Ronquillo – If we correctly identified those factors that are statistically relevant to the event-to-be-explained, we have completed the bottom tier of our explanatory structure. – A completed S-R basis-one that incorporates all statistically relevant factor – is, of course, something we rarely possess; it is idealization. Nevertheless… it is philosophically important to have an adequate account of the ideal statistical basis. – The next step is to provide causal accounts of the statistical relevance relations involved in the S-R basis. – There is no presumption that the causal relations can be “read off” in any automatic or routine fashion. We must formulate causal hypothesis and apply standard scientific procedures to test them. – According to the causal/mechanical approach I have been advocating, there are fundamental sorts of causal mechanisms that figure crucially in providing scientific explanations of statistical relevance relations. – Given statistical relevance relation between events of type A and events of type B, there may be a direct causal connection. – Causal connections are causal processes. In the case of a direct causal connection, there must be a causal process connecting any given event A with the corresponding event B; the causal influence may be transmitted form A, to B, or it may go in the opposite direction. – If the statistical relevance relation between A and B that we are trying to explain does not arise out of a direct relation, we search for an indirect causal relation that obtains an account of a common cause. – Salmon means at the end of this reading by the epistemic conception and the ontic conception of explanations as arguments, like the Hempel and Oppenheim model, such that what we make an inference to the explanadum based on the explanans, whereas in Salmon’s, ontic conception, explanation is treated as referring to and even exhibiting causal connections in the world. PRAGMATIC MODEL – Why would anyone seriously suggest that (1) we could explain the height of a flagpole by the length of its shadow, an (2) we could even claim that the length of the shadow causes, or at least is part of the cause, of the height of the flag pole? Like this little scenario: Remember my nephew terry, from the introductory chapter, the one I wanted to drown so I could get an inheritance? Well, suppose that Terry got wind of my dastardly designs and decided to bury his pot of gold somewhere. – He decided to bury it in a secret spot, but he did not want to leave any sort of map or massage anywhere, in case I might find some written record. So, he found a secret spot on the ground, made some calculations, and then built a flagpole so that the very tip of the flagpole’s shadow touched that secret spot at exactly high noon on summer solstice. In other words, what mattered to him was that the shadow end right at the exact spot where the treasure buried. Give that spot, he then built a flagpole to be exactly on the ground where it would reveal the treasure. – So, given his goal of hiding and later being able to find his treasure, he built the flagpole a specific height because he wanted its shadow to end up at exactly that spot. In other words, we would explain the height of the flagpole on the basis of the length of its shadow. – This is part of the pragmatic model explanation, namely, that purpose or goal or context, is an inherent part of any explanation. – This model is most often associated with Bas van Fraasen. In laying out a pragmatic model, he sees explanation as a relation of three parts: theory, fact and context. Explanations, he says, are answers to why-questions and why-questions consist of three elements: a topic of concern, a contrast class, and a relevance relation. The Scientific Image Bas van Fraasen A Model for Explanation I shall propose a new theory of explanation. An explanation is not the same proposition, or an argument, or list of propositions; it is an answer. An explanation is an answer to a why-question. So, a theory of explanation must be a theory of why- questions. A Theory of Why-questions – There are several respects in which why-questions introduce genuinely new elements into the theory of questions. Let us focus first on the determination of exactly what question is asked, that is, the contextual specification of factors needed to understand why- interrogative. – After that is done and as an independent enterprise, we must turn to the evaluation of those answers as good or better. This evaluation proceeds with reference to the part of science accepted as “background theory” in that context. – As example, consider the question “Why is this conductor warped?” The questioner implies that the conductor is warped, and is asking for a reason. Let us call the proposition that the conductor is warped the topic of the question. – Next, this question has a contrast-class, as we saw, that is a set of propositions which includes the topic. For this particular interrogative, the contrast could be that it is this conductor rather than that one, or that the conductor has warped rather than retained its shaped.