COMPULSORY

DISQUALIFICATION
Sec. 5 Canon 3 of New Code
of Judicial Conduct for the
Philippine Judiciary
 Rationale Behind The Rule On
Disqualification
URBANES VS. CA
FACTS:
Urbanes filed a motion for inhibition
of Justice Montenegro on the ground
that before he became as an Associate
Justice of the Court of Appeals, he had
acted as counsel for NPC in his then
capacity as Acting Solicitor General.
ISSUE:
Whether the Hon. Court of Appeals
erred in promulgating a decision in this
case with the participation of Justice
Eduardo G. Montenegro who is
disqualified under the rules to
participate in deciding this case.
HELD:
Yes.
The Rules of Court (Disqualification of Judges) has truly called
for the total inhibition of Justice Montenegro from the case.
The intendment of the above provision of the Rules of Court is
not difficult to find. Its rationale is predicated in the long
standing precept that no judge should handle a case in
which he might be perceived, rightly or wrongly, to be
susceptible to bias and partiality. His judgment must not
be tainted by even the slightest suspicion of improbity or
preconceived interest. The rule is aimed at preserving at all
times the faith and confidence in courts of justice by any party
to the litigation
 GROUND FOR DISQUALIFICATION
OF JUDGES UNDER THE NEW CODE

1. A Judge has actual bias or

prejudice concerning a party or
personal knowledge of disputed
evidentiary facts concerning the
proceedings.
 (a) Judge has actual bias or prejudice against a
party.

GARCIA VS. BURGOS

FACTS:
Petitioners, through Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, assail
the validity of three Orders of Judge Jose P. Burgos of the
Regional Trial Court of Cebu. Petitioners contend that the
respondent judge gravely abused his discretion, when he
made avolte faceon his previous Orderinhibiting himself
from hearing the case.In issuing said Order, Judge Burgos
noted that Petitioner Tomas Osmeas Motion for Inhibition
raised the ground of prejudgment on the basis of
statements made in his Order.
 However, respondent judge reversed his voluntary
inhibition, meekly stating in his Order that the allegation
of prejudgment and partiality is so bare and empty as
movant Osmea failed to present sufficient ground or
proof for the Presiding Judge to disqualify himself.The
Judge realized the mistake in granting the motion for
inhibition when defendant Osmea misled the Court in
asserting that on the same day, he would be filing an
administrative case against the Judge for violation of PD
1818 and Supreme Court Circularsissued in relation to
said decree.In that eventuality, Osmea said, the Judge
would be biased and partial to him because he was the
complainant in the pending administrative case.
ISSUE:
Whether the judge gravely abused
his discretion when he inhibits himself
from hearing the case.
HELD:
We deem it important to point out that a judge must preserve the
trust and faith reposed in him by the parties as an impartial and
objective administrator of justice. When he exhibits actions
that give rise, fairly or unfairly, to perceptions of
bias, such faith and confidence are eroded, and
he has no choice but to inhibit himself
voluntarily.It is basic that [a] judge may not be legally
prohibited from sitting in a litigation, but when circumstances appear
that will induce doubt [on]his honest actuations and probity in favor
of either party, or incite such state of mind, he should conduct a
careful self-examination.He should exercise his discretion in a way
that the peoples faith in the courts of justice is not impaired.The
better course for the judge is to disqualify himself.
 There must be convincing proof to
show that he or she is, in deed,
biased and partial
There must be convincing proof to show that
he or she is, in deed, biased and partial.

