STRUCTURE FAILURE REPAIR & EFFORTS BY:

JAGJEET SINGH UC1914

REHABILITATION JAYRAJ DESAI

RISHI BAJAJ
UC2014
UC4014
CASE STUDY SUMMARY
ON
TRUSS CONNECTION
FAILURE
Collapse of I-35W Highway Bridge
Minneapolis, Minnesota
August 1, 2007
INTRODUCTION
About 6:05 p.m.,
Central daylight time on Wednesday, August 1, 2007,
the eight-lane, 1,907-foot-long I-35W highway bridge over the Mississippi
River in Minneapolis, Minnesota,
experienced a catastrophic failure in the main span of the deck truss.
(Top) Aerial view (looking northeast) of I-35W bridge (arrow) about 2 hours 15 minutes before collapse.
This photograph was taken by a passenger in a commercial airliner departing Minneapolis/St. Paul
International Airport.
Accident location.
 COLLAPSE
On the day of the collapse, roadway work was underway on the I-35W bridge, and four of
the eight travel lanes (two outside lanes northbound and two inside lanes southbound) were
closed to traffic. In the early afternoon, construction equipment and construction aggregates
(sand and gravel for making concrete) were delivered and positioned in the two closed
inside southbound lanes.
The equipment and aggregates, which were being staged for a concrete pour of the
southbound lanes that was to begin about 7:00 p.m., were positioned toward the south end
of the center section of the deck truss portion of the bridge and were in place by about 2:30
p.m.
About 6:05 p.m., a motion-activated surveillance video camera at the Lower St. Anthony
Falls Lock and Dam, just west of the I-35W bridge, recorded a portion of the collapse
sequence. The video showed the bridge center span separating from the rest of the bridge
and falling into the river.
Center span of I-35W bridge, looking northeast. The center span is supported by pier 6 on the near
(south) riverbank and pier 7 on the far (north) riverbank.
I-35W bridge after collapse.
 Deck truss
portion

1,064
feet
Pier Pier Pier Pier Pier Pier
2 4 6 8 10 12

Pier Pier Pier Pier Pier

1 3 Pier 9 11 13
5 Pier
7

SOUTH NORTH
ABUTMENT ABUTMENT

East elevation of I-35W bridge.

Collapsed bridge center section, looking southeast.
Collapsed deck truss sections of I-35W bridge.
COLLAPSE EFFECTS
As a result,

1,000 feet of the deck truss collapsed, with about 456 feet of the main span
falling 108 feet into the 15-foot-deep river.
A total of 111 vehicles were on the portion of the bridge that collapsed. Of
these, 17 were recovered from the water.
13 people died, and 145 people were injured.
FAILURE - CAUSE
The National Transportation Safety Board determines that the probable
cause of the collapse of the I-35W bridge in Minneapolis, Minnesota,
was the inadequate load capacity, due to a design error by Sverdrup & Parcel
and Associates, Inc., of the gusset plates at the U10 nodes, which failed under
a combination of
(1) substantial increases in the weight of the bridge, which resulted from
previous bridge modifications, and
(2) the traffic and concentrated construction loads on the bridge on the day
of the collapse.
FAILURE - CAUSE
Contributing to the design error was the failure of Sverdrup & Parcels quality
control procedures to ensure that the appropriate main truss gusset plate
calculations were performed for the I-35W bridge and the inadequate design
review by Federal and State transportation officials.

Contributing to the accident was the generally accepted practice among Federal
and State transportation officials of giving inadequate attention to gusset plates
during inspections for conditions of distortion, such as bowing, and of excluding
gusset plates in load rating analyses.
Collapse of Commercial Property
Denison, Texas
December 30, 2006
INTRODUCTION
An awning collapse during a commercial property fire claimed the life of a Denison,
Texas, firefighter, Phillip Townsend. The fire occurred at a strip mall building located
at 900 South Crockett Avenue inside the city limits of Denison, Texas. The property
was partially occupied, housing an appliance repair business, the property owners
office space, and a vacant self- service laundry.

