TERRITORIAL DISPUTE

IN THE
SOUTH CHINA SEA
CHINAS EXPANSION
(RECLAMATION PROJECTS, LAWS)
DISPUTES IN THE SOUTH CHINA SEA

South China Sea Islands

Macclesfield Bank
Paracel Islands
Pratas Islands
Scarborough Shoal
Spratly Islands
SCARBOROUGH SHOAL STANDOFF
Claims by China
Nine-dotted line
A map showing
a U-shaped
eleven-dotted
line was
published in the
then Republic of
China on 1
December 1947.
NINE-DASH LINE
Originally an eleven-dotted-line, first indicated by the then
Kuomintang government of the Republic of China in 1947,
and it was adopted and revised to nine as endorsed by Zhou
Enlai after the Communist party of China took over mainland
China and formed the Peoples Republic of China in 1949

claims almost 90% of the South China Sea

overlaps 80% of the Philippines EEZ in the West Philippine

Sea
THREE POSSIBLE INTERPRETATIONS OF THE NINE-
DASH LINE CLAIM:

1) that the dashes represent a title to the islands and island

groups that it encloses

2) that the dashes represent a national maritime boundary

3) that the dashes represent a historic rights-based claim line

to waters that are exclusive to China
NATURE OF AMBIGUITY AND IRRATIONALITY
(EMBODIED IN ITS NAME, ORIGIN, EXPRESSIONS, AND CONTENTS OF SUCH CLAIMS)

Ambiguities of origin: The questions on why China fabricates the U-shape

line, when it was done, who the author is and what the purposes are behind
and under what circumstances are still unknown so far.

Ambiguities in expression: At the beginning the U-Shaped line comprises

11 consecutive passages, which enclose the main island features of the SCS
such as the Pratas islands, Paracel islands, Macclessfield banks and Spratly
islands; limit point in the South of the line at latitude 40 N, on James Shoal off
the coast of Malaysia.

Ambiguities in legal grounds: Official documents of China can not justify the
claim contents of the U-shaped line.
CLAIMS OF THE PHILIPPINES

1) Chinas nine-dashed line is invalid

2) China occupied mere rocks on Scarborough Reef
rather than significant features
3) Chinas structures on submerged features are
illegal; and
4) Chinese harassment of Philippine nationals at sea
is also illegal
SCARBOROUGH SHOAL STANDOFF
Claim by the Philippines
Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ)
- is a sea zone prescribed by
the United Nations Convention on
the Law of the Sea over which a
state has special rights regarding
the exploration and use of marine
resources, including energy
production from water and wind. It
stretches from the baseline out to
200 nautical miles (nmi) from its
coast.
SPRATLY ISLANDS DISPUTE
The Spratly Islands
dispute is an ongoing
territorial dispute between
Brunei, China (People's
Republic of China),
Malaysia, the Philippines,
Taiwan (Republic of
China), and Vietnam,
concerning ownership of
the Spratly Islands, a
group of islands and
associated "maritime
features" (reefs, banks,
cays, etc.) located in the
South China Sea.
SENKAKU ISLANDS DISPUTE
The Senkaku Islands
are located in the East
China Sea between
Japan, the People's
Republic of China,
and the Republic of
China. The
archipelago contains
five uninhabited
islands and three
barren rocks, ranging
in size from 800 m2 to
4.32 km2
CHINA HAS MAINTAINED ITS PURPOSE:

Its reclamation activities are for both

defense and humanitarian purposes like
maritime search and rescue, disaster
prevention and relief, and scientific
research.
 EFFECTS OF CHINAS MASSIVE
RECLAMATION ACTIVITIES
Devastating the already fragile marine ecosystem
and biodiversity
- Ambassador Lourdes O. Yparraguirre.

Annual loss worth US $280 million in ecosystem

products and services
- Dr. Edgardo Gomez, UP Marine Science
Institute
 WHAT ARE THE MAIN PROVISIONS OF THE
TREATY?
The UNCLOS provides the following:
Baseline Determined by connecting points on the coastline from a large map,
this is the starting point for measuring the maritime territory of a coastal state.

Territorial sea This is the belt of sea 12 nautical miles from the baseline. In
this area, the coastal state exercises sovereign rights and may arrest foreign
ships.
Contiguous Zone This is the maritime area not exceeding 24 nautical miles
from the baselines. The coastal state exercises authority over this area to the
extent necessary to prevent infringement of its customs, fiscal, immigration, or
sanitation authority over its territorial waters. This is a response to the practice
of foreign ships lingering beyond a states territorial sea, and thus beyond its
criminal jurisdiction, where they commit acts inimical to the coastal state.
 WHAT ARE THE MAIN PROVISIONS OF THE
TREATY?
The UNCLOS provides the following:
Exclusive Economic Zone or EEZ This is the maritime area within 200
nautical miles from a countrys baseline. Within the EEZ, the coastal state has
rights over the economic resources of the sea, seabed, and subsoil to the
exclusion of other states. However, other nations have the right of navigation
and overflight over this area, subject to the regulation of the coastal state.

