Territorial disputes in

Northeast Asia
[AS 230 Report]
Clarissa M. Camaya
PRESENTATION
Northeast Asian countries
territorial disputes are mostly on
useless territoryrocky
uninhabitable islands. However,
these rocks are positioned in key
maritime areas that were
presumed to have abundant oil
reserves in the late 1960s. Also,
control of the islands may also
mean control of the fishing area.
Backgrounder of Main Territorial Disputes
Japan vs. China : Senkaku / Diaoyu
Japan vs. Korea : Takeshima / Dokdo
Korea vs. China : Iodo / Suyan
Chinas Attitude on Territorial Disputes: The
Nine-Dash Line (and counting)
US as a Key Player in Northeast Asian Maritime
Security

Background source:
OShea, Paul. (2013) Territorial Disputes
in Northeast Asia: A Primer. Instituto per
gli Studi di Politica Internazionale
Analysis No. 182.
 1960s: Potential oil and gas (no oil, eventually
discovered)
1968 Hydrographic Survey: shallow seafloor between
Japan and Taiwan is oil-rich Never found
Senkaku|Diaoyu
Small islands and rocks, no history of human habitation
| Dispute no longer because of oil, now driven by historic
and symbolic factors (Sino-Japanese Wars)
Japan a close US ally which prevented Sino-Japanese
relations until 1970s
China claims the islands to be part of Taiwan, returned
through the San Francisco Peace Treaty (1951)
Strong Anti-Japanese sentiment in China because of
Japan not owning up to war crimes in WWII
China increasingly assertive as it developed military
power
Extreme view: First step for Chinese invasion of Okinawa
Likelihood of militarized effort remains low because of
economic ties
US: Islands are covered by Japan-US Treaty
 Intrinsically worthless, remote, uninhabited islands and
rocks
Sore point for Koreans: owing to humiliation from
Takeshima | Dokdo Japanese Occupation (1910)
Korean nationalism is Anti-Japanism. V. Cha, 2000
/ |
Was petitioned after WWII to be declared either
Japanese or Korean Territory was not mentioned in the
final San Francisco Peace Treaty
Suggested: US did not want to give the islands to Korea
lest it fall to the Communists.
Islands under Korean control since 1954
Passionate protests from Koreans: 2005 and 2006
Korean government spends a lot on publicity
Less sentiment aroused in Japan, gradually changing
Becomes tied with other historical tensions Takeshima
Shrine, Comfort Women, etc.
2012: Lee Myungbak visited the islands Japanese
Ambassador to Korea was recalled
Compromise would mean political suicide for a Korean
president, only way for Japan to get the islands would
be by force.
Protests
 Submerged rock
Not as controversial as the other two because it is not
Iodo | Suyan resource rich and not fuelled by historical tension.
| Also called Parangdo a mythical island for Jeju
citizens (house of spirits of fishermen who perished at
sea) One who sees Parangdo would never return
Activities: Korea Institute of Geology, only a site of
scientific explorations
China and South Korea technically do not share a
border. China also has territorial disputes with North
Korea.
According to UNCLOS, submerged reef cannot be
claimed by any country both countries insist that it is
part of their EEZ.
 THE CHINA ATTITUDE

China takes action when tranquility has been disturbed by other nations.
Believes that nine-dash line has always had a foundation in international lawincluding
customary law of discovery, occupation, and historic title, as well as UNCLOS.
Historic title provides basis for Chinas possession of historic rights and rights under UNCLOS.
In South China Sea: Xisha (Parcel), Dongsha (Pratas), Zhongsha, Nansha (Spratlys)
South China Sea had been known to Chinese fishermen and seafarers from time
immemorial. HISTORICAL ARGUMENT: Silk Road on the Sea (Qin and Han Dynasty)
Maps are claimed to indicate their ownership.
Refer to declarations/ treaties after WW2: 1946 Cairo Declaration and Potsdam
Proclamation recovering Xisha and Nansha from Japan (no reaction from SEA)
Also believe that natural gas is the source of tension in the area
Insists their UNCLOS ratification submission included the claimed territories

Gao, Zhiguo and Jia, Bing Bing. (2013). The Nine-Dash Line in the South China Sea: History, Status, and Implications. The American Journal of International Law. 107(1). 98-124
 US Role in NEA Maritime Security

Context: Common interests of

Japan and US or Korea and US
against the China-North Korea
Alliance
SK-US: 1954 Mutual Security
Agreement mutual defenses
against outside aggression
JP-US: 1960 Treaty of Mutual
Cooperation and Security similarly,
mutual defense
Does Korea and Japan rely on US?
SEI
Spill-In Elasticity: How much defense
goods are purchased by SK/JP to
substitute USs defense goods?
Elasticity: Effect of a 1% change in US defense good spending

Goo, Youngwan and Lee, Seonghoon. (2014). Military Alliances and Reality of Regional Integration: Japan, South Korea, the US vs. China, North Korea. Journal of Economic
Integration. 29(2). 329-342.
 US Role in NEA Maritime Security

Negative SIE: USs purchased

defense goods are substitutes for
allys defense goods
Close alliances because they can
mutually benefit against outside
threats.
Both Japan and South Korea
consider themselves closer allies of
US than vice versa.
US considers Japan as a closer
ally. Elasticity: Effect of a 1% change in US defense good spending

Goo, Youngwan and Lee, Seonghoon. (2014). Military Alliances and Reality of Regional Integration: Japan, South Korea, the US vs. China, North Korea. Journal of Economic
Integration. 29(2). 329-342.
 US Role in NEA Maritime Security

South Korea does not treat the

China-North Korea alliance as
heavily as US and Japan do.
South Korea considers North Korea
as a threat but not China (hence,
lower on the combined threat).
Japan responds more than US
does because of geographical
proximity.
Threat elasticity: sensitivity of defense goods purchase to 1 unit
increase in defense goods of external threats

Goo, Youngwan and Lee, Seonghoon. (2014). Military Alliances and Reality of Regional Integration: Japan, South Korea, the US vs. China, North Korea. Journal of Economic
Integration. 29(2). 329-342.