Firefighter Phillip Townsend and Fire Chief Weger, were operating a hand line fire
stream onto rolls of roofing materials on the building that were producing heavy
smoke, when the overhang collapsed, pinning both men.
STRUCTURE - INTRODUCTION
The structure was a one-story commercial occupancy built in 1963, consisting of three
separate suites, including an appliance store that conducted regular sales, repair and
testing of used appliances; a center suite occupied by the owner and used for his real
estate office and storage; and a laundry facility on the south end of the building that
was not being used for regular business but was being used for storage. There were no
fire sprinkler or fire alarm systems for the building. There are no building plans,
construction history, or inspection records available from the City of Denison. Businesses
were closed and the structure was unoccupied at the time of the fire.
The structure was of NFPA Type III construction and consisted of a combination of
poured concrete, masonry block and steel, measuring approximately 131 feet in length
and 45 feet wide, on a concrete slab foundation.
Site diagram and apparatus location
at time of collapse
Collapsed awning (Photo by Denison FD)
Cross-section Falling Action
Roof-Truss Attachment
COLLAPSE EFFECTS
Following the collapse,
Most firefighters on the scene went to the location of the collapse to assist with rescue
efforts. The firefighters used saws to remove parts of the wood overhang and Fire Chief
Weger was freed approximately ten minutes after the collapse. He was able to crawl out from
underneath the overhang on his own. Firefighter Townsend was extricated approximately two
minutes later, but was unresponsive. Rescuers began resuscitative efforts and he was
transported to the Texoma Medical Center, where continued resuscitative efforts were
unsuccessful.
Fire Chief Weger was treated and released from Texoma Medical Center for minor injuries.
Firefighter Townsend was pronounced dead at 09:51 AM. The cause of death, as
determined by the medical examiner, was attributed to blunt force injuries.
Locations of Chief Weger and Phillip Townsend after collapse
COLLAPSE - CAUSE
The building had a dropped ceiling, without fire separation between compartments to
prevent heat and smoke spread. The exposed roof system was a pin-connected open web
truss of tubular webbing and solid steel pins secured in unprotected two-inch by four-inch (2
x 4) wood chords. There were no indications that fire retardant or insulation was used on
any of the exposed wood surfaces of the truss system or the roof decking.
The examination of the scene revealed that the roof structure collapsed and was
consumed, leaving the tubular webbing of the truss system unsupported by the wood chords.
This loss of the truss system allowed for the lateral movement of the front wall supporting
the awning.
Collapse of Stadium Southland Roof
Invercargill, New Zealand
May, 2012
INTRODUCTION
The Stadium Southland building was constructed in 1999 to provide a new indoor
sports facility for the Southland region. The facility included multi-purpose courts,
events courts, a climbing wall, seating, full service amenities, lounge, bar, kitchen and
off-street parking facilities. The design of the stadium featured clear spans over two
large inter-linked spaces comprising the community courts area and the events courts
area.
The Stadium Southland roof collapsed at around noon on 18 September 2010
following a heavy fall of snow in the area. There were no injuries or loss of life. The
only person in the building at the time of collapse was not in the area affected by the
collapse.
Stadium Southland prior to Collapse
COLLAPSE EFFECTED AREAS

