LECTURE 2

FAILURE MODE AND EFFECT

ANALYSIS, LOGIC TREE ANALSIS:
FAULT, EVENT, AND GOAL TREES

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 Failure Mode and Effect
Analysis
A systematic approach for analyzing the causes
and effects of product or service failures.
Proactive Quality Strategy Focus on:
Failure prevention
Virtual elimination of the possibility of premature
failure
Mistake proofing
Many tools exist for the analysis performance
failure, consequence and risk.
These tools are used in both proactive and
reactive modes.
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Failure Mode and Effect
Analysis (Cont.)
FMEA focuses on:
Failure mode (ex. Fatigue, leakage,
buckling, binding, or excessive force
required, broken, too salty, eraser
smears pencil marks)
Mechanism
Effects

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Failure Mode and Effect
Analysis (Cont.)
In a proactive application, FMEA
can be adapted to focus on failure
prevention.
We usually think of a failure mode
as a physical description (result) of
a failure, whereas a failure
mechanism refers to the process
that create the failure.
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 FMEA (Cont.)
FMEA seeks to identify possible failure modes
and mechanism, the effects or consequences
that failure modes may have on performance,
methods of detecting the identified failure
modes, and possible means for prevention.
The net results from effective FMEA work are
product and process action plans for
elimination, or at least mitigation, of the
failure modes.

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 FMEA (Cont.)
FMEA encourages:
1. The systematic evaluation of a product or
process at specified levels of system
complexity.
2. The postulation of single point failures, the
identification of possible failure mechanism,
and the examination of the associated
effects, likelihood of occurrence, and
preventive measures.
3. The systematic documentation of potential
product or process nonperformance.

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 Development Base Format
for Proactive FMEA
1. Functional or equipment identification
2. Functional or equipment purpose
3. Failure mode
4. Failure mechanism: Connections between
failure mechanisms and the environment,
the application, and the operating method
are important in assuring product integrity.
5. Failure detection
6. Failure compensation
7. Failure effects
8. Preventive measures
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 Approaches for Performing an
FMEA
1. Functional approach recognizes that every
item is designed to perform functions. It is
used when hardware items can not be
uniquely identified or when system
complexity requires analysis from the top
downward through succeeding complexity
levels.
2. Part level hardware approach lists individual
hardware items and analyzes their possible
failure modes (in service FMEA the term
hardware would refer to explicit service
components). It is used only after hardware
items have been identified.
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Functional Level Analysis
Functional level analysis is often used when
hardware items cannot be uniquely identified
or when system complexity requires analysis
from the top downward through succeeding
complexity levels. This method of analysis
can be applied at any system level and
progress in either direction, up or down. This
trait is universal with both functional and
part level FMEA and allows for a great deal of
flexibility in the analysis design.

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Example:

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 Part Level Analysis
A part level analysis is used only after hardware items
have been identified. In general, the level of detail in
a part level analysis is much more comprehensive
than that found in a functional level analysis. The first
step in a part level analysis is to develop a hardware
list. This list should include detailed information about
individual hardware items, such as
1. Unique hardware identification
2. Detailed hardware description
3. Detailed description of the hardware function
4. A listing of any interfaces the hardware may have with
other unique hardware items as well as a description of
the hardware interface(s).
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 Part Level Analysis (Cont.)
In general, all hardware component failure events can
be described by one of the following:
1. Failure on demand- Certain components must start,
change state, or perform a particular function at a
specific instant of time. Failure to respond as needed
is referred to as failure on demand.
2. Standby failure- Some systems or components are
normally in standby, but are required to operate on
demand. Failure could occur during this non-
operational period, preventing operation when
required or causing related systems to failure
inadvertently.
3. Operational failure- A given system or component
may start successfully and operate normally but fail
some time in operation. This failure characteristic is
referred to as an operational failure. 15
Example:

FIGURE 12.1 16
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TABLE 12.3 FIREPLACE FMEA (Cont.)

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 Criticality Analysis
A method whereby unique failure effects are
ranked relative to one another, thus ranking
the criticality of the systems, subsystems, or
hardware components analyzed.
Once ranked, the systems, subsystems, or
components designated as most severe, in
terms of failure effect, are provided analysis
resources in a graded fashion.

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TABLE 12.4 RISK LEVEL DEFINITIONS (Cont.)

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Example:

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FIGURE12.2 Consequence-likelihood grid for criticality ranking
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TABLE 12.5 FIREPLACE FMECA (Cont.)

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 Logic Tree Analysis
Logic Tree Models are hierarchical models which
play an important role in performance analysis.
It is often helpful in describing and understanding
the system to construct visual aids which depict
the logic required to establish and accomplish
system performance goals and objectives.
The primary purpose of the tree structure is to
illustrate causal relationships between basic
human, hardware, and environmental events.

