WORD MEANINGS AND

CONCEPTS
Starting point: Meaning is conceptual in nature
linguistic forms (phonological and syntactic): connected with conceptual
structures, not with the outside world.
 The importance of concepts
Concepts :
absolutely vital to the efficient functioning of complex organisms like
human beings.
organized bundles of stored knowledge representing an articulation of
events, entities, situations, and so on in our experience.
If we were not able to assign aspects of our experience to stable
categories, it would remain disorganized chaos.
We would not be able to learn from it because each experience would
be unique, and would not happen to us again. It is only because we can
put elements of experience into categories, that we can recognize them
as having happened before, and we can remember our previous
reactions to their occurrence, and whether they were successful or not.
Furthermore, shared categories are a prerequisite to communication.
Concept: horse
Word-concept mapping
Concepts are linked together in a complex multi-
dimensional network (see Fig. 7.1).
The links are of specific types (e.g. is a kind of, is a part
of, is used for, etc.) and are of variable strength.
Each full lexical item directly activates a concept and
indirectly activates linked concepts according to the
strength of the link.
There is no direct link between, for instance, the word
horse and the concept ANIMAL: the word horse has a
direct link only with the concept HORSE.
The mapping between words and concepts may be any of the following:
(i) one-to-one:
in this arrangement, a word gives access to a single concept;

syzygy — SYZYGY
 (iv) a many-to-many mapping is also possible, but it arises from a
combinationof (ii) and (iii) above.
The three words/expressions which map on to DIE in (iii)
above are not identical in meaning.
Since they all map on to the same concept, the differences
between them must be a property of the words
themselves, not of the concepts; these may be termed
word-specific properties.
die, horse, cry  activate their associated concepts (DIE,
HORSE, and CRY) in a neutral way
kick the bucket, pass away, nag, steed, blubber, which
modulate the concept by adding emotive or other
features.
From this it follows that the meaning of a word
consists of word-specific properties plus the properties
of the associated concept.
MEANING OF A WORD = PROPERTIES OF THE
CONCEPT + WORD-SPECIFIC PROPERTIES
1. Which of the following are 'plain' words (i.e. words which map onto a
concept without 'modulating' it)?
1. guffaw 1. concept modulation: to laugh loudly, especially at
something stupid (mainly WRITTEN)
2. money 2. Plain word
3. inebriated 3. Modulation having drunk too much alcohol (FORMAL)
4. Plain word
4. tickle 5. Modulation APPROVING (especially of people)
5. slim attractively thin
6. Plain word
6. funny 7. Modulation (lat. uxor = wife): Of persons: Dotingly or
7. uxorious submissively fond of a wife; devotedly attached to a wife.
8. Modulation disappointed and sad because of having
8. Crestfallen failed unexpectedly in something
9. surprised 9. Plain word
10. concept modulation of ‘walk’
10. stroll
11. Modulation DISAPPROVING a teacher who gives too
11. pedagogue much attention to formal rules and is not interesting
12. Plain word
12. doctor
13. Plain word
13. vandal 14. Modulation: baby FORMAL
14. infant 15. Modulation INFORMAL a violin

15. Fiddle
Conceptual structure
Concept  “a person’s idea of what something in the world is like”.
Concepts can relate
to single entities such as the concept I have of my mother or
to a whole set of entities, such as the concept “vegetable”.
This type of concept has structure, in that it includes certain entities
such as carrots, cabbages, lettuce, etc and excludes others such as
apples and pears.
Such concepts divide reality into relevant units are called categories.
Whenever we perceive something, we automatically tend to categorize
it. For example, when we hear a piece of music, we automatically
categorize it as rock or as classical music or as something else.
The world is not some kind of objective reality existing in and for itself but is
always shaped by our categorizing activity, i.e., by our human perception,
knowledge, attitude, in short, by our human experience.

Conceptual categories laid down in a language  linguistic categories, or,

linguistic signs.

LINGUISTIC SIGN = FORM + MEANING (concept)

A meaning or concept relates to some entity in our experienced world.

A more comprehensive view of language as a system of signsmust also include
the human “conceptualizer” and the world as it is experienced by him. The
human conceptualizer, conceptual categories and linguistic signs are
interlinked as shown below
A sign consists of a form and a meaning, which reflects a
conceptual category, which is ultimately based on a human
conceptualizer and his/her experience of the world; the
meaning thus relates to an entity in the experienced world.
This model of the conceptual and linguistic worlds also
accounts for the possibility that different people may
categorize the same thing in the world differently and even
the same person may do so at different times.
One person may describe a half-filled glass of wine as half
full and another person may describe the same thing as
half empty.
A person’s choice between various alternatives of
viewing a thing  construal.
Examples of different construals: Compare the names
for the same object in various languages.
English : horseshoe (i.e. ‘shoe for horse’)
French : fer à cheval ‘iron for horse’,
German: Hufeisen ‘hoof iron’
 English : horseshoe (i.e. ‘shoe for horse’)
French : fer à cheval ‘iron for horse’,
German: Hufeisen ‘hoof iron’

English and French see a

relationship between the German relates the protecting
animal as a whole and the device to the relevant body part
protecting device of the horse.
 English : horseshoe (i.e. ‘shoe for horse’)
French : fer à cheval ‘iron for horse’,
German: Hufeisen ‘hoof iron’

French and German

English by using shoe takes an highlight the material the
anthropocentric view of the scene. protecting device is made
Bosnian/Croatian/Serbian?

