Explain why FBI was unsuccessful in counter terrorism

By- Abhimanyu Kr Singh(MP15002) ,

Manjesh Jha (MP15022),
Ms Shipra(MP15041)

XLRI, Jamshedpur 1
 Understanding the Organization
1870 1924 1993

1908 1972 2001

Year Headed by Responsibilities

1870 DOJ Headed by AG Prosecuting Federal crime and representing US in legal Matters
1908 Attorney General Appointed 34 Special Agents to serve BI within DOJ. Field Offices.
1924 J. Edgar Hoover Performance Appraisal System, Periodic Inspection, technical laboratory, National Academy
Director FBI WWII Counterintelligence
1972 Clarence kelley 3 Priorities Counter intelligence, Organized Crimes, White Collar crime
Declared Counter terrorism as forth priority
William Webster Illegal drug offenses became 5th priority in 1980s
1993 Louis Freeh Created a counter terrorism Division and setup job rotations between FBI and CIA counter
terrorism officials (1998 Out of 12730 conviction only 37 were related to counter terrorism)
2001 Mueller Position and Role Within US Govt Primary partners(SLTLE) , Intelligence Community 14
distinct agencies (CIA, DOD, FBI, DOE).
Oversight and Coordination Criminal Investigative, Counter intelligence , Counter terrorism
Division ( ITOS, DTOS)
Information Flow & the Wall Complexity of Organization, FISA restrictions as WALL
DOJ Department of Justice, BI Bureau of Investigation, AG Attorney general, SLTLE State Local tribal law enforcement agencies, FISA Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, 1978
 Competitive Advantage

Resource side: Business side:

Resources were cut from HQ staff Focus was more related to targets
General Resources: Allocation of Poor centralization
resources were poor on counter
terrorism.
Technology was competitive with
respect to reactive affairs, not
proactive side.
IT was not supportive.

Coordination Control
Organization

Organization side:
Complex structure
Culture to with hold information
Poor process to handover the project
Poor hiring mechanism
No mechanism for closure of counter
terrorism cases.
 July, 10 2001 Phoenix SA Kenneth Williams - Wrote Electronic memo of coordinated effort by Usama bin laden to send
students to US These students will be in a position in the future to conduct terror activity against civil aviation targets

Resource Business Organization

The memo was dated July 10 but entered IOS in Radical Fundamentalist unit Williams chose to address the
ACS system on July 27. 17 days later. The felt that the memo belonged to Bin memo to IOS and several
lack of accountability and supervisory Laden unit. agents in New York field
involvement was compounded by the fact Bin laden unit felt that Soubras office. Opted not to include
that the FBIs computer system, ACS, was connection to Bin laden was weak IRS . ( Lack of clear
not set up to ensure that all addressees (Focus was more related to targets) understanding of Org
on an EC were even made aware. structure)
Aug 15, 2001 the FBIs Minneapolis field office received a tip from flight training school that one of its students Zacarias
Moussaoui paid $6800 in cash for training to fly a Boeing 747 jet

Resource Business Organization

FISA warrant required the agent to
prove that Moussaoui was an agent of
foreign power. So FISA warrant was not
pursued. This decision sparked a conflict
between the field agents and HQ
Minneapolis supervisor argued that he
was trying to ensure that Moussaoui did
not take control of a plane and fly into
WTC. HQ agent replied thats not going
to happen and you have a guy
interested in this type of aircraft
Minnesota agents were startled to know
of Williams memo and William had no
idea about event in Minneapolis .
CIA officials expressed their dismay that
no one told them about Williams memo
Managerial Mission & Strategy Organization Structure
Areas
Technical Counter terrorism as top Aligning structure with strategy
priority (Struggling for resources,
System downsizing HQ staff)
Coordination and consultation
between Operational and
Analytical Units
Human Resource Management
Intelligent context was not lucrative
Hiring took 1 year for security clearance
Performance work plan of detailee not
revised to reflect critical element of the job
Ineffective system for assigning and managing
work
FBI employees lack of understanding of CIA
reporting process

