Beruflich Dokumente
Kultur Dokumente
Decisions
"Even those who like algorithms have remarkably little appreciation of the
algorithmic thinking that
thoroughgoing is required for a
constructive proof. This is illustrated by the nonconstructive nature of
many proofs in books on numerical analysis, the theoretical study of practical
numerical algorithms. I would guess that most realist mathematicians are unable
even to recognize when a proof is constructive in the intuitionist's sense.
It is a lot harder than one might think to recognize when a theorem depends
on a nonconstructive argument. One reason is that proofs are rarely self-
contained, but depend on other theorems whose proofs depend on still other
theorems. These other theorems have often been internalized to such an extent that
we are not aware whether or not nonconstructive arguments have been used, or
must be used, in their proofs. Another reason is that the law of excluded
middle [LEM] is so ingrained in our thinking that we do not distinguish
between different formulations of a theorem that are trivially equivalent given
LEM, although one formulation may have a constructive proof and the other not.”
Richman, Fred (1990), Intuitionism As Generalization, Philosophia Mathematica, Vol.5, pp.124-128.
Throwing out Error [ = Set Theory! ]
"I often hear mention of what must be `thrown out' if one insists that
mathematics needs to be algorithmic. What if one is throwing out
error? Wouldn't that be a good thing rather than the bad thing the
verb `to throw out' insinuates? I personally am not prepared to argue
that what is being thrown out is error, but I think one can make a
very good case that a good deal of confusion and lack of clarity are
being thrown out. .....
How can anyone who is experienced in serious computation
consider it important to conceive of the set of all real numbers as a
mathematical `object' that can in some way be `constructed' using
pure logic? .... Let us agree with Kronecker that it is best to express
our mathematics in a way that is as free as possible from
philosophical concepts. We might in the end find ourselves agreeing
with him about set theory. It is unnecessary.”
Harold Edwards: Kronecker's Algorithmic Mathematics, The Mathematical Intelligencer, Vol. 31, Number 2,
Spring, p. 14; bold emphases added.
Mathematics is Algorithmic
In mathematics everything is algorithm and nothing is
meaning; even when it doesn't look like that because
we seem to be using words to talk about mathematical
things. Even these words are used to construct an
algorithm.
Wittgenstein, Ludwig (1974), Philosophical Grammar, Basil Blackwell, Oxford, p. 468.
It is in this context that one must recall Brouwer's famous first act of intuitionism, with its uncompromising
requirement for constructive mathematics -- which is intrinsically algorithmic -- to be independent of `theoretical
logic' and to be 'languageless':
The three most important classes of decision problems that almost characterise
the subject of computational complexity theory, underpinned by a model of
computation, are the P, NP and NP-Complete classes.
Concisely, but not quite precisely, they can be described as follows:
i. P defines the class of computable problems that are solvable
in time bounded by a polynomial function of the size of the
input;
ii. NP is the class of computable problems for which a solution
can be verified in polynomial time;
iii. A computable problem lies in the class called NP-Complete if
every problem that is in NP can be reduced to it in polynomial
time.
Why are these ‘definitions’ imprecise?
Because ‘Solvable’, ‘verifiable’ and ‘reduced’ need to be
made precise in terms of allowable methods!
Computability vs. Constructivity
In his fascinating and, indeed, provocative and challenging chapter, titled What
is Bounded Rationality (cf: Gigerenzer, Gerd & Reinhard Selten (2001; editors),
Bounded Rationality: The Adaptive Toolbox, The MIT Press, Cambridge,
Massachusetts., chapter 2, p.35), Reinhard Selten first wonders what bounded
rationality is,a nd then goes on to state that an answer to the question `cannot
be given' now:
"What is bounded rationality? A complete answer to this
question cannot be given at the present state of the art.
However, empirical findings put limits to the concept and
indicate in which direction further inquiry should go."
In a definitive sense - entirely consistent with the computational underpinnings
Simon always sought - I try to give a `complete answer' to Selten's finessed
question. I go further and would like to claim that the `limits to the concept'
derived from current `empirical findings' cannot point the direction Simon
would have endorsed for `further inquiry' to go - simply because current
frameworks are devoid of the computable underpinnings that were the
hallmark of Simon's behavioural economics.
Paradoxes of Computation Universality