HAZOP Procedure for company

RISK = CONSEQUENCE (IMPACT) x FREQUENCY ( LIKELIHOOD)

OF OCCURRENCE
A measure of the consequence of a hazard and the frequency with
which is likely to occur.

PHA , Hazards Identification & Risk Analysis by Nigel Hyatt

HAZOP Procedure for company

WHAT ?
HAZOP is Hazard and Operability Analysis
WHEN ?
Hazop can be used at practically any stage. It is so widely used
that almost any form of process hazards analysis is referred to as
HAZOP
ADVANTAGE ?
HAZOP is very thorough , because you force yourself to examine
most aspect
DISADVANTAGE?
HAZOP is very time consuming and costly. If not setup correctly
and managed properly , it can be ineffective. Needs leadership
by an Expert in the field of Hazop

PHA , Hazards Identification & Risk Analysis by Nigel Hyatt

HAZOP Procedure for company

A hazard and Operability ( HAZOP) analysis is the systematic

identification of every credible deviation in the system or process , usually
a chemical manufacturing process from the design intent. This method
was used UK Imperial Chemical Industries in the 1960s
The purpose of a Hazop is to review a process or operation systematically
to identify whether deviations from the desired practices could lead to
undesirable consequences
Hazop is usually requires a series of meeting during which the team ,
using process drawings , systematically evaluates the impact of the
deviations from the desired practices
The risks of deviations are assessed and if deemed unacceptable , the a
set of recommended action is determined

PHA , Hazards Identification & Risk Analysis by Nigel Hyatt

What Is PHA ?

Definition
a system to identify, assess &
mitigate potential hazards to a
tolerable level by addressing not only
technology but also facility and human
using specific tools
Objective :
To ensure that an adequate assessment of risk is carried out in order to
meet the
following :
1.
2.
3.
4.

To
To
To
To

identify hazards and operability problems

identify the consequences and evaluate the risk of hazard events
analyse the adequacy of existing safeguards
recommend additional safeguards to reduce the risks if necessary

PHA Tools

Which
technique?

Hazard and Operability study (HAZOP)

Failure Mode and Effect Analysis (FMEA)

Hazard Identification (HAZID)
Hazard Analysis (HAZAN)
Structured What-if Technique (SWIFT)
Safety Integrity Level Assessment (SIL)
Layers of Protection Analysis (LOPA)
Quantitative Risk Assessment (QRA)

It depends on:
The type of work
you are doing and
The type of potential
hazards

HAZOP Process
Hazard &
Operability Problems

Existing
Safeguards

Highly

explosive fuel gas

Electric power
High pressure steam of 54 bar
High temperature superheated steam
N2, O2, Argon
Chemicals
Tray collapsed
Tubes leak, not properly weld
Valve passing
Consequence
& Hazard Risk
PEOPLE - Fatality, injury
ENVIRONMENT - air, water, land, ecological
ASSET: Equipment, asset damage/loss
REPUTATION: Loss of business, national
impact

Procedure

Alarm & operator intervention

Interlock, LSHH, PSHH
Lab analysis
Scheduled DOSH inspection
Preventive Maintenance
Additional safeguards
& recommendations

Proper training program for new staff?

Additional transmitter or alarm?
Verification checklist?
Review inventory of critical spare part?

Method Selection

CAUSE
DEVIATION
CONSEQUENC
E
What-If Checklist
Failure Mode &
Effect Analysis
(FMEA)

HAZOP
Fault Tree
Analysis (FTA)

Examples of PHA Applications

What
If/Checklist

Conceptual
Design

Basic
Detailed

Existing process
Process change
Decommissioning

FMEA

HAZOP

FTA

The Process Flow

start
Managing Recommendations &
Tracking

Assurance

Prioritized?Review/challenge?
Assign action party
Follow-up/track
Communicate to employees

Planning
Identify area of study/set
boundary
Select Team comprises of
PHA leader, scribe & members