SOLIDBANK VS. DEL MONTE MOTOR WORKS

FACTS:
Petitioner filed a motion praying that the presiding
judge, Judge Ricardo D. Diaz, of the courta quoinhibit
himself from this case maintaining that the latter rushed
into resolving its motion for reconsideration thereby
depriving it the opportunity of presenting proof that the
original of Exhibit A was delivered to respondents. Such
haste on the part of the presiding judge, according to
petitioner, cast doubt on his objectivity and fairness. This
motion to inhibit was denied.
ISSUE:
Whether the trial judge should have
inhibited himself from trying and
deciding the instant case considering
his perceived and manifest bias and
partiality in favor of the private
respondents to the grave prejudice of
petitioner solidbank.
HELD:
NO
In order for this Court to sustain a charge of partiality and
prejudice brought against a judge, there must be convincing proof
to show that he or she is, indeed, biased and partial. Bare
allegations are not enough. Bias and prejudice are serious charges
which cannot be presumed particularly if weighed against a judges
sacred obligation under his oath of office to administer justice
without respect to person and do equal right to the poor and the
rich. There must be a showing of bias and prejudice stemming from
an extrajudicial source resulting in an opinion in the merits on
some basis other than what the judge learned from his
participation in the case. In this case, as petitioner failed to proffer
any evidence indicating that Judge Diaz was guilty of bias and
prejudice,
Bias and prejudice must stem from
extrajudicial source and not from
the assailed order or decision
ALERIA JR. VS. VELEZ
itself.

FACTS:
Petitioner Victorio Aleria, Jr. standsaccused for Illegal
Possession of Firearms and for Murder. Petitioner filed a Petition
to Admit Bail, which the Judge denied. Hence, the present
petition for certiorari with prayer for inhibition and temporary
restraining order assailing the issuance of the aforementioned
Orders with a prayer that petitioner be allowed to post bail in
such amount as shall be reasonably affordable, and that
respondent Judge be ordered to inhibit himself from further
trying the instant case and that the same be raffled to another
sala.
ISSUE:
Whether bias and prejudice must
stem from extrajudicial source and not
from the assailed order decision itself.
HELD:
YES.
As to the prayer for inhibition, petitioner claims
that the issuance of the questioned Orders shows
that respondent Judge has already lost his
impartiality or cold neutrality to administer justice,
and that petitioner does not stand a chinamans
chance of ever getting justice before respondent
Judge. Such sweeping conclusions here do not merit
consideration. The questioned Orders, by
themselves, do not sufficiently prove bias and
prejudice to disqualify respondent Judge under
Section 1, second paragraph of Rule 137 of the
Rules of Court.For such bias and prejudice, to be a
disqualification, must be shown to have stemmed from an
extrajudicial source, and result in an opinion on the merits
on some basis other than what the judge learned from his
participation in the case. Opinions formed in the course of
judicial proceedings, as long as they are based on the
evidence presented and conduct observed by the judge,
even if found later on as erroneous, do not prove personal
bias or prejudice on the part of the judge.Extrinsic
evidence is required to establish bias, bad faith, malice or
corrupt purpose, in addition to palpable error which may
be inferred from the decision or order itself.This, the
petitioner herein did not sufficiently adduce to warrant
respondent Judges inhibition or disqualification.
(b) Judge has personal knowledge
of disputed evidentiary facts
concerning the proceedings.
 (b) Judge has personal knowledge of
disputed evidentiary facts concerning
the proceedings.
UMALE VS. VILLALUZ

