Beruflich Dokumente
Kultur Dokumente
Liaison Officers
09/19/07
Provide safe and
secure ground and air
transportation of
nuclear weapons,
nuclear components,
and special nuclear
materials and conduct
other missions
supporting the
national security
of the United States
of America.
NA-15
Assistant Deputy Administrator
NA-15 Principal Deputy ADA NA-153
Program Office Attorney Program Office
for Research and Analysis for Independent Oversight
Federal Agents
Executive Officer
Fleet NA-15
Program Office
Aviation
NA-15
Senior Technical
NA-15
Headquarters
NA-15
Planning and
Safety Advisor Liaison Office Programs Office
Management
Operations
(PPO)
Communications NA-151
Office of Mission
Operations
NA-154
Office of Training
and Logistics Command
NA-152
Office of Support
Emergency NA-154
NA-154
Logistics and
Management
Training Property
Support Management
Program Program
NA-152.2
NA-151.1 NA-151.2 NA-151.3 NA-151.4 NA-154.1 NA-152.1 Safety, NA-152.3
Agent Agent Agent Operation Training & Resources & Security & Engineering
Operation Operation Operation s Division Tactical Doctrine Business Emergency Systems &
s Western s Central s Eastern (OD) Command Management Management Technology
Command Command Command (TTDC) Division Division Division
(AOWC) (AOCC) (AOEC) (RBMD) (SSEMD) (ESTD)
Professionalism
We conduct ourselves and our operations with the
highest standards of professionalism and integrity.
Quality
We are committed to maintaining OST as a transportation
and security center of excellence. We employ quality principles
in the execution and management of our operations.
Stewardship
We strive to effectively utilize the resources
of the Department of Energy and thus, the taxpayer,
in accomplishing our mission and goals.
OST’s Commitment to
Transportation Safety
and Security
Over three decades of safe,
secure transport of nuclear
weapons and special nuclear
material to and from military
locations
Over 110 million miles traveled
Over three decades and 200,000
flight hours of accident-free flying
Federal Agent Facility
Western Command
Albuquerque,
New Mexico
Central Command
Amarillo,
Texas
Eastern Command
Oak Ridge,
Tennessee
Armored Tractors
Highly modified Peterbilts
Communications and tracking
Ballistic protection
Ergonomic features
OST Policy: 32-hour rule
Definition:
An area established within the United
States and used for safeguarding
classified, sensitive, and/or restricted
data to protect DOE equipment
and/or material
Criteria for an NSA:
Terrorist attack
Theft or loss of Category I or II
(special nuclear material) or weapons
Goals:
Promote the common defense and
national security of the United States
Emphasize the protection of health
Minimize the danger to life, property,
and the environment
The OST convoy commander
or designee maintains custody
of the NNSA material
Implement the incident
command system
Establish a unified command
post with the responding LEA
and emergency management
organizations
Notify local authorities of
potential cargo hazards
and protective action
recommendations
Emergency Management Program
Albuquerque, NM
TECC
Initiate emergency response
Nuclear weapons emergency hotline
Emergency notification recall
system (communicator)
Makes initial notification to DOE HQ
EOC
Stays activated for duration of incident to
provide monitoring and assistance for
DOE and OST assets
Provides monitoring and technical
assistance for responding agencies
Coordinates for the response of additional
assets (federal, state, and local)
Federal Radiological
Monitoring and Assessment
Aerial Measuring Center (FRMAC) Nuclear
System (AMS) Emergency
Search Team
National (NEST)
Atmospheric
Release Advisory
Capability (NARAC)
Radiological
Assistance
Program (RAP)
Accident
Response Radiation Emergency
Assistance Center (REAC)
Group (ARG) OST INCIDENT
Emergency Response Assets
Radiological Assistance Program (RAP)
Responds to offsite radiological incidents
Accident Response Group (ARG)
Responds to nuclear weapon incidents/accidents worldwide
What trends, patterns, tactics, or characteristics of organizational structure forecast the intent and
capability to (1) Steal Threat Level 1 Materials, (2) Conduct Nuclear Sabotage, or (3) Cause
Psychological or Economic harm to the United States?
What domestic or international diplomatic, political, security dynamics will increase the safety and
security threat to OST or require decisions impacting the continuity of OST operations?
What environmental or physical factors threaten the safety and security of Threat Level 1 shipments or
provide an advantage to the adversary?
PORA Contacts:
Ruben Romero (505) 845-4408
Rob Ange (505) 845-4236
Questions?