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MSC Napoli

DNV findings and conclusions

Olav Nortun, Technical Director


22 April 2008
Content of the presentation
 DNV’s conclusion
- Why the MSC Napoli broke its back
- The DNV investigation
- Consequences

 A brief history of the MSC Napoli


 DNV analyses reproduced the event in a
computer model
 Consequences and recommendations

Photo: BBC

© Det Norske Veritas AS. All rights reserved 11 January 2018 Slide 2
Why the MSC Napoli broke its back

 Harsh weather and wave


loading
- Wave heights of 7- 9 meters
- Steep waves

 Loading condition (containers,


ballast, fuel etc.)
- Stillwater loading condition
98% utilisation

Ship “frozen” in waves during a moment of time resulting in


high hull girder hogging loads
(This will be explained later)

© Det Norske Veritas AS. All rights reserved 11 January 2018 Slide 3
Why the MSC Napoli broke its back

 Structural integrity
- It was not a “rust bucket”
- Margins insufficient in one particular
area
- High wave load necessary for the
total load to exceed the capacity limit
- Whipping effects may also have
contributed to the total load

 Not strong enough


- Hull girder loading exceeded the
structural capacity
- Ship’s strength not satisfactory

© Det Norske Veritas AS. All rights reserved 11 January 2018 Slide 4
The DNV investigation

 Used three different models


 Direct wave load calculations
 Linear strength analysis
 Non-linear strength analysis
 Load and strength comparisons

© Det Norske Veritas AS. All rights reserved 11 January 2018 Slide 5
Consequences for container ships

 Ships in operation:
- Screening of container ships larger
than 2.500 TEU

 Newbuildings:
- Unified IACS rules to be considered

(More details to follow)

© Det Norske Veritas AS. All rights reserved 11 January 2018 Slide 6
Facts about MSC Napoli

 One of the world’s largest container


ships when built (1991)
 Built to BV Class and changed to
DNV 2002
 Last renewal survey carried out in
2004 in Singapore
 Built 1991
 Length over all 275.66 m
 Breadth 37.13 m
 Draught 13.50 m
 Gross tonnage 53,409 GRT
 Capacity 4419 TEU
© Det Norske Veritas AS. All rights reserved 11 January 2018 Slide 7
Accident January 2007
 Ship left Antwerp 17 January
2007 heading for Sines in
Portugal
 18 January - water ingress in
engine room reported
 All 26 crew members safely
rescued
 Ship beached in Lyme Bay near
Branscombe, UK on 19 January
2007

Photo: gCaptain.com

© Det Norske Veritas AS. All rights reserved 11 January 2018 Slide 8
Beached

© Det Norske Veritas AS. All rights reserved 11 January 2018 Slide 9
Removal of containers

© Det Norske Veritas AS. All rights reserved 11 January 2018 Slide 10
Present status
 The vessels was split into two in
July 2007
 Forward part was towed to Belfast
for recycling
 Aft part is still beached

© Det Norske Veritas AS. All rights reserved 11 January 2018 Slide 11
Reproducing the event in a computer model

 Wave load analysis


 Strength analysis
 Simulation of crack propagation

© Det Norske Veritas AS. All rights reserved 11 January 2018 Slide 12
Most severe wave for engine room area

Hull forces: Shear force and moment


Aft ship out of water

Wave crest around midship

Vertical ”g” force

Ship “frozen” in waves during a moment of time resulting in high


hull girder hogging loads

© Det Norske Veritas AS. All rights reserved 11 January 2018 Slide 13
Four stages of progressive collapse
Outer shell

© Det Norske Veritas AS. All rights reserved 11 January 2018 Slide 14
Four stages of progressive collapse
Inner structure

© Det Norske Veritas AS. All rights reserved 11 January 2018 Slide 15
Real life versus computer simulations

Real life (at sea picture) FE computer model (Non-linear ABAQUS)

© Det Norske Veritas AS. All rights reserved 11 January 2018 Slide 16
Identified possible critical ship designs
 The buckling capacity might not have
been checked sufficiently when the
ship was built
 Potentially insufficient buckling
strength in the engine room bulkhead
 A screening procedure developed by
DNV to check in service fleet
- Ship size 2500 TEU and over
- Distributed to all class societies
through the MAIB

 2 DNV ships identified to be at risk


 None of these were designed to DNV
rules

Photo: gCaptain.com

© Det Norske Veritas AS. All rights reserved 11 January 2018 Slide 17
Alternative correcting actions

 Increase buckling strength


- Minor modifications – small amount of
steel to be added
- Aft of the engine room bulkhead
- Can be done while in service

 Reduce the allowed loading limit

© Det Norske Veritas AS. All rights reserved 11 January 2018 Slide 18
Recommendation regarding newbuildings
 DNV will initiate an assessment
by all IACS members of their
newbuilding rules
 Focus on requirements
governing the longitudinal
strength of container ships
 IACS is invited to take a
coordinated and unified
approach

© Det Norske Veritas AS. All rights reserved 11 January 2018 Slide 19
Will it happen again?
 The likelihood of reoccurrence is very
low:
- Damage statistics are very good
- Little likelihood of such a harsh sea
state
- The ship’s strength was below the
strength of similar ships
- Maybe not all ships checked in this
area
- However – the consequences are
major

© Det Norske Veritas AS. All rights reserved 11 January 2018 Slide 20
© Det Norske Veritas AS. All rights reserved 11 January 2018 Slide 21