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Oligopoly
When just a few large firms dominate a market
So that actions of each one have an important
impact on the others
In such a market, each firm recognizes its strategic
interdependence with others
An oligopoly is a market dominated by a small
number of strategically interdependent firms
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Number of Firms
Oligopoly requires that a few firms dominate the
market
How few?
At some point, number of firms is large enough
and interdependence weak enoughthat oligopoly
becomes a poor description
Monopolistic competition would fit better
No absolute number at which oligopoly ends and
monopolistic competition begins
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Market Domination
Strategic interdependence requires that a
few firms dominate the market
Their share of market is large
As combined market share shrinks,
strategic interdependence becomes weaker
Oligopoly is a matter of degree
Not an absolute classification
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Economies of Scale: Natural Oligopolies
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Figure 1: Natural Oligopoly
Dollars
LRATCTypical Firm
$200 H F
E
80
DMarket
0 25,000 100,000
Units per Month
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Reputation as a Barrier
Established oligopolists are likely to have
favorable reputations
Investors decision: enter or not?
Critical thing: is it worthy to take the risk of being a
new firm in such market?
If expected profit is greater than the initial loss, enter
If initial loss is too big, stay out.
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Strategic Barriers
Strategies designed to keep out potential
competitors, for example:
Maintain excess production capacity as a signal
Make special deals with distributors to receive
best shelf space in retail stores
Spend large amounts on advertising to make it
difficult for a new entrant to differentiate its
product
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Legal Barriers
Patents and copyrightswhich can be
responsible for monopolycan also create
oligopolies
Like monopolies, oligopolies are not shy
about lobbying government to preserve
their market domination
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Measures of Market Structure
Concentration ratios: Aggregated market
share of the largest N firms in the industry
Range: 0-100%
4 Firm Concentration ratio: Market share
controlled by the largest 4 firms
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Measured Industry Concentration in Manufacturing
D: Not disclosed
Second and third columns: Percentage in value added in the industry
Last column: Herfindahl index from the 50 largest firms
D: Not disclosed
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The Game Theory Approach
Game theory approach
An approach to modeling strategic interaction of
oligopolists in terms of moves and countermoves
Elements
Players
Strategies
Payoffs
Pay off matrix
Game tree
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Game Theory Approach
Some situations to which game theory can
be applied:
firms competing for business
political candidates competing for votes
animals fighting over prey
bidders competing in an auction
legislators' voting behavior under pressure
from interest groups
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Game Theory Short History
John Von Neumann (1903-1957)
Theory of Games and Economic
Behavior with Oskar
Morgenstern
This book established game
theory as a field
An introduction to game
theory by Martin J.
Osborne. Oxford
University Press, 2002
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Game Theory Short History
John F. Nash, Jr.(1928- )
One of the contributions is
the introduction of the
equilibrium notion now
known as Nash equilibrium
1994 Nobel prize winner in
economics with the game
theorists John Harsanyi and
Reinhard Selten An introduction to game theory
by Martin J. Osborne. Oxford
University Press, 2002
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The Prisoners Dilemma
Simple example to explain why a technique
for obtaining confessions, commonly used by
police, is so often successful
Payoff matrix
Players: Rose and Colin
Payoffs: number in the matrix
Strategies: Confess (C) / not confess (NC) for
either of the players
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Figure 2: The Prisoners Dilemma
NC -30, -3 -5, -5
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The Prisoners Dilemma
A dominant strategy: the players best strategy
regardless of the other players strategy
Roses dominant strategy is confess regardless
of Colins choice
So is Colin
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Nash Equilibrium
Outcome of this game is an example of a
Nash equilibrium
Exists when each player is taking the best
actiongiven best actions taken by other
players
Under the Nash Equilibrium, no players want
to deviate
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Figure 3: Working on a joint project
Elements
Players:{you, your Friend
friend}
Strategies:{work hard,
Goof off} W G
Payoffs W
You 2, 2 0, 3
What is the Nash
Equilibrium?