Compliancy & Review

Communicate any findings
to affected employee

Process Hazard Analysis (PHA)

Hazard Review
To cover Technology, Human
Errors, Facility Siting & Inherent
Safer Process
To select the suitable tools e.g.
What-If?,HAZOP, FMEA, FTA,IPF

Supporting
Elements

Facilities Data
through PIMS, SAP
records, e-HSEMS, eCPA

Consequences Analysis

Identify the potential

source of leakages
Type of event F, E,TR
Size of release
Effect to PEAR

Site visit for

verification,
ergonomics study,
fire safety review,

Hazard Identification
(HazId)
Field tour
Previous MOC & Incident?
Previous HazOp report?

Up-to-date
Information and
Documentation
e.g. P&ID, O&M,
MSDS, Area
Classification

Resources PHA
practitioners &
cross-functional
subject matter expert

What is
HAZOP?

HAZOP comes from the phrase HAZard and

OPerability study
It is a systematic method (team-based) for examining

complex facilities or processes to find actual /

potentially hazardous procedures / operation. These
hazards shall be eliminated or mitigated to a tolerable
level (ALARP)
Identification & assessment of hazards related to

process deviation or changes in process operating

envelope

Importance of
HAZOP

How can we operate plants safety if we do not know the hazards?

How can we control the hazards if we dont understand their
potential of release and impacts.
How can we be confident that we are controlling the hazards if we
dont know how we expect our controls to perform?
How can we improve on the safeguards to ensure that the hazards
are adequately mitigated?

General way of doing

HAZOP

By considering the plant on section-by-section, line-by-line and item-by-item;

develop suitable node
By defining normal operation
By considering deviations from normal operation
By using a keyword matrix to initiate discussion

General assumptions while doing

HAZOP study

One failure at a time (no double jeopardy) unless

It has the potential to happen
It has happened before

The system will perform as the design intent

The system is operated and maintained in line with the design
intent
Protective systems/safeguarding are functioning as designed

Outline of HAZOP
Technique

HAZOP systematically review deviations from design intent

The study shall consists of a team of knowledgeable and experience personnel
Use guidewords to stimulate creative thinking
Identify significant consequences and reasonable causes (reject small, unimportant
issues e.g. small release from valve packing)
Review the available safeguards
Develop recommendations to manage risks
Proceed to the next deviation
Put risk ranking for each of the cause (preferably later)

Outline of HAZOP
Technique

The results are qualitative in nature (quantitative

assessment is available by using QRA)
Effective duration is 4-5 hours per day depending on
the team
Further study may be required more in-depth analysis
(i.e. quantitative method) and it should be noted

HAZOP Process

Divide system into nodes and state design intent

For each node, select parameter
Deviation
No

List Causes
Possible?
Yes

No

Consequence?
Yes

Yes

Existing

SAFEGUARD
sufficient?

No

Proposed Option

HAZOP Process Flow Detail

Identify a Node
Describe design intent & operating condition
Consider first or next Guide Word
Identify all Causes and record
Identify all Consequences and record
List existing Safeguards and record
Identify the Risk Ranking and record
Provide any recommendations and record
No

Last Guide Word?

Yes
Take a new Node

HAZOP Process Flow

1. Identify a Node
2. Describe design intent and operating condition

A node is defined as a segment of the system

which have distinct design intent
The boundary of the node should be selected
such that it is manageable for the team to analyze
Typical node: One major equipment
(vessel/column/storage tank etc), associated minor
equipment (pumps/valves etc), instrumentation and
other ancillary equipment
Team must understand the design intent of the node
specific information on how the node is operated under
design conditions (specific pressure, temperature, flow
etc)

HAZOP Process Flow

Normally, a node follows the process flow
Start at an isolation point (valve or equipment
item) of where the line enters the node being
analyzed (INLET BOUNDARY)
Continue to the next change of design intent
Continue to
OR
where a critical parameter (e.g. flow,
pressure, temperature) changes
OR
Continue to the next equipment item
The point of where the node stops is known as OUTLET
BOUNDARY