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Fault Tree Analysis
The purpose of FTA is to identify failure
pathways, both physical and human, that
could lead to an identified fault event
The fault tree includes only the fault events
and logical inter-relationship that contribute
to the top event
A fault tree does not contain all possible
componenet failure modes or all possible
fault events that could cause system failure

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 Fault Tree Analysis
Procedure
Development of an FTA consists of the
following steps:
Identify the top event
Identify the second-level events
Develop the tree logic (use the AND, OR, or
other gate logic structure)
Identify lower level events
Proceed to the desired level of detail
Quatify the tree logic (compute the probability
of failures and top event probability)
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Selected FTA Logic Symbols

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 FTA (Cont.)
Example: Develop a fault tree diagram and
analysis for the gas valve.
Solution: The first step is to identify the top event
on the fault tree: the gas valve fails to prevent
gas flow (when closed). For example, the handle
may inappropriately indicate that the valve is in
the closed position; or the valve may actually be
closed, as indicated by the handle, however the
interior seals may be faulty, thus allowing
continued gas flow; or the valve may not be
properly installed to the gas feed and allows gas
to escape at the connection, upstream from the
valve.
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FTA (Cont.)
Note the use of the word or in the
previous sentence. This word naturally
indicates the use of an OR gate in the
fault tree construction. In short, this
example assumes that three conditions
could lead to the top event. Figure 13.2
shows the top event and the three
conditions previously listed as the top
two layers of the FTA diagram.

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FIGURE 13.2 Gas valve fault tree
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FTA (Cont.)

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 Faults and Failures
We must be able to distinguish between the specific term
failure and the more general term fault. This distinction
can best be illustrated by an example. If a valve properly
closes when a low pressure indication occurs, the valve is
said to be in a success state. If, however, the valve fails to
properly close under the same circumstance, it is considered
to be in a failure state. On the other hand, it is possible that
the valve closes at the wrong time because some upstream
sensor component functions improperly. This premature
closing does not constitute a valve failure; the valve worked
as directed. However, the valves closing at the wrong time
may well cause the entire system to enter an unsatisfactory
state. Such an occurrence is called fault. We can state that,
in general and regarding any specific component, all failures
are faults, but not all faults are failures. Failures are basic
abnormal occurrences, whereas faults can be described as
higher order events.
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Event Tree Analysis
The purpose of an ETA is to identify
the sequence of events that follows a
given failure or error as it could lead
to a loss in system performance.
An event tree is a graphical
illustration of potential outcomes
that can result from a specific
equipment failure or human error.

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ETA (Cont.)
ETA considers the response of perdonnel
and safety systems in dealimg with the
failure
The results of an ETA are accident
sequences or failure sequences
ETA is useful in analyzing the effect of
safety systems or emergency
procedures on accident prevention and
mitigation.

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ETA (Cont.)
A key distinction between FTA and ETA
is that in the latter an initiating event is
assumed to have occured, whereas in
FTA this initiating event is usually the
event for which the probability of
occurance is determined
This initiating event may be the result of
a particular system failure, or it may be
caused by some external circumstance
such as a natural phenomenon.

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 ETA (Cont.)
ETA can be used during the definition, design,
modification, or operation phase of a system. It is
particularly useful as a tool for demonstrating the
efficiency of accident prevention and mitigation
techniques. Although the ETA is primarily used for
safety analysis, it can be quite useful for quality
procedure analyses dealing with corrective action
procedure design and development. ETA has great
potential to aid in process control when special
causes are detected using SPC.
ETA produces a series of event trees that illustrates
the event sequences effecting a system performance
loss following the occurrence of an initiating event.
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ETA Procedure
1. Identify an initial event (may be a
system failure, equipment failure,
human error)
2. Identify the response (an automatic
emergency shutdown, alarms to alert
operators etc.)
3. Construct the event tree
4. Describe the event sequences (variety
of outcomes that could occur following
the initiating event)

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 Construction of the Event
Tree
Enter the initiating event on the left hand side
List the functional responses chronologically
Decide whether or not the success-failure of
the function can or does effect the course of
the event
If the answer is yes, the event tree is branched
to distinguish between sucess and failure of
the function; success always branches upword,
failure downward. If the system function has
no effect, the tree does not branch, but
proceeds to the next system function (to the
right)

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Example:

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FIGURE 13.3 Gas valve event tree

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 Cut Sets In Logic Tree
Analysis
A fundamental objective of most logic tree
applications is to discover the event combinations
most critical to system performance.
A minimal cut set is the smallest set of primary
events, inhibit conditions, undeveloped fault
events, or any combination of these, which must
all occur in order for the top event to occur. A
minimal cut set represents the path by which the
top event can occur.
Determination of the minimal cut sets is significant
because they identify which events must be
achieved in order for the top event state to
happen.
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 Large System Analysis and
Logic Tree Reduction
Logic tree analysis techniques have the following
common characteristics:
1. The technique produces a system model that promotes
understanding of the ways in which the system can fail (or
succeed) and the ways in which failure (or success) can be
prevented (or achieved).
2. The technique is applicable to a wide variety of systems.
3. The technique provides reasonable assurance of
completeness.
4. The technique enhances understanding and communication,
regarding system improvement.
Logic trees represent a means for system analysis,
documentation, and communication. For complicated
systems, they may grow to a rather large size.
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Problems
What is meant by:
FMEA
FMECA
Criticality Ranking
FTA
System Breakdown Procedure
Develop the following:
FMEA for a pressure cooker
FMECA for a residential fire place
FTA for lightening of Operations Room considering two lane
system + A torch
FTA for a gas valve
Calculate:
Probability of Gas valve failure
Probability of lighting loss

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