practical Considerations in Choosing
a Capital Structure
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Capital Structure
A firms capital structure is the mix of financial

securities used to finance its activities.


The mix will always include ordinary shares and

will often include debt and preference shares.


The firm may have several classes of ordinary

shares, for example with different voting rights


and possibly different claims on the cash
flows available to shareholders.

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Capital Structure
The debt at a firm can be long term or short term, secured or

unsecured, convertible or not convertible into ordinary shares, and so


on.

Preference shares can be cumulative or

non-cumulative and convertible or not


convertible into ordinary shares.
The fraction of the total financing that is

represented by debt is a measure of the


financial leverage in the firms capital structure.

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Capital Structure
A higher fraction of debt indicates a higher

degree of financial leverage.


The amount of financial leverage in a firms

capital structure is important because it


affects the value of the firm.

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The Optimal Capital


Structure
Managers at a firm choose a capital

structure so that the mix of securities


making up the capital structure minimises
the cost of financing the firms activities.

This mix is the optimal capital structure

because the capital structure that minimises


the cost of financing the firms projects is
also the capital structure that maximises the
total value of those projects and, therefore,
the overall value of the firm.

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The Modigliani and Miller


Propositions
Modigliani and Miller Proposition 1 states
that the capital structure decisions a firm
makes will have no effect on the value of
the firm if:
1. There are no taxes.
2. There are no information or transaction costs.

3. The real investment policy of the firm is not


affected by its capital structure decisions.

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The Modigliani and Miller


Propositions
The real investment policy of the firm includes

the criteria that the firm uses in deciding which


real assets (projects) to invest in.
The market value of the debt plus the market

value of the equity must equal the value of


the cash flows produced by the firms assets.
VFirm = VAssets = VDebt + Vequity

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(16.1)

10

The Modigliani and Miller


Propositions
Modigliani and Miller Proposition 1 essentially

says that the combined value of the equity and


debt claims (represented by the present value of
free cash flows the firms assets are expected to
produce in the future) does not change when
you change the capital structure of the firm if no
one other than the shareholders and the debt
holders is receiving cash flows.

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11

The Modigliani and Miller


Propositions
Such a change is called a financial restructuring,

where a combination of financial transactions


occur that change the capital structure of the
firm without affecting its real assets.

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12

Exhibit 16.1: Capital Structure


and Firm Value under M&M
Proposition 1

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13

The Modigliani and Miller


Propositions
Modigliani and Miller Proposition 2 states

that the cost of (required return on) a


firms ordinary shares is directly related to
the debt-to-equity ratio.
If a firm has one type of equity:
WACC = xDebtkDebt + xosk0s
(16.2)
If we rearrange equation 16.2, we have:
VDebt
Vos

k os k Assets

WACC = RA = (E/V)RE + (D/V)RD


RE = RA + (RA RD)(D/E)

k Assets k Debt

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(16.3)
14

The Modigliani and Miller


Propositions
M&M Proposition II Example
After its restructuring, Millennium Motors will
be financed with 20 per cent debt and 80 per
cent ordinary shares. The return on assets is
10 per cent and the return on debt is 5 per
cent. What is the cost of equity for the firm?

k os

0.2
0.10
0.10 0.05
0 .8
0.1125 , or 11 .25%
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WACC = RA = (E/V)RE + (D/V)RD


RE = RA + (RA RD)(D/E)

RA is the cost of the firms business


risk, i.e., the risk of the firms assets
(RA RD)(D/E) is the cost of the firms
financial risk, i.e., the additional return
required by stockholders to
compensate for the risk of leverage

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16

The Modigliani and Miller


Propositions
The first source of risk is business risk. It is

the risk associated with the characteristics of


the firms business activities.

The second source of risk is the capital structure

of the firm which reflects the effect that the firms


financing decisions have on the riskiness of the
cash flows that the shareholders will receive.
Financial risk is associated with required

payments to a firms lenders.