Practical Tips for Node Selection

Aim for nodes which is planned to take no more
than 1 2 hours to study
Aim for not more than 5 causes for the first Guide
Word
If the team needs to analyze the node in parts,
then
HAZOP
break
Leader
the and
nodeScribe
into smaller
may choose
nodesthe nodes before
the study session starts. The proposed nodes shall be
agreed by the team members
Be prepared to change the nodes if the team is
struggling to analyze it

Example of Selection of Node: HAZOP Study on MOC

Replacement of PV-1100
The following are nodes/area of study for HAZOP:
Node 1: Line from V6-0204 to AGI
Node 2: Line from V6-0207 to AGI
Node 3: AGI

Node No: 3
AGI

PV-1100

Node No:1
Node No: 2
From LP fuel
gas

From V6-0207

From Glycol

From V6-0204

HAZOP Process Flow

3. Consider Guide Word
Guide
Word

Process Deviation

Definition

NO, NOT or
NONE

The complete negation of the

design or operating intent

No part of the intention is

achieved

MORE OF

Quantitative increase of the

parameter

More of the intention occurs

or is achieved

LESS OF

Quantitative decrease of the

parameter

Less intention occurs or is

achieved

AS WELL AS

Qualitative increase of the

parameter

All the intention is achieved

with some addition

PART OF

Qualitative decrease of the

parameter

Only some of the intention

is achieved

REVERSE

Logical opposite of the design

intent

The reverse of the

operating intention occurs

OTHER
THAN

Something else happens

No part of the intention

occurs

Deviations obtained by using Guide Words

Parameter

Guide Word

Deviation

Flow

No/Less

No/Less Flow

Flow

More

More Flow

Flow

Reverse

Reverse Flow

Pressure

More

High Pressure

Pressure

Less

Low Pressure

Temperature

More

High Temperature

Temperature

Less

Low Temperature

Level

More

High Level

Level

Less

Low Level

Reaction

More

More Reaction

Reaction

Other

Other Reaction

Composition

Other

Off-specification

Contamination

Other

Contamination

Relief

Other

Relief

Sampling

Other

Sampling

Service

No

Power Failure

Service

No

Instrument Air Failure

Service

No

Cooling Water Failure

Service

No

Steam Failure

Service

No

Nitrogen Failure

Service

No

No Flushing Oil

Maintenance

Other

Maintenance

Consider other modes of operation

Normal Operation
Reduced Throughput / Turndown
Routine Start Up
Routine Shutdown
Commissioning
Emergency
Special Modes of Operation

Other Guide Words

Phase

: Gas / liquid / solid

Compositio
n

: Two phase / changes with time /

slugging / additives

Testing

: Equipment / hydrocarbon streams /

effluents / sampling points

Operation

: Operability / maintainability

Electrical

: Area classification / isolation / earthing

Instrument

: Sufficient for control / too many /

correct location / consistent philosophy
/ separate tapping for alarm and IPF

Global Guide Words

Toxicity
Commissioning / start up
Shutdown (isolation / purging)
Breakdown (including services and utility failures)
Effluent
Noise
Fire / explosion
Safety equipment

Corrosion / erosion
Previous precaution

Accessibility
Materials of construction
Orientation
Quality, consistency & reliability
Efficiency and reliability
Ignition

Safety/ ESD

Engineering issues

Viscosity

Environmental

HAZOP Process Flow

4. Identify all Causes

The Causes identified must be within the Node

It must be a credible scenario
Typically done using a brainstorming technique
without considering the Consequences
It is possible that there are none or no new Cause
identified for a specific Deviation