potkovica
English grand piano: focuses on the size
French piano à queue ‘tail piano’
German Flügel ‘wing (piano)’
English  focus on the size
French and German: a metaphorical similarity with animal parts is construed.
Bosnian/Croatian/Serbian?
English: pavement  the focus is on the material,
French: trottoir ‘pavement’, derived from trotter ‘to
rush, to trot’ focuses on the function
German Bürgersteig ‘part of the road for civilians’
stresses the people who use it.
Bosnian/Croatian/Serbian?
Translate the following English words into
Bosnian/Croatian/Serbian and find out whether these objects are
seen in the same or the different way in the two languages:
1. washing machine 1. (E: focus on function,
2. brewery washing) – veš
mašina/mašina za
3. mother tongue
rublje-veš (B/C/S: focus
on object of washing)
2. (E: focus on the
production process,
brewing beer) – pivara
(B/C/S: focus on the
final product)
3. maternji jezik (same)
The classical approach to categories
The classical approach to categorization, which goes back at least to Aristotle,
but is still often taken for granted, defines a category in terms of a set of
necessary and sufficient criteria (or conditions, or features) for
membership.
So, for instance, the criteria for some X to qualify for inclusion in the category
GIRL are:
X is human
X is female
X is young
If any of these criteria are not satisfied, then X is not a girl (i.e. the criteria are
individually necessary); if all the criteria are satisfied, then X is a girl (i.e. the
criteria are jointly sufficient). (The above set of criteria can be taken as a
definition of the meaning of girl.)
Classical approach to
categories:
Everything is neatly packed
in boxes (categories)
Categories are strictly
separated
Something is either in one
box or in another
All members of a category
have equal status.
Some problems of the classical approach
1 Lack of plausible analyses
There are many everyday words whose meanings cannot be captured by means of a set
of necessary and sufficient features.

Wittgenstein's famous example is game. He argued that it was impossible to draw up a

list of features possessed by all games which jointly distinguish games from non-
games. One might suggest the following as possible criteria:
(i) involves winning and losing: there are many games which do not involve winning
and losing: party games, such as charades, children's games such as leapfrog and
hopscotch, etc.
(ii) involves more than one person: solitaire is a game for one person.
(iii) has arbitrary rules: again, children's games, such as dressing-up games have no
statable rules.
(iv) done purely for enjoyment: many games are played professionally.
2 Fuzzy boundaries
An Aristotelian definition of a
category implies a sharp, fixed
boundary.

Empirical research on category

structure has shown that the
boundaries of natural categories are
fuzzy and contextually flexible.
Labov (1973) studied subjects' naming of line
drawings illustrating cups, mugs, vases,
bowls, and the like which systematically
varied parameters such as ratio of height to
width, curved or straight sides, presence or
absence of a handle.

Certain items received reliable assignation

to a particular category, while others were
uncertain.
Contextual conditions could alter subjects'
responses, so that, for instance, an
instruction to imagine all the items as
containing rice extended the boundaries of
the BOWL category, while a similar
instruction to imagine coffee as contents
extended the CUP category.
Such results receive no natural explanation
within the classical (Aristotelian) picture.
Internal structure of categories
As far as the classical conception of categories goes, everything that
satisfies the criteria has the same status, that is to say, something is either
in the category, or not in it, and that is all there is to say about the matter.
However, language users have clear intuitions about differences of status of
items within a category: some members are felt to be 'better' examples of
the category than others. For instance, an apple is a better example of a
fruit than is a date, or an olive. In other words, categories have internal
structure: there are central members, less central members, and
borderline cases. No account of these facts can be given using the classical
approach.

The best member, called the prototypical member or most prominent

member of a category, is the subtype that first comes to mind when we
think of that category.
Categorization:
Aristotelian view,
everything is
strictly separated

Traditional view:
Category: bird
Sufficient and necessary
criteria: beak, feathers
All members have equal status
Cognitive linguistic view: members of a category are radially
distributed around the best example  the prototype
When we are asked to draw a picture of a chair, we are most likely to draw a picture
of a kitchen chair and not an armchair. The choice of a prototypical chair also relates
to its functions: It is a type of chair which we sit on, not one we lie on. Also the shape
and the material plays a part. Therefore a prototypical chair has four legs, a seat and
a back so as to be able to sit on it firmly and comfortably. A rocking chair or a swivel
chair is somewhat less prototypical than a kitchen chair. However, all these items are
chairs, so that alongside prototypical members of a category and less prototypical
ones, we also have more peripheral or marginal members such as the armchair or
wheelchair, and even dubious cases such as the highchair.
A stool is definitely not a member of the category of chairs: It lacks most of the
properties of a kitchen chair: It has no back, it does not have four legs, it is higher
than a usual chair and it is usually not made of wood. But the boundaries between a
chair and a stool are far from absolute, and what some people call a stool is a chair
for others. In general we find that the center of a lexical category is firmly
established and clear, while its boundaries are fuzzy and tend to overlap with the
boundaries of other lexical categories.
If lexical categories were not firmly established but ad hoc or haphazard, they
might look like the category of “animals” as jokingly put together in the following
quotation from an imaginary Chinese encyclopaedia:

„On those remote pages it is written that animals are divided into (a) those that
belong to the Emperor, (b) embalmed ones, (c) those that are trained, (d) sucking
pigs, (e) mermaids, (f) fabulous ones, (g) stray dogs, (h) those that are included in
this classification, (i) those that tremble as if they were mad, (j) innumerable ones,
(k) those drawn with a very fine camel’s hair brush, (l) others, (m) those that have
just broken a flower vase, (n) those that resemble flies from the distance.“
(J. L. Borges. 1966. Other Inquisitions. New York:Washington Square Press, p. 108).
This category of “animals” with its imaginary members makes no sense because it
lacks systematicity.We can still imagine that there is some cultural reason for
putting together the members (a), (b) and (c), but we would certainly not expect to
find (d) as a specific member and even less so the remaining imaginary members.