part of the end walls on the eastern and western sides of the stadium
a large portion of the roof above the community courts
the roof above the events court supported by the spine trusses
the main roof spine trusses located between the community courts and the events
courts and their western supporting columns.
Stadium Southland following collapse 19 September 2010
COLLAPSE - SEQUENCE
The stadium collapse is likely to have been initiated by the compression failure of the
defective mid-span top chord splice in one of the roof trusses over the eastern end of the
community courts.
The collapse then progressed through other roof trusses causing a westward displacement of
the trusses and their supporting columns.
As the building displaced westward, the bottom chord bolts that were connecting the spine
trusses to the two easternmost columns fractured.
The spine trusses then fell to the ground as the two westernmost support columns collapsed.
At the western end of the community courts, one of the roof trusses fell to the oor soon after
and in response to the collapse of the trusses at the eastern end.
Welds failed and strengthening plates peeled away on some of the roof trusses.
COLLAPSE - CAUSE
(a) Heavy Snow Fall
The loading requirement for the stadium, when it was originally designed, was for a
factored1 roof snow load of 0.40 kPa which, when combined with a factored
assessed dead load of 0.41 kPa, gave a total factored design load of 0.81 kPa.
The actual self weight of the roof was calculated at 0.34 kPa at the time of
collapse, allowing a snow load of 0.47 kPa to occur before the design was
exceeded.
At this self weight and attainment of this snow load an expected probability of
failure is expected to be less than 1%.
Therefore snow load alone does not explain the roof collapse.
COLLAPSE - CAUSE
(b) Problems with design changes and remedial work during the construction
process
(c) Construction Defects
The investigation found that aspects of both the off-site and on-site fabrication were
not compliant with the drawings on the Council property le and/or the Steel Structures
Standard and/or the Welding Standard.
(d) Site Supervision
The deciencies identied above should have been picked up if there had been an
adequate construction monitoring regime in place. The deciencies were not identied
and corrected.
(e) Design and detailing shortcomings
Collapse of Inspector Quarters Building
Hong Kong
May, 2016
INTRODUCTION
On 29 May 2016 at about 22:05 hours, the northwestern corner of the Married
Inspectors Quarters Building (MIQ Building) (i.e. Block 4) of the Central Police Station
(CPS) Compound at 10 Hollywood Road, Central, Hong Kong collapsed. No casualty was
reported in the incident. The Buildings Department (BD) subsequently conducted an
investigation on the incident.
Built between 1862 and 1864, the MIQ Building is a 3-storey, L-shaped brick
masonry building. MIQ Building is mainly built of timber floors and a pitched roof
supported by timber trusses. The timber floors and timber roof trusses are rested on top
of brick walls and brick piers. Brick walls and brick piers are founded on either retaining
walls or pad footings. At the north elevation, there are a three-storey verandah and two
projecting bays which are supported by granite corbels. The balcony at its west elevation
was removed subsequent to the damage caused by a fallen tree in 2008.
Photomontage of North Elevation of Building
Second Floor Plan of Building
COLLAPSE - CAUSE
Prior to the incident, the strengthening works of the timber floor of the verandah
at the first floor were being carried out. Two numbers of square hollow sections (SHS)
were being installed on both sides of each of the existing timber joists. Pockets were
hollowed out in brick walls and brick piers on both sides of the verandah during the
process of installing SHS.
A structural assessment was conducted on the effect of pocket openings on the
structural integrity of the five internal and external brick piers at the collapsed area.
Due to the reduction of the effective sectional bearing area, the compressive stresses
acting on these five brick piers had been increased and the stress on one of the
internal brick piers with multiple pocket openings had exceeded its structural
capacity and failed ahead of the others.
COLLAPSE - CAUSE

The collapse was initiated by the failure of this internal brick pier at 1/F level
which was then leaned towards the northern direction, pushing the timber joists at 2/F
level to cause failure of the external brick piers on north elevation, which had also
been weakened by pocket openings. The failure of the internal and external brick
piers then triggered the progressive collapse of the roof and other brick piers.
Computer Simulation of Failure of the Internal and External Brick Piers
View towards Northwest Elevation View towards Southwest Elevation
CONCLUSION

Based on the findings of the investigation, the key and triggering factor for the
collapse is most likely attributable to the hollowing out of multiple pockets in brick
piers and walls for the installation of steel members for the timber floor strengthening
works at the first floor of verandah. The collapse incident was likely to be triggered
by the failure of one of the internal brick piers due to significant loss of sectional
bearing area.