FACTS:
Petitioner Leon Umale impugns the validity of the order of
respondent Judge Onofre A. Villaluz, disqualifying or inhibiting
himself from trying the robbery charge against accused. Without
any party moving for his disqualification or inhibition,
respondent Judge Onofre Villaluz voluntarily inhibited himself
from trying the case "for the peace of mind of the parties
concerned and to insure an impartial administration of justice"
on the ground that before the criminal case was filed in his
court, he already had personal knowledge of the same; and
directed the immediate forwarding of the records of the case to
the Executive Judge.
ISSUE:
Whether respondent Judge Onofre
A. Villaluz of the Circuit Criminal Court
of Pasig, Rizal, can voluntarily, inhibit
himself, without any motion therefor
by the parties, on the ground of his
personal knowledge of the case even
before the same was filed.
HELD:
Yes.
It is possible that the respondent Judge might be
influenced by his personal knowledge of the case when he
tries and decides the same on the merits, which would
certainly constitute a denial of due process to the party
adversely affected by his judgment or decision. It is best
that, after some reflection, the respondent Judge on his
own initiative disqualified himself from hearing the
robbery case filed by herein petitioner and thereby
rendered himself available as witness to any of the
parties and therefore maybe subject to cross-
examination.
2. Judge had previously served as
a lawyer or as a material witness
in the matter in dispute.
In the natural course of human
experience, he would favor his
former client, and that is a
manifestation of partiality.
3. Judge or a member of his or her
family has an economic interest in
the outcome of the matter in
controversy.
 3. Judge or a member of his or her
family has an economic interest in the
outcome of the matter in controversy.
OKTUBRE VS. VALANO
FACTS:
Complainant is the attorney-in-fact of DArcy, a non resident
American. DArcy is the widow of Abraham. Respondent Judge is
Abrahams nephew.
Shortly after his appointment to the MTC Maasin, respondent
Judge, with DArcys permission, stayed in the Paler building for a
few days. He sought an extension of his stay but DArcy turned
down his request since during her next visit to the country she
would use the room respondent Judge then
occupied.Nevertheless, respondent Judge was able to continue
staying in the Paler building by transferring to a room reserved
for a sister of Abraham.
 Complainant alleges that DArcys refusal to grant
extension to respondent Judges stay triggered series of
events. Complainant filed a complaint against respondent
Judge withPunongBarangay of
Abgao,MaasinCity.Complainant charged respondent
Judge for changing the lock of his room and of the door
leading to the third floor of the Paler
building.Complainant also charged respondent Judge for
taking the jeep out of the garage of the Paler building.
Because of these events, complainant filed this
complaint.Complainant prays that the Court discipline
respondent Judge for using his salas letterhead, for his
failure to inhibit himself from his own criminal complaints.
 In his Comment, respondent Judge
admitted doing the acts complainant
recounted about the Paler building, its
tenants, and DArcys jeep. Respondent Judge
claimed, however, that he merely acted to
protect his maternal co-heirs interest in the
Paler building and in the other properties
claimed by DArcy.
Thereafter, respondent judge inhibited
himself from the three criminal cases.
ISSUE:
Whether respondent judge violated
the code.
HELD:
YES.

Although he is the complainant in the three criminal complaints,

respondent Judge did not disqualify himself from the cases.Worse, he
even issued a warrant of arrest, resulting in the arrest and detention
of complainant. By doing so, respondent Judge violated Rule 3.12 and,
by implication Section 1 of Rule 137, which covers the preliminary
stages of criminal prosecution. To be sure, the situation in this case
does not fall under any of the instances enumerated in Rule 3.12.
Nevertheless, as the provision itself states, such enumeration is not
exclusive. More importantly, paragraph (d) prohibits a judge from
sitting in a case where he is related to a party or to counsel within the
sixth and fourth degree of consanguinity or affinity, respectively.Thus,
there is more reason to prohibit a judge from doing so in cases where
he is a party.
4. Judge has served as executor,
administrator, guardian, trustee or
lawyer in the case or matter in
controversy, or a former associate
of the judge served as counsel
during their association, or the
judge or lawyer was a material
witness therein.
 Maliwat vs. CA
FACTS:
Petitioner filed a motion for declaration of
mistrial, pleading for the first time that his
constitutional right to due process was impaired
when Judge Rolando Diaz rendered the
judgment of conviction, knowing fully well that
he (Judge Diaz) previously testified against the
petitioner (then accused) in said cases, while
then the Clerk of Court of the Court of First
Instance (CFI) Branches 2 and 3 of Cavite City.
ISSUE:
Whether petitioner was given a fair
trial in the lower court.
HELD:
Yes.
The records show that Rolando Diaz, then
Clerk of Court of the CFI of Cavite City, indeed
testified for the prosecution.But as explained by
the Solicitor General, his testimony was limited
to certain facts directly connected with or arising
from the performance of his official duties as
Clerk of Court, without any reference to or
pronouncement as to the innocence or guilt of
the accused.
 The guiding rule is that a judge must not only render a just, correct
and impartial decision but should do so in such a manner as to be free
from any suspicion as to his fairness, impartiality and integrity.As
applied to the case at bar, the attitude exhibited by Judge Diaz speaks
more of extraordinary leniency to the accused in granting all his
requests for postponements, even to the extent of reconsidering his
orders declaring the accused as having waived his right to present
further evidence.

