Beruflich Dokumente
Kultur Dokumente
Petrochemical Industries
Ref: Clifton A. Ericson II, Concise Encyclopedia of System Safety, Wiley (2011)
Terms of Use
Must have a
purpose.
Is contained
within some form
of hierarchy.
Natural and
man-made
systems
Closed
Categories
Physical and
and
open-loop
of conceptual
systems
systems
System
Static and
dynamic
Ref: Benjamin S. Blanchard, System
systems
Engneering Management, 5th Edition,
Wiley (2016)
Terms of Use
SYSTEM SAFETY
System
The assurance and management that the system is safe
for all people, environment, and equipment .
(Ref:Nicholas J.Bahr, System Safety Engineering and
Risk Assessment Practical Approach, Second Edition,
CRC Press (2015))
Design for
Safety
Ref: Clifton A. Ericson II, Concise Encyclopedia of System Safety, Wiley (2011)
System Safety
Basic interrelated goals of system safety;
Protect the system and its users, the public, and the
environment from mishaps
Ref: Clifton A. Ericson II, Concise Encyclopedia of System Safety, Wiley (2011)
System Safety Process
DEFINE OBJECTIVES
VERIFICATION
Mitigation verification CONTROLS
RISK ACCEPTANCE ?
Risk acceptance
MODIFY
YES NO SYSTEM
Hazard /risk tracking
RATIONALE (Ref:Nicholas J.Bahr,
System Safety
Ref: Clifton A. Ericson II, Concise DOCUMENTED Engineering and Risk
Assessment Practical
Encyclopedia of System Safety, Wiley Approach, Second
PERIODIC SYSTEM
(2011) Edition, CRC Press
REVIEW (2015))
System Safety Process
DEFINE OBJECTIVES
DEFINE OBJECTIVES
SYSTEM DESCRIPTION
Define the boundary conditions or
HAZARD
IDENTIFICATION analysis objectives.
MODIFY
YES NO SYSTEM
(Ref:Nicholas
J.Bahr, System RATIONALE
Safety Engineering DOCUMENTED
and Risk Assessment
Practical Approach, PERIODIC SYSTEM
Second Edition, REVIEW
CRC Press (2015))
System Safety Process
DEFINE OBJECTIVES
SYSTEM DESCRIPTION
SYSTEM DESCRIPTION
How the system works and how
HAZARD
IDENTIFICATION the hardware, software, people,
and environment all interact.
HAZARD ANALYSIS
RISK ACCEPTANCE ?
MODIFY
YES NO SYSTEM
(Ref:Nicholas
J.Bahr, System RATIONALE
Safety Engineering DOCUMENTED
and Risk Assessment
Practical Approach, PERIODIC SYSTEM
Second Edition, REVIEW
CRC Press (2015))
System Safety Process
DEFINE OBJECTIVES
HAZARD IDENTIFICATION
SYSTEM DESCRIPTION
Crucial part of the system safety
HAZARD
IDENTIFICATION process.
VERIFICATION
CONTROLS
RISK ACCEPTANCE ?
MODIFY
YES NO SYSTEM
(Ref:Nicholas
J.Bahr, System RATIONALE
Safety Engineering DOCUMENTED
and Risk Assessment
Practical Approach, PERIODIC SYSTEM
Second Edition, REVIEW
CRC Press (2015))
System Safety Process
DEFINE OBJECTIVES
HAZARD ANALYSIS
SYSTEM DESCRIPTION
HAZARD
IDENTIFICATION A technique for studying the
cause/consequence relation of the
HAZARD ANALYSIS
hazard potential in a system.
RISK EVALUATION
RISK
MANAGEMENT HAZARD CONTROLS
VERIFICATION
CONTROLS
RISK ACCEPTANCE ?
MODIFY
YES NO SYSTEM
RATIONALE
DOCUMENTED
(Ref:Nicholas J.Bahr, System Safety
PERIODIC SYSTEM Engineering and Risk Assessment Practical
REVIEW Approach, Second Edition, CRC Press
(2015))
System Safety Process
DEFINE OBJECTIVES
RISK EVALUTION
SYSTEM DESCRIPTION
HAZARD
IDENTIFICATION To control hazards occurrence or
mitigate their effects.
