Beruflich Dokumente
Kultur Dokumente
(Chrisman et al., 2005; Gomez-Mejia, Nuez-Nickel, & Gutierrez, 2001; La Porta et al., 1999; Schulze, Lubatkin, Dino,
& Buchholtz, 2001)
THE AGENCY THEORY PERSPECTIVE
Tradicionalmente, la teora de las agencias ha argumentado que la
alineacin natural de los propietarios y gerentes (los agentes) en una
empresa familiar disminuye la necesidad de una supervisin formal de
los agentes y de mecanismos de gobierno elaborados, reduciendo as
los costos de propiedad de las empresas familiares. Ms recientemente,
sin embargo, la teora de la agencia se ha utilizado para apoyar la
conclusin opuesta. Esto es sintomtico de lo que a menudo se conoce
como el problema propietario-agente y est en el corazn de gran parte
de la literatura de costos de agencia
Teora de Agencia en EF
Propiedad Las EF deberan tener menores costos de agencia (Fama &
Administracin Jensen, 1983)
FAMILIA
EMPRESA
Familiness
Teora de Recursos en EF
Esta perspectiva afirma que los miembros de la familia fundadora ven a la empresa como una
extensin de s mismos y, por lo tanto, ven la salud continua de la empresa como conectada con
su propio bienestar personal
Como administradores de la empresa, los propietarios de la familia a menudo colocan a los
individuos en el tablero que tienen conocimiento de la industria y que pueden proporcionar
asesoramiento objetivo y abogar por una empresa en marcha.
La independencia de la junta es menos un fin en s misma que un reflejo del compromiso de la
familia de aprovechar las habilidades complementarias que carecen de la familia, tales como
habilidades legales, financieras, de planificacin de la sucesin, de contabilidad y de mercadeo
internacional.
Directors are chosen to promote continued corporate health, based on their ability to provide
value-added advice. As such, the board has a positive impact on the financial performance of the
company through its advice rather than through its supervisory or oversight function.
among S&P 500 firms, independent directors hold more than 61.2 percent
of the board seats in nonfamily firms but only 43.9 percent in family firms.
And the performance advantage, in terms of return on assets/return on
equity (ROA/ROE) and market valuation, demonstrated by family firms
between 1992 and 1999 relative to management-controlled firms vanishes
in the absence of an independent board providing company oversight.
Even more strikingly, and consistent with agency theory, the most valuable
S&P 500 firms are those in which independent directors balance board
representation by family members. Firms with continued founding-family
ownership and relatively few independent directors perform significantly
worse than do nonfamily firms (Anderson, R., & Reeb, D., op. cit.)
En las empresas familiares, ya sea desde una perspectiva de agencia o
de administracin, los directores independientes y asesores siguen
siendo la principal lnea de defensa contra el oportunismo gerencial, la
expropiacin y el atrincheramiento que los grandes accionistas
controladores pueden ejercer en relacin con los accionistas
minoritarios, empleados y otros Partes interesadas.
Desde el punto de vista de la agencia, lo hacen a travs de su funcin de
supervisin y supervisin; Desde la perspectiva de la mayordoma lo
hacen a travs de su actitud de asesoramiento, objetiva y comprometida
con la preocupacin constante.
Teora de la riqueza socioemocional
Las teoras mencionadas suponen que el principal conductor en la toma de decisiones es maximizar la
riqueza econmica. Pero las EF buscan algo ms que riqueza econmica y que variados objetivos no
econmicos que son critico en su gestin (Tagiuri & Davis, 1992; Zellweger, Nason, Nordqvist, & Brush, 2013)
Aspectos no financieros de la firma que incluye necesidades afectivas, como por ejemplo de
identidad, la capacidad de ejercer influencia y perpetuar la dinasta familiar Gmez-Meja, L. R.,
Haynes, K. T., Nez-Nickel, M., Jacobson, K. J. L., & Moyano-Fuentes, J. (2007).
Se expresa por medio de mltiples dimensiones como la prioridad por mantener el control de la
propiedad y la administracin, traspasar la empresa a la siguiente generacin, preservar la
reputacin de la familia, mantener la identidad de la empresa, entre otras. (Berrone, Cruz, and Gomez-
Mejia 2012).
Perspectiva terica que permite integrar prioridades personales, familiares y organizacionales (Dawson
& Mussolino, 2014).
Teora de la riqueza socioemocional
Gmez-Meja, L. R., et.al.(2007).
Escenario que la EF enfrenta
Teora - SEW CRITICO
Diagnostico de problemas
Los beneficios socioemocionales no se obtienen necesariamente a expensas de otros accionistas (Zellweger et al., 2012, p. 3).
Beneficios econmicos y socioemocionales estn muchas veces en conflicto (Cennamo, Berrone, Cruz, &
Gomez-Mejia, 2012; Cruz, Justo, & De Castro, 2012).
Teora de la riqueza socioemocional
Esta teora combina en una misma estructura flujos de actividades (relacionado con teora de agencia) y stock de
recursos (relacionado con RBV) (Chua et al., 2015).