Under Rule 137, Sec. 1 of the Rules of Court, Judge Diaz' previous
actuations did not render him legally disqualified from sitting and
deciding the case.The suggestion that he is not wholly free,
disinterested and independent could have been buttressed by the
exercise of his sound discretion in voluntarily disqualifying himself.Yet,
the manner in which he exhibited himself during the trial negates any
suspicion of prejudgment in the case.
 5. The judge ruling in a lower court
is the subject of review.

SANDOVAL VS. CA
FACTS:
Judge Luis Victor as RTC judge partly
heard a case. He heard part of the
plaintiffs evidence and ruled on motions.
The case was however decided by Judge
Lucas Bersamin, who took over when
Judge Victor was promoted to the CA.
When the case was appealed to the CA it
fell in the Division of Justice Victor.
ISSUE:
Whether Justice Victor disqualified to
participate in the case?
HELD:
The principle that approximates the situation obtaining herein is the
disqualification of a judge from deciding a case where his ruling in a lower court
is the subject of review or in which he has presided in any inferior court when his
ruling or decision is the subject of review. Granted that Justice Victor presided
partly over the case in the courta quo, his was not the pen that finally rendered
the decision therein.Hence, he cannot be said to have been placed in a position
where he had to review his own decision as judge in the trial court.Accordingly,
he was not legally bound to inhibit himself from the case.
Nevertheless, Justice Victor should have been more prudent and circumspect
and declined to take on the case, owing to his earlier involvement in the
case.The Court has held that a judge should not handle a case in which he
might be perceived, rightly or wrongly, to be susceptible to bias and
partiality,which axiom is intended to preserve and promote public confidence in
the integrity and respect for the judiciary.While he is not legally required to
decline from taking part in the case, it is our considered view that his active
participation in the case below constitutes a just or valid reason, under Section 1
of Rule 137 for him to voluntarily inhibit himself from the case.
 (6) The judge is related by consanguinity or
affinity to a party litigant which in the 6th civil
degree or to counsel within the 4th civil degree.