Political DCI was in charge for Less power due to FISA rule Roles and responsibilities of detailees and
both CIA and FBI The wall between intelligence communication to the CIA.
System FBIs Counterterrorism and criminal terrorism Closer consultation between the FBI and CIA
Division (Assisting and investigations not ensured.
Providing Information to Performance appraisals were based on what
field offices) they did as FBI employees, not as detailees to
the CIA.
Cultural Culture to with hold Integration of sub culture to Cross movement across various locations
information create company culture was Hiring, training, and retention of intelligence
System Procedures for missing (CIA and FBI were analysts(-)
coordination between competing with each other) Flow of intelligence information within the
intelligence and law No Agreement on what kind of FBI and the dissemination of intelligence(-)
enforcement (+) advice by the Criminal Division
to the FBI was permissible.
 Intelligence Research Specialists and analysis within the Counterterrorism Division
The FBI has acknowledged that prior to September 11, 2001, its Counterterrorism Division was primarily geared toward
conducting tactical analysis in support of operational matters rather than strategic analysis.
The wall between intelligence and criminal terrorism investigations
Because of the wall and beliefs about what the wall required an FBI analyst did not share important intelligence
information about Hazmi and Mihdhar with criminal investigators.
In addition, also because of the wall, in August 2001 when the New York FBI learned that Hazmi and Mihdhar were in the
United States, criminal investigators were not allowed to participate in the search for them.
Institutional divide between criminal and intelligence investigations
Agents conducting intelligence investigations are generally wary about the impact of sharing intelligence information with
prosecutors and criminal investigators. They expressed concerns about potential harm that disclosure would have on
intelligence sources and methods, and the damage that such disclosure would have on future collection of intelligence
information.
Additional restrictions on sharing intelligence information
In addition to the wall between FBI intelligence investigators and criminal prosecutors, a wall within the FBI between criminal
investigations and intelligence investigations also was created
Assembling an application for submission to the FISA Court
Process normally took several months to complete, although we FBI agents were told a FISA warrant could be obtained in a
matter of several hours or a few days if needed.
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Ineffective system for assigning and managing work
In instances where IOSs received leads or intelligence information directly, they were not required to seek any supervisory input on the
information that they were handling. The lack of accountability and supervisory involvement was compounded by the fact that the FBIs
computer system, ACS, was not set up to ensure that all addressees on an EC were even made aware of the EC.
Lack of adequate strategic analytical capabilities
The FBI did not regularly prepare analytical products that predicted trends, explained patterns, or identified national security vulnerabilities
with respect to international terrorism. Lack of strategic analytical capability undoubtedly affected how the Phoenix EC was handled. Instead of
being able to send the EC to a unit that had sufficient expertise and resources to assess the theory laid out by Williams, it wasnt distributed to
other agencies.
Resources and training for analysts
The FBIs strategic analytical function also was under-resourced. This was demonstrated by the shortage of IRSs and the lack of training offered to
them.
Poor information flow and information sharing
While the Phoenix EC did not contain information that constituted an imminent threat or warning of a terrorist attack, the FBI should have
obtained input from within and outside the FBI to properly analyze Williams theory. However, before September 11 the Phoenix EC was not
disseminated widely within or outside of the FBI.
FBI Headquarters handling of the Phoenix EC
Although the EC is dated July 10, the Phoenix Division did not upload the EC into ACS until the afternoon of Friday, July 27, 2001. The Phoenix FBI
also mailed the paper copy to FBI Headquarters around July 27.
The New York Divisions handling of the EC
No Action
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 The most critical breakdown in the Hazmi and Mihdhar case was the failure of the FBI to learn from the CIA critical information
about them; their travel to the United States, and terrorist linkages. These breakdowns reflected serious problems in the process
before the September 11 attacks for sharing information between the FBI and the CIA.
The FBI failed to receive from the CIA all critical pieces of intelligence about Mihdhar and Hazmi in a timely manner:
Use of detailees
FBI detailees did not have authority to disseminate CTC information without approval from the CIA.
FBI employees lack of understanding of CIA reporting process
These gaps in the information sharing process were exacerbated by FBI personnels lack of understanding of the CIAs reporting
process. This problem is clearly illustrated by the failure of the FBI to obtain the information
Inadequate procedures for documenting receipt of CIA information
In addition, structural impediments within the FBI undermined the appropriate documentation of information received from
the CIA.
Lack of appropriate infrastructure in FBI field offices
Information sharing with the FBI also was impeded by the inadequate facilities for the handling of intelligence information in the
two field offices most directly involved in the Hazmi/Mihdhar matter

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