Rationalism

Rationalism and Empiricism, 1

Empiricism: All knowledge of the world

comes from experience

Rationalism: Some knowledge of the

world is independent of experience that
is, some knowledge is inborn (innate)

Trifling Propositions
Locke: trifling
propositions are
Identical propositions
(Logical truths): A
soul is a soul, Lead
is lead
Truths by definition:
predicate is part of
subject, e.g., Lead is
a metal

A Semantic Distinction
Either the predicate B
belongs to the subject A, as
something which is
contained (though covertly)
in the conception A; or the
predicate B lies completely
out of the concept A,
although it stands in
connection with it. In the first
instance, I term the
judgment analytic, in the
second, synthetic.

Analytic judgments
Kant: predicate
contained in subject
General: true or false
solely in virtue of the
meanings of its terms
Example: all bachelors
are unmarried

Synthetic propositions 10

Kant: predicate not contained in

subject
General: truth value not determined
by meanings of terms depends on
the world
Examples: all bachelors are
unhappy

An Epistemological Distinction
Avicenna (ibn Sina, 980-
1037): Cognition can again
be analyzed into two kinds.
One is the kind that may be
known through Intellect; it is
known necessarily by
reasoning through itself. . . .
The other kind of cognition is
one that is known by intuition
[experience]. Whatever is
known by Intellect . . . should
be based on something
which is known prior to the
thing [that is, a priori].

A Priori/A Posteriori Judgments
A posteriori: dependent
on experience; can be
known only by experience

A priori: independent of
experience; can be
known by reasoning
alone

A Priori/A Posteriori 15

A Posteriori: Hume, matters

of fact: dependent on
experience

A Priori: Hume, relations of

ideas: can be known by
mere operation of thought

A Metaphysical Distinction
Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz
(1646-1716): There are
also two kinds of truths,
those of reasoning and
those of fact. Truths of
reasoning are necessary
and their opposite is
impossible: truths of fact
are contingent and their
opposite is possible.

Necessary and contingent
Necessary truths:
true in all possible
worlds; cant be false;
opposite impossible

Contingent truths:
true, but could be
false; opposite
possible

Necessary A Priori
Enlightenment philosophers thought all
and only a priori judgments were
necessary
Necessary Contingent
A Priori Yes No
A Posteriori No Yes

Kripkes Cases 20

Necessary a posteriori
Water is H2O
Gold has atomic number 79

Contingent a priori
Neptune causes
perturbations in the orbit of
Uranus

Concepts and Judgments
Avicenna distinguishes
knowledge of concepts from
knowledge of judgments

Rationalists and empiricists

can disagree about both

So, there are concept forms

and judgment forms of each

Concept Rationalism
Concept rationalism: There are innate concepts
Leibniz: . . . can it be denied that there is much that is
innate in our mind, since we are, so to speak, innate to
ourselves, and since in ourselves there are being, unity,
substance, duration, change, activity, perception,
pleasure and a thousand other objects of our intellectual
ideas? And as these objects are immediate objects of
our understanding and are always present (although
they cannot always be consciously perceived because
of our distractions and wants), why should it be
surprising that we say that these ideas, along with all
that depends on them, are innate in us?

Judgment Rationalism
Judgment rationalism: There are synthetic
a priori truths

We can learn something about the world

independently of experience from
reason alone

 Leibniz frames the issue 25

There is the question whether the soul, in itself, is entirely

empty, like a writing tablet on which nothing has yet been
written (tabula rasa), (which is the opinion of Aristotle and
the author of the Essay [Locke]), and whether everything
that is inscribed upon it comes solely from the senses and
experience; or whether the soul originally contains the
principles of several notions and doctrines, which are
merely roused on certain occasions by external objects,
as I hold along with Plato and even with the Schoolmen. . .
. Hence there arises another question, whether all truths
are dependent on experience, that is, on induction and
instances; or whether there are some which have yet
another foundation.

Kinds of Judgment
Analytic Synthetic

A Priori Yes ??