GARCIA VS. DELA PENA

FACTS:
Complainant Engr. Edgardo C. Garcia, husband of the
accused in Criminal Case, claimed that respondent judge
took cognizance of the criminal case without the requisite
certification from the Lupon Tagapayapa; that he should
have inhibited himself from acting on the case because
private complainant Dr. Melencio B. de la Pea is his
brother. Records show that Dr. Melencio B. de la Pea filed
a complaint for grave oral defamationagainst Ignacia G.
Garcia with the Municipal Trial Court of Naval, Leyte.
 In his comment, respondent judge
stated that even if the private
complainant is his brother, he need not
inhibit himself to "mobilize the
machinery of justice" because the case
has been deferred for quite a long time
due to the absence of the incumbent
judge and the non-designation of a
presiding judge from April to May
1992.
ISSUE:
Whether the Judge should have
inhibited himself from the case.
HELD:
The fact that respondent judge took cognizance of the criminal case,
notwithstanding the fact that he is related within the second degree of
consanguinity to private complainant is obviously a glaring violation of
the rule on compulsory disqualification of a judge to hear a case. The
proffered excuse that Criminal Case has been dragging on for some
time due to the absence of the incumbent judge and the non-
designation of a presiding judge will not justify the violation of a well-
settled rule on compulsory disqualification of judges to hear a case.
Respondent judge should have formally informed the Executive Judge
of the RTC of Leyte if, indeed, the case had been deferred, and
thereafter sought the designation of another MTC judge to take
cognizance of the case. He should have foreseen the possibility that
his actuation and motives would have been suspect if he had ruled in
favor of the prosecution as his blood relationship with the private
complainant was of general knowledge.
 Associacion de Agricultura de
Talisay-Silay vs. Talisay Milling Co.
FACTS:
Judge Carmelino G. Alvendia engaged the services of
Atty. Jose L. Africa to handle his private case where the
former is a defendant.
Atty. Africa has a client with a pending case before the
judge. This case was submitted for decision based on the
parties stipulation of facts. No testimonial evidence was
presented. The judge rendered a decision in favor of the
client of Atty. Africa.
The losing party now moved that the judgment be set
aside because the judge was the client of Atty. Africa at
the time the case was decided. He should have
disqualified himself.
ISSUE:
Whether the motion to set aside
judgment is proper.
HELD:
NO.

The mere fact that the presiding judge has engaged the
services of Atty. Africa does not disqualify the judge from
deciding the case. The ultimate test is to determine whether
the parties had been deprived of fair and impartial trial.

In the instant case, decision was rendered based on

stipulation of facts. Besides, the majority of the lawyers
involved in the case manifested that they have no objection to
the presiding judge deciding the case after he announced that
he had engaged Atty. Africa as counsel in his private case.
(7) The judge knows that his or
her spouse or child has a financial
interest, as heir, legatee, creditor,
fiduciary, or otherwise, in the
subject matter in controversy or in
a party to the proceeding, or any
other interest that could be
substantially affected by the
outcome of the proceedings.
 Dimacuha vs. Concepcion
FACTS:
Petitioner Dimacuha is the accused in Criminal Case for
homicide, pending before the respondent judge in the
Court of First Instance of Cavite, Branch IV, at Tagaytay
City.
Petitioner had a personal confrontation with the brother
of the late Ernesto Omandap and was directly and bluntly
told in this manner in the vernacular "di bale tutalyarika
rin sa asunto bayad na si Judge para umupo ka sa silya
electrika. The past actuations of respondent Judge tended
to lend truth to the rumor that his lawyer was constrained
to file an "Urgent Motion for Inhibition with Prayer to
Transfer Venue, which was denied by the judge.
ISSUE:
Whether the motion for inhibition
should be granted.
HELD:
YES.
We repeat the exhortation inPimentel v., Salonga where we
called the "attention of all judges to appropriate guidelines in
a situation where their capacity to try and decide a case fairly
and judiciously comes to the fore by way of challenge from
any one of the parties. A judge may not be legally prohibited
from sitting in a litigation. But when suggestion is made of
record that he might be induced to act in favor of one party
or with bias or prejudice against a litigant arising out of
circumstance reasonably capable of inciting such a state of
mind, he should conduct a careful self-examination. He
should exercise his discretion in a way that the people's faith
in the courts of justice is not impaired
 A salutary norm is that he reflect on the probability that a
losing party might nurture at the back of his mind the
thought that the judge had unmeritoriously tilted the scales
of justice against him. That passion on the part of a judge
may be generated because of serious charges of
misconduct against him by a suitor or his counsel, is not
altogether remote. He is a man, subject to the frailties of
other men. He should, therefore, exercise great care and
caution before making up his mind to act or withdraw from
a suit where that party or counsel is involved. He could in
good grace inhibit himself where that case could be heard
by another judge and where no appreciable prejudice would
be occasioned to others involved therein.
 On the result of his decisions to sit or not to sit may
depend to a great extent the all-important confidence in
the impartiality of the judiciary. If after reflection he should
resolve to voluntarily desist from sitting in a case where his
motives or fairness might be seriously impugned, his
action is to be interpreted as giving meaning and
substance to the second paragraph of Section 1, Rule 137.
He served the cause of the law who forestalls miscarriage
of justice.

