Texas City, TX

Amanda Engler
 Texas City, Texas
• “Explosions and
tragedy a way of life
in Texas city “

• BP oil refinery in
Texas City

• March 24, 2005 was it

preventable?
 April 16, 1947
• The port of opportunity
– Thriving community
– Chemical plants and refineries provided good jobs
• The Grandcamp was at the port loaded with
– oil-field machinery
– drill stems
– Peanuts
– sisal twine
– small-arms ammunition
– ammonium nitrate fertilizer
 The fire
• The ship caught on fire shortly after 8:00
AM
– The smoke was a peach color
– Many people from the town came to watch
• 8:45 AM the fire department came
– Ship hatch had blown off
– Fire was too hot to put out with water
• The fire could not be controlled
 9:12 AM the ship exploded

• Heard from 150 miles away

• The sky appeared as if it was on fire
• Mushroom cloud rose 2,000 feet
• A tidal wave swept people away
• Heavy debris flew thousands of feet
• 1.5 ton anchor flew 2 miles
• Secondary explosions were ignited
The explosion
The Grandcamp's propeller shaft
Tidal wave damage
Secondary explosion at a refinery
 The High Flyer
• In the port that day for repair
• Loaded with fertilizer
• Damaged by the first explosion
• Tried to move the ship away from shore
• Flames were spotted
• The alarm was sounded
• Exploded at 1:00 AM
• More secondary explosions
 The aftermath

• Death toll 576 people

• 5,000 injured
– Broken bones
– Lost limbs
• Thousands of homes destroyed
• Local churches and businesses gone
• Area refineries destroyed
 The recovery
• People opened their homes to those
who’s had been destroyed.
• Many major industries pledged to
rebuild
• Received $1 million in relief funds
• Received $4 million in insurance
payments
• Sunday, June 22, 1947, a day of
closure
 Industry changes

• Improved disaster preparedness

• Ports evaluated their safety procedures

• Community Awareness Response in

Emergencies (CARE)
 BP oil refinery Texas City
• Constructed in 1934
• BP’s largest refinery at 1,200 acres

• Third largest in the nation

• 1,600 employees

• World’s most complex refinery

 A history of accidents
• October 1988 fire halted operations in the
isomerization unit
• April 6, 1992 leak of flammable liquids explodes
severely burning an employee, he died 15 days
later
• July, 1995 another explosion, no one injured
• April 19, 1999, 50 pounds of hydrogen ignited,
worker suffered second degree burns
 History continued
• August 2000, fire in cooker unit, 20 people
escaped without injury
• March 30, 2004, explosion and fire, no one
injured, OSHA found 14 safety violations
• Sept. 2, 2004, three men exposed to
superheated steam, two died
• March 23, 2005, explosion in isomerization unit
kills 15, over 100 injured
March 23, 2005
 Where it happened?

• Isomerization Unit
– Converts low octane
feeds to higher octane
components
– Feed octane is
between 67-70
– Product octane is
between 83-85
 The isomerization unit
Sulfur
Nitrogen

Light
raffinate Final
Product

Hydrotreater Isomerization Vapor

Nonaromatic Recovery Unit
Reactor
stream
Raffinate
Splitter

Heavy
raffinate
 What happened?
• Unit was shutdown
• Explosion happened during the restart
• Vapor and liquids shot out of a ventilation
stack
• Truck may have provided the spark for the
explosion
• Explosion was felt in buildings up to 5
miles away
 Was it preventable? A closer look
• The vent stack
– Used as pressure relieve from fluids and gas buildup in the
isomerization unit
– The industry norm is to use a flare for this
• The American Petroleum Institute says that vent stacks
are old technology and are slowly being phased out
• 1992 OSHA citing
– The equipment at the center of the blast “allowed toxic gases to
vent to the atmosphere ... thus exposing employees to
flammable or toxic gases."
– OSHA recommended that the unit should be reconfigured so the
vapors went to a flare or air monitors should be installed on the
unit
Could the death toll have been less severe? Trailer
placement
• 11 of 15 were in a portable trailer 100 to 150
feet from vent stack
– "People who were injured or suffered fatalities had
nothing to do with that unit," said Charles Ramirez, a
safety representative for contractor JE Merit.
– Other industry leaders place trailers as far away from
equipment as possible
– “BP's own 2001 internal form for siting trailers - a 31-
point checklist - set a threshold of 350 feet between
trailers and refining units or else a special risk
analysis must be performed. “
• Two blast-proof control rooms at the site
seemed to have suffered minimal damage
What can we take away from
this tragedy?
Questions/Comments
 References
• “The Explosion 50 years later, Texas City still remembers,”
http://www.chron.com/content/chronicle/metropolitan/txcity/phoenix.html
• “Investigation Into Plant Explosion That Killed 15 Under Way,” US News
March 24, 2005.
• “FBI rules out terrorism in plant explosion,” US News, March 25, 2005.
• Fiegel, Eric, “Death toll in refinery blast rises to 15,” US News, March 24,
2005.
• Moran, Kevin,” 15th body pulled from refinery rubble,” Houston Chronicle,
2005.
• “BP EXPLOSION; LOCATION OF TRAILER DIDN'T MEET GUIDELINES;
Mobile office at refinery was too close to stack,“ Houston Chronicle, April
10, 2005.
• “THE BP EXPLOSION; Refineries under stricter rules overseas; Laws in the
U.S. do much less to protect workers than those in Great Britain ,“Houston
Chronicle, April 5, 2005.
• “Idling engine may have set off BP explosion; Witnesses claim the driver
tried to turn off the truck during vapor vent,” Houston Chronicle, April 1,
2005.
• “Ignition, hydrocarbon release likely explosion cause,” The Associated Press
State & Local Wire , March 30, 2005.
• “Volatile liquid distilling device may be cause of refinery blast,” Houston
Chronicle, March 27, 2005.
 References Continued
• “Two-inch error killed two BP workers in 2004, report shows,” The
Associated Press State & Local Wire, March 26, 2005.
• “Explosions and tragedy a way of life in Texas city,” The Associated
Press State & Local Wire, March 24, 2005.
• “Facility has costly history; Past incidents have cost owners millions in OSHA
fines and lawsuit settlements,” The Houston Chronicle, March 24, 2005.
• “OSHA faulted BP for unrepaired Texas City chemical leak,” The Associated
Press State & Local Wire, April 13, 2005.
• “Probe is closing in on BP blast's cause; The refinery's computer records are
being analyzed,” The Houston Chronicle, April 14, 2005.
• “Other accidents happened at Texas City refinery unit,” The Associated
Press State & Local Wire, April 11, 2005.
• “Fatal industrial accidents in Texas,” The Associated Press State & Local
Wire, March 23, 2005.
• “Texas City, Texas, Gasoline Refinery Returns to 'Near Normal' after Blaze”
The Houston Chronicle, April 1, 2004.
• “OSHA issued warning about dangerous ventilation stack in 1992,”
The Houston Chronicle, April 8, 2004.