Continental Shelf This is the seabed and subsoil of the submarine areas
adjacent to the coastal state but outside the territorial sea. The continental shelf
extends 200 nautical miles, and in some cases may extend up to 350 miles,
following the natural prolongation of the soil. The coastal state has the right to
explore and exploit the natural resources in this area, but this right does not
extend to other materials such as shipwrecks.
 WHATS AT STAKE?

Whether the Philippines will keep or

lose 80% of its exclusive economic
zone and 100% of its extended
continental shelf in the West
Philippines Sea.
 PHILIPPINES VS. CHINA
solely a maritime dispute and does not involve any territorial
dispute

Philippines is asking the tribunal:

1. if Chinas 9-dashed lines can negate the Philippines EEZ
as guaranteed under UNCLOS
2. if certain rocks above water at high tide, like
Scarborough Shoal, generate a 200 NM EEZ or only a 12
NM territorial sea
3. if China can appropriate low-tide elevations (LTEs), like
Mischief Reef and Subi Reef, within the Philippines EEZ
THE FIVE BASIC ARGUMENTS CASES FILED BY
THE PHILIPPINES AGAINST CHINA
1. CHINAS HISTORICAL RIGHTS

ARGUMENT: "First, that China is not entitled to exercise what it

refers to as 'historical rights' over the waters, seabed, and
subsoil beyond the limits of its entitlements under the
Convention."
EXPLANATION: China says the South China Sea has belonged
to it for centuries. This is why it claims "historical rights" over the
disputed sea.
A CLAIM OF HISTORICAL RIGHTS MUST SATISFY
FOUR CONDITIONS:
1.The state must formally announce to the international
community such claim to internal waters or territorial sea,
clearly specifying the extent and scope of the claim
2.The state must exercise effective authority, that is,
sovereignty, over the waters it claims as its own internal
waters or territorial sea
3.Exercise of effective authority must be continuous over a
substantial period of time
4.Other states must recognize, tolerate or acquiesce to the
exercise of such authority.
THE FIVE BASIC ARGUMENTS CASES FILED BY THE
PHILIPPINES AGAINST CHINA
2. CHINA'S 9-DASH LINE

ARGUMENT: "Second, that the so-called 9-dash line has no basis

whatsoever under international law insofar as it purports to define the
limits of Chinas claim to 'historic rights.'"

EXPLANATION: The 9-dash line is China's demarcation to claim virtually

the entire South China Sea. China says this is based on its "historical
rights."

The Philippines, however, asserts that the 9-dash line is baseless under
UNCLOS. This UN convention allows an EEZ, not a 9-dash line.
THE FIVE BASIC ARGUMENTS CASES FILED BY THE
PHILIPPINES AGAINST CHINA
3. ROCKS VS ISLANDS
ARGUMENT: "Third, that the various maritime features relied upon by China as a basis upon
which to assert its claims in the South China Sea are not islands that generate entitlement to
an exclusive economic zone or continental shelf. Rather, some are 'rocks' within the meaning
of Article 121, paragraph 3; others are low-tide elevations; and still others are permanently
submerged. As a result, none are capable of generating entitlements beyond 12NM (nautical
miles), and some generate no entitlements at all. Chinas recent massive reclamation
activities cannot lawfully change the original nature and character of these features."

EXPLANATION: Under UNCLOS, habitable islands can generate a 200-nautical-mile EEZ.

Rocks cannot.

China describes some features in the South China Sea as islands. One of these is Panatag
Shoal (Scarborough Shoal), a rocky sandbar. China claims these supposed islands.
THE FIVE BASIC ARGUMENTS CASES FILED BY THE
PHILIPPINES AGAINST CHINA
4. BREACH OF THE LAW OF THE SEA

ARGUMENT: "Fourth, that China has breached the Convention

by interfering with the Philippines exercise of its sovereign rights
and jurisdiction."

EXPLANATION: China prevents Filipinos from fishing in the

West Philippine Sea. UNCLOS, on the other hand, gives
Filipinos the exclusive rights to fish within the Philippines' EEZ in
the disputed waters.
 THE FIVE BASIC ARGUMENTS CASES FILED BY
THE PHILIPPINES AGAINST CHINA
5. DAMAGE TO ENVIRONMENT

ARGUMENT: "China has irreversibly damaged the regional marine

environment, in breach of UNCLOS, by its destruction of coral reefs in the
South China Sea, including areas within the Philippines EEZ, by its
destructive and hazardous fishing practices, and by its harvesting of
endangered species."