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17

Exhibit 16.2: Relations between


Business Risk, Financial Risk and
Total Equity Risk

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18

Exhibit 16.3: Illustration of Relations


between Business Risk, Financial Risk
and Total Risk

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19

Exhibit 16.4: Illustrations of


M&M
Proposition 2

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20

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21

Case I - No Taxes - Example


Data

Required return on assets = WACC = R A =


16%,
Cost of debt = RD = 10%
Percent of debt = D = 45%
E = 1 - 0.45 = 0.55 or 55%
D/E = 0.45/0.55 = 0.82

What is the cost of equity?


RE = RA + (RA RD)(D/E)

RE = 0.16 + (0.16 0.10)(.45/.55) = 20.91

Proof for WACC:


17-22

WACC = RA = (E/V)RE + (D/V)RD


WACC = RCopyright
* 20.91% + 0.45 * 10% =
A = 0.55
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Case I No Taxes
Example continued..

What happens if the firm increases leverage


so that D/E = 1.5? (before D/E = 0.82 when
D=45%,E=55%)

What is the cost of equity?

RE = RA + (RA RD)(D/E)
RE = 0.16 + (0.16 0.10)(1.5) = 0.25 or 25%

Proof for WACC:


WACC = RA = (E/V)RE + (D/V)RD E 1
V 1 D/E
From D/E = 1.5, D = 60%, E = 40%
WACC = 0.4 * 25% + 0.6 * 10% = 16%
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17-23

The Modigliani and Miller


Propositions
What the Modigliani and Miller
Propositions Tell Us

The value of the M&M analysis is that it tells

us exactly where we should look if we want to


understand how capital structure affects firm
value and the cost of equity.

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24

The Modigliani and Miller


Propositions

If financial policy matters, it must be becaus


1. Taxes matter.

2. Information or transaction costs matter.

3. Capital structure choices affect a firms real


investment policy.

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25

The Benefits and Costs of


Using Debt
The most important benefit from including debt in a

firms capital structure stems from the fact that firms


can deduct interest payments for tax purposes but
in most casescannot deduct dividend payments.

This makes it less costly to distribute

cash to security holders through interest


payments than through dividends.

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26

Exhibit 16.5: Capital Structure


and Firm Value with Taxes

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27

Case II Introducing Taxes


What happens to the firms cash
flows?
Interest is tax deductible
Therefore, when a firm adds debt, it
reduces taxes, all else equal
The reduction in taxes increases the
cash flow of the firm

How should an increase in cash


flows affect the value of the firm?

17-28

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The Benefits and Costs of


Using Debt
The total amount of interest paid each year,

and therefore the amount that will be


deducted from the firms taxable income, is
D kDebt.

This will result in a reduction in taxes paid

(the interest tax shield) of D kDebt t,


where t is the firms marginal tax rate that
applies to the interest expense deduction.

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29

Case II - with Taxes - Example


Unlevered Firm

Levered Firm

No Debt

EBIT

With Debt

5000

5000

Interest

Taxable
Income

5000

4500

Taxes (34%)

1700

1530

Net Income

3300

2970

CFFA

3300

3470

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(6250@8%)

500

17-30

Interest Tax Shield


Annual interest tax shield

Tax rate times interest payment


6250 in 8% debt = 500 in interest expens
Annual tax shield = 0.34(500) = 170

Present value of annual interest tax sh


Assume perpetual debt for simplicity
PV = 170 / 0.08 = 2125
6250 0.08 0.34
6250 0.34 2125
0.08
D R D TC
PV
D TC
RD
PV

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17-31

Case II - with Taxes - Proposition


I
The value of the firm increases by the
present value of the annual interest tax
shield

Value of a levered firm = value of an unlevered


firm + PV of interest tax shield
Assuming perpetual cash flows

VU = EBIT(1-T) / RU
with no debt

RU = RA= RE and VU = E

VL = VU + D*TC
E = VL - D
17-32

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Case II with Taxes


Proposition I - Example
Data Inc. has earnings of 25 million per
year every year. The firm has no debt and
the cost of capital is 12%. If tax is 35%
what is the value of the firm?
EBIT = 25 million; Tax rate = TC= 35%;
Unlevered cost of capital = RU= 12% = RA = RE
VU = ?

VU = EBIT(1-T) / RU
VU = 25(1-0.35) / 0.12 = $135.42 million
VU = E
17-33

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Case II with Taxes


Proposition I - Example (cont.)
Data Inc. decides to issue bonds that have a
market value of 75 million at a cost of 9%.
What is the value of the firm? What will be
the value of equity?
D = $75 million, RD= 9%, VL = ?, E = ?