HAZARD ANALYSIS
RISK EVALUATION
RISK With the information about
MANAGEMENT HAZARD CONTROLS relationship between hazard
cause and effect the associated
VERIFICATION risks are then ranked, and
CONTROLS
engineering management is better
RISK ACCEPTANCE ? able to determine which risks are
worth controlling and which
MODIFY
YES NO SYSTEM risks require less attention.
RATIONALE
DOCUMENTED
HAZARD
IDENTIFICATION Controls fall into two broad
categories: engineering controls
HAZARD ANALYSIS
and management controls.
RISK EVALUATION
RISK
MANAGEMENT HAZARD CONTROLS
VERIFICATION
CONTROLS
RISK ACCEPTANCE ?
MODIFY
YES NO SYSTEM
RATIONALE
DOCUMENTED
HAZARD
IDENTIFICATION Engineering controls are changes
in the hardware that either
HAZARD ANALYSIS
eliminate the hazards or mitigate
RISK EVALUATION
their risks.
RISK
MANAGEMENT HAZARD CONTROLS -Adding a relief valve to a 2000
psi oxygen system,
VERIFICATION -Building a berm around an oil
CONTROLS
storage tank,
RISK ACCEPTANCE ? -Using only hermetically sealed
switches in an explosive
MODIFY
YES NO SYSTEM environment,
-Putting in hard stops in rotating
RATIONALE
DOCUMENTED machinery to prevent
overtorquing
PERIODIC SYSTEM
REVIEW (Ref:Nicholas J.Bahr, System Safety Engineering and Risk
Assessment Practical Approach, Second Edition, CRC Press (2015))
System Safety Process
DEFINE OBJECTIVES
HAZARD CONTROLS
SYSTEM DESCRIPTION
Management controls are
HAZARD
IDENTIFICATION changes made to the organization
itself.
HAZARD ANALYSIS
RATIONALE
DOCUMENTED
MODIFY
YES NO SYSTEM
RATIONALE
DOCUMENTED
RISK EVALUATION
RISK
MANAGEMENT HAZARD CONTROLS
VERIFICATION
CONTROLS
RISK ACCEPTANCE ?
MODIFY
YES NO SYSTEM
RATIONALE
DOCUMENTED
VERIFICATION
CONTROLS
RISK ACCEPTANCE ?
MODIFY
YES NO SYSTEM
RATIONALE
DOCUMENTED
HAZARD
IDENTIFICATION
Need to answer the
HAZARD ANALYSIS
question How safe
RISK
RISK EVALUATION is safe enough? ***
MANAGEMENT HAZARD CONTROLS
VERIFICATION
CONTROLS
RISK ACCEPTANCE ?
MODIFY
YES NO SYSTEM
RATIONALE
DOCUMENTED
1972-1976 1972-1976
1977-1981 1977-1981
1982-1986 1982-1986
1987-1991 1987-1991
1992-1996 1992-1996
1997-2001 1997-2001
2002-2006 2002-2006
2007-2011 2007-2011
0 500 1000 1500 2000 0 500 1000 1500 2000 2500 3000 3500 4000
Two examples of sectors showing property damage losses in millions of 2011 USD over
5-year periods, according to Marsh,1 The 100 Largest Losses 1972-2011.
Ref: Hans J Pasman, Risk Analysis and Control for Industrial_Processes Gas, Oil and Chemicals: A System Perspective for Assessing and Avoiding
Low-Probability,High-Consequence Events, Elseiver (2015)
How Safe is Safe Enough?
(Ref:Nicholas J.Bahr, System Safety Engineering and Risk Assessment Practical Approach, Second Edition, CRC Press (2015))
How Safe is Safe Enough?
Union Carbide profits from the 1950s UCs Fortune 500 rank based on corporate
when they became owner of the Bhopal revenue (The Bhopal disaster took place in
plant until 2001 when it was acquired by 1984)
Dow Chemical Company
Ref: Hans J Pasman, Risk Analysis and Control for Industrial_Processes Gas, Oil and Chemicals: A System Perspective for Assessing and Avoiding
Low-Probability,High-Consequence Events, Elseiver (2015)
How Safe is Safe Enough? - ALARP
Magnitute of Risk
Increasing
ALARP
ice)
pract
good -Ideal levels of risk
vant -Risks are negligible or so small that they
(Rele
can be managed by routine procedures and
(Ref:Nicholas J.Bahr, System
Safety Engineering and Risk
able no additional risk treatment measures are
Assessment Practical
Toler needed
Approach, Second Edition,
CRC Press (2015))
How Safe is Safe Enough?
