Case Study Fukushima Nuclear Accident

Introduction:-
Earthquake on 9 magnitude on 11 March at 2:46 p.m. local time near the Japanese
island of Honshu
Earthquake resulted in Tsunami
The quake had an impact on North-East coast of Japan
Fukushima Nuclear Accident Independent Investigation Commission (NAIIC) found
that the causes of the accident had been foreseeable, and that the plant
operator, Tokyo Electric Power Company (TEPCO), had failed to meet basic safety
requirements such as risk assessment, preparing for containing collateral damage,
and developing evacuation plans
On 12 October 2012, TEPCO admitted for the first time that it had failed to take
necessary measures for fear of inviting lawsuits or protests against its nuclear plants
The Fukushima disaster is the largest nuclear disaster since the 1986 Chernobyl
disaster and the second disaster to be given the Level 7 event classification
 The Site:-
The Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power station is located in the Pacific Ocean coast
Located on a 3.5-square-kilometre (860-acre) site
The Fukushima NPP comprised six separate boiling water reactors originally designed
by GE and maintained by the TEPCO with a combined power of 4.7 gigawatts
First commissioned in 1971. One of the 15 largest nuclear power stations in the
world
 What Happened:-
Immediately after the earthquake, the active reactors automatically shut down their
sustained fission reaction. However, the tsunami destroyed the emergency
generators cooling the reactors, causing Reactor 4 to overheat from the decay heat
from the fuel rods
The insufficient cooling led to three nuclear meltdowns and the release of
radioactive materials beginning on 12 March
Several hydrogen-air chemical explosions occurred between 12 March and 15 March
 How it Happened:-
The largest tsunami wave was 13 meters high and hit 50 minutes after the initial
earthquake, overwhelming the plant's seawall, which was 10 m high
Water quickly flooded the low-lying rooms in which the emergency generators were
housed
The flooded diesel generators failed soon afterwards, resulting in a loss of power to
the critical coolant water pumps
After the secondary emergency pumps (run by back-up electrical batteries) ran out,
the water pumps stopped and the reactors began to overheat and eventually led
to meltdowns in reactors 1, 2, and 3
Meanwhile, as workers struggled to supply power to the reactors' coolant systems
and restore power to their control rooms, a number of hydrogen-air chemical
explosions occurred, the first in Unit 1, on 12 March and the last in Unit 4, on 15
March
It is estimated that the hot zirconium fuel cladding-water reaction in reactors 1-3
produced 800 to 1000 kilograms of hydrogen gas each. The pressurized gas was
vented out of the RPV where it mixed with the ambient air, and eventually
reached explosive concentration limits
 How it Happened:-
Radioactive material was released from the containment vessels
Concerns about the possibility of a large scale release led to a 20-kilometre (12 mi)
exclusion zone around the power plant
A monitoring system operated by the CTBTO tracked the spread of radioactivity on a
global scale
Radioactive isotopes were picked up by over 40 monitoring stations
Estimates of radioactivity released ranged from 10-40% of that of Chernobyl's
 Impact:-
No fatalities linked to short term overexposure to radiation, while approximately 18,500 people
died due to the earthquake and tsunami
Psychological distress among evacuated people rose fivefold
WHO indicated that the residents of the area who were evacuated were exposed to low
amounts of radiation and that radiation-induced health impacts are likely to be low
The risks from a number of additional radiation induced cancer are expected to be elevated.
A screening program a year later in 2012 found that more than a third (36%) of children
in Fukushima Prefecture have abnormal growths in thyroid glands
Data from Chernobyl accident showed that rise in thyroid cancer rates began after a cancer
incubation period of 35 years, however whether this data can be directly compared to the
Fukushima nuclear disaster is yet to be determined
Some 300,000 people who evacuated the area, approximately 1,600 deaths related to the
evacuation conditions, such as living in temporary housing and hospital closures
The earthquake and tsunami damaged or destroyed more than one million buildings leading to
a total of 470,000 people needing evacuation. Of the 470,000, the nuclear accident was
responsible for 154,000 being evacuated
Impact:-
 Analysis:-
Japanese National Diet appointed Fukushima Nuclear Accident Independent Investigation
Commission (NAIIC)
The Commission found the nuclear disaster was "manmade. The report also found that the
Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant was incapable of withstanding the earthquake and
tsunami. TEPCO, the regulatory bodies and the government body promoting the nuclear power
industry (METI), all failed to correctly develop the most basic safety requirementssuch as
assessing the probability of damage, preparing for containing collateral damage from such a
disaster, and developing evacuation plans for the public in the case of a serious radiation
release.
A separate study by Stanford researchers found that Japanese plants operated by the largest
utility companies were particularly unprotected against potential tsunami
The switching stations that sent power from backup generators to the reactors' cooling systems
for Units 1 through 5 were still in the poorly protected turbine buildings
Fukushima I was not designed for such a large tsunami, nor had the reactors been modified
when concerns were raised in Japan and by the IAEA
Japan, like the rest of the Pacific Rim, is in an active seismic zone, prone to earthquakes. IAEA
had expressed concern about the ability of Japan's nuclear plants to withstand earthquakes
 Challenges:-
Confucian influence: loyalty to one's lord
Poor pre-crisis communication:-
o A myth of safety surrounding nuclear power plants
o No drills for evacuation, no counseling
Downplaying risks:-
o Only after one month, the government upgraded the initial rating of the accident from
Level 4 to Level 7
o It took more than 2 months for TEPCO to announce that the Unit 1 reactor had gone into
meltdown on the first day
Failure to warn about the worst scenario:-
o Not warning people about probable events
o No speculation about the worst-case scenarios
Lessons:-

The accident showed that multiple levels of defense could fail and
demonstrated the importance of the concept of Defence-in-Depth (DiD).
The nuclear industry and its experts cannot plan for every contingency or
prevent every disaster
Radiation releases from nuclear accidents cannot be contained in space
and will not stop at national borders
The tsunami design bases for the Fukushima NPPs were not consistent
with the level of protections required for NPPs
Suggested Approach:-

Risk Informed approach to safety

Avoid proximity effects from multiple units, i.e., problems at one reactor cascading
into problems at adjacent units
It is important to have a chain of command that can react swiftly to an accident and
thereby minimize the overall consequences for society, i.e. where responsibility and
competence are properly matched
Discussion/Q&A