HAZOP Process Flow

Examples
Examples of
of Causes
Causes for
for NO
NO
FLOW
FLOW
Wrong routing
Blockage
Incorrect blind plate insertion
Isolation in error
Burst pipe
Large leakage
Incorrectly installed check valve
Equipment failure (fail-close valve, pump, filter
etc)
Incorrect pressure differential

HAZOP Process Flow

Examples
Examples of
of Causes
Causes for
for MORE
MORE
PRESSURE
PRESSURE
Surge problems
Thermal overpressure
Isolation of relief devices
Positive displacement pump running
Failed open PCV
Incorrect design pressure
Gas breakthrough (inadequate venting)
Connection to high pressure system
Specification of pipes, vessels, fittings &
instruments

HAZOP Process Flow

Examples
Examples of
of Causes
Causes for
for OTHER
OTHER
COMPOSITION
COMPOSITION
Phase change
Settling of slurries
Leaking isolation valves, exchanger tubes
Incorrect feedstock specification
Process control upsets
Uncontrolled reaction by intermediate or byproducts

HAZOP Process Flow

Examples
Examples of
of Causes
Causes for
for RELIEF
RELIEF
Wrong relief philosophy (process / fire etc)
Unsuitable type of relief device, blocking
Unsuitable relief device location
Multi-phase flow
Effect of debottlenecking on relief capacity
Effect of inlet/outlet piping & manifold
configuration

HAZOP Process Flow

Examples
Examples of
of Causes
Causes for
for INSTRUMENTATION
INSTRUMENTATION
Wrong control philosophy
Wrong fail-safe philosophy
Unsuitable instrument location and response time
Time available for operator intervention
Panel arrangement and location
Fire protection
Unsuitable set points of alarms, trips and
authorization of changes
Alarm and trip testing, auto/manual switches and
human error

HAZOP Process Flow

Examples
Examples of
of Causes
Causes for
for SERVICE
SERVICE FAILURE
FAILURE
Failure of
Instrument air, steam, water & nitrogen
Hydraulic power, electric power
Telecommunications, computer and interfaces
Heating and ventilation
Contamination of
Instrument air, steam, nitrogen

HAZOP Process Flow

Examples
Examples of
of Causes
Causes for
for ABNORMAL
ABNORMAL
OPERATION
OPERATION
Purging
Flushing
Start up
Normal shutdown
Emergency operation
Emergency shutdown
Inspection of operating machines

HAZOP Process Flow

Examples
Examples of
of Causes
Causes for
for IGNITION
IGNITION
SUPPRESSION
SUPPRESSION
Grounding arrangement
Insulated vessel/equipment
Low conductance fluids
Two liquid phases
Splash filling of vessel
Insulated components
Dust and powder handling
Electrical area classification
Flame arrestors
Hot work and hot surfaces
Auto-ignition and pyrophoric materials

HAZOP Process Flow

Examples
Examples of
of Causes
Causes for
for SAFETY
SAFETY EQUIPMENT
EQUIPMENT
Fire and gas detection
Testing of emergency equipment
Emergency shutdown
First aid, medical resources
Fire fighting response time
Effluent disposal
Emergency plan & training
Hazards created by others
Toxic and hazardous properties of process
materials

HAZOP Process Flow

5. Identify all Consequences

Consequences shall be linked to the cause

identified
Safeguards is not considered in Consequences
determination (assume the safeguards fail)
Consequences can be within the Node or outside
of the Node (upstream and downstream)
One Cause can lead to many Consequences (list
all of them)
Can be listed under People, Environment, Asset
and Reputation
Meaningful and significant
Can be listed one by one starting from not-soworse consequence until the worst case scenario

Examples of consequences

People
First aid injury, minor injury, major injury, fatality
Environment
Local spillage, effluent discharge to river, black
smoke
Asset
Equipment crack, valve damage, fire/explosion on
storage tank
Reputation
Media attention, public inquiry, disrepute to
international image

HAZOP Process Flow

6. List existing Safeguards

It is the designed system or administrative

controls to prevent, detect or mitigate the
Consequences
May list the safeguards based on the Causes
Something to think about:
i.

