Introduction to Hazardous

Evaluation Techniques
Guidelines for Hazardous Evaluation
Procedures (1992 by AIChE).
Second Edition with Worked Examples.
Center for Chemical Process Safety
(CCPS).
American Institute of Chemical
Engineers (AIChE).
 Hazard Evaluation Techniques

1960 - 2001 1960 - 2001 1965 - 2001 1970 - 2001 1972 - 1974 1974 - 2001
Safety Check Lists Relative PHA What if HAZOP
Review Ranking

Walk Historical ICI Mond Preliminary Brainstorming Hazards

Through Lists Index Hazard Operability
Inspection Analysis Analysis
Yes / No Dow FEI
Hazardous Mtls Line by Line
Hazardous Opns Deviation
Analysis
This presentation only considers the HAZOP technique.
 HAZOP
HAZOP was developed by Lawley (1974) of
ICI. Based on early account by Elliott & Owen
(1968).
Hazop studies are carried out by an
experienced, multidisciplanary team.
Review all physical aspects of a process
(lines, equipment, instrumentation) to
discover potential hazards.
 Basis for HAZOP
The basis for a HAZOP is a critical
examination of information found in a
word model.
It includes a flowsheet, a plant layout,
equipment specification or a P&ID,
(Piping and Instrument Drawing).
 Hazop Includes
1 Intention
2 Deviation
3 Causes
4 Consequences
(a) hazards
(b) operating difficulties
5 Safeguards
6 Recommendations / Actions
 Hazop Guide Words
NO or NOT Negation of intention No Flow of A

MORE Quantitative increase Flow of A greater than design flow

LESS Quantitative decrease Flow of A less than design flow

AS WELL AS Quantitative increase Transfer of some component additional to A

PART OF Quantitative decrease Failure to transfer all components of A

REVERSE Logical opposite of intention Flow of A in direction opposite to design direction

OTHER THAN Complete substitution Transfer of some material other than A

More recent computerization techniques use a Standard Set Of Generic Deviations

For Specific Section Types. See Dev'ns tab for examples.
 Common HAZOP Analysis
Process Parameters
Flow Time Frequency Mixing

Pressure Composition Viscosity Addition

Temperature pH Voltage Separation

Level Speed Toxicity Reaction

 Prepare for the Review
Attitude
Preparation Meeting Leadership

HAZOP
Review By Documentation Follow-up
Team

Knowledge Info for study

Experience Teams HAZOP P&Ids, Layout
Experience

Table

Deviation Causes Consequences Safeguards Action

Hazop Select a process
section or

Flow Explain design

operating step

Repeat for all

intention process sections
Sheet Select a process Repeat for all
variable or task process variables

Apply guide word Repeat for all

to process variable guide words

Examine Develop action

Consequences items
associated with
deviation

List possible Assess acceptability

causes of of risk based on
deviation consequences

Identify existing
safeguards to
prevent deviation
 Hazop Pitfalls
Poor understanding by management of the HAZOP procedure

An Ethylene plant has 100 P&IDs, 625 equip't items. 625 items
Consider 5 variables, Pressure, Temperature, Flow
Composition and Function. 5 variables
Consider 6 Guidewords, None, More of, Less of
Part of, More than and Other than. 6 guide words
Questions to be answered = 18750 questions
Consider 5 minutes per question = 5 min./question
Time for ethylene plant HAZOP study = 93750 minutes
4 hour, 240 minutes sessions per day = 250 minutes/day
No. working of days = 375 days
Days per week = 5 days/week
No. of weeks to complete HAZOP for plant = 75 weeks
 Other Pitfalls
Inexperienced HAZOP team.
Inadequately trained or in-experienced
leader.
 Common Hazop Mistakes
Failing to establish a "safe" environment
for team members.
Consequences of events not carried to
conclusion.
Taking unwarranted credit for
safeguards.
Too little credit given for safeguards.
 Hazop Mistakes Contd
Failure to make recommendations as
specific as possible.
Poor record keeping of HAZOPS.
Failure to HAZOP start-up and shut-
down procedures.
P&IDs not up-dated or poorly
constructed.
 Hazop Mistakes Contd
A HAZOP is performed in lieu of
properly executed design reviews.
Wrong technique for system being
reviewed (See spreadsheet titled Fig
5.3).
 HAZOP Example
To Compressor Inlet

LAH
FV Teams tend to quickly identify alarms, shut-downs
1 and controls, and claim them for safeguards.