Creterias:
1.Surprising
2.Have a sudden and severe impact
3. Might have been foreseen
How Safe is Safe Enough?
EXAMPLES OF BLACK SWAN EVENTS (ACCIDENTS) IN
PETROCHEMICAL INDUSTRY
Ref: Energy Practice; The 100 Largest Losses 1974-2013 Large property damage losses in the Hydrocarbon Industry 23rd Edition,
pages 25,26 (2014)
How Safe is Safe Enough?
Procedures
Process Analysis
Design
Management
Training
Operator Error
Supervision
Inspection
Manufacture/Construction
Maintenance
Other
Not Identified
0 5 10 15 20 25 30
Specific causes attributed to human/ organizational factors in the accidents of the petrochemical
sector.
Ref: Zoe Nivolianitou, Statistical analysis of major accidents in petrochemical industry notified to the major accident reporting
system (MARS), Journal of Hazardous Materials A137 (2006) 17)
Safety Management System (SMS) and
System Safety
(Ref:Nicholas J.Bahr, System Safety Engineering and Risk Assessment Practical Approach, Second Edition, CRC Press (2015))
Safety Management System (SMS) and
System Safety
Safety
governance
Safety
Safety
Safety culture Management
organization
System
System
Safety
(Programme)
(Ref:Nicholas J.Bahr, System Safety Engineering
and Risk Assessment Practical Approach, Second
Edition, CRC Press (2015))
Safety Management System Regulations
Regulation Process Safety Management of Highly Control of major-accident hazards
Hazardous Chemicals involving dangerous substances,
amending and subsequently
repealing Council Directive
Application United States of America (USA) European Union (EU)
Ref: The 2nd coloum, https://www.osha.gov/Publications/osha3132.html and the 3rd one DIRECTIVE 2012/18/EU OF The European
Parliament and of The Council of 4 July 2012, on the control of major-accident hazards involving dangerous substances, amending and
subsequently repealing Council Directive 96/82/EC
The Comparision of Elements with Safety Management
System Regulations and System Safety (Programme)
https://www.osha.gov/Publications/osha3132.ht
ml
Human factors:The tool to ensure that the humanmachine interface is accounted for and
ensuring that the SMS appropriately accounts for how people actually work.
Elements of Identification
Process Safety and Evaluation
Information and of Major
Process Hazard Hazards Ref:Nicholas J.Bahr,
System Safety
Analysis Engineering and Risk
Assessment Practical
Approach, Second
Edition, CRC Press
(2015))
Elements of System Safety (Programme) and Comparision with
SMS Regulations (PSM&Seveso)
Document control:
Companys system for configuration control of system design and operation.
Record control and information management: Closed-loop process that records how decisions
are made and carried out and information is managed. It records how safety decisions and safety
corrective actions are validated to be appropriate and verified to be in place. It also documents all
safety compliance for internal and external compliance.
PSM Seveso
-Operating
Procedures
-How Work Operational
Permit
-Mechanical
Control
Integrity Ref:Nicholas J.Bahr,
- Pre-start up System Safety
Engineering and Risk
Safety Review
Assessment Practical
Approach, Second
Edition, CRC Press
(2015))
Elements of System Safety (Programme) and Comparision with
SMS Regulations (PSM&Seveso)
Measuring equipment and calibration: Discusses how control equipment of the system life
cycle is defined and ensured to be within specification, especially as it relates to system safety.
Equipment maintenance: The system that ensures that equipment is maintained according to
the appropriate periodicity, including scheduled, unscheduled, and emergency maintenance. It
should also include design for ease of maintainability.
PSM Seveso
-Operating
Procedures
-How Work Operational
Permit
-Mechanical
Control
Integrity Ref:Nicholas J.Bahr,
- Pre-start up System Safety
Engineering and Risk
Safety Review
Assessment Practical
Approach, Second
Edition, CRC Press
(2015))
Elements of System Safety (Programme) and Comparision with
SMS Regulations (PSM&Seveso)
Procurement of goods and services: The formal procurement program and process for goods
and services and managing their procurement risks.