VU = 135.42 (calculated on previous slide)

VL = VU + tax shield
VL = VU + D*TC
VL = 135.42 + 75(0.35) = $161.67 million

E = VL - D
17-34

E = 161.67 75 =
$86.67 million
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Figure 17.4 Case II - with Taxes

Proposition I

17-35

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Case II with Taxes Proposition II

Recap: In case I Proposition II - no taxe


RE increases as Debt increases
WACC is unchanged

When taxes are introduced in Case II:


RE increases as Debt increases
RE = RU + (RU RD)(D/E)(1-TC)

WACC decreases as D/E increases because th


cost of
debt decreases
RL = WACC = (E/V)RE + (D/V)(RD)(1-TC)
17-36

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Case II with Taxes


Proposition II - Example
Data Inc. info from Case II proposition I:
EBIT = 25 million; TC= 35%; D = $75 million;
RD= 9%; Unlevered cost of capital = RU= 12%
E = $86.67m; VL = $161.67m
D/E = 75/86.67 = 0.87,
E/V = 86.67/161.67 = 0.54,
D/V = 75/161.67 = 0.46

RE = RU + (RU RD)(D/E)(1-TC)
RE = 0.12 + (0.12-0.09)(0.87)(1-0.35) = 13.69%

RL = WACC = (E/V)RE + (D/V)(RD)(1-TC)


17-37

RL = WACC = (0.54)(0.1369) + (0.46)(0.09)


(1-.35) = 10.05% Copyright 2011 John Wiley &
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Example: Case II
Proposition II
Suppose Data Inc. changes its capital structure
so that the debt-to-equity ratio becomes 1.
Before: D/E = 0.87, E= 54%, D=46%
Now: D/E = 1, E= 50%, D=50%

What will happen to the cost of equity under


the new capital structure? (previously 13.69%)
RE = 0.12 + (0.12 0.09)(1)(1-0.35) = 13.95%

What will happen to the weighted average cost


of capital? (previously 10.05%)
WACC = 0.5(0.1395) + 0.5(0.09)(1-0.35) = 9.9%

What if D/E = 1.25?, RE = ?, WACC = ?


17-38

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Figure 17.5 - Case II with Taxes

Proposition II

17-39

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Case III with Bankruptcy Costs


Now we add bankruptcy costs
As the D/E ratio increases, the
probability of bankruptcy increases
This increased probability will increase
the expected bankruptcy costs
At some point, the additional value of
the interest tax shield will be offset by
the increase in expected bankruptcy
cost
At this point, the value of the firm will
start to decrease and the WACC will start
to increase as more debt is added
17-40

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Case III with


Bankruptcy costs

Figure 17.6

17-41

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Figure 17.7

17-42

Case III with Bankruptcy


costs

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Bankruptcy Costs
Direct costs
Legal and administrative costs

Indirect costs
Larger than direct costs & more difficult to
measure and estimate

Financial distress costs

All costs associated with going bankrupt and


avoiding bankruptcy

17-43

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Conclusions
Case I no taxes or bankruptcy costs
No optimal capital structure

Case II corporate taxes but no bankruptcy costs

Optimal capital structure is almost 100% debt


Each additional dollar of debt increases the cash flo
of the firm

Case III corporate taxes and bankruptcy costs

Optimal capital structure is part debt and part equi


Occurs where the benefit from an additional dollar
debt just offsets the increase in expected bankruptcy
costs

17-44

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Figur
e
17.8

17-45

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Managerial
Recommendations
The tax benefit is only important if
the firm has a large tax liability
Risk of financial distress
The greater the risk of financial
distress, the less debt will be optimal
for the firm
The cost of financial distress varies
across firms and industries and as a
manager you need to understand the
cost for your industry
17-46

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The Benefits and Costs of


Using Debt

Effect of Debt Example


You are considering borrowing 1 000 000 at an
interest rate of 6 per cent for your pizza
business. Your pizza business generates pretax
cash flows of 300 000 each year and pays
taxes at a rate of 25 per cent. What is the value
of your firm without debt and how much would
debt increase its value? What is WACC before
and after restructuring?
VFirm = [300 000 (1 0.25)]/0.10 = 2 250 000
Value of tax shield = 1 000 000 0.25 = 250 000
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47