A Posteriori No Yes

Synthetic A Priori Truths?
Avicenna
The whole is greater than its parts
Things equal to the same thing are equal to each other
Descartes
I think, therefore I am
Anyone who thinks must exist while he/she thinks
Nothing is made from nothing
Its impossible for anything to be and not be at the
same time
Whats been done cant be undone

Synthetic a priori truths?
Leibniz
Principle of sufficient reason: there can be no
fact without a sufficient reason why it should
be so and not otherwise
Kant
Every event has a cause
Arithmetic (7 + 5 = 12)
Geometry (between any two points lies one
line)

Synthetic a priori truths? 30

Medieval philosophers
Theology (God exists; The soul is immortal)
Metaphysics (The world consists of
substances and their attributes; The will is
free; Every substance has an essence)
Ethics (One ought to seek the good;
Happiness is intrisically good; Courage is a
virtue)

The Platonic Tradition
Judgment of perception:
This is a triangle
Mind is turned toward
object perceived
But also to the form of a
triangle
We perceive the thing as
a triangle because we
apprehend the form

 Objects and Abstract Forms
Youareawarethatstudentsofgeometry,arithmetic,andthekindred
sciencesassumetheoddandtheevenandthefiguresandthreekindsof
anglesandthelikeintheirseveralbranchesofscience;thesearetheir
hypotheses,whichtheyandeverybodyaresupposedtoknow,and
thereforetheydonotdeigntogiveanyaccountofthemeitherto
themselvesorothers;buttheybeginwiththem,andgoonuntilthey
arriveatlast,andinaconsistentmanner,attheirconclusion?...Anddo
younotknowalsothatalthoughtheymakeuseofthevisibleformsand
reasonaboutthem,theyarethinkingnotofthese,butoftheidealswhich
theyresemble;notofthefigureswhichtheydraw,butoftheabsolute
squareandtheabsolutediameter,andsoontheformswhichthey
drawormake,andwhichhaveshadowsandreflectionsinwateroftheir
own,areconvertedbythemintoimages,buttheyarereallyseekingto
beholdthethingsthemselves,whichcanonlybeseenwiththeeyeofthe
mind?

Platos Philosophy of Mind

This is a
triangle
Form

Object

Platos Philosophy of Mind 35

Participation

This is a
triangle
Form
?

Perception
Object

Forms explain how we can
Think general thoughts
Account for regularities
Account for change
Think the same thought
at different times
Think the same thought
as each other
Think veridical thoughts

Platonisms problem
We dont perceive the forms
How do we know anything about them?
Aristotles answer: abstraction
Platos answers:
Recollection

The Form of the Good

Platos Philosophy of Mind 40

The Good
Participation

This is a
triangle
Form
Recollection

Perception
Object
Augustines Philosophy of Mind
Participation

God

This is a
Form triangle

Illumination

Perception
Object
The Rationalists Argument
Leibniz: For if some events can be foreseen before we
have made any trial of them, it is manifest that we
contribute to them something of our own. The senses,
although they are necessary for all our actual acquiring
of knowledge, are by no means sufficient to give us the
whole of our knowledge, since the senses never give
anything but instances, that is to say particular or
individual truths. Now all the instances which confirm a
general truth, however numerous they may be, are not
sufficient to establish the universal necessity of this
same truth; for it does not at all follow that what has
happened will happen in the same way.

Leibnizs Argument, contd
Whence it seems that necessary truths, such as we
find in pure mathematics and especially in arithmetic
and geometry, must have principles whose proof does
not depend upon instances nor, consequently, upon the
witnesses of the senses, although without the senses it
would never have come into our heads to think of
them. . . . Logic also, along with metaphysics and
ethics, of which the one forms natural theology and the
other natural jurisprudence, are full of such truths; and
consequently their demonstration can come only from
the inner principles which are called innate.

Universality 45

Experience is always of particular

instances
Knowledge immediately justified by
experience is knowledge of particular
instances
Universal truths dont follow from their
instances
So, experience cant justify universal
truths

Necessity
Experience is always of contingent
matters of fact
Knowledge immediately justified by
experience is knowledge of contingent
matters of fact
Necessary truths dont follow from
contingent truths
So, experience cant justify necessary
truths

Universal, Necessary Truths
Metaphysics (e.g., Substances have
properties)
Ethics (e.g., Happiness is good)
Mathematics (e.g., The union of two sets
is a set)
Natural science (e.g., F = ma; NaOH +
HCl > NaCl + H2O)