Due process requirements cannot be satisfied in the

absence of that degree of objectivity on the part of a judge
sufficient to reassure litigants of his being fair and just.
 Voluntary Inhibition
"A judge may, in the exercise of his
sound discretion, disqualify himself
from sitting in a case, for just or valid
reason other than those mentioned
above." (Par. 2, Sec. 1, Rule 137)
Under this second paragraph the
inhibition is discretionary. But it must
be based on just and valid reasons.
(Parayno vs Meneses, 231 SCRA 807)
 Grounds for Voluntary
Inhibition
Lost of respect in the manner the
prosecutor was handling the case
(People vs Gomez, 20 SCRA 293)
Prejudice, bias, hostility (Dais vs
Torres, 57 Phil. 897)
Expression of opinion which may lead
the adverse party to doubt the
Judges impartiality (Palanf vs Zoza,
58 SCRA 776)
 In such cases where the Judge might
be perceived, rightly or wrongfully, to
be susceptible to bias and partiality.
(Ubanes, Jr vs CA, 236 SCRA 72)
Guidelines as to form of conduct when
challenged:

A judge may not be legally prohibited from sitting in a litigation.

But when suggestion is made of record that he might be
induced to act in favor of one party or with bias or
prejudice against a litigant arising out of circumstances
reasonably capable of inciting such a state of mind, he
should conduct a careful self-examination. He should
exercise his discretion in a way that the peoples faith in the
courts of justice is not impaired. A salutary norm is that he
reflect on the probability that a losing party might
nurture at the back of his mind the thought that the
judge had unmeritoriously tilted the scales of justice
against him. That passion on the part of a judge may be
generated because of serious charges of misconduct against
him by a suitor or his counsel, is not altogether remote. He is a
man subject to the frailties of other men
He should, therefore, exercise great care and
caution before making up his mind to act or
withdraw from a suit where that party or counsel
is involved. He could in good grace inhibit himself
where that case could be heard by another judge and
where no appreciable prejudice would be occasioned
others involved therein. If after reflection he should
resolve to voluntarily desist from sitting in a
case where his motives or fairness might be
seriously impugned, his action is to be
interpreted as giving meaning and substance to
the second paragraph of Section 1, Rule 137.
(Pimentel vs. Salanga, G.R. No. L-27934. September
18, 1967)
Cresencio Paredes vs Francisco Abad
G.R. No. L-36927-28. April 15, 1974
Facts:
Cresencio Paredes and Venancio Uyan filed for the
disqualification of Judge Francisco Abad in hearing their
election protest against Gualberto Lumauig and John
Langbayan.

The petitioners claimed that the Judge had previously

campaigned in favor of the private respondents which
prompted the petitioners to file a complaint against the
Judge before the COMELEC. Petitioners also alleged that
the private respondents were the ones who recommended
the Judge from his present position.
Issue: WON Judge Abad should be disqualified from
hearing the case.

Ruling:
Yes, the SC declared that Judge Abad is disqualified
from hearing the election protest filed against
Lumauig and Langbayan. Next in importance to
the duty of rendering a righteous judgment is
that of doing it in such a manner as will beget
no suspicion of the fairness and integrity of a
judge." (Luque v. Kayanan, L-26826, August 29, 1969,
29 SCRA 165)

Under the circumstances, there must already be a

strained personal relationship between Paredes and
Uyan, on the one hand, and Judge Abad on the other;
and not only Paredes and Uyan but even their political
supporters as well may not be in a position to have full
 Jimmy Barnes, petitioner, vs Teresita Reyes, et al.,
respondents
G.R. NO. 179583 : September 3, 2009