The Benefits and Costs of


Using Debt

Effect of Debt Example

WACC before financial restructuring = k os = 10%


After restructuring:
Value of equity = 2 500 000 1 000 000
= 1 500 000
After-tax cash flows to shareholders
= [300 000 (1 000 000 0.06)] (1 0.25)
= 180 000
kos = 180 000/1 500 000 = 0.12, or 12 per cent
WACC = (1 000 000/2 500 000)(0.06)(1 0.25)
+ (1 500 000/2 500 000)(0.12)
= 0.09, or 9%

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48

The Benefits and Costs of


Using Debt
The perpetuity model assumes that
1. The firm will continue to be in business forever.

2. The firm will be able to realise the tax savings


in the years in which the interest payments
are made (the firms EBIT will always be at
least as great as the interest expense).
3. The firms tax rate will remain constant.

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49

Exhibit 16.6: How Firm Value


Changes

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50

Exhibit 16.7: The Effect of Taxes on


the Firm Value and WACC of
Millennium Motors

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51

Other Benefits
Underwriting spreads and out-of-pocket

costs are more than three times as large for


share sales as they are for bond sales.
Debt provides managers with incentives to

focus on maximising the cash flows that the


firm produces since interest and principal
payments must be made when they are due.

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52

Other Benefits
Because managers must make these interest

and principal payments or face the prospect


of bankruptcy, not making the payments can
destroy a managers career.
Debt can be used to limit the ability of bad

managers to waste the shareholders


money on things such as fancy jet aircraft,
plush offices and other negative-NPV
projects that benefit the managers
personally.
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53

The Costs of Debt


At some point, the costs begin to exceed the

benefits and adding more debt financing


destroys firm value.
Financial managers want to add debt just to

the point at which the value of the firm is


maximised.

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54

Exhibit 16.8: Trade-Off Theory


of Capital Structure

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55

The Costs of Debt


Bankruptcy costs, also referred to as costs of

financial distress, are costs associated with


financial difficulties that a firm might get into
because it uses too much debt financing.
The term bankruptcy cost is used rather loosely

in capital structure discussions to refer to costs


incurred when a firm gets into financial distress.

Firms can incur bankruptcy costs even if they

never actually file for bankruptcy.


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56

The Costs of Debt


Direct Bankruptcy Costs are out-of-pocket costs

that a firm incurs as a result of financial distress.

They include things such as fees paid to

lawyers, accountants and consultants.

Indirect Bankruptcy Costs are costs associated

with changes in the behaviour of people who


deal with a firm in financial distress.

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57

The Costs of Debt


Some of this firms potential customers will

decide to purchase a competitors products


because of:
Concerns that the firm will not be able

to honour its warranties.

Parts or service will not be available

in the future.
Some customers will demand a lower

price to compensate them for these risks.

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58

The Costs of Debt


When suppliers learn that a firm is in financial

distress, they will worry about not being paid;


to protect against losses for future shipments,
they often begin to require cash on delivery.
Employees at a distressed firm will worry that

their jobs or benefits are in danger and some


start looking for new jobs.
If the firm enters into the formal bankruptcy

process, it incurs another indirect bankruptcy


cost because a bankruptcy court must
approve all investments made by the firm.
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59

The Costs of Debt


Agency costs result from conflicts of interest

between principals and agents where one


party, known as the principal, delegates its
decision-making authority to another party,
known as the agent.
The agent is expected to act in the interest

of the principal but agents sometimes have


interests that conflict with those of the
principal.

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60

The Costs of Debt


Shareholder-Manager Agency Costs occur to

the extent that if the incentives of the


managers are not perfectly identical to those
of the shareholders, managers will make some
decisions that benefit themselves at the
expense of the shareholders.
Using debt financing provides managers with

incentives to focus on maximising the cash


flows that the firm produces and limits the
ability of bad managers to waste the
shareholders money on negative-NPV projects.
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61

The Costs of Debt


These benefits amount to reductions in the

agency costs associated with the principalagent relationship between shareholders


and managers.
While the use of debt financing can reduce

agency costs, it can also increase these costs


by altering the behaviour of managers who
have a high proportion of their wealth riding on
the success of the firm, through their
shareholdings, future income and reputations.

