CCB4623 INHERENTLY SAFER DESIGN

CASE STUDY:
MANUFACTURING OF POLYVINYL FLUORIDE AT DUPONT
FACILITY, NEW YORK
N O R N A D IA H N A D H I R AH N A D ZR I 18 4 4 7
N U R EZ ZATU N IS WAN SA MSU D D I N 18 1 3 3
PRESENTATION OUTLINE
INTRODUCTION TO CASE STUDY

WHY UNSAFE PROCESS?

METHODOLOGY

RESULTS

IMPACT TO PSM

CONCLUSION
 VF is pumped into reactor to
form PVF slurry in water

WHAT IS TEDLAR PROCESS? PVF slurry passes through

separators to remove unreacted
VF

Unreacted VF is recycled into

reactor

Steam is injected into PVF slurry

to raise the temperature and
vaporize the remaining VF

The heated mixture passes

through flash tank where
residual VF is released

PVF slurry is stored in slurry

holding tanks
WHAT WENT WRONG?
Shutdown 22nd Oct-6 Repair work at Tank 1 Found fishmouth split
Nov 2010. Found postponed due to lack in U-leg seal loop at
damaged agitator of materials. Tank 1 Tank 2. Engineers
support at Tank 1 isolated. concluded no hazards.

On 9 Nov, hot work at

On 8 Nov, compressor
Tank 1 was conducted. Restarted Tedlar
was found
Explosion occurred, the process on 6 Nov.
malfunctioned. VF
welder died instantly, Overflow line to Tank
present in PVF slurry
the foremen received 1st 1,2 & 3 not blinded.
increased
degree burn
WHY UNSAFE PROCESS?
As stated in Process Safety Management of Highly Hazardous Chemicals (Section 1910.119(a)(i))

A process which involves a Category

1 flammable gas (as defined in

OR
A process which involves a chemical
1910.1200(c)) or a flammable liquid
at or above the specified threshold
with a flashpoint below 100F (37.8
quantities listed in Appendix A
C) on site in one location, in a
quantity of 10,000 lbs
The DuPont Tedlar process unit uses
flammable VF in quantities exceeding
10,000 pounds;
thus, the unit is covered by OSHA Process
Safety Management (PSM) standard 29
CFR 1910.119.
According to OSHA definitions, VF is a
HHC. This incident clearly demonstrated
that VF can enter the slurry tanks.
Additionally, the tanks are interconnected
to the process that uses VF and are
physically close to the flash tanks that
remove VF.
METHODOLGY
Dow FEI
Dow FEI
ISD Checklist After ISD
Case Study
implementation

Assumptions were made when information is not available such as;

1. Dow FEI conducted without considering Lost Control Credit Factors

2. Modifications proposed for Tedlar process unit only.
RESULTS
ISD CHECKLIST
PRINCIPAL ACTION
Can on site generation of hazardous material exchange with less hazardous raw material?

Can the process equipment involving hazardous material with the smallest feasible inventory be designed?
Minimize
Are the intermediate slurry tanks really needed?

Is it possible to substitute raw material to noncombustible for flammable, less reactive and more stable material?

Is it possible to completely eliminate hazardous raw materials, process, intermediated or by products by using an
Substitute alternative process or chemistry?

Is it possible to substitute less hazardous final product solvents?

Can the supply of raw material (VF) to less than the maximum allowable be limited?

Can the thermodynamics or kinetics to reduce temperature or pressure be reduced?

Moderate
Is it possible to dilute hazardous raw material to reduce hazard potential?

Can the connections, paths and number of flanges in hazardous process be minimized?

Can fewer bend in piping be used?

Simplify
Can the temperature-limited heat transfer equipment be designed such that it is impossible to create a potential
hazardous situation due to an operating error?
Principal Justification

Minimize Inventory level of VF from 20,000 lbs to 8,000 lbs.

Eliminate slurry holding tanks

S. Ebnesajjad. (2012). Polyvinyl Fluoride: Technology and

Applications of PVF. USA. Plastics Design Library.
Principal Justification

Moderate In case of malfunctioned compressor, lower concentration of VF by using bypass/

standby compressor.
Simplify Remove slurry tank overflow line to avoid connected piping and valves at Tank 1,
2 and 3.
Remove flash tank overflow line to avoid connected piping to Tank 2

Design control
Flash tank system in such a
way no overflow
line needed by fix
the flowrate inlet to
each tank

Slurry Tank 3 Slurry Tank 2 Slurry Tank 1

RESULTS
DOW FIRE & EXPLOSION INDEX FOR CASE STUDY
RESULTS
DOW FIRE & EXPLOSION INDEX FOR PROPOSED ISD
MODIFICATIONS
HOW ISD REDUCE PSM REQUIREMENT?
As stated in Process Safety Management of Highly Hazardous Chemicals (Section 1910.119(a)(i))

A process which involves a Category

1 flammable gas (as defined in

OR
A process which involves a chemical
1910.1200(c)) or a flammable liquid
at or above the specified threshold
with a flashpoint below 100F (37.8
quantities listed in Appendix A
C) on site in one location, in a
quantity of 10,000 lbs
CONCLUSION
Fire and explosion hazard can be reduced
by implementing inherent safer design

ISD can be improved by conducting

research and understanding the chemical
process

Tools to quantify the Inherent Safety

Index should be developed to aid in
decision-making process