Does an indicator or a gauge being

considered as a safeguard?

ii. Does working procedure being considered as

a safeguard?

HAZOP Process Flow

Safeguards for any system could be listed based
on the systems Layers of Protection theory.

HAZOP Process Flow

7. Identify the Risk Ranking

The Risk Ranking for each Consequence shall be

identified by utilizing the PGB Risk Matrix
Consequence vs. Probability = Risk Ranking
In general, there are three levels of Risk
Ranking i.e. HIGH

MEDIUM and LOW

The Consequence rating shall take into

consideration of the detection and mitigation
safeguards available
The Probability rating shall take into
consideration of the prevention safeguards
available

ample of Risk Matrix

CONSEQUENCE

People (P)

Environment (E)

P0
No injury

E0
No effect

P1
Slight Injury

E1
Slight effect

P2
Minor Injury

P3
Major Injury

P4
Fatalities

P5
Fatalities

E2
Minor Effect

E3
Localised effect

E4
Major effect
E5
Massive effect

Assets
Loss (A)

A0
No loss
A1
Slight loss
< 10k
A2
Minor Loss
10k ~ 100k
A3
Local Loss
100k ~ 0.5 M
A4
Major Loss
0.5M ~ 10M
A5
Extensive
Loss
> 10 M

INCREASING LIKELIHOOD ------>

A
Never heard
of in the
industry

B
Has
happened in
the industry.

C
Has
happened
once in the
company

D
Has
happened
several times
per year in
the company.

E
Has
happened
several
times per
year in
company

Negligible

1 time in > 20
years

1 time
between 4 to
20 years

1 time
between 6
months to 4
years

1 time in < 6
months

Reputation (R)

R0
No Impact

R3
Considerable Impact

R4
National Impact

R5
International Impact

R1
Slight Impact

R2
Limited Impact

HAZOP Process Flow

8. Provide any Recommendations

If the team decided that the existing Safeguards

are inadequate to prevent, detect or mitigate the
Consequences, they may recommend additional
safeguards to protect the system
The Recommendations must address the issue
and bring the risk to an acceptable level i.e. LOW
The Recommendations must be clear and use 3Ws
WHAT, WHY and WHERE
A further study may also be recommended
because HAZOP is not a tool to solve safety issues
in detail
Cost of the recommendations SHALL NOT be an
issue for the HAZOP analysis team

HAZOP Team
Selection
The team shall consist of
o HAZOP leader to facilitate the study
o Scribe to record the study
o Operation personnel
o Multi-disciplinary members, depending on the scope of
the study (e.g. instrument, electrical, mechanical,
inspection, piping, civil, HSE)
Balance of skills, knowledge and experience
Willing contributors, able to express thoughts
clearly

Process Engineer & Operation Personnels Responsibilities

Provide simple description of the system
Provide design intention for each process unit
Provide information in process conditions and design
conditions
Provide operational specialist input to the analysis
Check design for operational issues
Ensure design compatibility with existing work
practices
Check design for operating procedure and training
requirements
Provide details of process chemistry
Provide details of process hazards

Typical information required

As built / latest P&ID of the plant

PFD and material balances
Design parameters: temperature, pressure, flow
etc
Operating parameters: temperature, pressure, flow etc
Equipment data sheet / drawing
Marked up P&ID / drawing of the system as
reference
Operating procedures
Schedule of alarm/trip setting
Cause & effect matrix
Interlock logic chart
Properties and hazards of process materials

HAZOP Team dynamics

Everyone shall be involved

o Encourage quiet people, manage loud people
Maintain attention and motivation
o Concentrate on the task
Appropriate pace
o Not too rush or too drawn out
Appropriate orientation
o Primarily process rather than content oriented