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62

The Costs of Debt


The use of debt increases the volatility of a

firms earnings and the probability that the firm


will get into financial difficulty.
Increased risk causes managers to make

more conservative decisions.


Shareholder-Lender Agency Costs can occur

when investors lend money to a firm and


delegate authority to the shareholders to
decide how that money will be used.

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63

The Costs of Debt


Lenders expect that the shareholders, through the managers

they appoint, will invest the money in a way that enables the
firm to make all of the interest and principal payments that
have been promised.

However, shareholders may have

incentives to use the money in ways that


are not in the best interests of the lenders.

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64

The Costs of Debt


Lenders know that shareholders have

incentives to distribute some or all of the funds


that they borrow as dividends and so they
protect themselves against this sort of
behaviour by including provisions in the lending
agreements that limit the ability of shareholders
to pay dividends and conduct other behaviours.

These protections are not foolproof.

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65

The Costs of Debt


One example of this behaviour is known

as the asset substitution problem, where


once a loan has been made to a firm, the
shareholders have an incentive to switch
from less risky assets to more risky
assets, such as negative-NPV projects.

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66

The Costs of Debt


Another example behaviour is known as

the underinvestment problem and it


occurs in a financially distressed firm
when the value that is created by
investing in a positive-NPV project is
likely to go to the lenders instead of the
shareholders; therefore the firm forgoes
financing and undertaking the project.

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67

Two Theories of Capital


Structure
Trade-Off Theory
The trade-off theory of capital structure says

that managers choose a specific target capital


structure based on the trade-offs between the
benefits and the costs of debt.
The theory says that managers will increase

debt to the point at which the costs and


benefits of adding additional debt are exactly
equal because this is the capital structure
that maximises firm value.
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68

Two Theories of Capital


Structure
The Pecking Order Theory
The pecking order theory recognises that

different types of capital have different costs.


This leads to a pecking order in the financing
choices that managers make. Managers
choose the least expensive capital first then
move to increasingly costly capital when the
lower-cost sources of capital are no longer
available.

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69

Two Theories of Capital


Structure
The Pecking Order Theory
Managers view internally generated funds, or

cash on hand, as the cheapest source of capital.


Debt is more costly to obtain than internally

generated funds but is still relatively inexpensive.

Raising money by selling shares is the

most expensive.

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70

Two Theories of Capital


Structure
The Empirical Evidence
When researchers compare the capital

structures in different industries, they find


evidence that supports the trade-off theory.
Some researchers argue that, on

average, debt levels appear to be lower


than the trade-off theory suggests they
should be.

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71

Exhibit 16.9: Average Capital


Structures for Selected
Industries in Europe at the End
of 2006

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72

Two Theories of Capital


Structure
More general evidence also indicates that the

more profitable a firm is, the less debt it tends


to have, which is exactly opposite what the
trade-off theory suggests we should see.
This evidence is consistent with the pecking

order theory.
The pecking order theory is also supported by

the fact that, in an average year, public firms


actually repurchase more shares than they sell.

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73

Two Theories of Capital


Structure
Both the trade-off theory and the pecking

order theory offer some insights into how


managers choose the capital structures for
their firms but neither is able to explain all
of the capital structure choices that we
observe.

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74

Practical Considerations
in Choosing a Capital
Structure
Managers do not think only in terms of a

trade-off or a pecking order but are


concerned with how their financing decisions
will influence the practical issues that they
must deal with when managing a business.

Financial flexibility is an important consideration

in many capital structure decisions.

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75

Practical Considerations
in Choosing a Capital
Structure
Managers must ensure that they retain

sufficient financial resources in the firm to


take advantage of unexpected opportunities
as well as unforeseen problems.
They try to manage their firms capital structures

in a way that limits the risk to a reasonable level.

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76

Practical Considerations
in Choosing a Capital
Structure
Managers think about leverage and the

effect that interest expense has on the


reported value of the firms net profit.
Managers consider control implications

when choosing between equity and debt


financing of the firm.

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