SEW may play a role in upward earnings management when firm performance
Family control on the business ownership and
Stockmans et al. (2010); is poor. First-generation and founder-led FB have a greater incentive to engage
SEW explains the FB financial management, FB generational stage. Family
Achleitner et al. (2014); Gomez- in upward earnings management. FB compared with NFB engage less in real
reporting behaviour identification. Probability of organisational
Mejia, Cruz, et al. (2014) earning management, they also exhibit more decreasing accrual-based earning
failure used as threat to SEW.
management practices.
Overall is observed that SEW is negatively related to R&D investment. But it can
Family control on the business ownership and Overall, it was observed that SEW has mixed impact on the
change under specific conditions. For example, FB invest less in research and
Chrisman and Patel (2012); Block et al. management. Business performance aspiration gap business
developmentperformance
(R&D) and receivedepending
fewer patenton specific
citation conditions.
than NFB, but when For
SEW explain R&D investment (2013); Sciascia et al. (2015); Jain and Shao was used to capture threats to SEW. Founder
behaviour (2014); Gomez-Mejia, Campbell, Family
ownershipcontrol on the business example a family CEO (SEW) has a positive impactfounder
performance is below expectation or if the FB is managed by the on theit
Naldi et al. (2013); Chen et etal.al. and founder
equity overlap.and
manager. Family wealth/firm
change. Family wealth/firm equity overlap also impact on R&D investment. For
(2014). ownership management.
Performance hazard wasFounder
used as business
high tech FB,performance when
negative relationship the business
between operates
family control in
and R&D investment
SEW, business (2014); Zellweger et al. (2012); moderator capturing threat to SEW.
vs other family members control. industrial
was confirmed. districts, but negative in stock exchange markets
performance and business Miller et al. (2014); Miralles-
Employment growth (family legacy). context. Succession strategies has a positive impact on
value Marcelo et al. (2014); Sciascia et
Gomez-Mejia et al. (2011); Berrone et al. Duration of control. Generational business
Overall, SEWperformance, butFBincreasing
helps to explain why familyIt presence
behave distinctively. would explain onfor
al. (2014); Minichilli et(2013);
al. (2014)
SEW explaining other FB strategies,
(2012); DeTienne and Chirico stages.
FIBER construct. Acquired, Founded or inherited FB. the board moderates (negatively) the positive relation. On
example strategies used by the family business owners to exit their business.
Pazzaglia et al. (2013); Deephouse and SEW also shade light on earning quality and has a positive impact on FB
behaviours and systemic
Jaskiewicz (2013); Ceja-Barba (2014);
Family control on ownership and management. the otherSEW
reputation. hand, intention
construct could befor transgenerational
central to making progress on control has
the Positive
relationships. Family name in the firm name.
Dawson and Mussolino (2014); Morgan and a positive impact
Organizational on Family
Scholarship. the perceived acceptable
emotions impact on and areselling
impacted price.
by the
Gomez-Mejia (2014); Chua et al. (2015) family business activities.
Overall, it was observed that SEW has mixed impact on the business
performance depending on specific conditions. For example a family CEO (SEW)
Naldi et al. (2013); Chen et al. (2014); Family control on the business ownership and Because
has the
a positive priority
impact on thefor preserving
business SEW
performance FB the
when arebusiness
willingoperates
to
SEW,business performance and Zellweger et al. (2012); Miller et al. (2014); management. Founder vs other family members in industrial districts, but negative in stock exchange markets context.
SEW explain how FB
business value
Glover and Reay (2015);
Miralles-Marcelo et al. (2014); Sciascia et al.
Family ownership and management
control. Employment growth (family legacy).
continue with their business activity despite minimal
Succession strategies has a positive impact on business performance, but
managed business crisis Faghfouri et al.
(2014); Minichilli (2015)
et al. (2014) control.
Duration of control. Generational stages. financial return
increasing family and family
presence ownership
on the board moderatesis(negatively)
negatively the related
positive
to formalised crisis procedures.
relation. On the other hand, intention for transgenerational control has a
positive impact on the perceived acceptable selling price.
Because the priority for preserving SEW FB are willing to continue with their
SEW explain how FB managed Glover and Reay (2015); Faghfouri et al.
Family ownership and management control. business activity despite minimal financial return and family ownership is
business crisis (2015) Overall, SEW lead
negatively related FB to avoid
to formalised risk. Thus, FB with higher
crisis procedures.
Family control on the business ownership control and no management positions diversify
SEW explaining FB Kraiczy et al. (2015); Schmid et ownership and management. more and
Overall, SEWFBmoderate
SEW lead to avoid risk. the
Thus,positive impact
FB with higher of CEO
ownership risk-
control and
diversification al. (2015); StrikeSchmid
et al.et(2015) Family control on the
Generational business
stage ownership
of the FB and and no management positions diversify more and SEW moderate
taking propensity on new product portfolio innovativeness. the positive
Kraiczy et al. (2015); al. (2015);
SEW explaining FB diversification management. Generational stage of the FB and impact of CEO risk-taking propensity on new product portfolio innovativeness.
Strike et al. (2015) current/preceding/founder family CEO.
current/preceding/founder family CEO. The scenarios
The scenarios the
the FB faceFB face is important,
is important, a negative
a negative career career
horizon effect on
horizon effect
international on international
acquisition was observed. acquisition was observed.