Management of contracted goods and services: The system that performs day-to-day
management of outside vendors and members of their supply chain (contractor and
subcontractor management) and ensures that they employ appropriate SMS techniques (within
their contractor and subcontractor activities) to ensure adequate system safety protocols are in
place.
Supply chain traceability of goods and services: The program that actively documents how
contracted goods and services are managed through the entire supply chain and demonstrates
appropriate system safety protocols.
System Safety: Procurement of goods and services, Management of contracted goods and services , Supply chain traceability of goods and services
PSM Seveso
-Employee
Participation Organisation
-Training and Personnel Ref:Nicholas J.Bahr,
-Contractors System Safety
-Trade Secrets Engineering and Risk
Assessment Practical
Approach, Second
Edition, CRC Press
(2015))
Elements of System Safety (Programme) and Comparision with
SMS Regulations (PSM&Seveso)
System for managing requirements and changes: The closed-loop
process that documents how requirements and changes in system design,
operation, and other aspects of the system life cycle are documented.
It also includes process controls to production.
It works hand in hand with document and record control.
PSM Seveso
Management of
Management of Change
Change
Ref:Nicholas J.Bahr,
System Safety
Engineering and Risk
Assessment Practical
Approach, Second
Edition, CRC Press
(2015))
Elements of System Safety (Programme) and Comparision with
SMS Regulations (PSM&Seveso)
Analysis and monitoring :The approach to evaluating and trending safety
and risk profiles over time. This includes regulatory compliance, safety
performance indicators, and appropriate process controls and asset
management.
PSM Seveso
Management of
Management of Change
Change
Ref:Nicholas J.Bahr,
System Safety
Engineering and Risk
Assessment Practical
Approach, Second
Edition, CRC Press
(2015))
Elements of System Safety (Programme) and Comparision with
SMS Regulations (PSM&Seveso)
Incident/accident investigation: Defines how incidents, notifiable
occurrences, and accidents are investigated and evaluated for corrective
action.
PSM Seveso
Monitoring
Incident Performance
Investigation
Ref:Nicholas J.Bahr,
System Safety
Engineering and Risk
Assessment Practical
Approach, Second
Edition, CRC Press
(2015))
Elements of System Safety (Programme) and Comparision with
SMS Regulations (PSM&Seveso)
Emergency management and response procedures: Describes how the company
will respond to and manage an emergency event.
Medical issues: The system that ensures that employee medical safeguards are in
place and that employees are working in a healthy environment.
Environmental protection and occupational health are described here.
System Safety: Emergency management and response
Procedures, Medical Issues
PSM Seveso
Ref:Nicholas J.Bahr,
System Safety
Engineering and Risk
Assessment Practical
Approach, Second
Edition, CRC Press
(2015))
Elements of System Safety (Programme) and Comparision with
SMS Regulations (PSM&Seveso)
Internal audit:The process of independently reviewing programs to ensure that
system safety protocols are in place and followed.
PSM Seveso
Ref:Nicholas J.Bahr,
System Safety
Engineering and Risk
Assessment Practical
Approach, Second
Edition, CRC Press
(2015))
System safety Program Plan (SSPP) and Safety Report (SR)
System safety Program Plan (SSPP): The formal document that describes the
SMS and how all the pieces fit together and operate within the company. It also
includes general engineering and operational system safety requirements.
PSM Seveso
Ref:Nicholas J.Bahr,
System Safety
Engineering and Risk
Assessment Practical
Approach, Second
Edition, CRC Press
(2015))
Proposals For The Petrochemical Industries
in the Concept of System Safety
Ref: Ming Yang, Risk assessment of rare events, Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 42 (2016) 6-13
Proposals For The Petrochemical Industries
in the Concept of System Safety
1. Need to Determine the Risk Target considering the Black
Swan Events:
Perform the
Hierarchical Update the
Bayesian priors and
Approach to estimate the
predict the probability of
number of the Blak
precursors in swan
the next year
Develop the Is new
Event tree for Collect Risk precusor N End
estimation data o
the rare event precursor Estimate available
to identify data Perform the ?