Facts:
This case involves a civil case for specific performance with damages
against the respondents which has been previously dismissed by
Judge Ma. Luisa C. Quijano-Padilla but reversed by the Supreme Court
and remanded to the lower courts for further proceedings.
Thereafter, petitioner filed a motion for the inhibition of Judge
Quijano-Padilla, allegedly to preclude doubts or apprehensions of
partiality and to give the parties breathing space and peace of mind
in the course of the adjudication of the proceedings. After
respondents filed their opposition, Judge Padilla issued an order
declaring that she was voluntarily inhibiting herself from hearing the
case and that she was granting the motion in order to dispel any
doubt and perception of bias, and so that the faith and confidence in
the justice system would not be eroded.

Issue: WON there is just and valid reason to support Judge Padillas
voluntary inhibition.
Ruling:
No, the SC held that under Sec. 1, Rule 137 of the Rules of Court
a judge may, in the exercise of his sound discretion, disqualify
himself from sitting in a case, for just or valid reasons. In the
case of PCIB vs Sps. Wilson Dy Hong Pi (G.R. No. 171137, June 5,
2009), this Court noted that the mere imputation of bias or
partiality is not enough ground for inhibition, especially
when the charge is without basis.

In the case at bar, petitioner, aside from his bare

allegations, has not shown that Judge Quijano-Padilla
had been biased and partial against a particular party in
the proceedings in the civil case. The judge even
acknowledged in the inhibitory order that the motion for her
disqualification contained no statement of specific act or acts
that would show her partiality or bias in the treatment of the
case. Her voluntary inhibition was only on account of
dispelling any doubt and perception of bias on the part
of petitioner. Clearly, therefore, no just and valid reason
supports the inhibition of Judge Quijano-Padilla.
Rosario Castillo and Sonia Villa Santa,
petitioners, vs Judge Celestino Juan
G.R. Nos. L-39516-17 January 28, 1975

Facts:
Petitioners Castillo and Villa Santa who are the offended
parties in two rape cases, filed a petition for disqualification
against Judge Juan on the ground of bias and prejudice. They
alleged that on two separate occasions on August 15 and 27,
1974, in the secrecy of his chambers, Judge Juan informed
petitioners of the weakness of their cases, the likelihood of a
verdict of acquittal in favor of the accused, and impressed
upon them that it would be to their advantage to settle, as the
most he could do on their behalf was to have such accused
indemnify them. This move, according to him, would assure
their being spared from the embarrassment occasioned by
suits of this character, clearly prejudicial to their future.
 These conversations took place even before the
prosecution had finished presenting its evidence, one of
the petitioners not having testified as yet. On the other
hand, Judge Juan admitted that he did invite the
petitioners to confer with him, but he argued that he was
prompted to act thus from the best of motives, "as an act
of charity" and as a "clear attempt to humanize justice.

Issue: WON Judge Juan is disqualified from hearing the

case.

Ruling:
Yes, the SC held that Judge Juan is disqualified from
hearing the case.
In the case of Gutierrez vs Santos, in the language of
Justice Dizon,: "It has been said, in fact, that due
process of law requires a hearing before an
impartial and disinterested tribunal, and that
every litigant is entitled to nothing less than the
cold neutrality of an impartial Judge."

In the present case, it cannot be denied that

after such conferences, they could no longer be
expected to have faith in his impartiality. Even
before they had been fully heard, they were told that
their cases were weak. They could very well conclude
then that there was a prejudgment. Under the
circumstances, the fact that he acted as he did
because any monetary settlement would benefit
petitioners, considering their straitened financial
circumstances, was of no moment.
Even if it be admitted that, according to his best
lights, respondent Judge acted from a sense of
sympathy or "charity", his conduct cannot be said
to be consonant with the exacting standard of the
cold neutrality of an impartial judge. The
administration of justice would thus be subject to a
reproach if there be a rejection of the plea for
disqualification.