G 3, 0 1, 1
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Figure 4: Battle of Sex
Elements
Players:{Mr. R and Mr. R
Mrs. R}
Strategies:{ go
shopping, watch a S B
baseball game} S
Payoffs Mrs. R 2, 1 0, 0
What is the Nash
Equilibrium? B 0, 0 1, 2
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Figure 5: Duopoly
Elements
Players:{Firm A, Firm A
Firm B}
Strategies:{ Low
price, High price} L H
Payoffs
What is the Nash Firm B L 10, 10 40, -5
Equilibrium?
H -5, 40 20, 20
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Simple Oligopoly Games - Duopoly
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Example: Price Competition for Duopoly
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Oligopoly Games in the Real World
Typically more than two strategies
Usually more than two players
In some games, one or more players may not have
a dominant strategy
A game with two players will have a Nash equilibrium
as long as at least one player has a dominant strategy
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Oligopoly Games in the Real World
-- Static v.s. Dynamic
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Oligopoly Games in the Real World
-- Cooperation in the long run
One possible result of repeated trials is
cooperative behavior
Results may be very different from
equilibrium in a game played only once
Explicit collusion
Simplest
Managers meet face-to-face to decide how to
set prices
Tacit collusion
No formal discussion
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Explicit Collusion
Most extreme form is creation of a cartel
Group of firms that tries to maximize total profits of
the group as a whole
OPEC
However, it is not commonly observed. Why?
Usually illegal in U.S.A., EU & most of developed
countries
Penalties, if the oligopolists are caught, can be severe
But oligopolists can collude in other, implicit ways
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Tacit Collusion
Two most common forms
Tit for tat
A game-theoretic strategy of doing to another
player this period what he has done to you in
previous period
Price Leadership
One firmthe price leadersets its price and
other sellers copy that price
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Tacit Collusion - Tit For Tat
Prominent in airline industry
However, gentle reminder of tit-for-tat is not
always effective in maintaining tacit collusion
Oligopolist will sometimes go further
Attempting to punish a firm that threatens to
destroy tacit cooperation
Lead to price wars
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Tacit Collusion Price Leadership
No formal agreement
Rather the decisions come about because
firms realizewithout formal
discussionthat system benefits all of
them
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The Limits to Collusion
Oligopoly powereven with collusion
has its limits
demand constraints
collusioneven when it is tacitmay be
illegal
collusion is limited by powerful incentives to
cheat on any agreement
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The Incentive to Cheat
Will firm stick to the collusion?
Maybe, and maybe not
Problemeach player may conclude that he can do even
better by cheating, Figure 5
Two players would be back to non-cooperative outcome
based on their dominant strategies
May be in each players interest to cheat occasionally
Analyzing this sort of behavior requires some rather
sophisticated game theory models
Economists are actively engaged in building them
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When is Cheating Likely?
While no firm wants to completely destroy a
collusive agreement by cheating
Since this would mean a return to the noncooperative
equilibrium wherein each firm earns lower profit
Some firms may be willing to risk destroying agreement if
benefits are great enough
Cheating is most likely to occur when there is
Difficulty observing other firms prices
Unstable market demand
Large number of sellers
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The Future of Oligopoly
Some people think U.S. and other Western
economies are moving toward oligopoly as
dominant market structure
Prediction has not come true
Today, there are hundreds and thousands of ongoing
businesses in United States
Possible reasons
Antitrust law
Globalization of markets
Technological change
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Antitrust Legislation and Enforcement
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Technological Change
Technological change works
To increase competition by creating new
substitute goods
To reduce barriers to entry
To increase size of market
However, technologies on the other hand
encourage oligopoly by actually increasing MES
of typical firm
Result could be strategic interaction, or collusion,
among large national players
Thereby encouraging formation of oligopolies
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The Four Market Structures: A Postscript
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