HAZOP Procedure Existing Plant

Occupational Safety & Health Administration( OSHA) process

safety management ( PSM) regulation 29 CFR 1910.119
-Requires company to update or revalidate their PHA at least
every 5 years
-In addition , the US Environment Protection Agencys (EPA) risk
management program rule , 40 CFR Part 68 requires companies
to performe quatitative off-site consequences analysis

PHA , Hazards Identification & Risk Analysis by Nigel Hyatt

Scheduled hazard study on existing plant

Risk assessment in this context is the process of quantifying the level of risk
associated with the operation of the equipment / machine
It should be a structured and systematic process that answers the following
4 specifics questions:i)How severe are potential injuries?
ii)How frequently are employees exposed?
iii)What is possibility of avoiding the hazards if it does occur?
iv)What is the likelihood of an injury should a safety control system fail ?

PHA , Hazards Identification & Risk Analysis by Nigel Hyatt

Pilot Plant & Operational Lab

Pilot Plant & Operational Lab

HAZOP GROUP PRESENTATION

HAZOP GROUP PRESENTATION

How to perform HAZOP process ?

1.

Preparation
P&ID
PFD plus material and energy balances
Equipment specifications
Layout drawing

2. Facilitator and Process Engineer

Break P&ID down into nodes
Nodes are equipment items
If nodes are too small you can loose sense of analysis and incur excessive
repetition
If nodes are too large , hard to handle and becomes confusing

PHA , Hazards Identification & Risk Analysis by Nigel Hyatt

How to perform HAZOP process ?

3. Prepare HAZOP outline with List of Deviations
4. Assemble HAZOP team
5. Facilitators Explains
The facilitator or one of the team members explains the purpose and scope of the
HAZOP and sets the rules of the study
6. Process Engineer Explains
Process in general
Immediate Node being Hazoped
7. HAZOP Each Node Using Deviation Listed in Outline Working Through the
P&ID
Produce Hazop worksheet recording the following :
Cause
Consequence
Safeguards
Action & recommendation
Remarks

How to perform HAZOP process ?

8.At the End of HAZOP , the Facilitators Issues Preliminary

HAZOP Report consisting of
Attendance
Outline
Detail report
Action/ recommendation Register.
9. Issues Final Report Giving Full Details

PHA , Hazards Identification & Risk Analysis by Nigel Hyatt

Example of Single Node on Boiler System

Boiler Feed Water for F4- 781

LA 7809

LALL 7809

LC
7810A

Steam
drum

LT 7810

LT 7809
LSLL 7809

BV

Water drum
FC 7810

Economizer

FC 7810

PI 7802

TI 7801

PI 7810

PT 7801
FT 7810

FY 7810

FV 7810

TI 7801

From BFW
Header

BV

BV

NC
Demin Water

TW-1"-7801-A1031-H(N20A)

NC

NC

PI 7801

NODE 1

BW-3"-7801-D6103-H(N20B)

BV

HAZOP Worksheet

NODE
1

Design intent:
Replacement of B/Valve at
D/ Stream & U/ Stream FV
7801

GUIDE

DEVIATION CAUSES

CONSEQUENC
ES

SAFEGUARD
S

WORD
More

No

More
Pressure

BV at
Econo
mizer
partial
ly
close

Less
pressure

RISK
RANKING

RECOMMENDATION
S
P
PI 7801
To install
L
, PI
vibration sensor
7802
to all ST pump
and PI
7810
(indicati
on only

Pressure

L
BV at
U/stream or
D/ Stream
FV 7810 is
fully close

Less

1.Increased
backpressure
on Steam
turbine
2.ST tripped

REMARKS &

NA

1.,No water
supply
to
steam drum
leading to low
level
2.Boiler tripped
3.Slow down the
process

LSLL 7809

To implement
Tagging system to
critical valve

E
L

ACTION BY/ DATE:

A R
M L 1.
MTA
( Q3 Fy 2010/11)

M L
1.POA
( 1st May 2010 )

STAT
US