An alarm not tested may not work when called upon

Inlet Line to do so.
LIC
1
Nuisance alarms are frequently bypassed and are
not effective as safeguards.

Often operators are not monitoring control panel.

Valve in manual Automatic control routines are often set in manual

mode.
 Standard Set of Deviations
ID No. Deviation Column Vessel Line Exchanger Pump Compressor
1 High Flow X
2 High Level X X
3 High Interface X
4 High Pressure X X X X
5 High Temperature X X X X
6 High Concentration X X X
7 Low / No Flow X X
8 Low Level X X
9 Low Interface X
10 Low Pressure X X X X
11 Low Temperature X X X X
12 Low Concentration X X X
13 Reverse / Misdirected Flow X X
14 Tube Leak X
15 Tube Rupture X
16 Leak X X X X X X
17 Rupture X X X X X X
 Typical Hazop Worksheet
Company Nova Revision 0 Date 02-Jun-97
Location Corunna Dwg No. Cor -123-4567 Page 1
Leader RAH Proc Des JB Research Op Tech
Scribe GFR Instr'ts GH Electrical HH Other
Prod'n PM Mech FD Safety MN Other

Node No. 1 Describe Transfer Ethane from Deethanizer to C2 KO Pot

Intention The intent is to transfer 150,000 lb/hr of C2/C2= mix at 300 psig and at -30 F for the startup period.

Guide Wrd High Param Flow Dev'n High Flow

Possible Causes
1 FV-1 Wide open
2 Line break.
3
Consequences
1 High level in KO pot with liquid carry-over to compressor with serious damage to rotor. Potential hydrocarbons release.
2 Potential hydrocarbon release.
3
Safeguards
1 High level alarm LAH-1
2 High - High level alarm HHLA - 1 shutdown.
3 Vessel inspection yearly.
Recommendation / Actions Respib By Date
1 Consider limiting flow orifice, auto SD trip on High-High level, smart check valve. 1 JB 01-Jan-99
2 Determine extent of typical hydrocarbon release. 2 PM 15-Jan-99
3 Set-up vessel inspection yearly. 3 FD 30-Jan-99
 Check List Example
1 Changes In Quantity a High Flow 1 Pump racing, delivery vessel pressure lost, Loss of automatic
suction pressurized, scale dislodged, leak in control
heat exchanger
b Low Flow 2 Pump failure, scaling of delivery, presence of Operator error
foreign body, poor suction condition,
cavitation, leak in heat exchanger, drain
leak, valve jammed
c No Flow 3 Pump failure, delivery vessel Failure of joint, pipe,
overpressurized, gas blockage, presence of valve, trap, bursting
foreign body, scale, sediment, suction vessel disc, relief valve.
empty.
d Reverse Flow 4 Pump failure, pump reversed, delivery vessel
over pressurized, poor isolation, gas locking,
surging, back siphoning.
 Check List Contd
2 Changes in physical a High or Low 1 Boiling, cavitation, freezing, chemical
condition pressure breakdown, flashing, condensation,
sedimentation, scaling, foaming, gas
release, priming, exploding, imploding.
Changes in viscosity, density. External Fire,
Weather conditions, Hammer.
b High or Low 2 same as 1
Temperature
 Check List Contd
3 Changes in chemical a High or Low 1 Changes in proportion of mixture, in water or
condition Conentration solvent content.
b Contaminants 2 Ingress of air, water, steam, fuel, lubricant,
corrosion products, other process materials
from high pressure system, leakage through
heat exchangers. gas entrainment, spray,
mist.

4 Startup and a Testing 1 Vacuum, pressure testing with with harmless

Shutdown Condition. material.
b Commissioning 2 Concentration of reactants, intermediates

c Maintenance 3 Purging, venting, sweetening, drying,

warming. Access, spares.

5 Hazardous Pipelines a Pipeline 1 Should this pipe be considered for

registration registration?
 End of HAZOP Presentation.
Presented to ES-317y
27 Feb, 2001
By R.A. Hawrelak