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Adel Dakheel

PII Senior Engineer


Jan. 24-26, 2016

Process Improvement Institute, Inc.


www.piii.com
 Welcome (Marafiq)
 Meeting room logistics
◦ Restrooms
◦ Breaks
 Lunch and prayer breaks
 Meetings 8:00 – 15:30
 Why do a PHA?
 Controlling risk
 How to determine acceptable risk
 How can a PHA help in risk analysis?
 What are the PHA methods?
◦ HAZOP
◦ What If?
◦ Checklist
 PHA Results
 Preventpossible process
incidents/ accidents
 Unsafe acts
◦ Mistakes
 Unintentional
 Intentional
 Unsafe conditions
 Process operated outside of design
parameters

FAILURE OF ALL SAFEGUARDS!


Hazard

Barrier 1

Barrier 2

Barrier 3
Weaknesses
in Barriers

Target
(negative
impact)
 Find
hazardous scenarios not
known
*******Brainstorming****** WHAT CAN
HAPPEN WHEN ALL SAFEGUARDS
FAIL
◦ It’s not just documenting what is known
 Then …. make recommendations
to improve the safety and
reliability of the process
Controlling Risk


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Un
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PHA & JSA
Audits &

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Accident
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Investigations

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Ri
aly

Controlling Risk

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 Management Systems
Design standards, MOC, LOTO, Confined
space entry, preventative maintenance
Understanding Risk

Risk

What can How likely What are


happen or is it to get the impacts?
what can go the stated (also called
wrong? outcome? c onsequence s;
(human, (includes can relate to
proces s, cause s and harm or to
external) protections) money)
How to determine acceptable risk
What Can Go Wrong?

Likelihood of
Likelihood
Occurrence
Safeguards will
X be Successful
Consequences
Amount of
acceptable
Risk

Is Risk Acceptable?
 Process Hazard Analysis
 Identify design weaknesses (scenarios) before
an accident occurs
◦ PHA is similar to an accident investigation but the
PHA team tries to predict accident scenarios before
they happen
 Reduce process risk to tolerable levels
 Meeting notes are recorded
 Recommendations to reduce risk are the most
important results of meeting
◦ Design stage is the most effective time to fix
weaknesses
◦ HAZOP – Hazard and Operability
◦ What If?
◦ Checklist
 Uses deviations from intent to promote
brainstorming
• Using guidewords combined with parameters
• Using guidewords combined with steps

 Continuous mode of operation


◦ Process is running
 Non-continuous mode of operation
◦ Start up, shutdown, on-line maintenance,
sampling, etc.
HAZOP Terminology
Design Intent How the process or task is
expected to perform
Deviation Departure from the design
intent
Cause Reason why the deviation
might occur
Consequence Result (including severity) of
the deviation
Safeguard Reduces the likelihood or
severity of the deviation
Recommendation Suggestions to strengthen or
add layers of protection
No.: __ Description:
PIPE/LINE

Parametric Consequences Causes Safeguards Recommendations


Item

Deviation
__.1 High flow

__.2 Low/no flow

__.3 Reverse
flow

__.4 Misdirected
flow
Guide Word + Process Condition = Parametric
Deviation

Guide Word + Procedure Step = Step Deviation


HAZOP Guide Words and Example Meanings
No (not) Flow stops; Fail to add catalyst
Part of One of three pumps fail off
More High flow; Add too much catalyst
Less Low flow; Add too little catalyst
As well as High conc. of contaminant; Do some
other step as well as this step
Sequence/ Reverse flow; Add catalyst too soon;
Reverse Add reactant X before catalyst
Other than Misdirected flow; Add wrong catalyst
 Personnel Injury
◦ Toxic releases
◦ Fires/explosions
◦ Cryogenic exposure
 Damage to Environment
 Equipment Damage
◦ Fires/explosions
◦ Process upsets
 Production Downtime
◦ Trips
◦ Equipment damage

 NCOI – NO CONSEQUENCE OF INTEREST


 Inherently safe (or safer)
 Prevention of causes
 Detection (or monitoring) of:
◦ causes
◦ deviations
◦ consequences
 Containment of problem/release
 Response/mitigation of consequences

Safeguards can:
 Be IPLs (if 4 criteria are met)

 Support an IPL (but are not counted separately)


 Only make recommendations if risk is not
acceptable
 We are not here to make recommendations
just because we can
 Goals of PHA
 Identifying accident/ loss scenarios
 Understanding process hazards
 Judging risks with help from risk matrix
 Severity
 Frequency or likelihood
 Making recommendations to lower
unacceptable risk before design is
finalized
 A technical review of the design
 Team has to understand design intent
 An analysis of failure of safeguards
 Example: What if high-high level switch doesn’t
shut off inlet valve. This would normally be done
using the Failure Mode and Effects Analysis (FMEA),
for complex systems
 The PHA may identify critical safeguards that
require FMEA at a later date
oTeam member roles
 Attendance and sign in sheet
 Substitution
 Open item list
 Meeting ground rules
 Tentative schedule and pace for 3 days of
meetings

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