MORAL OBLIGATIONS AS THE THIRD

ASPECT OF THE NOTION OF

CAPABILITIES
JULIO CCEDA
PONTIFICAL CATHOLIC UNIVERSITY OF PERU
STRUCTURE OF THE PRESENTATION

1. Objetictive
2. The notion of Social Freedom
3. Delimitation of the notion of SF
4. Why to introduce the concept of Social Freedom in the Approach? The limits of the notion of freedom of Sen and
Nussbaum
5. Why to introduce the concept of Social Freedom in the Approach? Social Freedom as a possibility condition of the
Capacities
6. Justification of the notion of SF
7. Capability with the inclusion of SF
8. Consequences
OBJECTIVE
Do a normative reconstruction of
the <<Capabilities>> notion, introducing
a third aspect in it, along with the aspects of opportunity and choice
developed by the Capability Approach itself: the aspect of moral obligations
Show that moral obligations as a condition of possibility of freedom
bring practical consequences by pointing out that Human Development also
consists in the search of individuals with greater moral commitments and the
construction of social institutions that promote this links.

Moral obligations
Opportunity aspect Choice aspect
aspect

CAPABILITY NOTION
THE NOTION OF SOCIAL FREEDOM
Axel Honneth (2014) argues that social reality is a mean and condition of freedom itself. It is an essential
part, not just an additive.
Is based on the idea of the notion of <<Mutual Recognition>>, which means: () the reciprocal experience
of seeing oneself confirmed in the desires and goals of a counterpart as the existence of these represent a
condition of the realization of ones own desires and goals, under the condition that both individuals recognize
the need for complementarity of their respective goals (67).
But this is based in turn on the cordial concern for others (not reciprocal or expecting something in exchange for others), which is
given by the recognition of the other as an end in itself. <<Cordial Recognition>>

This because the pursued goals can only be achieved in relation to the others. Therefore, the formulation of
desires and purposes must be complementary to the one of others.
This is the only way to be free. The objective conditions of realization are part of the same freedom. This
means Social Freedom. It means that the concern for other peoples capabilities, of which one of the essential
components is to achieve effectively the valued purposes (Sen 2010, 331), is a necessary condition for their
own Capabilities.
DELIMITATION OF THE NOTION OF SF
"the capacity to choose and to act is itself a collective capacity" (Deneulin
2006, 68) because capacities will depend on the relations with others and
cannot be given without this intersubjectivity"irreducible social goods
(goods that are produced and maintained only in the relationship between
individuals)
This doesnt mean that everything that people are and do must have this social orientation
or orientation towards the other
Concern for others is something that must be done constantly, but not always. Is a matter
of deliberation Imperfect obligations
It supposes space for the individuality because it is something valued in itself space to
disconnect of moral obligations is also based on mutual recognition
DELIMITATION OF THE NOTION OF SF
Others never look at the world from one's perspective. Understanding and
mutual reciprocity isnt complete.
Because subjectivity is a heterogeneous process a subject is not a unit and doesnt
always know everything about itself. Its not as transparent as the recognition requires. He
has multiple desires that are not entirely coherent. It is a difference that cannot be
comprehended at all.
this means that recognition will always be incomplete and fragile, complexed by multiple
identities, where conflict would be inherent due to this non-coherent multiplicity resulting
from the multiple identities of the subjects that claim forms of recognition in different
ways.
The realization of freedom will be permanently flawed by this condition
DELIMITATION OF THE NOTION OF SF
But what happens to people who are free and nevertheless dont find
themselves in relationships of mutual reciprocity but subjected to others?
Dialectic of the master and slave: even who has a dominant position depends
on the other to be able to exercise his will.
But, since there isnt a relationship of reciprocity and cordiality, this
relationship of domination is constantly weakened by the demands of
recognition from those who are dominated.
Itis only through mutual and cordial recognition that freedom can be fully
exercised in a sustainable way.
WHY TO INTRODUCE THE CONCEPT OF SOCIAL FREEDOM
IN THE APPROACH? THE LIMITS OF THE NOTION OF
FREEDOM OF SEN AND NUSSBAUM
While the Approach incorporates a link among freedom, society, rationality and ethics, so that
its related to the concept of Social Freedom, it doesnt combine these notions properly. It
doesnt point out that mutual or cordial recognition and commitment with freedom and the
others purposes are a constitutive element of freedom itself.
The problem of recognizing the need of others to exercise freedom without acknowledging
the counterpart of obligations to others as a condition of possibility of the same.
The problem of concern for others as an exercise of freedom, but not as a condition of it
The problem of recognizing the responsibility to others as a result of freedom and not as a
condition of possibility of it
WHY TO INTRODUCE THE CONCEPT OF SOCIAL FREEDOM
IN THE APPROACH? SOCIAL FREEDOM AS A POSSIBILITY
CONDITION OF THE CAPABILITIES
The notion of Social Freedom is not only a regulative ideal to which one must aspire
in order to be fully free, but it is also a notion that is the core of the freedom
ontology
It underlies in the freedom possibility itself because its realization depends on a
circuit of attitudes, practices, and convictions regarding the others, that in turn
represent relationships of mutual and cordial recognition
The multiples dimensions of freedom (constitutive freedom; freedom process;
instrumental freedom; freedom opportunity; wellbeing and agency freedom;
combined capability; practical reason capability; affiliation capability) suppose the
notion of mutual or cordial recognition as a condition of possibility
JUSTIFICATION OF THE NOTION OF SF

The notion of SF can

Be a partial agreement of public reasoning? YES, it
is a notion that different people can be agree.
Be a narrow principle? YES, it does not set rigid
obligations but leave enough open margins
Produce comprehensive effects in people live? YES,
it is a condition for freedom
Be a thin principle? YES, it does not commit with
controversial metaphysical or epistemological
assumptions
CAPABILITY WITH THE INCLUSION OF SF
Social Freedom
As well as capability is not
freedom to choose between any
F F
F option, but the possibility of
F choosing between valuable
F options, the new concept of
F capability (with the inclusion of
Choice F social freedom) consist in choose
F between options or functions that
F are compatible with moral
F
F F obligations or with mutual and
cordial recognition
Capability
CONSEQUENCES
a) Enriching the Development goals, because expanding the Capabilities
means promoting moral individuals
b) Contributing to the construction of the field of Development ethics or moral,
introducing moral as an essential component of freedom, going beyond the
single link between freedom and rationality.
c) The relational concept of Social Freedom naturally leads to the need of
talking about collective capabilities and institutions of cordial and mutual
recognition: <<relational institutions>>
d) Allowing the moral evaluation of the institutions.
e) e) Introducing a new category: << Moral poverty>>. This involves
identifying existing privations on individuals regarding moral issues.
THANKS