EXPLANATION: China is building artificial islands in the West Philippine

Sea. The Philippines says China's reclamation activities have buried 311
hectares of coral reefs around 7 times the size of Vatican City. This can
mean P4.8 billion ($106.29 million) in lost economic benefits. At the same
time, China is accused of poaching.
CHINAS ARGUMENT:
Arbitral tribunal has no jurisdiction over the Philippines claim.

Two reasons:

1. The dispute involves maritime boundary delimitation

arising from overlapping EEZs of the Philippines and China,
a dispute that China has opted out of compulsory
arbitration.

2. Chinas 9-dashed line claim is a historical right that

predates UNCLOS and cannot be negated by UNCLOS
 DFA Sec. Secretary Albert del Rosario

Arbitral Tribunal in The Hague, The

Netherlands
 Philippine Solicitor General Florin Hilbay

The counsel team for the Philippines,

Professor Bernard Oxman, Professor
Alan Boyle, and Mr Lawrence Martin
 Paul Reichler, the Philippines' chief
counsel,

Members of the Philippine delegation,

DOJ Sec. Leila de Lima, SC Senior
Associate Justice Antonio Carpio, &
Deputy Executive Secretary for Legal
Affairs Menardo Guevarra
 Professor Philippe Sands QC, counsel
for the Philippines

House Speaker Feliciano Belmonte Jr

& Exec. Sec. Paquito Ochoa Jr
Representing all 3 branches of Philippine government, the Philippine delegation comes in
full force in The Hague
 The arbitral tribunal is led by Judge Thomas Mensah (president, C), the first president of the
International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea. The high-caliber tribunal also includes the following
(L to R): Judge Jean-Pierre Cot, Judge Stanislaw Pawlak, Judge Rdiger Wolfrum, and Professor
Alfred H. A. Soons.
 ARBITRATION BETWEEN THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES AND THE PEOP LES REPUBLIC OF CHINA

TABLE OF CRITICAL DATES 2013-2014

22 January 2013 Philippines served China with notification and Statement of Claim
China presents Philippines with diplomatic note that rejected and returned the Philippines
19 February 2013
Notification
11 July 2013 First meeting of the Arbitral Tribunal at the Hague

31 July 2013 Philippines commented on draft Rules of Procedure for the Tribunal
China addressed a Note Verbale to the Permanent Court of Arbitration indicating that it does not
1 August 2013
accept the arbitration initiated by the Philippines
27 August 2013 Procedural Order No. 1 issued via PCA Press Release on behalf of the Arbitral Tribunal

30 March 2014 Submission of the Philippines Memorial

14-15 May 2014 Second meeting of the Arbitral Tribunal at the Hague
China comments on draft Procedural Order No. 2 and observes that it does not accept the
21 May 2014 arbitration initiated by the Philippines and that the Note Verbale from China shall not be regarded
as Chinas acceptance of or participation in the proceedings
29 May 2014 Philippines comments on draft Procedural Order No. 2

3 June 2014 Procedural Order No. 2 issued via PCA Press Release on behalf of the Arbitral Tribunal

15 December 2014 Date set by Arbitral Tribunal for the filing of the Chinese Counter-Memorial
3 REASONS THE PHILIPPINES WILL SUFFER BECAUSE OF ITS
SOUTH CHINA SEA CASE AGAINST CHINA

First, there is no guarantee that the Philippines is going to win the

arbitration case, even though media reports might suggest that it will

Second, the arbitration case has seriously hurt China-Philippines

bilateral relations in recent years

Third, a very important factor behind the Philippines arbitration case

against China is the support of the United States
CONCLUSION
It was indeed a mistake for the Philippines to file an arbitration case against China, no
matter how necessary it felt given the circumstances. Indeed so far, the Philippines
has only gained some moral support from a few countries.
It is important for the Philippines to think about the long term consequences of such
confrontational strategy against China China is a permanent neighbor, after all, and
countries cannot escape their neighbors.
In the end, it is up to China and the Philippines to sit down and resolve their conflicts
with some outside help.
Alas, the arbitration case has clearly ruined any such hope in the near future.

Even if it wins at the Hague, the Philippines will lose against China in the long run by
Dingding Chen, 23 July 2015
CONCLUSION

In order to clarify the legitimacy of the U-shaped line raised by global

communities, China must first clarify the contents of its claim in the SCS
and give up the ambiguity of claimed historic right. If China can justify
the legitimacy of the U-shaped line, it should be willing to have a
multilateral discussion with relevant countries and correspond to the
requirement of the Philippines on an arbitration procedure, instead of
applying its own rules on other countries by force. The only solution is to
abandon the U-shaped line, conclude the COC and resolve disputes
on the ground of international law, particularly UNCLOS. NGUYEN HONG
THAO Ambassador of Vietnam to Malaysia