mutual conseque
precursors information nce of the
analysis to Black
identify the Swan
most based on Y
informative the e
precursor identified s
precursor
Ref: Ming Yang, Risk assessment of rare events, Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 42 (2016) 6-13
Proposals For The Petrochemical Industries
in the Concept of System Safety
2. Need to Calibrate risk matrices for
process safety:
Ref: Paul Baybutt, Calibration of risk matrices for process safety, Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 38 (2015) 163-168)
Proposals For The Petrochemical Industries
in the Concept of System Safety
Ref: Paul Baybutt, Calibration of risk matrices for process safety, Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 38 (2015) 163-168)
Proposals For The Petrochemical Industries
in the Concept of System Safety
2.Need to Calibrate risk matrices for process
safety:
Use of risk matrices finds favor;
. Simple to understand,
. Not require specialized expertise,
. Are graphically appealing.
But;
. No industry or government standards for risk matrices for process safety.
In particular, there are pitfalls in the allocation and calibration process for
Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process risk matrices38that
Industries often163-168;
(2015) are unrecognized
Calibration of risk matrices for process
Proposals For The Petrochemical Industries
in the Concept of System Safety
2. Need to Calibrate risk matrices for process safety:
Step 1: Select a reference risk tolerance criterion for the type of casualty of
interest
Ref: Paul Baybutt, Calibration of risk matrices for process safety, Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 38 (2015) 163-168)
Proposals For The Petrochemical Industries
in the Concept of System Safety
2. Need to Calibrate risk matrices for
process safety:
Methodologies:
. Hazard and Operability Analysis
. Preliminary Hazard Analysis
. Subsystem Hazard Analysis
. Operating and Support Hazard Analysis
. Health Hazard Assessment
. Safety Requirements/Criteria Analysis
. Fault Tree Analysis
. Event Tree Analysis
. Failure Mode and Effects Analysis
. .
Ref:Clifton A. Ericson II, Hazard Analysis Techniques for System Safety, Wiley 2005
Proposals For The Petrochemical Industries
in the Concept of System Safety
Ref:Clifton A. Ericson II, Hazard Analysis Techniques for System Safety, Wiley 2005
Proposals For The Petrochemical Industries
in the Concept of System Safety
. The design intent forms a baseline for the examination and should be accurate
and correct, as far as possible.
. The verification of design intent (see IEC 61160) is outside of the scope of
the HAZOP study, but the study leader should ascertain that it is accurate and
correct to allow the study to proceed.
. A HAZOP study can only consider those parts that appear on the design
representation. Activities and operations which do not appear on the
representation might not always be considered.
Ref: Hazard and operability studies (HAZOP studies) Application guide, IEC 61882, Clause 4.3.2 Design requirements and design
intent (2016) )
Proposals For The Petrochemical Industries
in the Concept of System Safety
Accident modelling;
. Is a methodology used to relate the causes and
effects of events that lead to accidents,
. This modelling effectively seeks to answer two
main questions:
(i) Why does an accident occur,
(ii) How does it occur.
Ref: Ali Al-shanini, Accident modelling and analysis in process industries, Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 32
(2014) 319-334
Proposals For The Petrochemical Industries
in the Concept of System Safety
. e-MARS (EU)
. ZEMA in Germany
. ARIA in France
. AEA technology MHIDAS database in UK
. TNO FACTS database in The Netherlands
Ref: Zoe Nivolianitou, Statistical analysis of major accidents in petrochemical industry notified to the major accident reporting
system (MARS) , Journal of Hazardous Materials A137 (2006) 17
Proposals For The Petrochemical Industries
in the Concept of System Safety
. Design
The design of the system will determine its structure and
which of the list of potential components which perform the
same function will be selected.
Ref: Andrews John, System design and maintenance modelling for safety in extended life operation, Reliability Engineering and
System Safety, 163 (2017) 95108
Proposals For The Petrochemical Industries
in the Concept of System Safety
Ref: Andrews John, System design and maintenance modelling for safety in extended life operation, Reliability Engineering and
System Safety, 163 (2017) 95108
Proposals For The Petrochemical Industries
in the Concept of System Safety
. The method has advantages over the traditionally used methods of fault tree
and event tree analysis and is capable of accounting for the following
features: